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The American Political Science Review

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AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

LOUIS HARTZ
Harvard University

I

"The great advantage of the American," Tocqueville once wrote, "is that he has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution. . . ."[1] Fundamental as this insight is, we have not remembered Tocqueville for it, and the reason is rather difficult to explain. Perhaps it is because, fearing revolution in the present, we like to think of it in the past, and we are reluctant to concede that its romance has been missing from our lives. Perhaps it is because the plain evidence of the American revolution of 1776, especially the evidence of its social impact that our newer historians have collected, has made the comment of Tocqueville seem thoroughly enigmatic. But in the last analysis, of course, the question of its validity is a question of perspective. Tocqueville was writing with the great revolutions of Europe in mind, and from that point of view the outstanding thing about the American effort of 1776 was bound to be, not the freedom to which it led, but the established feudal structure it did not have to destroy. He was writing too, as no French liberal of the nineteenth century could fail to write, with the shattered hopes of the Enlightenment in mind. The American revolution had been one of the greatest of them all, a precedent constantly appealed to in 1793. In the age of Tocqueville there was ground enough for reconsidering the American image that the Jacobins had cherished.

Even in the glorious days of the eighteenth century, when America suddenly became the revolutionary symbol of Western liberalism, it had not been easy to hide the free society with which it started. As a matter of fact, the liberals of Europe had themselves romanticized its social freedom, which put them in a rather odd position; for if Reynal was right in 1772, how could Condorcet be right in 1776? If America was from the beginning a kind of idyllic state of nature, how could it suddenly become a brilliant example of social emancipation? Two consolations were being extracted from a situation which could at best yield only one. But the mood of the Americans themselves, as they watched the excitement of Condorcet seize the Old World, is also very revealing. They did not respond in kind. They did not try to shatter the social structure of Europe in order to usher in a Tenth and Final Epoch in the history of man. Delighted as they were with the support that they received, they remained, with the exception of a few men like Paine and Barlow, curiously untouched by the crusading intensity we find in the French and the Russians at a later time. Warren G. Harding, arguing against the League of Nations, was able to point back at them and say, "Mark you, they were not reforming the world."[2] And James Fenimore Cooper, a keener mind than Harding, generalized their behavior into a comment about America that America is only now beginning to understand: "We are not a nation much addicted to the desire of proselytizing."[3]

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[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, ed. F. Bowen (Boston, 1873), Vol. 2, p. 123.

There were, no doubt, several reasons for this. But clearly one of the most significant is the sense that the Americans had themselves of the liberal history out of which they came. In the midst of the Stamp Act struggle, young John Adams congratulated his colonial ancestors for turning their backs on Europe's class-ridden corporate society, for rejecting the "canon and feudal law."[4] The pervasiveness of Adams' sentiment in American thought has often been discussed, but what is easily overlooked is the subtle way in which it corroded the spirit of the world crusader. For this was a pride of inheritance, not a pride of achievement; and instead of being a message of hope for Europe, it came close to being a damning indictment of it. It saturated the American sense of mission, not with a Christian universalism, but with a curiously Hebraic kind of separatism. The two themes fought one another in the cosmopolitan mind of Jefferson, dividing him between a love of Europe and fear of its "contamination"; but in the case of men like Adams and Gouverneur Morris, the second theme easily triumphed over the first. By the time the crusty Adams had gotten through talking to politicians abroad, he had buried the Enlightenment concept of an oppressed humanity so completely beneath the national concept of a New World that he was ready to predict a great and ultimate struggle between America's youth and Europe's decadence. As for Morris, our official ambassador to France in 1789, he simply inverted the task of the Comintern agent. Instead of urging the French on to duplicate the American experience, he badgered them by pointing out that they could never succeed in doing so. "They want an American constitution," he wrote contemptuously, "without realizing they have no Americans to uphold it."[5]

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[2] *Rededicating America* (Indianapolis, 1920), p. 137.

[3] In J. L. Blau (ed.), *Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy* (New York, 1947), p. 58.

[4] "Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law," in John Adams, *Works*, ed. C. F. Adams (Boston, 1856), Vol. 3, pp. 447–465.

Thus the fact that the Americans did not have to endure a "democratic revolution" deeply conditioned their outlook on people elsewhere who did; and by helping to thwart the crusading spirit in them, it gave to the wild enthusiasms of Europe an appearance not only of analytic error but of unrequited love. Symbols of a world revolution, the Americans were not in truth world revolutionaries. There is no use complaining about the confusions implicit in this position, as Woodrow Wilson used to complain when he said that we had "no business" permitting the French to get the wrong impression about the American revolution. On both sides the reactions that arose were well-nigh inevitable. But one cannot help wondering about something else: the satisfying use to which our folklore has been able to put the incongruity of America's revolutionary role. For if the "contamination" that Jefferson feared, and that found its classic expression in Washington's Farewell Address, has been a part of the American myth, so has the "round the world" significance of the shots that were fired at Concord. We have been able to dream of ourselves as emancipators of the world at the very moment that we have withdrawn from it. We have been able to see ourselves as saviours at the very moment that we have been isolationists. Here, surely, is one of the great American luxuries that the twentieth century has destroyed.

II

When the Americans celebrated the uniqueness of their own society, they were on the track of a personal insight of the profoundest importance. For the nonfeudal world in which they lived shaped every aspect of their social thought: it gave them a frame of mind that cannot be found anywhere else in the eighteenth century, or in the wider history of modern revolutions.[6]

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[5] Quoted in D. Walther, *Gouverneur Morris* (New York and London, 1934), p. 76.

[6] The term "feudal," of course, has a technical reference to the medieval period. What Tocqueville and Adams largely had in mind, and what I refer to here, is the decadent feudalism of the later period—the "corporate" society of Europe, as some historians of the eighteenth century have put it. It has often been noted that the nonexistence of a feudal tradition—save for scattered remnants of which most, to be sure, were abolished by the American revolution—has been the great distinguishing feature of American civilization. But no interpretation of American politics or American political thought has as yet been inspired by this observation. It is obvious that the development of liberalism without feudalism, the development of Locke, as it were, without the antagonism of Filmer

One of the first things it did was to breed a set of revolutionary thinkers in America who were human beings like Otis and Adams rather than secular prophets like Robespierre and Lenin. Despite the European flavor of a Jefferson or a Franklin, the Americans refused to join in the great Enlightenment enterprise of shattering the Christian concept of sin, replacing it with an unlimited humanism, and then emerging with an earthly paradise as glittering as the heavenly one that had been destroyed. The fact that the Americans did not share the crusading spirit of the French and the Russians, as we have seen, is already some sort of confirmation of this, for that spirit was directly related to the "civil religion" of Europe and is quite unthinkable without it. Nor is it hard to see why the liberal good fortune of the Americans should have been at work in the position they held. Europe's brilliant dream of an impending millennium, like the mirage of a thirst-ridden man, was inspired in large part by the agonies it experienced. When men have already inherited the freest society in the world, and are grateful for it, their thinking is bound to be of a solider type. America has been a sober nation, but it has also been a comfortable one, and the two points are by no means unrelated.

Sam Adams, for example, rejects the hope of changing human nature: in a mood of Calvinist gloom, he traces the tyranny of England back to "passions of Men" that are fixed and timeless.[7] But surely it would be unreasonable to congratulate him for this approach without observing that he implicitly confines those passions to the political sphere—the sphere of Parliaments, ministers, and Stampmasters—and thus leaves a social side to man which can be invoked to hold him in check. The problem was a different one for Rousseau and Marx, who started from the view that the corruption of man was complete, as wide as the culture in which he lived, with the result that revolutions became meaningless unless they were based on the hope of changing him. Here, obviously, is a place where the conclusions of political thought breathe a different spirit from the assumptions on which they rest. Behind the shining optimism of Europe, there are a set of anguished grievances; behind the sad resignation of America, a set of implicit satisfactions.

One of these satisfactions, moreover, was crucially important in developing the sober temper of the American revolutionary outlook. It was

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and Maistre, is bound to raise a whole series of peculiar problems. One of the reasons for our failure to examine these problems is undoubtedly to be found in the academic separation of American from European history. Any attempt to follow up the nonfeudal nature of the American experience requires the interchangeable use of American and European data and the formulation of issues that tend to be unfamiliar to the American specialist.

[7] Samuel Adams, *Writings*, ed. F. H. Cushing (New York, 1904–08), Vol. 2, p. 164.

the high degree of religious diversity that prevailed in colonial life. This meant that the revolution would be led in part by fierce Dissenting ministers, and their leadership destroyed the chance for a conflict to arise between the worldly pessimism of Christianity and the worldly ambitions of revolutionary thought. In Europe, especially on the Continent, where reactionary church establishments had made the Christian concept of sin and salvation into an explicit pillar of the *status quo*, liberals were forced to develop a political religion, as Rousseau saw, if only in answer to it. The Americans not only avoided this compulsion; they came close, indeed, to reversing it. Here, above all in New England, the clergy was so militant that it was Tories like Daniel Leonard who were reduced to blasting it as a dangerous "political engine," a situation whose irony John Adams caught when he reminded Leonard that "in all ages and countries" the church is "disposed enough" to be on the side of conservatism.[8] Thus the American liberals, instead of being forced to pull the Christian heaven down to earth, were glad to let it remain where it was. They did not need to make a religion out of the revolution because religion was already revolutionary.

Consider the case of Rev. William Gordon of Roxbury. In 1774, when all of Boston was seething with resentment over the Port Bill, Gordon opened one of his sermons by explicitly reminding his congregation that there were "more important purposes than the fate of kingdoms" or the "civil rights of human nature," to wit, the emancipation of men from the "slavery of sin and Satan" and their preparation "for an eternal blessedness." But the Sons of Liberty did not rise up against him; they accepted his remarks as perfectly reasonable. For instead of trying to drug Bostonians with a religious opiate, Gordon proceeded to urge them to prepare for open war, delivering a blast against the British that the Tories later described as a plea for "sedition, rebellion, carnage, and blood."[9] When Christianity is so explosive, why should even the most ardent revolutionary complain if heaven is beyond his grasp?

Of course, the Gordons and the Mayhews of America were quite unaware that their work had this significance—the indirect significance of keeping political thought down to earth. If anything impressed them in their role as religious figures, it was undoubtedly the crusade they were carrying forward against the "popery" of the Anglican Tories—in other words, what mattered to them was not that they were helping America to avoid the eighteenth century, but that they were helping it to duplicate the seventeenth. However, their achievement on the first count was actually far more important than their achievement on the second. The revolutionary attack on Anglicanism, with its bogy of a Bishop coming to America and its hysterical interpretation of the Quebec Act of 1774, was half trumped up and half obsolete; but the alliance of Christian pessimism with liberal thought had a deep and lasting meaning. Indeed, the very failure of the Americans to become seventeenth-century prophets like the English Presbyterians enhances this point considerably. For when we add to it the fact that they did not become latter-day prophets like the Jacobins and the Marxists, they emerge, if we wish to rank them with the great revolutionaries of modern history, as in a curious sense the most secular of them all.

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[8] John Adams, *Works*, Vol. 4, p. 55.

[9] J. Thornton (ed.), *The Pulpit of the American Revolution* (Boston, 1876), pp. 196–7. The point I am making here about America in contrast to Europe is much the same point that Halevy makes about England in contrast to the Continent. We must not, of course, confuse French and English thought on this score. But the role of nonconformity in discouraging the rise of political religions was actually more marked in America than it was in England.

Perhaps it was this secular quality that Joel Barlow was trying to describe when he declared, in a Fourth of July oration in Boston in 1778, that the "peculiar glory" of the American revolution lay in the fact that "sober reason and reflection have done the work of enthusiasm and performed the miracles of Gods."[10] In any case, there was something fateful about it. For if the messianic spirit does not arise in the course of a country's national revolution, when is it ever going to arise? The post-revolutionary age, as the experience of England, France, and even in some sense Russia shows, is usually spent trying to recuperate from its effects. The fact that the Americans remained politically sober in 1776 was, in other words, a fairly good sign that they were going to remain that way during the modern age which followed; and if we except the religiosity of the Civil War, that is exactly what happened. There have been dreamers enough in American history, a whole procession of "millennial Christians," as George Fitzhugh used to call them; but the central course of our political thought has betrayed an unconquerable pragmatism.

Sir William Ashley, discussing the origins of the "American spirit," once remarked that "as feudalism was not transplanted to the New World, there was no need for the strong arm of a central power to destroy it."[11] This is a simple statement, but, like many of Ashley's simple statements, it contains a neglected truth. For Americans usually assume that their attack on political power in 1776 was determined entirely by the issues of the revolution, when as a matter of fact it was pre-

[10] Quoted in H. Niles (ed.), *Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America* (New York, 1876), p. 56.

[11] *Surveys Historic and Economic* (London and New York, 1900), p. 406.

cisely because of the things they were not revolting against that they were able to carry it through. The action of England inspired the American colonists with a hatred of centralized authority; but had that action been a transplanted American feudalism, rich in the chaos of ages, then they would surely have had to dream of centralizing authority themselves.

They would, in other words, have shared the familiar agony of European liberalism—hating power and loving it too. The liberals of Europe in the eighteenth century wanted, of course, to limit power; but confronted with the heritage of an ancient corporate society, they were forever devising sharp and sovereign instruments that might be used to put it down. Thus while the Americans were attacking Dr. Johnson's theory of sovereignty, one of the most popular liberal doctrines in Europe, cherished alike by Bentham and Voltaire, was the doctrine of the enlightened despot, a kind of political deism in which a single force would rationalize the social world. While the Americans were praising the "illustrious Montesquieu" for his idea of checks and balances, that worthy was under heavy attack in France itself because he compromised the unity of power on which so many liberals relied. Even the English Whigs, men who were by no means believers in monarchical absolutism, found it impossible to go along with their eager young friends across the Atlantic. When the Americans, closing their eyes to 1688, began to lay the axe to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, most of the Whigs fled their company at once.

A philosopher, it is true, might look askance at the theory of power the Americans developed. It was not a model of lucid exposition. The trouble lay with their treatment of sovereignty. Instead of boldly rejecting the concept, as Franklin was once on the verge of doing when he said that it made him "quite sick," they accepted the concept and tried to qualify it out of existence. The result was a chaotic series of forays and retreats in which a sovereign Parliament was limited, first by the distinction between external and internal taxation, then by the distinction between revenue and regulation, and finally by the remarkable contention that colonial legislatures were as sovereign as Parliament was. But there is a limit to how much we can criticize the Americans for shifting their ground. They were obviously feeling their way; and they could hardly be expected to know at the time of the Stamp Act what their position would be at the time of the first Continental Congress. Moreover, if they clung to the concept of sovereignty, they battered it beyond belief, and no one would confuse their version of it with the one advanced by Turgot or even by Blackstone in Europe. The meekness of the American sovereign testifies to the beating he had received. Instead of putting up a fierce and embarrassing battle against the limits of natural law and the separation of powers, as he usually did in the theories of Europe, he accepted those limits with a vast docility.

If we look at what happened to America's famous idea of judicial control when the physiocrats advanced it in France, we will get an insight into this whole matter. Who studies now the theory of legal guardianship with which La Rivière tried to bind down his rational and absolute sovereign? Who indeed remembers it? American students of the judicial power rarely go to Cartesian France to discover a brother of James Otis—and the reason is evident enough. When the physiocrats appealed to the courts, they were caught at once in a vise of criticism: either they were attacked for reviving the feudal idea of the *parlements* or they were blasted as insincere because they had originally advanced a despot to deal with the feudal problem. They had to give the idea up.[12] But in America, where the social questions of France did not exist and the absolutism they engendered was quite unthinkable, the claim of Otis in the Writs of Assistance Case, that laws against reason and the Constitution were "void" and that the "Courts must pass them into disuse," met an entirely different fate.[13] It took root, was carried forward by a series of thinkers, and blossomed ultimately into one of the most remarkable institutions in modern politics.

The question, again, was largely a question of the free society in which the Americans lived. Nor ought we to assume that its impact on their view of political power disappeared when war and domestic upheaval finally came. Of course, there was scattered talk of the need for a "dictator," as Jefferson angrily reported in 1782;[14] and until new assemblies appeared in most places, Committees of Public Safety had authoritarian power. But none of this went deep enough to shape the philosophic mood of the nation. A hero is missing from the revolutionary literature of America. He is the Legislator, the classical giant who almost invariably turns up at revolutionary moments to be given authority to lay the foundations of the free society. He is not missing because the Americans were unfamiliar with images of ancient history, or because they had not read the Harringtons or the Machiavellis and Rousseaus of the modern period. Harrington, as a matter of fact, was one of their favorite writers. The Legislator is missing because, in truth, the Americans had no need for his services. Much as they liked Harrington's republicanism, they did not require a Cromwell, as Harrington thought he did, to erect the foundations for it. Those foundations had already been laid by history.

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[12] Cf. M. Einaudi, *The Physiocratic Doctrine of Judicial Control* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938).

[13] Quoted in John Adams, *Works*, Vol. 2, p. 522.

[14] Thomas Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. P. L. Ford (New York, 1892–99), Vol. 3, p. 231.

The issue of history itself is deeply involved here. On this score, inevitably, the fact that the revolutionaries of 1776 had inherited the freest society in the world shaped their thinking in a most intricate way. It gave them, in the first place, an appearance of outright conservatism. We know, of course, that most liberals of the eighteenth century, from Bentham to Quesnay, were bitter opponents of history, posing a sharp antithesis between nature and tradition. And it is an equally familiar fact that their adversaries, including Burke and Blackstone, sought to break down this antithesis by identifying natural law with the slow evolution of the past. The militant Americans, confronted with these two positions, actually took the second. Until Jefferson raised the banner of independence, and even in many cases after that time, they based their claims on a philosophic synthesis of Anglo-American legal history and the reason of natural law. Blackstone, the very Blackstone whom Bentham so bitterly attacked in the very year 1776, was a rock on which they relied.

The explanation is not hard to find. The past had been good to the Americans, and they knew it. Instead of inspiring them to the fury of Bentham and Voltaire, it often produced a mystical sense of Providential guidance akin to that of Maistre—as when Rev. Samuel West, surveying the growth of America's population, anticipated victory in the revolution because "we have been prospered in a most wonderful manner."[15] The troubles they had with England did not alter this outlook. Even these, as they pointed out again and again, were of recent origin, coming after more than a century of that "salutary neglect" which Burke defended so vigorously. And in a specific sense, of course, the record of English history in the seventeenth century and the record of colonial charters from the time of the Virginia settlement provided excellent ammunition for the battle they were waging in defense of colonial rights. A series of circumstances had conspired to saturate even the revolutionary position of the Americans with the quality of traditionalism—to give them, indeed, the appearance of outraged reactionaries. "This I call an innovation," thundered John Dickinson, in his attack on the Stamp Act, "a most dangerous innovation."[16]

Now here was a frame of mind that would surely have troubled many of the illuminated liberals in Europe, were it not for an ironic fact. America piled on top of this paradox another one of an opposite kind, and thus as it were, by misleading them twice, gave them a deceptive sense of understanding.

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[15] *The Pulpit of the American Revolution*, p. 311.

[16] John Dickinson, *Writings*, ed. P. L. Ford (Philadelphia, 1895), p. 316.

Actually, the form of America's traditionalism was one thing, its content quite another. Colonial history had not been the slow and glacial record of development that Bonald and Maistre loved to talk about. On the contrary, since the first sailing of the *Mayflower*, it had been a story of new beginnings, daring enterprises, and explicitly stated principles—it breathed, in other words, the spirit of Bentham himself. The result was that the traditionalism of the Americans, like a pure freak of logic, often bore amazing marks of anti-historical rationalism. The clearest case of this undoubtedly is to be found in the revolutionary constitutions of 1776, which evoked, as Franklin reported, the "rapture" of European liberals everywhere. In America, of course, the concept of a written constitution, including many of the mechanical devices it embodied, was the end-product of a chain of historical experience that went back to the Mayflower Compact and the Plantation Covenants of the New England towns: it was the essence of political traditionalism.[17] But in Europe just the reverse was true. The concept was the darling of the rationalists—a symbol of the emancipated mind at work.

Thus Condorcet was untroubled. Instead of bemoaning the fact that the Americans were Blackstonian historicists, he proudly welcomed them into the fraternity of the illuminated. American constitutionalism, he said, "had not grown, but was planned"; it "took no force from the weight of centuries but was put together mechanically in a few years." When John Adams read this comment, he spouted two words on the margin of the page: "Fool! Fool!"[18] But surely the judgment was harsh. After all, when Burke clothes himself in the garments of Siéyès, who can blame the loyal rationalist who fraternally grasps his hand? The reactionaries of Europe, moreover, were often no keener in their judgment. They made the same mistake in reverse. Maistre gloomily predicted that the American Constitution would not last because it was created out of the whole cloth of reason.

But how then are we to describe these baffling Americans? Were they rationalists or were they traditionalists? The truth is, they were neither, which is perhaps another way of saying that they were both. For the war between Burke and Bentham on the score of tradition, which made a great deal of sense in a society where men had lived in the shadow of feudal institutions, made comparatively little sense in a society where for years they had been creating new states, planning new settlements, and, as Jefferson said, literally building new lives. In such a society a strange dialectic was fated to appear, which would somehow unite the antagonistic components of the European mind; the past became a continuous future, and the God of the traditionalists sanctioned the very arrogance of the men who defied Him.

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[17] Cf. B. F. Wright, Jr., "The Early History of Written Constitutions in America," in *Essays in History and Political Theory in Honor of Charles Howard McIlwain* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), pp. 344 ff.

[18] Quoted in J. Shapiro, *Condorcet and the Rise of Liberalism* (New York, 1934), p. 223.

This shattering of the time categories of Europe, this Hegelian-like revolution in historic perspective, goes far to explain one of the enduring secrets of the American character: a capacity to combine rock-ribbed traditionalism with high inventiveness, ancestor worship with ardent optimism. Most critics have seized upon one or the other of these aspects of the American mind, finding it impossible to conceive how both can go together. That is why the insight of Gunnar Myrdal is a very distinguished one when he writes: "America is . . . conservative . . . . But the principles conserved are liberal and some, indeed, are radical."[19] Radicalism and conservatism have been twisted entirely out of shape by the liberal flow of American history.

III

What I have been doing here is fairly evident: I have been interpreting the social thought of the American revolution in terms of the social goals *it did not need to achieve*. Given the usual approach, this may seem like a perverse inversion of the reasonable course of things; but in a world where the "canon and feudal law" are missing, how else are we to understand the philosophy of a liberal revolution? The remarkable thing about the "spirit of 1776," as we have seen, is not that it sought emancipation but that it sought it in a sober temper; not that it opposed power but that it opposed it ruthlessly and continuously; not that it looked forward to the future but that it worshipped the past as well. Even these perspectives, however, are only part of the story, misleading in themselves. The "free air" of American life, as John Jay once happily put it, penetrated to deeper levels of the American mind, twisting it in strange ways, producing a set of results fundamental to everything else in American thought. The clue to these results lies in the following fact: the Americans, though models to all the world of the middle class way of life, lacked the passionate middle class consciousness which saturated the liberal thought of Europe.

There was nothing mysterious about this lack. It takes the contemptuous challenge of an aristocratic feudalism to elicit such a consciousness; and when Richard Price glorified the Americans because they were men of the "middle state," men who managed to escape being "savage" without becoming "refined,"[20] he explained implicitly why they themselves would never have it. Franklin, of course, was a great American bourgeois thinker; but it is a commonplace that he had a wider vogue on this score in Paris and London than he did in Philadelphia; and indeed there is some question as to whether the Europeans did not worship him more because he seemed to exemplify Poor Richard than because he had created the philosophy by which Poor Richard lived. The Americans, a kind of national embodiment of the concept of the bourgeoisie, have, as Mr. Brinkmann points out,[21] rarely used that concept in their social thought, and this is an entirely natural state of affairs. Frustration produces the social passion, ease does not. A triumphant middle class, unassailed by the agonies that Beaumarchais described, can take itself for granted. This point, curiously enough, is practically never discussed, though the failure of the American working class to become class conscious has been a theme of endless interest. And yet the relationship between the two suggests itself at once. Marx himself used to say that the bourgeoisie was the great teacher of the proletariat.

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[19] *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), p. 7.

There can, it is true, be quite an argument over whether the challenge of an American aristocracy did not in fact exist in the eighteenth century. One can point to the great estates of New York where the Patroons lived in something resembling feudal splendor. One can point to the society of the South where life was extraordinarily stratified, with slaves at the bottom and a set of genteel planters at the top. One can even point to the glittering social groups that gathered about the royal governors in the North. But after all of this has been said, the American "aristocracy" could not, as Tocqueville pointed out, inspire either the "love" or the "hatred" that surrounded the ancient titled aristocracies of Europe.[22] Indeed, in America it was actually the "aristocrats" who were frustrated, not the members of the middle class, for they were forced almost everywhere, even in George Washington's Virginia, to rely for survival upon shrewd activity in the capitalist race. This compulsion produced a psychic split that has always tormented the American "aristocracy"; and even when wealth was taken for granted, there was still, especially in the North, the withering impact of a colonial "character" that Sombart himself once described as classically bourgeois.[23] In Massachusetts Governor Hutchinson used to lament that a "gentleman" did not meet even with "common civility" from his inferiors.[24] Of course, the radicals of America blasted their betters as "aristocrats," but that this was actually a subtle compliment is betrayed in the quality of the blast itself. Who could confuse the anger of Daniel Shays with the bitterness of Francis Place even in the England of the nineteenth century?

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[20] *Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution* (London, 1785), p. 69.

[21] *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (New York, 1937), Vol. 2, p. 645. By the same logic, we have never had a "Liberal Party" in the United States.

[22] *Democracy in America*, Vol. 1, p. 58.

[23] W. Sombart, *Quintessence of Capitalism* (London, 1915), p. 306.

Thus it happened that fundamental aspects of Europe's bourgeois code of political thought met an ironic fate in the most bourgeois country in the world. They were not so much rejected as they were ignored, treated indifferently, because the need for their passionate affirmation did not exist. Physiocratic economics is an important case in point. Where economic parasites are few, why should men embark on a passionate search for the productive laborer? Where guild restrictions are comparatively slight and continental tariffs unknown, why should they embrace the ruthless atomism of Turgot? America's attack on the English Acts of Trade was couched in terms of Locke, not in terms of Quesnay; and though Franklin and Jefferson were much taken by the "modern economics," they did not, here as in certain other places, voice the dominant preoccupation of American thought. It had often been said, of course, that the Americans were passionately "laissez faire" in their thinking, but this is to confuse either bourgeois ease with bourgeois frustration or a hatred of absolute power with the very economic atomism which, in physiocratic terms, was allied to it. Turgot himself saw that the Americans did not long to smash a feudal world into economic atoms any more than they longed for a unified sovereign to accomplish this feat. A lover of the Americans who, like most European liberals, could not quite imagine life outside the *ancien regime*, he complained bitterly on both counts. His complaint on the count of sovereignty is legendary, but his complaint on the count of laissez faire has, alas, been entirely forgotten. This is because John Adams replied to the one in his *Defence of the Constitutions* but did not mention the other. And yet it appears in the same place, in Turgot's famous letter to Richard Price: *On suppose partout le droit de regler le commerce . . . tant on est loin d'avoir senti que la loi de la liberté entière de tout commerce est un corrollaire du droit de proprieté.*[25]

The lament of Turgot reveals that America's indifference to the bourgeois fixations of Europe had in itself a positive meaning: the failure to develop a physiocratic conscience led to a quiet and pragmatic outlook on the question of business controls. This is the outlook that characterizes a whole mass of early economic legislation that American historians are now beginning to unearth in what should have been, reputedly, the most "laissez faire" country in the world.[26] But it is in connection with materialism and idealism, utilitarianism and natural law, that the inverted position of the Americans comes out most clearly. There was no Bentham, no Helvetius among the superlatively middle-class American thinkers. On the contrary, they stuck with Puritan passion to the dogma of natural law, as if an outright hedonism were far too crass for consideration. In a purely political sense this may be interesting, for the Americans, at least during the Stamp Act phase of their struggle, were fighting that corrupt system of parliamentary representation which in England Benthamism later rose to assail. But it is in terms of the wider significance of utility as an attack on feudal norms, as an effort to make of "business a noble life," as Crane Brinton has put it,[27] that America's indifference to it takes on its deepest meaning. Benjamin Franklins in fact, the Americans did not have to become Jeremy Benthams in theory. Unchallenged men of business, they did not have to equate morality with it. And this has been a lasting paradox in the history of American thought. The American tradition of natural law still flourishes after a century and a half of the most reckless material exploitation that the modern world has seen. A persistent idealism of mind, reflected in Emerson's remark that utilitarianism is a "stinking philosophy," has been one of the luxuries of a middle class that has never been forced to become class conscious.

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[24] Quoted in V. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought* (New York, 1927–30), Vol. 1, p. 200.

[25] The letter, dated 1778, is printed in Price's *Observations*, p. 95. For a general discussion of the problem, see O. and M. Handlin, *Commonwealth: Massachusetts* (New York, 1947), and L. Hartz, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).

But this is not all. If the position of the colonial Americans saved them from many of the class obsessions of Europe, it did something else as well: it inspired them with a peculiar sense of community that Europe had never known. For centuries Europe had lived by the spirit of solidarity that Aquinas, Bossuet, and Burke romanticized: an organic sense of structured differences, an essentially Platonic experience. Amid the "free air" of American life, something new appeared: men began to be held together, not by the knowledge that they were different parts of a corporate whole, but by the knowledge that they were similar participants in a uniform way of life—by that "pleasing uniformity of decent competence" which Crèvecoeur loved so much.[28] The Americans themselves were not unaware of this. When Peter Thacher proudly announced that "simplicity of manners" was the mark of the revolutionary colonists,[29] what was he saying if not that the norms of a single class in Europe were enough to sustain virtually a whole society in America? Richard Hildreth, writing after the levelling impact of the Jacksonian revolution had made this point far more obvious, put his finger directly on it. He denounced feudal Europe, where "half a dozen different codes of morals," often in flagrant contradiction with each other, flourished "in the same community," and celebrated the fact that America was producing "one code, one moral standard, by which the actions of all are to be judged. . . ."[30] Hildreth knew that America was a marvellous mixture of many peoples and many regions, but he also knew that it was characterized by something more marvellous even than that: the power of the liberal norm to penetrate them all.

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[26] Some of the finest work on this subject is being done by Professor Carter Goodrich of Columbia. See his recent articles in the *Political Science Quarterly*.

[27] *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. 15, p. 199.

[28] M. G. Jean de Crèvecoeur, *Letters from an American Farmer* (London, 1926), p. 40.

Now a sense of community based on a sense of uniformity is a deceptive thing. It looks individualistic, and in part it actually is. It cannot tolerate internal relationships of disparity, and hence can easily inspire the kind of advice that Professor Nettels once imagined a colonial farmer giving his son: "Remember that you are as good as any man—and also that you are no better."[31] But in another sense it is profoundly anti-individualistic, because the common standard is its very essence, and deviations from that standard inspire it with an irrational fright. The man who is as good as his neighbors is in a tough spot when he confronts all of his neighbors combined. Thus William Graham Sumner looked at the other side of Professor Nettels's colonial coin and did not like what he saw: "public opinion" was an "impervious mistress. . . . Mrs. Grundy held powerful sway and Gossip was her prime minister."[32]

Here we have the "tyranny of the majority" that Tocqueville later described in American life; here too we have the deeper paradox out of which it was destined to appear. Freedom in the fullest sense implies both variety and equality; but history, for reasons of its own, chose to separate these two principles, leaving the one with the old society of Burke and giving the other to the new society of Paine. America, as a kind of natural fulfillment of Paine, has been saddled throughout its history with the defect which this fulfillment involves, so that a country like England, in the very midst of its ramshackle class-ridden atmosphere, seems to contain an indefinable germ of liberty, a respect for the privacies of life, that America cannot duplicate. At the bottom of the

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[29] Quoted in *Principles and Acts of the Revolution in America,* cited above (n. 8), p. 46.

[30] *Theory of Politics* (New York, 1854), p. 262.

[31] C. Nettels, *Roots of American Civilization* (New York, 1938), p. 315.

[32] Quoted in A. G. Keller (ed.), *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays* (New Haven, 1914), p. 318.

American experience of freedom, not in antagonism to it but as a constituent element of it, there has always lain the inarticulate premise of conformity, which critics from the time of Cooper to the time of Lewis have sensed and furiously attacked. "Even what is best in America is compulsory," Santayana once wrote, "—the idealism, the zeal, the beautiful happy unison of its great moments."[33] Thus while millions of Europeans have fled to America to discover the freedom of Paine, there have been a few Americans, only a few of course, who have fled to Europe to discover the freedom of Burke. The ironic flaw in American liberalism lies in the fact that we have never had a real conservative tradition.

One thing, we might suppose, would shatter the unprecedented sense of uniform values by which the colonial American was beginning to live: the revolution itself. But remarkably enough, even the revolution did not produce this result; John Adams did not confront Filmer, as Locke did, or Maistre, as the followers of Rousseau did. He confronted the Englishmen of the eighteenth century; and most of these men, insofar as the imperial struggle went, themselves accepted the Lockean assumptions that Adams advanced. Nor did the American Tories, with the fantastic exception of Boucher, who stuck to his thesis that Filmer was still "unrefuted," confront him with a vision of life completely different from his own. Samuel Seabury and Joseph Galloway accepted the Lockean principles, even sympathized with the American case, insisting only that peaceful means be used to advance it. Among their opponents, indeed, there were few who would fundamentally deny the "self-evident" truths the Americans advanced in 1776. The liberals of Europe always had a problem on their hands, which they usually neglected, to be sure, of explaining how principles could be "self-evident" when there were obviously so many people who did not believe them. Circumstance nearly solved this problem for the Americans, giving them, as it were, a national exemption from Hume's attack on natural law—which may be one of the reasons why they almost invariably ignored it. When one's ultimate values are accepted wherever one turns, the absolute language of self-evidence comes easily enough.

This then is the mood of America's absolutism: the sober faith that its norms are self-evident. It is one of the most powerful absolutisms in the world, more powerful even than the messianic spirit of the Continental liberals which, as we saw, the Americans were able to reject. That spirit arose out of contact with an opposing way of life, and its very intensity betrayed an inescapable element of doubt. But the American absolutism, flowing from an honest experience with universality, lacked even the passion that doubt might give. It was so sure of itself that it hardly needed to become articulate, so secure that it could actually support a pragmatism which seemed on the surface to belie it. American pragmatism has always been deceptive because, glacier-like, it has rested on miles of submerged conviction, and the conformitarian ethos which that conviction generates has always been infuriating because it has refused to pay its critics the compliment of an argument. Here is where the joy of a Dewey meets the anguish of a Fenimore Cooper; for if the American deals with concrete cases because he never doubts his general principles, this is also the reason he is able to dismiss his critics with a fine and crushing ease. But this does not mean that America's General Will always lives an easy life. It has its own violent moments—rare, to be sure, but violent enough. These are the familiar American moments of national fright and national hysteria when it suddenly rises to the surface with a vengeance, when civil liberties begin to collapse, and when Cooper is actually in danger of going to jail as a result of the Rousseauian tide. Anyone who watches it then can hardly fail to have a healthy respect for the dynamite which normally lies concealed beneath the free and easy atmosphere of the American liberal community.

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[33] G. Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States* (New York, 1924), p. 210.

When we study national variations in political theory, we are led to semantic considerations of a delicate kind, and it is to these, finally, that we must turn if we wish to get at the basic assumption of American thought. We have to consider the peculiar meaning that American life gave to the words of Locke.

There are two sides to the Lockean argument: a defense of the state that is implicit, and a limitation of the state that is explicit. The first is to be found in Locke's basic social norm, the concept of free individuals in a state of nature. This idea untangled men from the myriad associations of class, church, guild, and place, in terms of which feudal society defined their lives; and by doing so, it automatically gave to the state a much higher rank in relation to them than ever before. The state became the only association that might legitimately coerce them at all. That is why the liberals of France in the eighteenth century were able to substitute the concept of absolutism for Locke's conclusions of limited government and to believe that they were still his disciples in the deepest sense. When Locke came to America, however, a change appeared. Because the basic feudal oppressions of Europe had not taken root, the fundamental social norm of Locke ceased in large part to look like a norm and began, of all things, to look like a sober description of fact. The effect was significant enough. When the Americans moved from that concept to the contractual idea of organizing the state, they were not conscious of having already done anything to fortify the state, but were conscious only that they were about to limit it. One side of Locke became virtually the whole of him. Turgot ceased to be a modification of Locke, and became, as he was for John Adams, the destruction of his very essence.

It was a remarkable thing—this inversion of perspectives that made the social norms of Europe the factual premises of America. History was on a lark, out to tease men, not by shattering their dreams, but by fulfilling them with a sort of satiric accuracy. In America one not only found a society sufficiently fluid to give a touch of meaning to the individualist norms of Locke, but one also found letter-perfect replicas of the very images he used. There was a frontier that was a veritable state of nature. There were agreements, such as the Mayflower Compact, that were veritable social contracts. There were new communities springing up *in vacuis locis*, clear evidence that men were using their Lockean right of emigration, which Jefferson soberly appealed to as "universal" in his defense of colonial land claims in 1774. A purist could argue, of course, that even these phenomena were not enough to make a reality out of the pre-social men that liberalism dreamt of in theory. But surely they came as close to doing so as anything history has ever seen. Locke and Rousseau themselves could not help lapsing into the empirical mood when they looked across the Atlantic. "Thus, in the beginning," Locke once wrote, "all the world was America. . . ."[34]

In such a setting, how could the tremendous, revolutionary social impact that liberalism had in Europe be preserved? The impact was not, of course, missing entirely; for the attack on the vestiges of corporate society in America that began in 1776, the disestablishment of the Anglican church, the abolition of quitrents and primogeniture, the breaking up of the Tory estates, tinged American liberalism with its own peculiar fire.[35] Nor must we therefore assume that the Americans had wider political objectives than the Europeans, since even their new governmental forms were, as Becker once said, little more than the "colonial institutions with the Parliament and king left out."[36] But after these cautions have been taken, the central point is clear. In America the first half of Locke's argument was bound to become less a call to arms than a set of preliminary remarks essential to establishing a final conclusion: that the power of the state must be limited. Observe how it is treated by the Americans in their great debate with England, even by original thinkers like Otis and Wilson. They do not lavish upon it the fascinated inquiry that we find in Rousseau or Priestley. They advance it mechanically, hurry through it, anxious to get on to what is really bothering them: the limits of the British Parliament, the power of taxation. In Europe the idea of social liberty is loaded with dynamite; but in America it becomes, to a remarkable degree, the working base from which argument begins.

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[34] *Second Treatise on Civil Government* (Oxford, 1947), p. 29.

[35] The distinctive nature of these reforms is that they were a fulfillment of the past rather than, as in Europe, a revolt against it. The elimination of feudal vestiges in a society already under the dominion of liberalism is an entirely different matter from the introduction of liberalism in a society still heavily ridden by feudal forms. America's "social revolution" thus is not to be compared with the great social revolutions of Europe. I am reserving this general problem for another discussion.

[36] C. L. Becker, *Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life* (New York, 1945), p. 16.

Here, then, is the master assumption of American political thought, the assumption from which all of the American attitudes discussed in this essay flow: the reality of atomistic social freedom. It is instinctive to the American mind, as in a sense the concept of the polis was instinctive to Platonic Athens or the concept of the church to the mind of the middle ages. Catastrophes have not been able to destroy it, proletariats have refused to give it up, and even our Progressive tradition, in its agonized clinging to a Jeffersonian world, has helped to keep it alive. There has been only one major group of American thinkers who have dared to challenge it frontally: the Fitzhughs and Holmeses of the pre-Civil War South who, identifying slavery with feudalism, tried to follow the path of the European reaction and of Comte. But American life rode roughshod over them—for the "prejudice" of Burke in America was liberal and the positive reality of Locke in America transformed them into the very metaphysicians they assailed. They were soon forgotten, massive victims of the absolute temper of the American mind, shoved off the scene by Horatio Alger, who gave to the Lockean premise a brilliance that lasted until the crash of 1929.[37] And even the crash, though it led to a revision of the premise, did not really shatter it.

It might be appropriate to summarize with a single word, or even with a single sentence, the political outlook that this premise has produced. But where is the word and where is the sentence one might use? American political thought, as we have seen, is a veritable maze of polar contradictions, winding in and out of each other hopelessly: pragmatism and absolutism, historicism and rationalism, optimism and pessimism, materialism and idealism, individualism and conformism. But, after all, the human mind works by polar contradictions; and when we have evolved an interpretation of it which leads cleanly in a single direction, we may be sure that we have missed a lot. The task of the cultural analyst is not to discover simplicity, or even to discover unity, for simplicity and unity do not exist, but to drive a wedge of rationality through the pathetic indecisions of social thought. In the American case that wedge is not hard to find. It is not hidden in an obscure place. We find it in what the West as a whole has always recognized to be the distinctive element in American civilization: its social freedom, its social equality. And yet it is true, for all of our Jeffersonian nationalism, that the interpretation of American political thought has not been built around this idea. On the contrary, instead of interpreting the American revolution in terms of American freedom, we have interpreted it in terms of American oppression, and instead of studying the nineteenth century in terms of American equality, we have studied it in terms of a series of cosmic Beardian and Parringtonian struggles against class exploitation. We have missed what the rest of the world has seen and what we ourselves have seen whenever we have contrasted the New World with the Old. But this is a large issue, which brings us not only to the Progressive historians but to the peculiar subjectivism of the American mind that they reflect, and it is beyond the scope of our discussion here.

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[37] I have sketched the main lines of this interpretation of Southern thought in "The Reactionary Enlightenment: Southern Political Thought before the Civil War," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 5, pp. 31–50 (March, 1952).

IV

The liberals of Europe in 1776 were obviously worshipping a very peculiar hero. If the average American had been suddenly thrust in their midst, he would have been embarrassed by the millennial enthusiasms that many of them had, would have found their talk of classes vastly overdone, and would have reacted to the Enlightenment synthesis of absolutism and liberty as if it were little short of dishonest doubletalk. Bred in a freer world, he had a different set of perspectives, was animated by a different set of passions, and looked forward to different goals. He was, as Crèvecoeur put it, a "new man" in Western politics.

But, someone will ask, where did the liberal heritage of the Americans come from in the first place? Didn't they have to create it? And if they did, were they not at one time or another in much the same position as the Europeans?

These questions drive us back to the ultimate nature of the American experience, and, doing so, confront us with a queer twist in the problem of revolution. No one can deny that conscious purpose went into the making of the colonial world, and that the men of the seventeenth century who fled to America from Europe were keenly aware of the oppressions of European life. But they were revolutionaries with a difference, and the fact of their fleeing is no minor fact: for it is one thing to stay at home and fight the "canon and feudal law," and it is another to leave it far behind. It is one thing to try to establish liberalism in the Old

World, and it is another to establish it in the New. Revolution, to borrow the words of T. S. Eliot, means to murder and create, but the American experience has been projected strangely in the realm of creation alone. The destruction of forests and Indian tribes—heroic, bloody, legendary as it was—cannot be compared with the destruction of a social order to which one belongs oneself. The first experience is wholly external and, being external, can actually be completed; the second experience is an inner struggle as well as an outer struggle, like the slaying of a Freudian father, and goes on in a sense forever.[38] Moreover, even the matter of creation is not in the American case a simple one. The New World, as Lord Baltimore's ill-fated experiment with feudalism in the seventeenth century illustrates, did not merely offer the Americans a virgin ground for the building of a liberal system: it conspired itself to help that system along. The abundance of land in America, as well as the need for a lure to settlers, entered so subtly into the shaping of America's liberal tradition, touched it so completely at every point, that Sumner was actually ready to say, "We have not made America, America has made us."[39]

It is this business of destruction and creation which goes to the heart of the problem. For the point of departure of great revolutionary thought everywhere else in the world has been the effort to build a new society on the ruins of an old society, and this is an experience America has never had. Tocqueville saw the issue clearly, and it is time now to complete the sentence of his with which we began this essay: "The great advantage of the American is that he has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution; *and that he is born free without having to become so.*"

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[38] Note the words of Goethe:

Amerika, du hast es besser
Als unser Kontinent, das Alte
Hast keine verfallene Schloesser
Und keine Basalte.
Dich stoert nicht im Innern
Zu lebendiger Zeit
Unnuetzes Erinnern
Und vergeblicher Streit.

[39] In *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 304. It will be seen that this analysis coincides to some extent with the much debated philosophy of Frederick Jackson Turner. The mistake of Turner was to miss the importance of the liberal ideas that the American settlers brought with them from the Old World and the East; nevertheless he seized upon an important truth when he emphasized the raw environment that they found. That feudalism could be established in Canada does not alter the fact that liberalism could be established much more easily in America because feudalism did not already exist. B. F. Wright, Jr., one of the earliest of the Turner critics, noted the significance of this factor of a new environment. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the abundance of land in America helped to support a system of liberal individualism by giving it a solid economic basis. Turner, in other words, seized upon a half-truth, and the argument over his theory has tended to obscure it. The American liberal community arose out of what must be accounted one of the happiest coincidences of modern history: the interplay between the philosophy of liberalism and an almost actualized state of nature. I am indebted to Mr. Rush Welter for originally suggesting to me that the interpretation of American thought advanced here, based on the nonexistence of a feudal tradition, might serve to confirm in part Turner's famous and controversial insight.

Born free without having to become so: this idea, especially in light of the strange relationship which the revolutionary Americans had with their admirers abroad, raises an obvious question. Can a people that is born free ever understand peoples elsewhere that have to become so? Can it ever lead them? Or to turn the issue around, can peoples struggling for a goal understand those who have inherited it? This is not a problem of antitheses such, for example, as we find in Locke and Filmer. It is a problem of different perspectives on the same ideal. But we must not for that reason assume that it is any less difficult of solution; it may in the end be more difficult, since antitheses define each other and hence can understand each other, but different perspectives on a single value may, ironically enough, lack this common ground of definition. Condorcet might make sense out of Burke's traditionalism, for it was the reverse of his own activism, but what could he say about Otis, who combined both concepts in a synthesis that neither had seen? America's experience of being born free has put it in a strange relationship to the rest of the world.

FOREIGN POLICY: THE REALISM OF IDEALISM

THOMAS I. COOK AND MALCOLM MOOS
The Johns Hopkins University

World politics today is admittedly bipolar, and it seems destined to remain so within the foreseeable future. Beset by its sustained tension, Americans have been led to debate, sometimes acrimoniously, the proper foundations, scope, and content of an effective foreign policy. Since presumably the central theme and central purpose of this debate is the definition of what constitutes the American national interest, the first objective is to define the idea of national interest. Thereafter it is necessary to draw proper deductions relevant to the total world situation, and in turn to apply these deductions as policy to the forces there at work. These forces—political, economic, ideological, and military—in their interconnectedness collectively constitute the raw materials for assessment, judgment, planning, and action in our policy-making.

Resultant differences of opinion therefore can take place at different levels. Initially there are vastly divergent concepts of the characteristics of a nation, of the role of nations in the world, and of the nature of interests proper to a nation. The scope of these divergencies is often hidden by our tendency to find in the term "national interest" connotations of particularism, of exclusiveness, of the nation as against, or superior to, the rest of the world. Yet, save for a few extremists, even the advocates of world government base their position on a theory which takes account of, although it does not give primacy to, the interests of the American nation itself.

Even if agreeement on the meaning of national interest is reached, views as to what constitute suitable means for its furtherance can differ greatly. The issues here, manifestly, turn on the logical consonance of means and ends, and on the suitability, both practical and ethical, of means to ends. A concept of national interest may be agreed upon as sound and adequate; but two questions still remain: will suggested means prove efficacious, and will they, even if efficacious, clearly or subtly corrupt professed ideals? Indeed, in a world of fundamental conflict, these questions together may raise in acute form the further question whether it is possible to be at once effective and uncorrupted. The answering of such queries necessitates an analysis of the objectives and instruments of opposing interests. It necessitates an examination of the aspirations and the possible developments of peoples to be influenced and won. It necessitates exploration of the grounds on which and the means by which they may be influenced and won. It necessitates careful consideration of the consonance of those grounds and means with possible and actual concepts of American interests.

At all points in any reëxamination of national interest, however, it is essential to avoid a tendency to be bewitched by neatly compacted arguments that either laud altruism and moral abstractions uncritically or defile the idea of national interest as the motivating basis of foreign policy.

I. PERSONS AND NATIONS

Foreign policies are not built upon abstractions, remarked Charles Evans Hughes, "but are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising out of some immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective." That nations, like persons, ought to pursue their several real self-interests, and that they will pursue their supposed self-interests, may be taken for granted. As with persons, so with nations, disagreements arise when the attempt is made to define the nature of the self and to deduce consequent interests. Definition of the nation is especially difficult since, unlike the individual self, it is not immediately experienced. Indeed, one major source of disagreement arises from the very concept of a national self. Some persons may and do treat the nation as a real and ultimate being rather than as a continuing organization of the institutions of life. But quite apart from the resultant violence done to individuals, including those who hold this misconception, there results a great oversimplification of the problem. For the major difficulty of properly discovering national interest arises from the fact that it is at once a product and a directional molding of particular interests, of persons and of groups.

For the person, the concept of the self is both immediate and ultimate. The concept of the nation, on the other hand, is derivative and instrumental, even though any individual's concept of his nation and of his relation to it may mold him and constitute part of the framework of his own self. Through inner inconsistencies and conflicts, and even more by reason of unexamined habit, the individual may pursue his interests inadequately. He may even act without regard to, or in conflict with, consciously held ideals of his self, just as he may, through ignorance or misinformation, reasonably pursue sound interests of the self in a manner which is inappropriate from the viewpoint of actual success. But in the case of the nation, with its everlasting interplay of particular interests, of groups and persons ever-changing both in their activities and objectives and in their importance and power within the whole, the very formulation of a coherent view of national purpose and interest becomes inordinately difficult. The never-fixed pattern of these cross-cutting interests makes extraordinarily complicated the sustained pursuit of any national interest that is formulated, especially when the nation is vast, democratic, and pluralistic. The changing weight of interests and the interplay through them of changing concepts of interest, some at one moment dominant and at another recessive, manifestly make a hazardous task of reconciling prevalent views of what constitutes national interest with any reasoned theory of that interest. Similarly, even if the prevalent concept of any moment seems also to be a rational one, there is no guarantee that it will remain central over any significant time span. Thus the measure of national self-interest, as Ortega y Gasset observed of the true meaning of any word or phrase, lies not in the dictionary: "it is in the instant."

It is, indeed, these difficulties, reflected in fluid and changing policy, in an absence of neatly coherent continuity and of the possibility of easily relating tendencies of the moment to a systematic pattern, that have led so many commentators to deplore the seeming incoherence of American foreign policy, and even to deny that the United States has possessed anything worthy of the name of policy. Yet such elasticity and variability may well be a reflection of the vitality of our democratic society, and of the effectiveness of government in reflecting the living forces at work therein. The twin drawbacks of our unpredictability to others, who may in time find us even more perfidious than Albion of yore, and of our own lack of a clear sense of where we stand and what we stand for, are inescapable. Yet the gains may well outweigh the losses. In any event, the situation would appear to be a necessary corollary of the democratic way of life.

Certainly it is worth noting that one of the main appeals of modern dictatorships has been their claim to eliminate conflicting concepts of interest by defining one alone as the compelling interest of the nation and attempting to give a permanent ascendancy to it. Dictators have invariably argued that the interest so defined is the full embodiment of, or the nearest practical approach to, what the national interest genuinely is. But their definition has rarely been based on reasoned analysis or on the assumption that human beings are rational, nor has it reflected the view that men ought to endeavor to achieve rationality in their collective behaviors. Observation of the life, and in certain cases the death, of dictatorships makes clear that such attempted singleness of definition of interests has not led to a root consistency in practice, even when it has created useful myths for the genesis and maintenance of an illusion of consistency. Moreover, insofar as the singleness of interest has been consistently pursued, it has rarely led to the predicted results, to the actual achievement of the stated national interest. Indeed, there is reason to question whether such definition, however great the predictability it allows to others, really makes the lasting conduct of foreign policy more successful, although it may simplify diplomacy. When adaptations are actually made while the nature of the controlling interest is professed to remain unchanged, the consequence may well be outrage to others. Their reaction can then prove deleterious from the point of view of the actual pursuit and attainment of the nation's own professed objectives.

In any event, the theory and practice of a democratic society and culture are incompatible with an interpretation of the nation which pursues a superinterest according to which the interests of groups and persons are defined and determined, rather than an interest which is molded and shaped by the more finite interests. The national interest is at most a continuous and quasi-organic outcome and synthesis of an interplay of forces, in which varied concepts of national role and function and of the relationship of particular interests to the nation are an inherent part. The nation is an instrument for persons who, amidst their vast diversity, share some common heritage and some general aspirations which can be pursued by collective action. A national interest, it is true, is not merely a sum of individual interests, which, in part by very reason of their divergencies, cannot be added or averaged. Rather, it is in large measure a set of some conditions which have to be furthered and of which some must be preserved by appropriate action. The reason for compacting the national interest to a meaningful definition is to insure as far as possible that there may be some predictability in change within an order so oriented as to give large degrees of satisfaction to major elements in the society. Thus, the concept of a national interest must commemorate and clarify the continuity of a people at the same time that it identifies for persons generally a promise and an effective program for their continued pursuit of betterment.

Since the political order of the nation, unlike the entity of a person, is an instrument, the national interest is also derivative. So to state is the reverse of denying that the maintenance and functioning of the nation is a fundamental condition for the pursuit of more ultimate personal interests, as it is a limiting or guiding factor in their pursuit. But its derivative character does suggest one limitation on a concept of national interest which is not a part of the loosely analogous concept of a personal interest. No nation could exist without persons, since society is composed of persons; nevertheless, any particular person may properly decide, by reason of the ethical principles which give his life meaning and purpose, to sacrifice his life in the service of others. He may do so especially when specific conditions he confronts present the alternative of death or corruption. The nation, on the other hand, just because it is instrumental, and despite the fact that a society not composed of nations is conceivable, has to maintain itself at least as long as, and insofar as, its structure, organization, and functioning are conditions of the development and fulfillment of the persons, or of the greater part of the persons, composing it. The nation cannot with propriety seek its own elimination. Certainly it cannot pursue a policy calculated to bring about the elimination of all persons, or of the great majority of persons, embraced within it; its interest can never be collective suicide or martyrdom in the name of service to an ideal principle. Because it serves shared interests and properly aims to promote conditions for the better realization of personal interest beyond its own direct creation, purview, or control, its continued maintenance and function is by definition needful.

This reasoning is no argument against all risk-taking by the nation. The collectivity which is the nation may well find that a willingness to risk, though not to court, destruction, is a necessary condition for the fulfillment of persons and groups within it, or at the very least for the prevention of frustration of their purposes, under world conditions not of its own exclusive creation. But the nation, as a political institution with a particular set of functional obligations, has to be operated on the presumption of collective permanence. There is a real interest, on the part both of the nation's own people and of humanity generally, in the development of the social and cultural order which the nation serves. Particular national policies may diminish the interest of other nations in its welfare, and may even lead them to desire the destruction of the existing nation-state. Nevertheless, the enrichment of human culture and the development of humanity make the preservation of its component peoples lastingly desirable. Indeed, one criterion of national policy and one basis for evaluating concepts of national interest is the degree to which they do or do not give justification of a rational kind to a desire on the part of others to destroy the existing nation-state. A concept of national interest in any way incompatible with the peaceful existence of the nation which holds it, certainly confronts an initial presumption against its adequacy and correctness. Similarly, and *a fortiori*, a concept of national interest which denies the right of other nations to exist naturally promotes hostility to the particular nation espousing it, to a point where others are prepared to seek and pursue not only the destruction of the existing government, but even the elimination of the nation's people. Such a concept is, on its very face, untenable.

The argument that national self-interest cannot properly lead to a deliberate search for collective suicide must not, therefore, be taken to imply that the nation's interest is the sole and exclusive welfare of its own people regardless of, or in opposition to, that of others. Nor does it imply either the nation's duty to maintain an exclusive juristic sovereignty as traditionally conceived or, yet again, its refusal to accept limitations, by agreement or law, which prohibit purely unilateral action. The nation's acceptance of limitations depends on the relation of prevalent conditions to the furtherance of present and anticipated purposes of its own people as at once involved in humanity, yet distinct, or distinguishable by attitude and interest, from other organized parts thereof. In this context practical decision involves assessment of the current state of the arts and sciences, of technology and intercommunications, and of realizable potentials for a broadened order, capable of satisfying both the people of the particular nation and others simultaneously.

The nation is, in short, a lasting, yet ever-changing thing—"the cup of the community," as Madariaga aptly identifies it. It is not a static bundle of exclusive interests. It is not a real being. It does not exist in a vacuum. Its role and function, its powers and its limitations, are not permanent and unchanging, but adaptive and purposive. It is not to be sacrificed in the service of supposed moral ends which, when so defined as to exclude consideration of its own special interests and conditions, are clearly false. Yet it is no insular, narrowing order whose members can fulfill their purposes by an exclusive selfishness. Until a world state which embraces all persons is achieved—when the problem disappears—the nation cannot be unconcerned with the aspirations and the welfare of other peoples. If, however, under existing conditions it is thus unconcerned, it is ultimately unconcerned with its own well-being also.

II. UTILIZING POWER

Much of the difficulty both in defining and in implementing the idea of the national self-interest has arisen from ambiguities in the concept of power. Since today power is usually, though not uniformly, accepted as the very substance, the key idea and concern, of politics, the difficulty tends to grow rather than decrease. In discussions of the international or world order, confusion has been particularly great. For there "power politics," a facile but largely meaningless phrase with overtones of healthy realism or sinister immoralism, has rather generally been taken to denote the essence of the matter, as well as in some mysterious way to provide a key to the analysis and solution of all problems.

The generation, the husbanding, and the application of power are indeed central to politics. They are, what is more, vital to the furthering of most social interests and to the achievement of most human purposes, provided that power be defined in a sufficiently broad way. Because of the instrumental and external nature of political action, however, the creation, preservation, and application of power to achieve the optimum of human political purposes, necessitate a degree of force and constraint over persons. Such force and constraint are not equally necessary to other forms of human influence, where the type of accomplishment desired and the relevant means do not involve the same externality and impersonality. In some institutions, such as the family, appeal is to more tender emotions not characteristic of, or appropriate to, the public order. These emotions may constitute an effective leverage which, though broadly definable as power, is certainly not, either initially or ultimately, force. In other situations appeal can be made to reason and argument; in yet others to common religious belief and consequent duty. In all of them force is rarely successful. It is certainly not identical with power. Indeed, its use or attempted use, as for instance in love, often perverts, corrupts, and ultimately destroys the motivating emotion itself. Force rarely creates, in the sense of evoking willing positive action. But it can prevent action, as it can destroy actors. As a deterrent from undesired action, force may, especially when suitably supplemented by more positive elements of power such as consent, create a base for the effective use and direction of power.

Politics, then, does mean power generated and used, with force and constraint as techniques to channelize and limit activities, although consent is needed to make the power effective by leading to the positive fruition of policy and eliminating friction. Certainly it would be idiotic in internal or in international affairs to talk of powerless politics. The issues are always how to generate and to use power; what is the interest which power is to serve; what conception of interest, duly accepted, will be most effective as a generator of power; and, especially in the international field, what is the relation of force and persuasion to the diminution of conflict and the creation of harmony.

The international order is composed of many powers which differ in their particular interests, yet whose members all share common humanity. Although particular national policies are in competition here, the competition is not simply a struggle between the particular powers at the moment involved in a specific issue. It is also directed toward getting the allegiance or support of third parties, singly or in groups. Since these also have their interests and aspirations which are supported by various degrees of will and strength, power has a limited, though not precisely defined, force at its command. In the resultant competition, the relative effectiveness of any two opposed parties in winning the support of a third, prior to war and short of conquest, is the outcome of a parallelogram of force and principle.

The probable rationale of the otherwise misleading and confusing term "power politics" arises from an essential difference between internal and international politics. In the internal sphere the political institution known as the state is accepted at once as the locus of contention between interest groups and persons and as the necessary order for their better fulfillment. Struggles can normally be solved by essentially diplomatic means, with an accepted enforcement agency endowed with force as a reserve in the background. Such solutions are possible just because of acknowledged common purpose and shared interest. In the world order, however, common purpose is often unrecognized and is rarely dominant, despite acknowledgments of an ultimate common humanity. Similarly, organs of settlement and enforcement of the rules of a common order, when adjustment by politic compromise fails, are rudimentary or nonexistent.

III. NATIONAL SELF-INTEREST OR SHANGRI-LA ISOLATIONISM?

In the world order, more or less coherent systems of national interests and strategies of interest-promotion come into contact and conflict. Under modern conditions of industrialism and intercommunication, such contact and conflict are the inescapable consequences of nationhood and the possession of national interests. The resultant competitive sharing renders isolation and isolationism meaningless. It would be impossible for the professed isolationist to maintain his stand consistently with the preservation of the totality of his interest, even if other nations should be willing to allow any one nation to enjoy and remain in a position of isolation, which they surely are not. It is also true that divergent concepts of national interests, based on particular traditions and locations, possess a generative power, of which force is indeed one instrument. But for the effective and continued pursuit of interests, including above all lasting material and spiritual satisfactions at home, force alone is, as political thinkers have known for centuries, an instrument both inadequate and inappropriate. It is necessary in the national interest of any nation, to generate power as influence on, and persuasion of, other nations. Such power may be generated bilaterally, and even multilaterally to a certain point, by appeal to common or complementing selfishness. But ultimately it has to rest on a larger common appeal, directed to universal interests, even though these are distorted by the particular immediacies of the power making the appeal and of the power or powers to whom it is made. Such distortion unfortunately gives aid and comfort to proponents of power politics, as it does more generally to those who argue that in the conduct of international relations it is sufficient to rely on the immediate and narrowed interests of neighbors and temporary allies, supported by military preparedness. Perhaps, to put it more fundamentally, this distortion tends to disguise, if not to hide completely, the deeper common principles which nations in truth share and which give meaning to their very immediate self-interests. Undoubtedly, the essential moral weakness of the international order is the absence of an impartial judge and interpreter of claims to rights, presenting a situation analogous to Locke's state of nature. Such a lack is doubly evil: it prevents genuine adjudication of disputes, and it hides the reality of those common rights which are in truth shared interests to be interpreted.

In their policy-making, individual nations may recognize the impossibility, or at the very least the painful inadequacy, of an escapist isolationism as the means to pursue their own concepts of national well-being. As an alternative they may elect, in both the formulation and implementation of policy, to deny the very right to exist of some or of all other nations. They may avowedly or by implication deny the right to treatment as human beings of persons composing other nations. So to do is, of course, to rely on force alone, in the sense of martial might. It is to reject any possible common principle of appeal based on sharing, as it is to forego any freely won allegiance and support. The immediate objective may be the subordination of others as slaves, rather than their total extermination. Yet the probable consequence of any such unreal, "pure" policy is either the elimination of all other nations or, as we have shown above, the destruction as a power of the nation which relies upon it. As C. J. Friedrich has shown in another context, consent and constraint are functionally related in the creation and use of power. The logic of force only is no consent. Its consequence, because it cannot create power based on the sympathy or cooperation of others, is the need to eliminate. The particular nation which takes such a view necessarily proclaims itself, by prideful ambition, the sole state in the world. It rejects international politics; it rejects the possibility of creating and using power in an international order to pursue its real, but limited, interests.

IV. THE HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL SELF-INTERESTS

The actual course of international politics is necessarily mixed. Where one party possesses force and is able to apply it effectively, and the second party is aware of such possession and willingness, the latter, assuming it to be the weaker, will normally redefine its own interest in the light of the actual alternatives confronting it. Such redefinition will relate concepts of ideal national interests, including potentials for their realization, with a view of what constitutes a minimally tolerable collective life. The last of these in turn defines with some precision the limits of policy for the superior power. For, especially under modern conditions, the collective resistance of war, as well as resistance movements to an occupying conqueror, will to a greater or lesser extent frustrate the latter's objectives insofar as they involve the exploitation through oppression, rather than the extermination, of the conquered. Even passive resistance and sabotage may seriously limit the effectiveness of exploitation by a conqueror. This is a consideration which, at the appropriate point in time, must be taken into account when the dominant power defines its own national interest and determines the techniques appropriate to its furtherance.

The preceding analysis, based on the postulate of two unequal powers, involves a great and misleading oversimplification. For a weaker power, calculations of national interests usually present alternatives of alliance with or submission to different major powers. To these may be added opportunities for collective alliances of many minor powers, in resistance to, and to maintain independence from, both or all major powers. Here decision involves calculation of the potential realization of ideals of national interest, or at least of the avoidance of extreme frustration of such ideals. The search is for the optimum way of national life in relation to the force generated, or capable of generation, in the relevant time span.

It is, of course, still possible that a major power might conceive of total conquest over other peoples as a worthwhile and possible undertaking. However, at the least such a totally exclusive viewpoint diminishes potential power. Given the nature of modern weapons and any conceivable balance of available forces under present circumstances, such a policy would probably be self-defeating. It would lead, not to the exclusive domination and population by one people or race of the whole habitable globe, but to the destruction in large part of both aggressor and victim. It might even render major areas of the civilized world uninhabitable for a considerable period.

In any event, the present-day bipolar world does not present this issue; nor, whatever the possible indictments of Soviet totalitarianism, does it warrant the conclusion that Russia maintains this view of national interest. The two major parties in the conflict do indeed have national interests in the short term incompatible with one another. No doubt, too, the Soviet Union desires both to expand and, in the present circumstances, to dominate. Yet each side professes, and uses as a major implement of power, a philosophy which claims universality. Each professes to serve not only its own peculiar interests but the interests of all people, of humanity generally.

A nation's possession of armed might may help persuade other nations to accept a particular and biased interpretation of more universal insights. It may be a means to prevent dissent or backsliding once the viewpoint is accepted. Similarly, it may be a tool to prevent rejection of or escape from domination, by reason of disappointment, once control is achieved, whether by consent or by conquest. But it is a more vital point that the sponsorship by a major power of a moral appeal based on universalism, though addressed to specific national interests and needs, today is urgently required for the very generation of power. The furtherance of particular national interests necessitates their identification with the interests of other peoples, as the latter does in fact conceive them, or can be persuaded to conceive and formulate them. The first and chief weapon of national interest, in time as in effect, is then ideas, which are essentially moral doctrines. Effectively to pursue its own interests, the nation has to profess to be universal in interest, and to accept the equality of persons and peoples. Indeed, the utilization of a national interest concept based upon a moral appeal as the firmament of our foreign policy, holds out the greatest promise for meeting the challenge of events that lie ahead.

One testimony to the truth of this thesis is the common use by East and West of the term "democracy." The significance of its use is not lessened by differences in interpretation. Nor is it diminished by possible insincerity in its actual utilization or, where influence or control would permit, in implementation, by one of the parties. In a world where isolation seems impractical and extermination of all peoples save one improbable, even were it desired, the process of furthering national interests necessitates limited identification, appeals to shared purposes, and the generation of power primarily through ideas essentially moral in character. Force, which is but a portion of power, not its prime creator, is indeed relevant as pressure, the utilization of which reflects a lack of an impartial judge under an established law; yet force corrupts the purity and perverts the use of moral ideas. It is finally these ideas—of equality, of sharing, and of liberty, common to the great world religions and philosophies, including Marxism itself—which play a vital role in international politics.

Idealism, far from being utopian and destructive of realistic foreign policy, is basic to such policy. It is likewise basic to the idea that force itself, in the form of warfare, is but a means to creative peace. The purpose of force is to redress evils which, as Grotius first clearly stated and the whole Catholic school of international law has continuously affirmed, stand in the way of man's self-realization through a just social order. The corruption and perversion of moral ideals by simplified propaganda may indeed lead at times to a very unrealistic representation of other peoples or nations collectively as devils, to the detriment both of national and of general human interests. Such falsification can create the belief that, once the devils are destroyed, no further effort is needed: men may then live happily ever after. The error here, however, should not be attributed to idealism; instead, it indicates the necessity for the integrity of factual reality as the basis for moral judgment, just as, on a different level, it is an argument for the proper maintenance and use of force. A moral use of force always necessitates the subordination and service of that force to ethical aspiration. Force is not properly set in balance against idealism itself. Rather, its right application is always subject to moral judgment, even as sound morality necessitates its availability. That curious professed realism which insists that moral ideas are a protective coloration for exclusive and antagonistic interests, is in truth at once immoral and unrealistic. Moreover, to profess it deceives its exponent far more than it deceives those to whom the "realism" is professedly addressed. As a consequence, its potency as a creator of effective power is doubly diminished.

A genuine foreign policy necessitates absence of hypocrisy. Under present conditions it necessitates proceeding beyond the self-delusion that the road to the promotion of political self-interests is military and economic aid to others for selfish reasons only. Effective promotion of American national interests, for instance, requires concern for the real well-being of our NATO allies. It requires, more profoundly, the pursuit of commonly shared ideas and interests beyond the chance parallelism of the moment. It necessitates abandonment of the attempt to create, or, when needed, to recreate, an always precarious favorable balance of power against some other major power, at the present moment Russia. It must be based on a long-term parallelism of interests. It must possess an awareness that universalist moral insight is requisite also from the point of view of technology and communication and must envisage the ultimate creation of corresponding world political institutions. Such institutions, not possible at present, must yet be held desiderata which can be achieved in a foreseeable future.

At the present moment it is vital to pursue and effectuate ideas and policies compatible with the recognized and shared universal interests of those devoted to the ideals of free society and questing man. Certainly these interests necessitate the nurturing and development of the rich diversities of peoples, whose elimination would be impoverishing even were it practicable. Realistic policy is the proof in action of the reality of sharing, despite cultural differences, and beyond any desire to destroy them. It necessitates, above all, the combatting of a hard-boiled, niggardly realism at home. Such realism not only harms our own moral stature, but also gives genuine warrant for realistic insight abroad into the nature of our realism within the confines of its own concepts. The net result is the destruction of the effectiveness of our attempted appeal to moral ideas. Yet we have seen that such ideas are the fundamental generators of power. The essence of the thesis here propounded is that our national power, the organized social creativity of our people, does not diminish, but increases where it works to supplement and to reinforce the generically similar, though in specific content different, creativity in other peoples. The so-called realistic theory of national interest and the balance of power doctrine, insofar as it rests on that theory, constitute in truth a belated translation and preservation of the old economic wage-fund doctrine as a power-fund theory.

V. IDEALISM IN A BIPOLAR WORLD

In the bipolar world as it is today, a major power has to be global in interest and commitment. For one thing, it must recruit support from all lesser and uncommitted powers. It must do so by persuasive demonstration that its doctrines of personality and of democracy and its concept of the compatibility of diverse cultures embraced within a world community, are more sincere and more promising to others, from the point of view of their own national interests, than the alternatives offered. Nonetheless, impurities and biases are inescapable in this imperfect world, not at present capable of world government. The United States must therefore also possess, or rapidly create, the force necessary to reassure others that allegiance to a common cause will not involve the risk of their own rapid destruction or conquest through our failure to support them at all, or by reason of the complete inadequacy of the forces we can make available to the actual task and need. Such force, combined with superior promise and performance in the material realm, can stimulate others to effort and to allegiance freely given because of a conviction of sharing. The sense of sharing can in turn evoke a creative and resistant energy and, if fear is removed, a sense of sufficient strength first to choose our way and then to stand upright in it, in resistance alike to pressure and to force from the U.S.S.R.

The present lack of adequate force on the part of this country, despite a will and a program for its correction, may lead to our espousal of limited commitments on the ground of operational realism. That realism in turn may well result in an indifference to the fate of peoples who are hard to attach to the Western and American program and ideology, and who would be hard to defend in the absence of the necessary force. Yet the very allegiance and energy created by our acceptance of the obligations of an ally possessed of superior power and by our willingness to take risks not narrowly delimited in advance, can themselves create collective power. For they can persuade other peoples that genuine alliance with us offers greater fulfillment of their overall national interests, defined from the point of view of their ideal objectives, than the alternatives of submersion in the Soviet bloc or of a dubiously secure independence. It is manifestly necessary on our part to indicate the limitations and the difficulties of our own present position of semi-preparedness. It is likewise vital to urge the need for positive action and cooperation by real allies. It is necessary finally to warn them of the possibilities of short-term sacrifices, and even Dunkirks, on their part. In essence, the implications of NATO must be made explicit, while the NATO system must be expanded wherever surviving free powers may, by appropriate effort on our part, be made into allies for peace and prepared for war.

The cost of creating the needed force on our part, plus the cost of aid in the development, both for peace and war, of other peoples, will indeed be great, as the expense of present more limited commitments indicates. It will therefore necessitate short-run sacrifice of standards of living and of leisure on our own part, beyond those at present planned or anticipated. Yet a calculation of immediate national interests based on a narrow calculation of present income and comfort will, in the long run, prove self-defeating. At the very least the following of such a policy risks insufficient power and inadequate force at now unpredictable points where they may be needed. The doctrine of precise and contained commitment, whatever its appeal to the military strategist, is inadequate political strategy, and in truth betokens failure to follow through the concepts of global struggle and possible global war.

In the long run, a more immediately painful policy is more conducive to the national interest. In it lies, not solely the possibility of victory, but the opportunity for the prevention of war and for creative peace. Such policy is our insurance against defeat, in peace or war, by a country which also professes to be the defender and standard-bearer of a universal ethics of social justice. Today that state is more prepared than we, by teaching, and to some extent by actual attitude and behavior, for adequate sacrifices in order to acquire effective power. That its discipline to this end may destroy the very values it professes is here an irrelevance, as it is certainly not an appropriate example. It is our job to achieve an equivalent in morale and effectiveness by a voluntary material sacrifice which avoids the U.S.S.R.'s sacrifice of the values of free men. Similarly, the fact that the Soviet Union, once its power is secure, may prove unwilling to implement its ideals, and may, in lands which accept its promise, in time replace consent and enthusiasm by force, is not relevant to our own case except insofar as the demonstration of disparity between its promise and performance may help create a power friendly to our own cause. Indeed, the combination of the demonstrated unwillingness of the U.S.S.R. to implement its professed ideals immediately or within a specific future with convincing proof of our own will to promote and lastingly to maintain behaviors and institutions expressive of our proclaimed democratic ideals, is the most powerful force on our side by which to evoke the sustaining power emanating from other people, who in the process of generating it and under its impact become more powerful. The long-run implications of this thesis are greater equality of power, as of living standards. They are also, however, security in the creation and enjoyment of higher standards of living, both economic and cultural, than can otherwise be made available. They are, somewhat paradoxically, the preservation of our initial leadership, as of our differential advantages, through a demonstrated will at once to share and to diminish the latter.

Total commitment and a total idealism which is yet self-interest are our appropriate answers to Soviet totalitarianism. They are the means to success in total war, should it come. They are also the most probable grounds for a lasting peace based on positive policies. These policies must be conceived and geared to the preservation of continuity in ever-changing situations, just as they must be directed finally toward the creation of more effective international institutions.

An effective, because long-term, concept of national interest cannot, of course, rest solely on the grim alternative "we or they." It must accept a commonly shared universe of aspiration, at the same time that it necessarily condemns the forceful imposing of unity. It must aim to create a situation in which effective power at once discourages aggression by, and stimulates transformation in, Russia. American ideological power is in this context a leverage. Such power must be backed by a collective force, with the will to use it, which is organized though not created by itself. Possible transformation in Russia, long hoped for from without and implicitly promised from within, has been prevented first by fear and then by national pride. The shared aspirations of humanity have been hidden by the short-sightedness of some putative American interests, promoted and defended by actually irrelevant dogmas. In Russia they have been corrupted by a yet narrower dogma, progressively perverted and misused. Yet these aspirations may still be realized, provided that American policy generates power through sincerity.

This last proviso necessitates a refusal to appease, which is not synonymous with a refusal to comprehend or, consistently with principle, to conciliate. Apart from direct appeasement, which compounds injustice and sacrifices others after the manner of Munich, it is also possible indirectly to appease by our own refusal to commit ourselves to risks and dangers, a refusal supported by narrowly defined and ungenerous interests at home. Nonetheless, it is vital for America to abandon the position of an infallible and absolutely just deity sitting in judgment, a position even more dangerous when sincere than when hypocritical. It is necessary to reject the dogma that diversity of political and social philosophy is incompatible with fundamental universality. It is essential to probe behind the evils of the present regime of Russia and to perceive the justified realities of its economic and cultural national interests and aspirations. It is vital to understand the genuine relevance of Marxism to the organization of Russia as a would-be industrial country, even as it is necessary to condemn the perversion of Marxist teaching and the misuse of it. This means that it is necessary to understand the ethical side of Marxist philosophy, with its broad appeal in countries which would avoid Soviet domination as they would avoid dictatorship. It is, finally, necessary to clarify our own theory and practice of a classless society, which is not incompatible with the essential insights of Marx. This society we have been slowly achieving, during a century and more of peaceful change, by an effective wedding of constitutional democracy, here federal and anti-statist, with a highly productive industrial technology, the fruits and blessings of which have been distributed ever more widely and equally. It is necessary to show that this concept is now closer to realization; that our own national interest and purpose is to help its realization; that it promotes social and economic welfare without the necessity of sacrificing individual freedom or the creative method of constitutional democracy. The preservation and the extension of these last, which can only come through voluntary acceptance, are surely the essence of our national interest.

Our interest is the fulfillment compatibly of diverse persons and, by analogy, of diverse peoples. Based on Christian ethics, it is a doctrine of method in coping pragmatically with the realities of differences among men and of imperfections in men. Foreign policy consistently conceived in the light of this tradition and insight at once proclaims, and persuades others of, the realism of idealism.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND POLITICAL POWER*

REINHARD BENDIX
University of California (Berkeley)

Contemporary studies of political power have often been based on the belief that the major determinants in the struggle for power may be ascertained by analyzing the social stratification of a society. This belief is supported by the following series of more or less tacit assumptions: The ideas and actions of men are conditioned by their social and economic position in society. When large number of individuals occupy a comparable social position, they may be expected to think and act alike. They are likely to share social and economic interests which are promoted—in competition or conflict with other social groups—through political organization and interest-representation. Hence, a study of politics should be concerned with the social composition of the members and leaders of different political organizations; this kind of knowledge will provide a clue to the power which such organizations can exert and to the political goals which their leaders are likely to pursue.

I wish to examine the relation between stratification and politics in four respects:

(1) How did Marx deal with the problem of social stratification and political power?

(2) What insight into the relation between stratification and politics can be gained from retrospective investigations?

(3) Does a knowledge of social stratification enable us to understand the development of totalitarian movements and their conquest of power?

(4) Does our understanding of these movements improve if this knowedge of stratification is supplemented by an analysis of the radical elite and of the underlying psychological predisposition of the members?

I. THE MARXIAN APPROACH

On the basis of his analysis of capitalism, Marx predicted a series of political events: that the bourgeoisie would resort to increasingly repressive laws in order to safeguard its economic position; that the workers would eventually create a class-conscious labor movement; and that the contradictions inherent in the capitalist economy would lead ultimately to a proletarian revolution. These political events were to occur toward the end of the capitalist era.

Marx based his predictions on a comprehensive theory of history. He believed that the relations among men in society result from the prevailing organization of the economy in each historical period. In each case the touchstone of this organization was the relation of the different classes to the ownership of the means of production, and this led to the oppression of one class by another. The struggle which resulted led in each period from the initial progressiveness of the ruling class to a growing contradiction between the available forces of production and the willingness and the ability of the old ruling class to utilize them fully. In line with this general theory, Marx predicted that the class struggle of the capitalist system would lead to the proletarian revolution. But he did not imply that capitalism would *automatically* produce a proletariat which would fulfill its historic role.

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Though Marx left his analysis of social class incomplete, it is possible to summarize his views on this subject. In his analysis of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* Marx offered this definition of a social class, which he applied to the French peasants:

> In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that divide their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes, and put them in hostile contrast to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local inter-connection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organization, they do not form a class.[1]

Marx applied the same analysis, but somewhat more ambiguously, to the role of the industrial worker in a capitalist economy. Workers shared the fate of having nothing but their labor power to sell. This common fate put them in hostile contrast to the capitalist, partly because they were exploited by him, and partly because modern machine production reduced them to human fragments, not allowed to exercise their rational faculties. And yet this common condition of the industrial workers would not automatically result in the formation of a labor movement. Such a movement would result only if groups of workers throughout a country communicated with each other, if they developed nationwide interests and made them effective through a political organization.[2] Whether or not the hostile division between "millions of worker-families" and the capitalists would lead to a nationwide political movement was to Marx a question of practical politics.

Still, Marx believed that he could predict the outcome of this political struggle. He believed that an overwhelming majority of the people would come to share (or to sympathize with) the life-experience, and hence the ideas, of the industrial proletariat. To be sure, the working class in Marx' sense would emerge only after regional, local, ethnic, and many other antagonisms had disappeared. Only then could a politically organized labor movement develop; for it to be effective, such a political organization would have to represent a "national union" rather than just another interest group. Hence Marx identified the politically organized labor movements of the world with the masses of mankind.[3] And believing that the development of capitalism necessitated a polarization of society into two classes, he minimized the importance both of the existing divisions among workers in capitalist society and of the ideas and political actions to which they gave rise.[4]

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[1] *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, n.d.), p. 109.

[2] *The Communist Manifesto* (New York, 1932), pp. 17–19.

[3] The philosophical significance of this identification is explored in Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (New York, 1941), pp. 287–295.

The history of the last hundred years since the publication of the *Communist Manifesto* in 1848 has taught us that these sweeping generalizations were mistaken. To be sure, a radical movement which obliterates local, regional, and even many national antagonisms *is* developing today, but it is *not* the labor movement of the industrialized countries as Marx envisaged it. It is rather an international protest movement against the countries of western civilization in which industrialization has bestowed major benefits on the working masses. All countries outside this civilization continue to struggle with the problem of transforming their peasant masses into an industrial work-force. The masses themselves are caught in the dilemma of not being able to survive either in cities that are not industrialized enough to absorb them or in villages that are too overcrowded and poor to yield them a subsistence. Confronted, in addition, with a steadily increasing availability of diverse commodities which they cannot buy, they experience an intensification of the poverty which they cannot escape. For these reasons, peasant uprisings, the organization of hitherto inert masses under communist leadership, and the effective transformation of discontent into a militant nationalist movement are likely to occur in the countries of comparative disadvantage with regard to industrialization. The ruling groups within each of these underdeveloped areas will strain every effort in order to transform a discontent which is often directed against them, into a unified nationalist movement which is directed instead against the "imperialists" of the West. Hence, the major determinants of the struggle for power in these areas cannot be ascertained by an analysis of their social stratification, but rather by emphasizing that class differences have come to be subordinated to the much more decisive conflict between the underdeveloped areas and the industrialized West.[5]

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[4] I should add that Marx made a keen analysis of the relation betwen social stratification and politics in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, especially with reference to the urban groups supporting the *coup d'état*. He also gave a completely misleading interpretation of the Paris Commune, which he identified as a model of the coming proletarian revolution. The contrast between these two discussions illustrates Marx's genius as well as his propagandistic dogmatism. Cf. the recent analysis of the Commune by Melvin Kransberg, *The Siege of Paris, 1870–1871* (Ithaca, 1950), esp. pp. 179–183, where the author shows convincingly that the social radicalism of the Parisian workers was in large part the result of a patriotism which had been intensely frustrated by the Prussian siege of the capital and by the indecision of the middle class and the authorities in the face of this threat.

[5] A striking analysis of the background factors in India, Southeast Asia, and China is contained in J. D. Boeke, *The Interests of the Voiceless Far East* (Leyden, 1948). The conflict between Marxian class theory and the facts of social stratification has been analyzed with great acumen by David Mitrany in *Marx Against the Peasant* (Chapel Hill, 1951.) See especially the following summary comment of the author: "The startling fact is that Communism has only come to power where by all Marxist tenets it might have been least expected that it could. In every instance, from 1917 in Russia to 1949 in China, Communism has ridden to victory on the back of disaffected peasantries; in no instance has it come near to victory in industrialized 'proletarian' countries. So far it has always been a 'proletarian' revolution without a proletariat; a matter of Communist

The basic contentions of Marx do not fare better when we apply them to the actual development of capitalism. In the countries of advanced industrialization Marx's theory does not fit the situation because industrialization has been accompanied by an increasing peacefulness of industrial relations. Broadly speaking, labor movements have arisen primarily in the industrialized countries of the world, in which the working masses have begun to enjoy the rising standard of living that goes with industrialization. The result has actually been a growing identification of interests between capitalists and workers. This working harmony is often marred by intense suspicion and by ideological radicalism; and the struggle over the distribution of the national product certainly continues unabated. Nonetheless, where the economic interests of the nation are concerned, capitalists and workers suffer or benefit alike, and they have on the whole acted accordingly. Neither the polarization of classes nor an intensification of the class struggle has accompanied the development of capitalism;[6] instead, the predictions of Marx have been reversed, or altered in their significance, to an extent that the theory behind them, attributing long-run political changes to the class struggle, must be rejected.

It is insufficient, however, to indicate the reasons why the Marxian theory should be discarded. The question before us is not primarily whether Marx's predictions were correct, but rather whether predictions of *major* political events based on an analysis of the economy and its corresponding class structure are feasible at all. We can, for example, describe the development of the class structure under capitalism more accurately than Marx did. And on this description we can base a generalized theory which is similar to his in the sense that it also shows the effects of changes in the technology and in the system of production on the occupational structure and the changing relations between the classes. But while this is possible, it is important to realize that it does not lead further for our purposes.

We have fairly accurate knowledge of the occupational trends which have accompanied the development of capitalism. Colin Clark has shown in considerable detail that, with the rise of industry, the proportion of people in agriculture declines along with an increase of the proportion of people employed in the "tertiary" branch of production (trade, transportation, communication; domestic, personal and professional service).[7] It is possible to attribute to

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management of peasant discontent. But while this shows that in the countries where this has happened the peasants were ripe for revolt, it does not show that they inclined to Communism. As regards eastern Europe at any rate, the evidence is all the other way" (pp. 205–206).

[6] Cf. the papers on class conflict by T. H. Marshall, Lionel Robbins and Maurice Dobb in T. H. Marshall (ed.), *Class Conflict and Social Stratification* (London, 1938).

[7] *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (2nd ed., London, 1950). The recent critique of Clark's work by P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yaney, "Economic Progress and Occupational Distribution," *Economic Journal*, Vol. 61, pp. 741–755 (Dec., 1951), contains some useful reservations concerning Clark's tripartite division of the occupational structure, but it does not invalidate Clark's contribution as the authors believe. A more striking critique of this work is contained in John Jewkes, "The Growth of World Industry," *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 3, pp. 1–15 (Feb. 1951).

these occupational changes certain general political tendencies, such as the willingness of broad masses of people, especially in the "middle class," to give political support to an economic system in which their economic security and their personal self-respect are frequently threatened.[8] The growing proportion of salaried people engaged in trade and professional service, as well as the organization of workers in trade unions, has also given a pervasive influence to certain middle-class standards of aspiration, which in turn have had an important influence on the changing role of the government in economic life. This occupational trend has thus helped to end the era of the laissez-faire doctrine and to foster the emergence of a doctrine of social rights (e.g., the right to a job, the demand for pensions, old-age insurance, health insurance).[9] On the basis of the available evidence it is even possible to predict with some assurance that, as other countries industrialize, similar changes in the occupational structure and similar political trends are likely to occur. But the fact that industrial societies have tended to become increasingly middle class, and that certain political tendencies have accompanied this development, is a far cry from the assertion that changes in the organization of the capitalist economy and, therefore, in the class structure will determine the ultimate political outcome of the struggle between the classes.

By bringing Marxian theory in line with historic facts, however, we tend to lose sight of the major thesis which made that theory interesting. Marx studied the organization of production under capitalism because he believed that this enabled him to predict the hostile contrasts between the classes, as well as the broad development of parties or movements which would utilize these antagonisms in order to exercise power. Even if we now discard Marx' specific answers and dismiss altogether the possibility of a long-range prediction of political trends, this problem is still basic. It is basic in the sense that the antagonisms existing in a society *are* the source of *gradual* political change.

II. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Because of its claim to predict the development of capitalist society, Marxism has long asserted the ability to distinguish between the present and the eventual class interest and political alignment of any social group. The *present* expression of interests by a social group has thus been judged in terms of its supposedly "real" interests in the future; this has meant that if the present interests of a group ran counter to the interests of the "progressive" or revolutionary labor movement, as Marxists appraise them, then the group would not be analyzed as such, but would be denounced as "petty bourgeois," reactionary, or what not. It is apparent that this distinction between "present" and "real" interests depends largely on the possibility of predicting that there will be only two divisions of society, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.[10] In his preoccupation with long-run tendencies, Marx either ignored the appraisal of day-to-day politics or analyzed the shifting alliances between conflicting social groups only in order to discover the economic forces which—if properly understood—would reveal the decisive, rather than the ephemeral, determinants of the class struggle.

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[8] In a recent study of public opinion, 76 per cent of the national sample indicated their belief that the good effects of big business outweighed the bad. Breakdowns of the sample revealed no significant differences between various occupational groups. See the report of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, *Big Business from the Viewpoint of the Public* (Ann Arbor, 1951), p. 179.

[9] The development from "civil rights" to "social rights" has been traced by T. H. Marshall in *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge [Eng.], 1950), pp. 1–85.

Yet if we abandon this attempt to predict the ultimate outcome of the class struggle, we should not also abandon the genuine insight which makes the Marxian theory attractive: that the many antagonisms created in a society, and especially the conflicts inherent in its economic structure, may, but need not, give rise to collective action and that it is the task of the analyst to discover the circumstances under which collective action does or does not arise. I believe that Marx forfeited his genuine insight into the indeterminacy of the relationship between class situation and class action by his prophetic fervor, which prompted him to forecast the capitalist development with a certainty often belied by his own historical sense.[11] Once we abandon this presumption of certainty, we must necessarily accept a wider range of possible developments than Marxian theory permits, even though we continue to recognize the fundamental importance of the economic structure for an understanding of social stratification and class conflict. However, we must also accept the corollary that our understanding of the relations between the economy, social stratification, and the struggle for power are necessarily retrospective.[12] We can summarize these conclusions as follows:

1. Marxism identifies major elements of the struggle for power.
2. We cannot predict the exercise of power from a knowledge of these ele-

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[10] Of course, the belief in this possibility of prediction has had major historic significance as an effective ideology, quite apart from any appraisal of its validity.

[11] These contradictions have been explored by Harold Rosenberg in "The Pathos of the Proletariat," *Kenyon Review*, Vol. 11, pp. 595–629 (1949).

[12] There is one interpretation of the relations between economic interests, social stratification and political power which is *not* retrospective. Through their analyses of "pressure groups," political scientists have made us well aware of the plethora of organizations whose economic and political interests are explicitly formulated and pressed upon legislatures and the general public with all available means. I suggest that in these cases the problem examined in this paper does not arise. *Once* the economy and its corresponding social structure have given rise to an articulation of interests and to an implementation of these interests through organizations, the problem has become one for political analysis proper. The question of the political sociologist is which of the existing antagonisms in society will give rise to organizations that participate in the struggle for power, and it is obviously answered once these organizations exist. The question which then remains for him is the pertinent one as to how stable any given articulation of interests (with their organizational implementation) is. It is, of course, precisely the fact that any present articulation of interests is unstable, and that the tendency to think and act alike among commonly situated men may in the future give rise to a new articulation of interests (and find expression in new organizational action), which is of major interest to the political sociologist. It was the merit of Marxian analysis, as I have suggested, to have focussed attention on this instability of the social structure.

ments *because* we cannot determine how, when, or whether the political factors can or will utilize these elements.

3. *Therefore,* we can understand the exercise of power only retrospectively; after the fact we know whether or not the elements (of the struggle for power) remained latent or were effectively used in producing change.

General theories of social stratification in industrial society do not throw much light on the forces that determine the exercise of power, because they do not grasp the indeterminate relationship between class situation and class action. This is probably one reason why in recent years most inquiries into the relation between stratification and politics have consisted of particular case studies, whose illumination of details has been obtained at the price of abandoning the developmental theories which have been discussed. The theory which seems to have governed these case studies holds that affiliation with, or membership in, a social group engenders a certain homogeneity of belief and action which *may* lead to collective political action. Thus studies of social stratification are undertaken in the belief that the interests which unite the members of a social group and simultaneously divide them from other groups, are to the exercise of power what fuel is to fire.

Another theory (and its relation to the first is by no means clear) holds that the existence of common interests will lead to collective action only when a particular organization and its leaders succeed in utilizing this potentiality for the political struggle. Studies governed by this theory have analyzed the social composition of the members and leaders of a given organization in the belief that such data provide a major explanation for its political success or failure. Restricted to historical reconstructions, these studies cannot predict whether the social and ideological homogeneity of a given group will lead to collective political action. Collective political action as the outcome of social homogeneity and effective political organization can be explained fully only in the light of subsequent events.[13]

It may be useful to cite some examples of retrospective studies, in order to illustrate the type of proposition which may be derived from them. Research has revealed that a significant proportion of the leaders of different socialist parties in Western Europe have come from a middle-class background, but that there are characteristic cultural and national differences among these groups of leaders. In Italy a significant number of the earlier socialist leaders were aristocrats or well-to-do bourgeois, who dedicated their lives and fortunes to the movement. Michels reports that 28 of the 33 parliamentary representatives of the Italian Social-Democratic party in 1903 were intellectuals of bourgeois or aristocratic origin. This compared with 13 of the 81, or 16 per cent, of intellectuals with a middle-class background among the parliamentary representatives of the German Social-Democratic party in the same year.[14] Intellectuals, but especially Jewish intellectuals, have played an important role among the leaders of the socialist movements in Germany, Russia and other Eastern European countries. Intellectuals, but not Jews, have been of importance in the French socialist movement, and Irishmen, self-educated craftsmen as well as certain sectarian Tories, were among the significant leaders of the Chartist movement in England.[15] Clearly it is possible to say that the leaders of the socialist movements have been primarily members of the middle class; this statement covers all of the cases mentioned, but it does not explain the significant differences between the socialist leaders of different countries. We might also say that those members of the middle class who are refused social recognition tend to identfy themselves with labor's cause. But while this is a useful proposition to account for the role of the Jews and the Irish, it cannot adequately explain the Italian case, for example. Another important variable is the degree to which intellectuals have played a role in the socialist movements. They participated prominently in Germany, Italy, France, and Russia, but less prominently in England and least perhaps in the United States. A more detailed investigation might reveal a number of sociological factors which account for these differences in the social composition of socialist leaders in the various countries, though it is not safe to assume that a knowledge of such factors would be sufficient. At any rate, these examples may suffice to illustrate the type of retrospective proposition which a comparative study of leadership would seek to establish.

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[13] Yet, historical studies often imply a contrary view; they lend themselves to a retrospective determinism, which regards the outcome of all political action as predetermined because in looking back we can understand the reasons for this and no other outcome. The danger of *ex post facto* explanations is obviously that they make every political action appear as if no alternative actions had been possible.

Other retrospective studies of the relation between social stratification and politics deal with the masses rather than their leaders. A case in point is Rudolf Heberle's analysis of party affiliations and their regional differences in the province of Schleswig-Holstein during the period of the Weimar Republic.[16] In the areas of large landed estates the landowners belonged to the conservative parties, while their tenants, the farm laborers, along with the lower middle-class groups of the town and country, belonged to the parties of the Left. In the areas of small, independent farm holdings, however, a majority of the farmers belonged to democratic parties, which advocated a policy of free competition; neither the social democrats nor the communists could make much headway among these independent farmers. It should be noted, however, that in areas of small holdings and backward production methods the French Communists have been successful in their appeals to the peasants, where their German colleagues were not. Moreover, some of the communist slogans are strikingly similar to those used by the Nazis.[17] It appears advisable, therefore, to consider this type of evidence on a comparative basis. The point is not that certain types of farmers in relatively industrialized countries are potential fascists *or* communists, but that they have a certain propensity to radicalization under conditions of acute distress. When such radicalization will eventuate and which way it will turn, the analyst of social stratification is not in a position to predict. His knowledge does enable him to estimate the relative chances for such a development, but only in the sense that certain types of farmers are more likely to be affected than others. Obviously, local conditions, historical antecedents, the acuteness of the crisis, and the intensity of the organizational drive on the part of a totalitarian movement will play a role and can be judged only in specific cases.

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[14] Robert Michels, "Proletariat und Bourgeoisie in der sozialistischen Bewegung Italiens," *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft*, Vol. 21, pp. 379–380 (1905).

[15] Cf. the comments on this question in M. Beer, *Fifty Years of International Socialism* (London, 1937), pp. 103–107. Also Robert Michels, *Political Parties* (Glencoe, 1949), pp. 235–267. The contemporary significance of this problem is clearly stated by Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the People of Underdeveloped Areas," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 1, pp. 22–36 (March, 1952).

[16] Rudolf Heberle, *From Democracy to Nazism* (Baton Rouge, 1945), esp. pp. 90–120.

It may be useful to give another example of a political judgment which is based on knowledge of social stratification. It has often been observed that the absence of a political labor movement in the United States is the result of social mobility. Closer examination of this assertion indicates that it must be amplified in a number of respects. First, social mobility has been coexistent with striking differences in wealth and social status. Second, it has consisted of such different types of mobility as mobility between jobs, geographic mobility and high turnover in small-scale enterprises, as well as of the proverbial "rags to riches" mobility within the same or between different generations. Third, social mobility in America has occurred on top of a substratum of underprivileged ethnic and racial minorities, which have filled and continue to fill the jobs that rank lowest in terms of social and economic desirability.[18] Social mobility in conjunction with this underprivileged substratum has brought about both the relative absence of class-consciousness and class-conscious political action, on the one hand, and the transmutation of class-consciousness (among the minority groups) into race-consciousness and race-conscious political action, on the other.

All of these examples illustrate the kind of proposition which may be derived from a study of the relation between social stratification and political action. Such studies are retrospective in the sense that they are plausible interpretations after the fact. They permit of tentative generalizations, but only in the sense that the recurrence of similar facts of social stratification would make the recurrence of similar political responses highly probable. That is to say, we would expect the leaders of radical political movements in industrialized societies to come in the first instance from the ranks of the middle class, and we would also expect that they would be prompted to join these movements because of their status as members of an ethnic minority or of the intelligentsia

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[17] Cf. Henry Ehrmann, "The French Peasant and Communism," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 19–43 (March, 1952).

[18] Though large-scale immigration has ceased since the 1920's, the migration of Negroes to the northern cities, as well as the more or less temporary seasonal immigration of Mexican and Puerto-Rican farm laborers, has played a similar role. A more detailed, though summary discussion of social mobility in the United States is contained in Reinhard Bendix and S. M. Lipset, "Power and the Elites in American Society," to be published.

(or of both). We would similarly expect large-scale farmers to be more frequently conservative, and small-scale independent farmers more frequently liberal or radical in their political orientation. Or again, we would expect a continued absence of political radicalism in American society as long as the labor force continues to be mobile and continues to be subdivided into ethnic or racial groups.

Although these generalizations are of limited scope, they are not negligible on that account. In particular, they go beyond the purely descriptive and historical. They call attention to certain abstract variables of the social structure which may have general significance: the discrepancy between high economic and low social status; the relative vulnerability of the marginal enterpriser to radical appeals in a capitalist society; the effectiveness with which social mobility provides a vent for grievances, especially when it occurs on top of a substratum of underprivileged minorities. A knowledge of these variables of the social structure is relevant to an understanding of the relations between stratification and power in many different historical contexts.

Generalized knowledge of such variables is applicable in retrospective studies as well as in the appraisal of the contemporary relations between stratification and the exercise of power. But since its usefulness is premised on the persistence of the given pattern of social stratification, its scope is limited to the analysis of social statics. However, the many antagonisms which have accompanied industrialization have at times been superseded—not by mass proletarization, but by a momentary unity of revolutionary action organized by a totalitarian movement. It seems to me that the nature of this nationwide unity of interests among social groups which have traditionally been in conflict with one another, constitutes today one of the basic problems for the political sociologist. To be sure, the unification of interests among conflicting social groups is a temporary one. It is superseded by a coercive totalitarian levelling of all groups under the leadership of a successful movement, which then becomes the supreme arbiter over the three branches of government—formally retained —and over all private associations as well. It is also true that the same hostile divisions among social groups are sure to recur, in the event that the movement fails.[19] But none of this alters the fact that the success or failure of totalitarian movements lies outside the frame of reference of the student of social stratification. This limitation is perhaps the most serious defect in the "social class" interpretation of political movements.[20]

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[19] In postwar Germany, for example, in the field of industrial relations the trade unions and the employers' associations seem to have resumed where they had left off in 1933. Witness the request from the unions to the Military Government authorities to allow the reorganization of the employers, a request which was based presumably on the desire to have somebody with whom to bargain. It was obviously difficult for the German trade unionists to adopt another pattern of collective bargaining and benefit from the temporary absence of employers' organizations. Cf. Clark Kerr, "Collective Bargaining in Postwar Germany," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 323–342 (April, 1952). In other respects, major changes in the German class structure *have* taken place. Some of these are described in Leopold von Wiese, "Soziale Sicherheit und Sozialer

III. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS

In this section I shall refer to the relation between stratification and politics in the countries of relatively advanced industrialization. For this reason I shall confine myself to the evidence on the rise of fascism, since so far communist movements have been successful only in predominantly agrarian countries. There is a resemblance between the rise of fascism and the rise of communism: both are made possible by the existence of a relatively small, tightly-knit, and well-disciplined organization and both depend for their success on the widespread support of large masses of people who flock to the movement suddenly during a period of acute crisis. The differences are, however, more striking, especially for a student of social stratification. In the countries of advanced industrialization we have a large middle class which initially resists the revolutionary attempts from the Right and the Left, only to join the fascist movement when it is about to attain power. In the predominantly agrarian countries, where the communist movement has been successful so far, no such middle class exists; hence success must necessarily depend upon the support of other social groups, especially the peasants.[21]

Propositions concerning the conquest of power by a totalitarian movement have suffered repeatedly from a failure to distinguish the several elements of a successful totalitarian movement. One important distinction should be made between the description of a movement before its conquest of power and afterwards. A second distinction should emphasize the difference between the nucleus of leaders, their immediate entourage (subleaders), the party members, and the supporting or acquiescent masses. And a third distinction probably should refer to the reasons for the increasing weakness of established institutions rather than to the reasons for the strength of the totalitarian threat. Any analysis of a totalitarian movement should leave no doubt as to which aspect of the problem it is concerned with.

For illustrative purposes, I shall discuss the mass-support of the Nazi movement prior to its conquest of power. To begin with, it is superficially plausible to suggest that fascist movements are of middle-class origin. Since the thesis is generally familiar, I merely add the point that it fits in well with the growing importance of the middle class in industrial society, discussed

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Aufstieg als Probleme Unserer Zeit," *Soziale Welt*, Vol. 1, pp. 3–13 (April, 1950).

[20] We speak of movements as distinct from parties and interest organizations in order to designate their revolutionary, extra-legal characteristics.

[21] What a successful communist revolution would be like in a country of advanced industrialization we are as yet unable to say. Although this statement is apparently contradicted by the case of Czechoslovakia, I would suggest that in this instance the population was so united in its opposition to the Germans that it momentarily greeted the Russians as liberators. The problems involved certainly illustrate the decided limitation of a study of political power which would base itself exclusively on an analysis of social stratification. While it is possible that peasant discontent is a major factor which explains communist success in agrarian countries, it is probable that a more or less disguised Russian intervention, rather than the internal social structure of the country, would account for such a development in an industrialized country.

above. According to this reasoning, fascism can be explained as a mass-response to the frustrations suffered by members of the middle class during a period of acute economic distress. The new as well as the old middle class experience a sudden loss of economic security and social status. This sudden loss makes them despair of regaining security and status through the traditional legal, political, and economic means, while the totalitarian movement inspires them with the hope that both may be regained by "direct action."[22] Such a theory is certainly plausible in a broad sense; but it has a number of implications which need to be analyzed separately.

The middle-class origin theory refers to the large masses of people who rallied suddenly to the cause of the Nazi Party; but it does not refer to the leaders, the subleaders, or the regular party members—or at any rate it should not refer to them, if it seeks to explain the mass-support of the party rather than the behavior of its leaders and members. Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind the suddenness with which the Nazi Party changed from an unimportant splinter-group to that of the major contestant for power among the numerous political parties of Weimar Germany. In the elections of 1928 the Party obtained 810,127 votes and 12 seats in the Reichstag; in the elections of 1930 it secured 6,379,672 votes and 107 seats in the Reichstag. And in the following election, 1932, the Party again more than doubled its votes and seats (13,765,781 votes and 230 seats).[23]

How are we to explain the suddenness with which large masses of people became identified with the Nazi Party? Apparently, people of middle-class origin were willing to support an attack on law and order and private property, though ordinarily they are strong supporters of the status quo. A glance at the election statistics during the crucial years reveals why a study of the fascist movment should not be based primarily on an analysis of social stratification. The first major success of the Nazis occurred during the period 1928–1930, when the total votes cast in their favor increased by 5,569,545, i.e., an eightfold increase in two years. During the same two-year period the Communist Party gained 1,325,367 votes. The combined increase in votes for the National Socialist and Communist parties constitutes a radicalization of the electorate by 6,894,912 votes. It occurred at a time when 2,444,990 persons decided to vote who had not voted in the previous election and when an additional 1,758,234 young people became eligible and voted for the first time.[24] The only other parties which together gained over 1 million votes in 1930 as compared with 1928 were the small middle-class parties and the Catholic Center Party. All other parties lost votes, ranging from a loss of 270,000 by the Democratic Party to a loss of almost 2 million by the German Nationalist Party. The most plausible interpretation of this evidence is to suggest that the increase in Nazi votes resulted from a radicalization of members in the nationalist parties of the Right and from the sudden participation of about 4,200,000 nonvoters and young people.[25] No evidence on the social composition of previous nonvoters and of the newly eligible young people is available, but there is no reason to believe that they were all, or even predominantly, members of the middle class.[26] Political apathy occurs in all strata of a population, but it occurs less frequently among members of the middle class than among workers. It seems safest simply to offer the hypothesis that it was the radicalization of people who had not participated actively in party politics and who had been too young to vote which gave a major impetus to the rise of fascism.[27]

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[22] See for example, the theory of fascism as a populist, middle-class movement in D. J. Saposs, "The Role of the Middle Class in Social Development," in *Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Mitchell* (New York, 1935), pp. 393–424. The same thesis is discussed, albeit with psychoanalytic adumbrations, by H. D. Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism as a Response of the Lower Middle Class to Continuing Insecurity," in his *The Analysis of Political Behavior* (London, 1949), pp. 235–245.

[23] All election statistics are based on Wilhelm Dittman, *Das Politische Deutschland vor Hitler* (Zurich, 1945).

[24] Arthur Dix estimates the number of newly eligible voters in 1930 as approximately 2.5 million, though he does not indicate his source. He also remarks that 1.5 million of the older voters died during 1928–1930, and that the loss of conservative votes may be attributed to this fact in part. My own figure of 1,758,234 new voters is derived by sub-

The subsequent elections of 1932 *do* indicate the growing support of the Nazi Party among middle-class voters. The small middle-class parties polled only 1,126,991 votes in 1932, a drop of over 3,740,000 in two years. This, together with a further loss of the nationalist parties of 1.5 million votes and the addition of another 2 million previous nonvoters and newly eligible voters, gave the National-Socialists a gain of over 7,300,000 votes. And although in the second election of 1932 (November) the nonvoters increased again, it is interesting that in March, 1933, over 3.5 million previous nonvoters decided to participate, once more.

The importance of the newly eligible voters and of the politically apathetic

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tracting the total number of eligible voters in 1928 from the corresponding figure for 1930. It is clear, however, that this is a minimal figure which would be increased if the number of voters who had died during this period could be deducted as Dix suggests. See Arthur Dix, *Die Deutschen Reichstagswahlen, 1870–1930, und die Wandlungen der Volksgliederung* (Tübingen, 1930), pp. 36.

[25] Presumably, the gain of the small middle-class parties and the Catholic Center accrued from both the Right and the Left, from those nationalists who feared the radicalism of the Nazis and the Communists and those liberals and socialists who wanted to bolster the middle-of-the-road parties during this crisis. The gain of the Communists probably resulted more from the increase of young voters than from a radicalization of liberals or socialists.

[26] That the new voters in 1930 were predominantly of middle-class origin has been suggested frequently, though no evidence is given to support this contention. See, for example, the article by Theodor Geiger, "Panik im Mittelstand," *Die Arbeit*, Vol. 7, esp. p. 648 (Oct., 1930). Evidence is available, however, which suggests that political participation increases with education and income. See Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior* (London, 1937), pp. 120–156, where studies from several countries are reviewed. Tingsten's conclusion is that "the analysis of the electoral participation of the different social classes has proved that as a rule the political interest grows with rising social standard" (*ibid.*, p. 230).

[27] It should be added that the German public was thoroughly political, since the addition of 4.2 million new voters increased the percentage of voters from 75.6 (in 1928) to 82 (in 1930). From 1930–1933 participation in the elections increased further from 82 to 88.7 per cent.

casts doubt on the conception of fascism as a middle-class movement. This is not to deny that the economic insecurity of middle-class groups was important for the conquest of power as a secondary response.[28] It is to assert rather that the radicalization of the electorate originated among the previous nonparticipants in party politics, who probably came from various social groups, and that the significant support of the totalitarian movement by members of the middle class and of other social groups occurred subsequently in the hope of relief from economic distress and in the desire to gain from backing the victorious movement.[29] Although the social composition of party members is not an index of the social composition of the electorate, it is significant that fascist parties drew their members from all strata of the population. In contrast to the socialist and communist parties, about 90 per cent of whose members were manual workers, the fascist parties were quite heterogeneous.

TABLE I

PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF NAZI AND FASCIST PARTY MEMBERS IN DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONS, 1933 (GERMANY) AND 1921 (ITALY)[30]

Nazi Party Members, 1933 (Germany)		Fascist Party Members, 1921 (Italy)	
Manual Workers	31.5	Small Traders and Artisans	9.8
White Collar	21.1	Industrialists	3.0
Self Employed	17.6	State Servants (including soldiers and civil servants)	5.1
Peasants	12.6	Salaried Employees	10.6
Officials	6.7	Teachers	1.2
Others	10.5	Students	14.0
		Merchant Marine	1.0
		Industrial Workers	16.5
		Agricultural Workers	26.0
		Landowners (including small proprietors and contractors)	12.8

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[28] It is secondary in the sense that the mobilization of the apathetic and the young as voters and as party-activists comes first. For a detailed case study of one area, cf. Heberle, *op. cit.* (above n. 16), Ch. 3. Cf. also Charles P. Loomis and J. Allen Beagle, "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 11, pp. 724–734 (Dec., 1946). A striking literary portrayal of the rural development is contained in the novel by Hans Fallada, *Bauern, Bonzen und Bomben.*

[29] Heberle, pp. 84–89. The influx of nonparticipants in 1928–1930 coincided with the radicalization of the nationalists, many of whom were probably members of the middle class. But the big shift of votes away from the parties of the Right and Center occurred in 1932 rather than in 1930. If we add all the lost and gained votes for the 1930 and 1932 elections, we find that all the parties between the Nazis and the Communists lost 2,691,688 votes in 1930, but 6,132,692 votes in 1932. Yet the 1930 election had 4,203,224 new voters, while the 1932 election had 1,925,883 new voters. It is apparent that the major increase of Nazi votes came from the new voters in 1930, while the major change in the votes of people in the middle class (and other social groups) occurred in 1932.

[30] The figures for Germany are taken from H. H. Gerth, "The Nazi Party," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, p. 527 (Jan., 1940). The figures for Italy are taken from Her-

If the above figures are compared with those for the population as a whole, they show, it is true, a disproportionate number of party members from middle-class groups. But the point to note is that the active members of these radical movements came from many sections of the population, whose interests frequently conflicted under ordinary circumstances, not that there were many persons of middle-class background among them.

Fascism arose in Germany when a severe social and economic crisis blurred or obliterated the conflicting interests between different social groups coincident with, and partly because of, the sudden entry into political life of previous nonparticipants. These nonparticipants were stimulated by, and helped to spread, an all-or-nothing demand for the solution of the crisis. I would suggest that a temporary unification of interests between previously antagonistic groups occurred in many instances and that this probably added an impetus to the sudden participation of the politically apathetic. There was the temporary unity of interests among different social groups in small towns in their common antagonism against the economic power of the metropolis.[31] There was the unity of the small farmers and of the petty bourgeoisie in the semi-rural towns, when depression and indebtedness drove them to the brink of economic disaster. There was the so-called intellectual proletariat, whose lack of regular employment led them to cooperation with other marginal groups in the task of organizing a fascist movement.[32]

Neither the temporary unity between previously antagonistic groups nor the sudden entry into political life of a large number of nonvoters and young people can lead to a conquest of power without the existence of a well-organized political machine.[33] The size of the organization is not nearly so important as the

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man Finer, *Mussolini's Italy* (London, 1935), p. 143. Earlier data on the social composition of the German Social-Democratic Party are contained in Robert Michels, "Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie," *Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft*, Vol. 23, esp. p. 509 (1906). Figures for the social composition of the German Communist Party are quoted in Ossip Flechtheim, *Die KPD in der Weimarer Republik* (Offenbach, 1948), p. 236.

[31] An example of such unity has been discussed with reference to the American scene in S. M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, "Social Status and Social Structure," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 2, pp. 230–233 (Sept., 1951).

[32] See the recent study by Daniel Lerner, *The Nazi Elite* (Stanford, 1951), in which the marginality of the Nazi leaders is analyzed in detail. Of course, the leaders of other mass movements have also been marginal, though perhaps in a different sense of the word. A comparative study of the leaders of mass movements would be very interesting. A first step in this direction is provided in Robert Michels, "Historisch-Kritische Untersuchungen zum politischen Verhalten der Intellektuellen," *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, Vol. 57, pp. 29–56 (Dec., 1933). Michels concludes his study with the following analysis: "Education is power. Yet only a modicum of intellectual qualities belong to the social dynamics of a political exercise of power. Other factors like energy, faith in oneself, knowledge of men have a far greater impact on the conquest of power and on its retention for a period of time. The influence of the intelligentsia on the masses remains, therefore, on the surface. Only if this influence is buttressed by objective conditions is it likely to foster political movements which produce profound changes in the social structure" (*ibid.*, p. 56—my translation).

[33] The importance of these three factors for the rise of fascism was pointed out 21

discipline it can impose on its members. This discipline is crucial in a number of ways. It effectively severs the member from all personal and social ties, or successfully identifies these with the movment; and it continually tests his loyalty in the face of social ostracism by new demands for service and sacrifice. By these methods it creates a new community within the larger society, so that the "movement" is of necessity a center of allegiance which conflicts with all previous affiliations of the individual, including his identification with a social class, as well as with his adherence to generally accepted political and legal procedures.[34] It was the presence of such a paramilitary organization in the Germany of 1929–1930 which created a totalitarian mass-movement out of the sudden participation of newly eligible voters and previous nonvoters.[35]

But the impetus to radicalization among the German masses arose in the first instance among those who were just entering political life. It is probably characteristic of many nonvoters to regard political participation as "useless," to believe that politics will only benefit the crooks anyway, and to profess a lack of concern with public affairs. Such people are likely to vote only under extreme provocation, and they are likely to support a party which proposes to clean the Augean stables and to establish an entirely new order. It is, therefore, conceivable that under certain conditions the survival of democratic institutions does not depend on a more widespread participation in politics, as is commonly assumed. It may depend rather on a persistent residue of political apathy which enables the nonparticipants to acquiesce in the democratic process and to ignore its many imperfections. This residue is especially important in countries, such as Germany was, where the majority of the voters are firmly committed to one party or another. As Herbert Tingsten has observed:

> An exceptionally high voting frequency may indicate an intensification of political controversy which may involve a danger to the democratic system. The enormous election figures in Austria 1923–1930 and in Germany 1930–1933 were symptoms of a political

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years ago, though the voluminous literature on this subject has largely ignored the first and second factor. I refer to the article by Carl Mierendorff, "Gesicht und Charakter der National-Sozialistischen Bewegung," *Die Gesellschaft*, pp. 489–504 (1930). The preceding analysis was written before I chanced upon this article, but I want to pay tribute to the insight of this courageous man, who clearly understood the danger long before events proved him to have been correct. Mierendorff helped to prepare the 1944 revolt against Hitler, but was killed in a bombing attack.

[34] These are the factors which distinguish, for example, communist from socialist parties: not the social composition of their members, which is largely working-class, nor the origin of their leaders, which is largely bourgeois, in both cases. Cf. the discussion in A. Rossi, *A Communist Party in Action* (New Haven, 1949), pp. 193–233.

[35] This transformation of the civilian into a "true believer" has been analyzed with great insight by Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York, 1951). The presence of an effective organization in the Germany of 1929 and the threat which it presented owing to the influx of new voters was already analyzed by Mierendorff, pp. 498–501. Corresponding analyses for Italy are contained in Ignazio Silone, *Der Faschismus* (Zurich, 1934), pp. 75–95; Robert Michels, *Sozialismus und Faschismus in Italien* (Munich, 1925), pp. 189–250, although these and other studies (such as Rossi's *The Rise of Italian Fascism*) still attempt to explain fascism in terms of social stratification.

> tension heightened in the extreme, and foreshadowed the fall of the democratic regimes. Another circumstance is of importance. So long as electoral participation is "normal," the parties will in the main direct their energies to conquering the politically indifferent groups, but when practically all the electors are politically engaged, not only will the competition for the indifferent be intensified, but in addition the efforts to win over electors from the opposing camp will become predominant. . . . These points are of importance above all when the electoral masses are comparatively firmly attached to separate parties. In countries where a great number of electors do not feel bound to a certain party but to a great extent make their choice in each election according to their views on the particular election issues, a high degree of electoral participation cannot be judged in the same manner.[36]

IV. *ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF FASCISM*

I have examined the mass-support of a fascist movement prior to its conquest of power in order to indicate why I believe that a knowledge of social stratification contributes little to an understanding of the success of such a movement. My objective was also to point up a particular configuration of conditions which must be taken into account in the analysis of totalitarian movements. Though the facts I have cited raise many important questions for further research, they are perhaps sufficient to indicate the weakness of analyses of totalitarianism which ignore them. I shall review three examples of such analyses.

Attempts have been made to account for the rise of totalitarianism by specifying the social composition of totalitarian movements before their conquest of power. The presumption of such studies is that the sociological make-up of totalitarian movements explains their successful conquest of power in the same way as, say, the lack of a working-class following might explain the weakness of the French socialists while the adherence of a large, class-conscious following would explain the strength of the Communists.[37] Yet this approach is adequate only so long as the revolutionary situation is not at hand. A totalitarian movement does not conquer a state because of the strength of its regular following. It conquers because some crisis situation adds to that following a significant portion of the electorate as well as of the politically indifferent public, whose previous political allegiance or indifference have been transformed rather suddenly by the cumulative pressure of adverse circumstances.

This transformation takes place under the leadership of social outcasts—many of them unemployed professionals of all sorts—whose general characteristics Marx had already pointed out in his comments on the Society of December 10.[38] But it should be remembered that these "bohemian" outcasts of the bourgeoisie have accompanied the whole development of capitalist society since the beginning of the nineteenth century. They have responded to their outcast role in a variety of ways: from the original Bohemia of Paris in the 1830's to the Paris colony of American artists in the 1920's, from the individual terrorism of the social revolutionaries in Russia to the intellectual glorification of death and violence of the "armed intellectuals" (Heiden) in Germany after World War I.[39] An analysis of social stratification can merely reveal that all of them are outcasts. It cannot account for the historically significant differences between them.[40]

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[36] Tingsten, *op. cit.* (above, n. 26), pp. 225–226.

[37] See Henry W. Ehrmann, "The Decline of the Socialist party," and Val R. Lorwin, "The Struggle for Control of the French Trade-Union Movement, 1945–1949," in E. M. Earle (ed.), *Modern France* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 181–218.

[38] "On the pretext of founding a benevolent society, the lumpenproletariat of Paris had been organized into secret sections, each section being led by Bonapartist agents, with a Bonapartist general at the head of the whole. Alongside decayed roués with doubtful means of subsistence and of doubtful origin, alongside ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie, were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged jail-birds, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, mountebanks, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gam-

I question also whether much light is shed on the conquest of power by a totalitarian movement when a study of its social composition is combined with a psychological analysis.[41] Such an analysis runs along familiar lines. Totalitarian movements have had a special appeal to the lower middle class. Members of this class are typically authoritarian. They exaggerate their idealization of their own and their depreciation of alien groups; they have a punitive attitude towards outsiders. They are beset by a concealed hostility which is expressed in rigid adherence to conventional morals, in a basic distrust of others, in the anticipation of aggression from all quarters, and in a catastrophic conception of human life.[42] I accept the soundness of this analysis. But the question here is whether the prevalence of authoritarian character traits can be cited as a major cause for the success of a totalitarian movement. I do not believe it can. First, the fallacy of retrospective determinism applies here also: we study a group whose support swept a totalitarian movement into power, we find that it is authoritarian, and we infer that the second fact caused the first (among many other factors, to be sure). But ethnocentric people were always authoritarian, long before they became supporters of a movement; indeed, some scholars have attempted to trace the historical development of this character-structure

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blers, procurers, brothel-keepers, porters, literati, organ-grinders, rag-pickers, knife-grinders, tinkers, beggars, in short the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass thrown hither and thither, which the French term La Boheme" (Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, p. 65).

[39] See Robert Michels, "Zur Soziologie der Boheme und ihrer Zusammenhaenge mit dem geistigen Proletariat," *Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik*, Vol. 136, pp. 801–816 (June, 1932).

[40] A brilliant discussion of two of these groups is contained in Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951), pp. 92–120, with reference to the Anti-Dreyfusards, and pp. 320–326, with reference to the nihilist and nationalist German intellectuals of the post-World War I generation.

[41] This is not to deny the great value of the excellent study by T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Nevitt Sanford, and D. Levinson, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950), but I question the assertion that people of authoritarian character are "potential fascists" (p. 1).

[42] Dr. Else Brunswik has coined the phrase "intolerance of ambiguity," which indeed characterizes these people as few other single phrases do. For a brief delineation of this character structure, see Else Frenkel-Brunswik, "A Study of Prejudice in Children," *Human Relations*, Vol. 1, pp. 295–306 (1948), and A. H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," *Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 18, pp. 401–411 (1943).

back to the time of the Reformation, in the case of Germany.[43] Second, a good case can be made for the contention that the authoritarian family was an important factor in resisting the totalitarian movement, because all families, including those of the authoritarian type, are threatened by the effort of such movements to set children against parents. Third, the psychological analysis seems to me to explain too much. The issue is not whether people of an authoritarian bent will support a totalitarian regime more wholeheartedly than others, once it is in power.[44] The question is rather whether, under trying circumstances, people of such character will jump on the band wagon, as well as despair, earlier than people of a more permissive disposition. I believe that we lack the necessary comparative evidence to answer this question properly.[45]

It seems probable to me that the answer lies not in psychological analysis so much as in the study of cumulative political experience. Let me state this point by way of an analogy. Men of various personality types are sorely tried under great adversities. They are likely to meet them with patience and endurance only when their personal experience provides them with a backlog of success in the use of certain established methods, for such a backlog enables them to absorb the shock of repeated failure under trying conditions. It seems to me that such a backlog of success in the use of democratic institutions has been lacking wherever totalitarian movements have been successful. The study of social stratification, whether or not it is adumbrated by psychological analysis, is not the proper approach to an understanding of the role of cumulative political experience.

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[43] See Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York, 1941) for the most comprehensive attempt in this respect.

[44] Though even this may be doubtful, since authoritarianism can take many forms. See, for example, the telling study of Cecil Jane, *Liberty and Despotism in Spanish America* (Oxford, 1929).

[45] A more detailed discussion of this psychological analysis is contained in the authors' "Compliant Behavior and Individual Personality," to be published in the *American Journal of Sociology*.

THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: NOTES FOR A THEORY*

EARL LATHAM
Amherst College

The chief social values cherished by individuals in modern society are realized through groups.[1] These groupings may be simple in structure, unicellular, so to speak, like a juvenile gang. Or they may be intricate meshes of associated, federated, combined, consolidated, merged, or amalgamated units and subunits of organization, fitted together to perform the divided and assigned parts of a common purpose to which the components are dedicated. They may operate out of the direct public gaze like religious organizations, which tend to have a low degree of visibility. Or they may, like Congress and many other official groups, occupy the front pages for weeks at a time. National organizations are usually conspicuous; indeed, so much is this so at times that they tend to divert the eye from the great number of groups which stand at the elbow of the citizen of every small town. Everywhere groups abound, and they may be examined at close range and from afar.[2]

I. THE GROUP IDEA IN SOCIAL SCIENCE

The literature of many disciplines agrees, as it does sometimes in little else, on the central importance of groups to an understanding of men in their relations with each other. The science of sociology, for example, devotes itself to the study of groups and groupings in society, the forms of group structure and behavior, the role of the individual in the group and his relation to it, the development of functional norms of behavior, the tendency of informal groups to sift themselves into a leadership and the led, the relation of subgroups to a central body, and so on.[3]

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* An extended and somewhat modified version of this essay appears in Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics, A Study in Basing-Point Legislation* (Ithaca, 1952).

[1] "The whole structure of modern society is associational . . . ," according to William Yandell Elliott in *The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (New York, 1928), p. 434. The view expressed by Elliott is also asserted by John Dewey in *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago, 1946). Dewey, however, denies the usefulness of the concept of "society," as a basis for generalizations on the ground that it is devoid of meaning. To pose problems of relationship between the individual and "society" is as meaningless, he feels, as "to make a problem out of the relation of the letters of an alphabet to the alphabet" (p. 69).

[2] In the small town of Amherst, Massachusetts, there are, not counting student organizations and official groups in the town government, "well more than one hundred Clubs, Lodges, Leagues, Guilds, Tribes, Granges, Circles, Unions, Chapters, Councils, Societies, Associations, Auxiliaries, Brotherhoods, and Fellowships. Their specialties or special interests, to name a few, include cards, cameras, stamps, gardens, churches, teachers, speakers, voters, horses, business, service, golf, nature, eating, fishing, gunning, parents, grandparents, ancestors, needlework, temperance, travel, and kindergarten" (William L. Doran, *University of Massachusetts Alumni Bulletin*, Vol. 31, No. 4, p. 4, Dec., 1948).

[3] See, for example, Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action; A Study in Social*

But the sociologists are not alone. The instrumentalist philosophy of John Dewey rejects the abstract individual as a fictional character, and asserts that the individual has meaning only in his relations with others.[4] The psychologists, by different routes, come to the same conclusion. The Gestalt school argues that the basic forms of knowing are comprehensive collectivities, general thought forms and patterns, not atomistic particulars. Modern psychoanalytical theory, as represented by Dr. Karen Horney, rejects the earlier Freudian assumption that the singular person can be understood apart from his culture, and asserts, instead, that what were formerly regarded as innate elements of the personality are induced traits originating in the culture, the result of interpersonal, i.e., group or social, influences.[5] The concept of the group has been indispensable to those working in the combined fields of cultural anthropology and psychology.[6] The concept of the group also is basic to certain approaches to jurisprudence,[7] and it has been helpful in bringing to economics a knowledge of the human institutions through which men dig coal, make soap and battleships, create credit, and allocate the resources of production.

Commons, Veblen, Clark, Andrews, and other pioneers in the empirical

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Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers (New York and London, 1937); Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York, 1947), especially the concept of the "corporate group," pp. 145 ff.; Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, trans. A. Bongiorno and A. Livingston, 4 vols. (New York, 1938); Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York and London, 1939). The concepts of the elite and the mass which are developed by Pareto and Mosca are concepts of group action. For political applications of sociological methods, see the following, in addition to the works of Pareto and Mosca: Robert Michels, *Political Parties; A Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (New York, 1925); Robert McIver, *The Modern State* (Oxford, 1926) and *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947); and Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in An Age of Reconstruction* (New York, 1948). Some of these sociological insights into the structure and processes of politics are not new. For example, John Adams foreshadowed the view that society fundamentally divides into elite and mass when he said, "It already appears, that there must be in every society of men, superiors and inferiors, because God has laid in the Constitution and course of nature, the foundations of the distinction" (Charles Francis Adams, *The Life and Works of John Adams*, Boston, 1856, Vol. 4, p. 427).

[4] John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct; An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1922). See also Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*.

[5] Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York, 1937) and *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (New York, 1939). For example, Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, trans. Dr. A. A. Brill (New York, 1950), describes and explains the Oedipus complex without limiting it to any culture (pp. 160–162, 269–270). But what becomes of the Oedipus complex in a society like that of the Marquesas or the Trobriand Islands, where, anthropologists assert, it does not exist? Modern research suggests that this fundamental pattern in human behavior is a culture trait; for a discussion of the point, see Abram Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New York, 1947), pp. 479 ff.

[6] Well known are the following works: Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (New York, 1922); Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (Boston, 1934) and *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston, 1946); Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society;* and Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York, 1945).

[7] As in N. S. Timasheff, *An Introduction to the Sociology of Law* (Cambridge, 1939).

study of such economic group forms as banks, corporations, granges, unions, cooperatives, railroads, brokerage houses, and exchanges did much to rectify the notion that some objective law, heedless of men, somehow filled each purse to the exact limit justified by the contribution of its owner to the total of the goods and services of society. The economic theory of a century ago fixed the nature of the economic universe by definition and tended to derive its characteristics by deduction—an economic world inhabited by a multiplicity of individuals in isolation, where combination was a pathological deviation. Such a *defined* (not observed) universe could not fail to work—in the realm of discourse. However, so far have we come from this view that a whole new vocabulary has been invented to explain the operations of an economic community formed of aggregations, clusters, blocs, and combinations of people and things—not individuals in isolation. Few modern writers on economics would be able to discuss their subject matter without reference to "oligopoly," "imperfect competition," "monopolistic competition," and other group phenomena in the economic community.

II. THE GROUP IDEA IN POLITICAL THEORY

The Utilitarians made the same assumptions about the nature of the political community that they made about the nature of the economic community. While the liberal philosophy of a John Stuart Mill rejected doctrines of natural law and right that were so familiar to the eighteenth century, it retained the feeling that the chief political problems were those that involved the singular individual on the one hand and the "state" on the other. All other and intermediate associations and groupings were dissolved, blanked, and obscured—a kind of sunken hinterland between two dominating mountainous battlements. This exaggerated individualism not only abstracted man from his social environment; it made him more sentient, more responsive to the gentle but compelling dictates of reason, more enlightened about his affairs than the facts justified. The political community seemed to possess characteristics of an Oxford debating society, policy emerging from endless debate, with reason presiding in the speaker's chair.[8]

But Utilitarian theories did not entirely dominate the field of political speculation, even in England. On the Continent and to a lesser degree in England, considerable attention was given to the works of the philosophical idealists—the school of Hegel, Fichte, and Treitschke on the Continent, and of T. H. Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet later in England. The Utilitarians virtually abolished the state, by deduction, and the philosophic idealists virtually abolished the individual, also by deduction.[9] The first imagined the political community to be a loose coëxistence of singular individuals, like marbles on a plate, held loosely together within the circumference of a common restraint but otherwise complete, unengaged, private, and unique. The second rather imagined the political community to resemble beads on a string, of which the separate parts by themselves were incomplete and without meaning, and which existed only to fulfill the pattern of the necklace.

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[8] This conception is fundamental to John Stuart Mill's famous essay, "On Liberty." For a discussion of the relation between Mill's view and the prevailing doctrine of free speech in the United States Supreme Court, see Earl Latham, "The Theory of the Judicial Doctrine of Freedom of Speech," in the *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 12, pp. 637–651 (Nov., 1950).

[9] For a brief but strong criticism of Hegel, see Bertrand Russell, *Philosophy and Politics* (London, 1947), pp. 16–20.

The principal attack, in England at least, upon the political speculations of the philosophic idealists was made by a group of writers professing pluralist doctrines. Figgis, Maitland, G. D. H. Cole, and Laski showed that many of the assumptions of the idealist school were contrary to fact. They showed that the state does not absorb all of the loyalties of the individual in the political community, as had been asserted, but that many lesser associations, such as church, corporation, and trade union, also lay claim to the faith, attachment, devotion, and obedience of the individual, and that these claims are acknowledged by responsive behavior. The state, said the pluralists, is merely one association among a host of associations, both factually and rightfully; and far from absorbing the entire allegiance of the individual, the state must compete with conflicting group loyalties, some of which are invincible. Most people think of themselves first as members of their clubs, lodges, unions, or parishes, and only incidentally as members of the state. And since the state is merely one group among many, it is without superior right to dominate other associations. In its extreme form (in guild socialism, for example), the pluralist doctrine advocated political communities organized syndically by industries, with common affairs administered by common consent, a loose kind of confederation or working alliance.

The pluralists did useful work when they evaporated the misty figment of the state which the idealists had presented as a colossus of unity, a monolith, an absolute, a total system swallowing and assimilating all personal beliefs, attachments, obligations, and relations, endowed with some of the attributes of human personality like will, and having an autonomous and independent life and existence apart from the lives and personalities of the members of the political community. But while this spectral personality was exorcised from the state by the pluralists, they materialized the phantasm in other bodies. The state, they said, did not have a "real" personality, separate and apart from its people; it was not a separate corpus possessing such human attributes as personality and will. What was denied to the state, however, was claimed for other associations, such as churches and trade unions. One would have thought that the arguments that caused the rejection of the real personality of the state should also have caused the rejection of the real personalities of other group associations. Or conversely, if the nonstate associations had real personalities, it was difficult to see why the state should be denied one, since it was also an association. Actually the effort, by words, to make the state disappear did not succeed, because all of the pluralist writers found it necessary to invent a normative, rule-making apparatus to represent the community interests of the constituent group associations, that is, to perform the functions of the state. What they sought to achieve was a political community based upon a federation of constituent groups to replace the consolidated lump that the idealists had been describing, authoritarian and unstriated; and in this endeavor the important insights of the pluralists were at least two. First, they pointed out the undeniable fact of the group basis of society, in both its political and its economic communities. Second, they demonstrated a few of the virtually infinite number of accommodations between the common and the universal on the one hand and the diverse and the particular on the other. These accommodations are implicit in the principle of federalism—a master principle that makes it possible to produce unities out of multiplicities of dissimilar parts, including unities as local as the organizations in the Community Fund and as universal as the United Nations.

The English pluralists did two things at the same time: they made an observation and expressed a hope. They described the group basis of society and then either erected Utopia upon this foundation or employed the insight to rationalize prejudged social and economic reforms. They intermingled wish and fact, and may indeed have been led to the second by the intensity of the first. Some support for this view is supplied by the evidence that writers like Laski, once pluralists, abandoned the doctrine and worked with more authoritarian modes of social reform, ignoring the fact when it seemed no longer to suit the hope. Perhaps for such pluralists the adjective "philosophic" may be employed, as a phrase which suggests the characteristics of system, perception, metaphysics, and value judgment which are found in their writings. The philosophic pluralists accepted the group basis of society, but failed to investigate its forms, mutations, and permutations in a scientific spirit. It has remained for others to carry forward scientific analyses of group behavior, including a number of writers on politics. The word "pluralists" may properly be applied to these investigators since they deal with the plurality of observed group forms, but they are concerned less with prejudged programs of social and economic reform than with the accurate investigation and description of the many phenomena connected with the activities of groups in society. The adjective "analytical" may be added to refer to that species of pluralist who concerns himself with the structure and processes of group forms as they in fact occur. And although analytical pluralism has characterized principal works of sociology, the term is here reserved for political writers, to distinguish them from their philosophic predecessors.

In sum the doctrine of the philosophical pluralists was systematic (although imperfectly so), conceptual, deductive, and normative. That of the many writers here called analytical pluralists was, and is, hypothetical, experimental, empirical, and descriptive. The intellectual roots of analytical pluralism are deep in the history of American thought. In a line through Peirce, James, and Dewey, the psychology has tended to be behavioristic, the philosophy pragmatic, and the metaphysics realistic rather than idealistic. This combination of intellectual elements has turned social inquiry towards process and away from static conceptualism, towards relations rather than structures, and towards consequences instead of causes. Process, relations, and consequences are not, however, the antonyms of concepts, structures, and causes. The distinctions blur, shade, and fuse. It might be more nearly correct to say, therefore, that the analytical pluralists have tended to emphasize the former while not ignoring, nor neglecting the latter. Although the modern approach has much in common with the philosophy of science, fragments of pluralistic politics are to be found in the classics of American political philosophy, notably in Madison and Calhoun.

It is since Alfred Bentley in 1908 that American writers in politics have increasingly accepted the view that the group is the basic political form,[10] although most of the literature follows Pendleton Herring's pioneer work in 1928. Studies have been made of the significance of the group in the enactment of legislation, in the conduct of party activity, in the formulation and execution of public policy, in the process of public administration, and in the protection of civil liberties.[11] The recognition of the importance of groups to a study and an understanding of politics has drawn the attention of political scientists to the considerable amount of work done in the related social science fields on the nature of group organization, and, increasingly, materials developed in these allied fields have been used in political writing and in the classroom. For example, closely relevant to politics are the studies of the structure and process of groups as simple, amorphous, and uncontrived as the street-corner gang, as remote as South Pacific islanders, and as near as Middletown.[12] Such studies throw much light upon the contrast between the objective and subjective relationships among people in groups, the difference between the formal and the informal organization which this reflects, the imposed rule and the developed custom, the external and visible structure on the one hand and the internal and invisible network of unconscious, nonlogical personal relationships on the other, the distribution of authority and the distribution of power, the nature of leadership and the relations of leaders and followers, the importance of prestige and status anxieties, and the methods employed to develop and maintain security systems for the protection of the members of the group.[13]

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[10] See Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908); Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (Baltimore, 1929), *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York and London, 1936), and *The Politics of Democracy* (New York, 1940); E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff* (New York, 1935) and *Party Government* (New York, 1942); William Bennett Munro, *The Invisible Government* (New York, 1928); Peter Odegard, *Pressure Politics* (New York, 1928); and David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951).

[11] Enactment of legislation: Stephen K. Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York, 1950); Roland Young, *This is Congress* (New York, 1943). Party activity: Peter Odegard and E. A. Helms, *American Politics* (New York, 1938); E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government;* V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties and Pressures Groups* (New York, 1946). Formulation of policy: Stuart Chase, *Democracy Under Pressure* (New York, 1945); Wesley McCune, *The Farm Bloc* (New York, 1943). Public Administration: Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation* (Chicago, 1942); Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950); Robert Dahl, *Congress and the Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950); Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest.* Civil liberties; David Riesman, "Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition," *Public Policy,* Vol. 3 (Cambridge, 1942), pp. 33 ff.; "Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties," *Yale Law Journal,* Vol. 58, pp. 574 ff. (1949).

[12] These studies are illustrative: William Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago, 1943); W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven, 1941); W. Lloyd Warner and J. O. Low, *The Strike, A Social Analysis* (New Haven, 1947); W. Lloyd Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven, 1945); W. Lloyd Warner, *The Status System of a Modern Community* (New Haven, 1942); Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific;* Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (New York, 1937); W. Lloyd Warner, *Democracy in Jonesville* (New York, 1949).

III. ORGANIZED GROUPS AS STRUCTURES OF POWER

The conclusion emerges from an inspection of the literature dealing with the structure and the process of groups that, insofar as they are organized groups, they are structures of power. They are structures of power because they concentrate human wit, energy, and muscle for the achievement of received purposes. They are of the same genus, although a different species, as the state. And so we come by still another route to the insight which the philosophical pluralists demonstrated, that the state as an association (or group) is not different from other associations, like churches and trade unions. That which puts both state and nonstate associations in the same category of forms is the common factor of power. Both are associations of people for the achievement of ends common to the members, and the means of achievement is the application of the power of the association to the obstacles and hindrances which block the goal. It is true that the state and other group forms represent power in different packages, that organized groups may be regarded as systems of private government while the organs of the state represent a system of public government. However, the ubiquity of power in human relations, with its manifestations in other group forms than the state, is the reason for believing that the subject matter of politics is power, contrary to the view that its subject matter is the state, which is only one of the engines through which power is exercised.[14] Private government is not only a legitimate but a much neglected subject of inquiry by political science.

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[13] Studies dealing with this material are: Chester I. Barnard, *Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, 1947); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, 1939); F. J. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale* (Cambridge, 1942); Elton Mayo, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston, 1945); Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1933); T. North Whitehead, *Leadership in a Free Society* (Cambridge, 1936); Peter Drucker, *The Concept of the Corporation* (New York, 1946); A. A. Berle and Gardiner Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York, 1932); Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York, 1947); Herbert Simon, Donald Smithburg, and Victor Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York, 1950); Sebastion de Grazia, *The Political Community* (Chicago, 1948).

[14] For a study of the political structure and process of an institution of private government, see Oliver Garceau, *The Political Life of the American Medical Association* (Cambridge, 1941), and A. R. Danielian, *The A.T. and T.* (New York, 1939). For general works on the subject of power as the focus of politics, see Bertrand Russell, *Power* (New York, 1938), and Charles Merriam, *Political Power* (New York, 1934). The distinction between private and public government is discussed in Charles Merriam, *Public and Private Government* (New Haven, 1944).

The course of the discussion to this point may be summarized as a doctrine of the politics of plural forms. To use the phrase of John Dewey, the "doctrine of plural forms is a statement of fact: that there exist a plurality of social groupings, good, bad, and indifferent."[15] These groupings have no "real" personality; there is no derivative entity in group organization which is not people, but somehow possesses human attributes. For social groupings *are* people in connected relationships; the connected relationships do not exist apart from the people. To recognize the group basis of society and, by inclusion, the group basis of the political and other communities, is not to lose sight of the individual. Far from it—the individual is the center without which the circumference of the group could not form.

As we have seen, groups exist for the individuals to whom they belong; by his membership in them the individual fulfills personal values and felt needs. To view the individual as the centerpiece of all group forms is to avoid the error of regarding society as a congeries of discrete and disconnected human particles. Recognition of the place and role of the individual in group associations also avoids the error of supposing that political processes move by a blind voluntarism in a Schopenhaueresque world. To repeat the observation with which this paper began, the whole structure of society is associational; neither disjected nor congealed, it is not a multiplicity of discontinuous persons, nor yet a solid fusion of dissolved components.

To say that the structure of the political community is associational is not to elevate other groups above the state, nor really to put them in a relationship of parity, as the philosophical pluralists did. In civil politics, some association does in fact represent the consensus by which the various groups exist in mutual relations. This is the state.[16] It establishes the norms of permissible behavior in group relations, and it enforces these norms. The fact that men have other group loyalties than the one they bear to the state does not in itself prescribe limits to the activity of the state. This activity is not confined to police functions at the margins where the intersecting and overlapping groups touch each other, because the role of the state is not limited to that of referee in the group conflict. Established as custodian of the consensus, the state helps to formulate and to promote normative goals, as well as to police the agreed rules. In the exercise of its normative functions, it may even require the abolition of groups or a radical revision of their internal structure.

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[15] *The Public and Its Problems*, p. 73.

[16] Although Bentley refers to the "idea of the state" as one of "the intellectual amusements of the past," he does not reject it completely but indicates that it may have some place in a complete restatement of theoretical political science. In the *Process of Government*, he was not trying to make such a comprehensive restatement but trying to describe political activity, that is, political processes. (See p. 263.) In his later works, the subject is not referred to again. Dewey, on the other hand, is clear that state and government are not the same, that there is no archetypal state, that there could be no state without a government, that the state did not create the government, that the state is a "public," articulated and operating through representative officers. (See *The Public and Its Government*, p. 67.) For Dewey, the state is the organization of singular individuals and their relations to the officials and functionaries established to protect the perceived consequences of conjoint behaviors. The perception of such consequences creates the "public," which is the constituent power of the state. The state is not a structure but a relationship. It is an association.

Organized groups, then, are structures of power; the forms of private government differ from the forms of public government principally in that public governments possess the characteristic of officiality, which will be more fully discussed below.[17] Through usage, the word "government" has come to be associated almost exclusively with the formal official apparatus of presidents, kings, duces, fuehrers, commissars, rajahs, rasses, sachems, sagamores, legislators, councillors, commissioners, mayors, governors, ministers plenipotentiary, ambassadors, judges, and other public officeholders. But who has not heard of "office politics," "faculty politics," "union politics," and so on? These phrases are more than metaphor. They bespeak the general understanding that the phenomena of power appear in unofficial groups as well as in the formal structures of official agencies of the public government. We may therefore add to the subjects which are proper to political inquiry, the activities of corporation managers, trade union leaders, bishops, colonels, trade association executives, boards of directors, trustees of colleges, and other such functionaries. The vocabulary of power in public governments is a key to the understanding of the structure and processes of systems of private government also. It is in the literature of administration, perhaps, that the most notable advance has been made in recognizing the single identity of the problem of power in its public and private manifestations, one test of which is the extent to which the public bureaucracy and the private have exchanged knowledge about the ways in which the management of organizations can most efficiently and effectively be carried on.[18] But this knowledge is not modern. John Wise, the liberal Ipswich theologian of the late seventeenth century, wrote tracts on the *government* of the Congregationalist churches in New England, which he wanted to keep democratic, as opposed to certain bureaucratic tendencies that appeared in his day.[19] He viewed the church as an ecclesiastical polity and discussed its organization in political terms which were virtually interchangeable with the vocabulary employed for similar speculation about forms of public government.[20]

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[17] It is useful to distinguish groups in three senses or phases of development: incipient, conscious, and organized. The indispensable ingredient of "groupness" is consciousness of common interest and active assistance, mutually sustained, to advance and promote this interest. Where the interest exists but is not recognized by the members of the putative association, the group may be said to be incipient. Thus, all dwellers in the Caribbean may actually possess certain interests in common—economic resources, strategic position, native populations in a colonial status, exposure to the hazards of weather, and so on—which may produce a consciousness of community, as similar predisposing factors produced the Indonesian Republic. A conscious group is one in which the community sense exists but which has not become organized. An organized group is a conscious group which has established an objective and formal apparatus to promote the common interest. Habitual cooperation of the members of a group is possible without any elaborate apparatus. Mannheim, in *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, pp. 51 ff., distinguishes between substantial and functional rationality. The first is conscious, contrived, directed action which makes use of deliberate means to produce known ends, efficiently sought. Functional rationality may be likened to what is here called habitual cooperation. Wherever the objective and formal apparatus of the organized group appears in its mature manifestations, it exhibits a very similar general form and pattern. Max Weber, in *Essays in Sociology*, trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1946), pp. 196 ff., discusses the phenomenon of bureaucracy, which is not limited to the institutions and behavior of public government but is universal among organized group structures. The three principal characteristics of bureaucracy are a fixed distribution of functions, a fixed distribution of authority, and a predictable procedure. By these terms, it is clear that private organizations have their bureaucracies as well as Washington and Whitehall.

IV. THE DYNAMICS OF PLURAL FORMS

So far, we have been concerned with the nature of the structure of society and its principal communities, and with the composition and classification of the group forms which are basic to both. They have been held still, so to speak, while they were being viewed. But they do not in fact hold still; they are in a state of constant motion, and it is through this motion and its interactions that these groups generate the rules by which public policy is formulated and the community is to be governed. It is necessary now to consider the impulses which animate the group motion and produce these penetrating and far-reaching results.

To consider further a point which has been made, groups organize for the self-expression and security of the members which comprise them. Even when the group is a benevolent, philanthropic association devoted to the improvement of the material and spiritual fortunes of people outside its membership—a temperance or a missionary organization, for example—the work towards this goal, the activity of the organization, is a means through which the members express themselves. Satisfaction in the fulfillment of the received purposes of the group is an important element in keeping groups intact, as Barnard has shown.[21] Indeed, if these satisfactions are not fulfilled, the group suffers loss of morale, energy, and dedication. It is for this reason that military organizations and the civil authorities to which they are responsible seek to inculcate in the soldier some sense of the general purposes for which force by arms is being employed, in an attempt to identify the soldier's personal purpose with that of the community he serves. The soldier then can fulfill his own purposes in combat, as well as those of various groups in the country whose uniform he bears.

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[18] To name only a few of these writers, there are James Mooney and Alan Reiley, *Principles of Organization* (New York, 1939); Henri Fayol, *Industrial and General Administration* (London, 1930); Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York, 1937); Lyndall Urwick, *The Elements of Administration* (London, 1943); Mary Niles, *Middle Management* (New York, 1941).

[19] See *A Vindication of the Government of New England Churches* (Boston: Congregational Board of Publication, 1860).

[20] The problem dealt with by John Wise involved a few thousands. The same kind of problem today involves millions. For example, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America contains twenty-seven different denominations and claims a membership of more than 29,000,000 people, a figure which the total population of the United States did not reach until just before the Civil War. The form of organization is a loose confederation of the following constituent bodies: National Baptist Convention, Northern Baptist Convention, Church of the Brethren, General Council of Congregational Christian Churches, Czech-Moravian Brethren, International Convention of Disciples of Christ, Evangelical and Reformed Church, Evangelical United Brethren Church, Five Years Meeting of the Friends of America, Religious Society of Friends of Philadelphia and Vicinity, the Methodist Church, African Methodist Episcopal Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, Colored Methodist Episcopal Church in America, Moravian Church, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., Presbyterian Church in the U.S., Protestant Episcopal Church, Reformed Church in America, Romanian Orthodox Church of America, Russian Orthodox Church of North America, Seventh Day Baptist General Conference, Syrian Antiochian Orthodox Church of North America, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of America, United Church of Canada, United Lutheran Church (Consultive), United Presbyterian Church. It is estimated that there are also seven hundred local and state councils of churches in America, designed to advance interchurch cooperation locally.

At the same time, security is an object of every group organization if security is understood only in its elemental sense of the survival of the group itself in order to carry forward its mission. At the very least, the interest of security means the maintenance of the existence of the group. In different groups one or the other of these impulses—self-expression or security—will predominate.

Self-expression and security are sought by the group members through control of the physical and social environment which surrounds each group and in the midst of which it dwells. It is an elemental fact that environments are potentially dangerous to every group, even as homes are potentially dangerous to the members of the household, as the statistics of accidents in the home will attest. The military battalion runs the risk of being shot up. The church, new or old, runs the risk of losing its members to other and competing claims of interest and devotion. The businessman runs the risk of losing his profit or his customer to his rival. The philanthropic organization devoted to good works often regards other agencies in the same field with a venomous eye. Councils of social agencies in large cities are sometimes notorious for the rancor with which the struggle for prestige and recognition (i.e., self-expression and security) is conducted among them. Every group, large and small, must come to terms with its environment if it is to endure and to prosper.

There are three modes by which this is done. First, the environment may be made safe and predictable by putting restraints upon it. Jurisdictional fights between unions may be explained in this way. Jurisdictional fights are battles in which each claimant union seeks to make an environment for itself in the area of dispute, but to exclude its rival from this environment. On the employer side, the Mohawk Valley Formula was a pattern of actions in a planned sequence by which employers, if they followed it, could break union movements. The objective of this formula was to discredit each union and its leadership and to enlist the support of the townspeople on the side of the plant; it thus was a concerted plan to make an environment unfavorable to the success of unions. One overcomes the hostility in the environment most directly by destroying the influence which creates the hostility.

Second, the environment may be made safe and predictable by neutralizing it. In the propaganda war of giant world powers, the effort is ceaseless to neutralize the effects of propaganda with counterpropaganda so as to render the international environment favorable, or at least not hostile—that is, neutral. The Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company similarly bought a great deal of advertising space in newspapers all over the country to counteract the expectedly unfavorable impressions created by a Department of Justice action against it under the anti-trust laws. The object, among other purposes, was to make the customer-inhabited environment of the business enterprise favorable if possible, neutral at the least, concerning the merits of the charges against it.

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[21] In *Functions of the Executive.*

Third, the environment may be made safe and predictable, and therefore secure, by conciliating it and making it friendly. Even where there is no manifest hostile influence, a credit of good will may be accumulated by deeds and words which reflect favorably upon the doer. It is true that concessions to a potential hostile force may work sometimes, and again they may not. In the struggle of free nations with the dictatorships, appeasement did not succeed in producing that conciliation which was hoped for it. Nonetheless, politicians are constantly at work making friends and increasing votes by performing favors of one kind or another. Friendliness towards soap is generated on the radio by endless broadcasts of simple tales of never-ending strife and frustration. And during the Second World War advertising by business enterprises was a means of cultivating and keeping good will for the products advertised, even though there was no market for them because of the wartime restrictions on production.

All of these are methods by which the environment in which groups dwell is made safe and predictable to them, and therefore secure. And because the relations of people are myriad and shifting, subject to cycles of deterioration and decay, because the environment itself changes with each passing hour, there is a ceaseless struggle on the part of groups to dominate, neutralize, or conciliate that part of their environment that presses in upon them most closely. In this struggle, there is an observable balance of influence in favor of organized groups in their dealings with the unorganized, and in favor of the best and most efficiently organized in their dealings with the less efficiently organized. Strong nations tend to take advantage of the weak, and imperial powers to take advantage of their colonies. Or, to put it another way, organization represents concentrated power, and concentrated power can exercise a dominating influence when it encounters power which is diffuse and not concentrated, and therefore weaker.

The classic struggle of farmers against business enterprise is a case in point, the latter at first being more efficiently organized, and able (before the farmer became "class conscious") to gain advantages which the farmers thought exorbitant, under conditions which the farmers found offensive. But organization begets counterorganization. The farmer organizes in the American Farm Bureau Federation or the National Grange, and uses his influence with the legislatures to write rules to his advantage. In some states of the Middle West, for example, legislation even prescribes the terms of contracts for the sale of farm equipment. But the organized farmer pays little attention to the tenant and the sharecropper, and they in turn experience an impulse to organize for their own advantage. The history of the development of farmers' organizations is instructive; the whole program of farm subsidies which has evolved in the last twenty years may be seen as an effort on the part of the farmer (organized for the purpose) to make himself independent of the vicissitudes of the business economy, that is, to take himself out of the environment which he can control only imperfectly, and to insulate himself against economic adversity.

In the constant struggle of groups to come to terms with their environments, one other phenomenon of group politics may be noted. Simple groups tend to become more complex. And the more complex they become, the greater is the tendency to centralize their control. The structure of the business community in 1950 is different from that of 1860 precisely in that relatively simple forms of business organization have become complex—have gone through federations, combinations, reorganizations, mergers, amalgamations, and consolidations in a growing tendency to rationalize the complexity and to integrate the elements in comprehensive structures. Monopolies, combinations, cartels, giant integrated enterprises are characteristic of a mature phase of the evolution of group forms. Furthermore, the history of federal administration amply shows that the tendency of simple forms of organization to become complex by combination and to develop centralized bureaucracies to cope with this complexity is to be observed among official groups as well as among the groups, like the CIO and the American Legion, which dwell outside the domain of public government.

What has been said about farmers' organizations and business enterprises supports the conclusion that the operations of the economic system lend themselves to political interpretation, that is, to analysis in terms of the struggle of economic groups to exercise power. A recent book by Kenneth Galbraith uses political analysis to describe and explain the workings of an economy characterized no longer (if ever) by a multiplicity of small sellers without decisive market power, but by the existence of a few big firms in various industries, surrounded by a fringe of small ones.[22] Professor Galbraith does not think that the competitive model of previous economic theory is adequate to explain present-day economic activities, and for "competition" would substitute the concept of "countervailing power." Countervailing power is the development by disadvantaged sectors of the economy of resistant strength to check and balance the concentrations of private market-power represented by oligopolistic industry; and one of the functions of government is to encourage private associations to build up "countervailing power." This thesis, of course, challenges much economic thought regarded as orthodox.

The struggle of groups to survive in their environments and to carry forward the aims and interests of their members, if entirely uninhibited, would produce violence and war. Social disapproval of most of the forms of direct action, however, reduces this struggle to an effort to write the rules by which groups live with each other and according to which they compete for existence and advantage. Thus, in the development of mature institutions of collective bargaining from the raw material of unorganized workers, the time comes when violence, disorder, and force are put to one side as the normal aspect of labor relations and the conduct of negotiations occupies the energies of the leaders. In the relations of nations to each other, there has been a persistent effort to substitute diplomacy and the rule of law for war as the arbiter of the differences among national groups. As groups come to put away gross forms of coercion in their dealings with each other, by equal degree the area widens within which the behavior of each is subject to codification by rules. The struggle for advantage, for benefits to the group, for the self-expression and security of its members, tends then to concentrate upon the writing of the rules. Among the forms which the rules may take are statutes, administrative orders and decrees, rules and interpretations, and court judgments.

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[22] Kenneth Galbraith, *American Capitalism, The Concept of Countervailing Power* (Boston, 1952).

V. THE CONCEPT OF OFFICIALITY

We come then to the apparatus of the state which, through its manifold offices—legislatures, councils, agencies, departments, courts, and other forums—maintains a system of instrumentalities for the writing and enforcement of the formal rules by which the society is governed. All of these instrumentalities are themselves groups, and they possess a sense of group belonging and identification which is very strong. In what respect, then, are these groups different from the more numerous groups outside the structure of public government? In a political sense they are not different at all, but exhibit the internal social and political characteristics of group forms which are separate from the state apparatus. But there *are* differences in behavior which may be observed. The Bureau of Internal Revenue collects taxes, that is, it takes a portion of the substance of individuals and corporations—but individuals and corporations do not take a portion of the substance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The policeman on the corner is permitted to blow a whistle at an automobile driver and stop his travel, but the driver of the automobile is not permitted to blow a whistle at the policeman to prevent the latter from walking up and giving him a tag. Why is there this unilateral relationship between some groups and others? How does it happen that a man with a badge may give orders to men without badges, and that the reverse relationship does not prevail? The answer, of course, is that the law permits this: it establishes the difference between the badge-wearer and the others. But this answer does not go far enough. The Eighteenth Amendment was also "law" in the sense that it was on the books. For law to have force, there must be popular consent and understanding to support the law. In the example of the policeman, there is a social understanding that approves the unilateral relation between men with badges and men with buttonnieres. It is a part of the political consensus—the understood and agreed conditions of life in a civil society—that certain groups will be permitted to act like badge-wearers. The groups so privileged collectively make up the instrumentalities of the state, and such groups are distinguished from others only in their possession of the characteristic of officiality. The designation "official" is the sign which manifests that the bearer is authorized by the social understanding to exercise against all groups and individuals certain powers which they may not exercise against him. The concept of officiality, then, is the sum of the technical differences which are rooted in the social understanding as to who does what to whom; and the difference between the public and private groups is the "officiality" of the former.

What is the function in the total group struggle of the complex of official groups? What role do these groups play in the restless flux of effort on the part of groups to dominate, neutralize, or conciliate the environment in which they seek to survive? Addressing ourselves to these questions, we find that the principal function of official groups is to provide various levels of compromise in the writing of the rules, all within the body of agreed prinicples that forms the consensus upon which the political community rests, and that each of the three principal branches of government has a special role in performing this function.

The legislature referees the group struggle, ratifies the victories of the successful coalitions, and records the terms of the surrenders, compromises, and conquests in the form of statutes. Every statute tends to represent compromise because the very process of accommodating conflicts of group interest is one of deliberation and consent. The legislative vote on any issue thus tends to represent the composition of strength, i.e., the balance of power among the contending groups at the moment of voting. What may be called public policy is actually the equilibrium reached in the group struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions of groups constantly strive to weight in their favor.[23] In this process, it is clear that blocks of groups

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[23] John Fischer, "Unwritten Rules of American Politics," *Harpers Magazine*, Vol. 197, pp. 27–36 (Nov., 1948), expresses the thesis that Calhoun, who devised the doctrine of the concurrent majority, provides the key to an understanding of American politics today. Fischer asserts that the legislative system, especially as it functions in Congress through committees, is a modern-day institutionalization of Calhoun's concurrent majority, in which no important interest is forced to accept legislation unfavorable to it, at least in the particulars in which its interest is immediately invested. Economic interests and others also, through the groups in which they are organized, according to Fischer then exercise a minority veto on legislation which concerns them—like the minority veto that Calhoun sought to establish for the protection of the interests of the South.

This view, however, gives too much credit to Calhoun. Far from having the key to the mysteries of American politics, Calhoun was outside the mainstream of American political thought and tendency in his own time. He was closer to Andre Vishinsky than to any American politico of our day. In fact, Calhoun could have written Vishinsky's speech of November 24, 1948, to the United Nations General Assembly's Ad Hoc Political Committee in which he said, "The veto is a powerful political tool . . . . Perhaps we use it more, but that is because we are in the minority and the veto balances power. If we were in the majority we could make such grandiloquent gestures as offering to waive the veto on this or that" (*New York Times*, Nov. 25, 1948).

In the functions which the American legislature performs, it is clear that no minority exercises a *veto* on legislation that affects it. Certainly no veto power is recognized in law and none is exercised in practice. The assumption that there is a minority veto, as Fischer asserts, must show that minorities can always exercise it, as they do in the United Nations Security Council, and that no minority is without it. So far as the first is concerned, what veto did business men interpose against the enactment of the Wagner Act of 1935? How successful have the bankers been in applying a veto to the currency reforms of the last can be defeated. In fact, they can be routed. Defeated groups do not possess a veto on the proposals and acts that affect them. But what they do possess is the right to make new combinations of strength if they are able to do so—combinations that will support a new effort to rewrite the rules in their favor. This process of regrouping is fully in accord with the American culture pattern, which rates high in the characteristics of optimism, risk, experimentalism, change, aggressiveness, acquisitiveness, and colossal faith in man's ability to subdue and bend nature to his desire. The entire process is dynamic, not static; fluid, not fixed. Today's losers may be tomorrow's winners.

In these adjustments of group interest, the legislature does not play the part of inert cash register, ringing up the additions and withdrawals of strength; it is not a mindless balance pointing and marking the weight and distribution of power among the contending groups. Legislatures are groups also and show a sense of identity and consciousness of kind that unofficial groups must regard if they are to represent their members effectively. In fact, each of the two houses of the Congress has a conscious identity of special "house" interest, as well as a joint interest against the executive establishment. More will be said of the struggle of official groups among themselves below. At this point it may be noted that the dignity of the Congressman is an expression of his official group interest, and that it cannot be invaded lightly. Legislators have to be approached with a certain amount of deference and tact; they may be pressured, but some forms of pressure will be regarded as too gross. The Congressman, like men everywhere, comes to his position bearing in his head a cargo of ideas, principles, prejudices, programs, precepts, beliefs, slogans, and preachments. These represent his adjustment to the dominant group combination among his constituents. If he mistakes the pattern of his support or acts too independently of its desire, he loses his seat, as some Congressmen have, after one full term.

The function of the bureaucrat in the group struggle is somewhat different from that of the legislator. Administrative agencies of the regulatory kind are established to carry out the terms of the treaties that the legislators have negotiated and ratified. They are like armies of occupation left in the field to police the rule won by the victorious coalition. Thus the Transportation Act of 1920 substantially augmented the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission by vesting it with authorities acceptable to labor unions, investors, weak roads, and shippers. The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 similarly gave to the Federal Trade Commission the authority to control the price practices of one classification of business groups in favor of another, by limiting the power of the chain stores in favor of independent merchants. The defeated coalition of groups, however, does not cease striving to wring interpretations favorable to it from the treaties that verbalize its defeats. Expensive legal talent is employed to

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decade? How successful were the labor unions in opposing the enactment of the restrictive features of the Taft-Hartley Act? Where were the vetoes in these and many other instances that might be cited? The answer is that they did not exist. In addition, the hypothesis of a minority veto fails to account for the failure of substantial minorities to get a hearing, let alone exercise a veto. Among these are Negroes, small business men, share-croppers, Oakies, and so on.

squeeze every advantage which wit and verbal magic can twist from the cold prose of official papers; and the regulatory agencies are constantly besought and importuned to interpret their authorities in favor of the very groups for the regulation of which they were originally granted. This campaign against unfavorable rules which losing coalitions of groups address to the bureaucrats appointed to administer them is, of course, in addition to their constant effort to rewrite the rules in their favor through compliant legislators. Where the balance of power is precarious, the law will remain unsettled until the balance is made stable. This is especially true in the enforcement of the labor relations and anti-trust laws.

The function of the judge is not unlike that of the legislator and the bureaucrat, as the function of the bureaucrat is not unlike that of the legislator and the judge. The judiciary, like the civilian bureaucracy, is one of the instrumentalities for the administration of agreed rules. But the responsibility rests with the judge, more than with either the legislator or the bureaucrat, to develop a more or less homogeneous and objective pattern of rules from the many strands supplied by the statutes, administrative decrees, and causes of private clients.[24] The judiciary is a superior agency to the bureaucracy in performing this important and fateful task, and it is in this superiority that its distinguishing characteristic lies. All other distinctions (procedural mainly) between the judges and the bureaucrats are derived and secondary, not innate.

VI. THE GROUP STRUGGLE IN OFFICIALDOM

In the small universe of official groups—small at least by comparison with the infinite group configuration outside the official domain—the same phenomena of struggle for self-expression and security take place that may be witnessed in the various nonstate communities of the society. In fact, some interesting variants are thrust into the entire political process by the existence of the official groups in what is often a state of rivalry. The Founding Fathers made sure that rivalries would occur by separating the powers of the government. It was their intention to prevent the public powers from being brought to focus in the same public authority and to endow each separated public authority with the capacity to fend off attempts by the others to invade its domain. The object of this, as Mr. Justice Brandeis said in an important case in which the rivalry of official groups was at issue, was "not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but *by*

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[24] Much ingenuity and resourcefulness go into the production of an objective and homogeneous pattern of law. Benjamin Cardozo, in *The Nature of the Judicial Process* (New Haven, 1925), confessed that the function of the judge is creative and original in those many interstices of the law left vacant by the statutes and administrative decrees. James M. Landis, in *The Administrative Process* (New Haven, 1938), presented a case for judicial self-restraint in the relations between the courts and the bureaucrats. In fact, the judiciary and the regulatory agencies of the quasi-judicial kind may be regarded as rival bureaucracies, with overlapping jurisdictions. The judges have been jealous for a half-century of the threat represented by the bureaucracy to their historic monopoly to say what the law is; and until recent years at least, they protected their security against this threat in their environment by dominating the danger, and nullifying it on appeal.

means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of government powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."[25]

The Congress is traditionally suspicious of the President, and historically has sought to dominate the executive establishment. The chief executive of any business enterprise is permitted to manage such staff facilities as personnel and budget, but Congress prefers to exercise these powers of the President itself. Thus when Congress set up the Tennessee Valley Authority, it reserved to itself the authority, by concurrent resolution (not subject to the veto), to remove the members of the board of directors.[26] In the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 and the Emergency Price Stabilization Act of 1942, to name only two, Congress wrote language into the statutes reserving to itself the authority to withdraw from the President the powers conveyed by those acts of legislation. And time and again Congress has sought to force from the President's subordinates the surrender of information deemed by him to be confidential.[27]

One of the prime deterrents to the development in the United States of an adequate federal civil service is the manifest hostility, relentless and unceasing, which Congressmen pour out upon officials of the executive establishment. One former official of the federal government said that it was "like being nibbled to death by ducks"; and former Secretary of the Interior Krug, when asked, at the start of the Korean War in July, 1950, whether he would return to Washington to mobilize industry as he had in the Second World War, replied that he would seek a painless death by joining the military forces this time.

It has been pointed out that overlapping but different combinations of economic groups are marshalled behind the President and Congress in this historic duel.[28] The rivalry between the Congress and the executive establishment would be natural and expected because of the inherent group interest of the functionaries, but the struggle is exacerbated by the support that each of the contestants is given by alliances and coalitions of groups whose interests are at stake in the outcome. Furthermore, the leverage in this contest is with the Congress. As Woodrow Wilson said, "The legislature is the aggressive spirit. It is the motive power of the government. . . . [29] Even when, as in the national elections of 1948, the Congress and its own particular and unique behavior are made an issue and a new Congress is returned, the new congress may behave much as the old one did. The presidential power to campaign for a mandate from the people does not necessarily mean, when he gets one, that Congress will enact it.

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[25] Italics supplied. The case is *Myers v. United States,* 272 U.S. 52 (1926), which involved an attempt by Congress to exercise the power which presidents supposed they possessed to remove officials at will. The jealousy which Congress has displayed towards the Chief Executive is both extensive and historic. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was vetoed by Wilson when it first passed Congress because Congress had reserved to itself the authority to dismiss the Comptroller-General and Wilson believed this to be unconstitutional (*Congressional Record,* 66th Cong., 2d sess., Vol. 59, pp. 8609–8610, June 4, 1920). Wilson's veto was anticipated by the observation he made in his book, *Congressional Government* (New York, 1925, 1st ed., 1885): "It is not often easy to see the true constitutional bearing of strictly legislative action; but it is patent even to the least observant that in the matter of appointments to office, for instance, senators have often outrun their legal rights to give or withhold their assent to appointments, by insisting upon being first consulted concerning nominations as well, and have thus made their constitutional assent dependent upon an unconstitutional control of nominations" (pp. 48–49).

[26] See *Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority,* 115 F (2d) 990 (1940), certiorari denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941), where the court held that the authority of the President to remove such directors for any cause he chose was not limited by this congressional reservation of power.

[27] See the discussion of this problem in the *New York Times,* Sept. 3, 1948, p. 5.

[28] See Wilfred Binkley, *The Powers of the President* (New York, 1937). Binkley's thesis is that the conservative groups have tended to support Congress and the popular and less conservative groups have tended to support the President. The Whigs and the

The rivalry between the judiciary and the executive has sometimes emerged in spectacular form, as in the duel between Jefferson and Marshall and in the unsuccessful Court Plan which Roosevelt submitted to Congress in 1937; but the enduring struggle has really taken place below the surface of public events and out of the public gaze, in the silent duel waged by the judiciary against the regulatory agencies. The chief characteristic of the regulatory agency of the quasi-judicial kind is that it combines in one instrumentality the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers. It is a device invented by necessity for bringing to a focus the public powers (otherwise separated in the Constitution) for the regulation of conditions which any single one of the three traditional powers had been found inadequate to regulate.

The judges have looked at the work of these agencies with split vision and have persisted in separating the powers that necessity and the legislatures had put together. Many anomalies have resulted. At first the courts regarded rate-making as legislative in nature and not for the judges. Said the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of *Munn v. Illinois* in 1876, "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts. . . ."[30] Eventually, however, the judges came to regard the reasonableness of rates not as a question to be decided at the polls but one to be decided in the courtrooms, that is, a judicial question; but up to the present time the rate-making process of quasi-judicial agencies is still called legislative in nature.[31] The entire logomachy of words and definitions contained in the law of jurisdictional facts and evidentiary facts has developed from the concern of the judges to keep within their hands the determination of the kinds of question that historically have been decided by judges. This is understandable, perhaps; but the judges, having the last word on questions of jurisdiction, have tended to decide the close votes in their favor, as well as many that should not have been in their favor at all, and have thus moved some of the legal profession to urge that the judges retain authority in the matter in which they are expert—to wit, the law—and

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Republicans in the main have preferred a strong Congress and a weak President, while the Democrats, in the New Freedom, New Deal, and Fair Deal versions, at least, have preferred a strong President and a weak, that is, subordinate but not docile, Congress. The alternation of strong and weak presidents, and contrariwise, strong presidents and strong Congresses, is the result of the shifts in the balance of power among the multifarious groups that constitute the society.

[29] *Congressional Government*, p. 36.

[30] 94 U.S. 113.

[31] See *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company*, 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944).

yield to the administrative bodies the authority to decide matters in which they are expert, such as questions of valuation.

Except where the simulacra of the judicial process were on display, the judges have tolerated a great range of unreviewed discretion in executive agencies. Thus due process is not necessarily judicial process.[32] But where the executive process appeared to rival the judicial, the judges have been stern and adamant. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 perpetuates the internal separation of powers within the executive agencies and thus institutionalizes and sanctifies by legislative enactment the rule that the judges had enforced by themselves.

It might be mentioned that even within the structure of official agencies in a single branch of the federal government, competition of group interests takes place. Mention has been made of the consciousness of a separate group interest in each of the two houses of Congress. Competition among the official groups in the executive establishment is both long-standing and notorious. The extended contest over unification of the military services, and the resistance of the Navy in 1949 to the curtailments enforced against it in favor of the Army and the Air Force by the Secretary of Defense, is a case in point. Many others will come to mind, as will instances which show that the states are not immune from the effects of rivalry among official groups. State departments of health, for example, are often in conflict with state departments of industry over matters that fall within the jurisdictions of both, such as the prevention and control of diseases induced by industrial occupations.

To carry analysis still a step further, we note that the subgroups of single official groups may be in competition with each other. Accordingly, committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives frequently contest for jurisdiction over bills, parts of which fall within the competence of more than one group. In the Senate struggle in 1948–1950 over the repeal of the discriminatory tax on oleomargarine, for example, it became a matter of vital importance whether the Senate Committee on Agriculture got hold of the repealer or the Senate Committee on Finance, for the first was dominated by the farm groups opposed to repeal while the second was not. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 split jurisdiction on anti-trust matters between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, with amendments to the Clayton Act under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee and amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The vital position which such committees hold in the legislative processes of Congress intensifies the effort of partisans in the group struggle to get their favored view before them.

There is also group tension and conflict within the structure of bureaus and divisions of single agencies and departments in the family of official executive groups. Thus within the Department of Agriculture there was once a right-left axis along which some of the bureaus tended to line. In the middle period of the New Deal, the Farm Security Administration, speaking for the small farmer, the tenant, and the sharecropper and advocating a generous lending policy, was in strife with the Farm Credit Administration, the Soil Conservation Service, and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration over the question of conversion to a defense policy, part of which involved the proposed establishment of an integrated and unified set of field services for the Department of Agriculture. In this contest, the Farm Credit Administration won over the Farm Security Administration. Within the War Department the Corps of Engineers is so powerfully entrenched, with civilian support among Congressmen interested in rivers and harbors improvements, and behind them business groups in the "improved" localities, that it was able to defy the command of the Commander-in-Chief in wartime in a dispute between the Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation over the building of dams in the Central Valley of California.[33]

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[32] *Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Company*, 12 Howard 272 (1856).

The struggle of subgroups within a department is to be found even in lower levels of administration. Divisions within bureaus may be, and often are, in contest with each other. Management improvement divisions or units of organization may and do run as rivals to finance and accounting divisions, and the personnel division or office is often the butt of bitter humors by all the others.

Attendant upon group spirit are feelings of belonging and not belonging, an acceptance of those within the group and a hostility to those outside, the fastidious sense of jurisdiction engendered by these feelings, the desire for status and prestige, the wish to be admired and to feel of account—and all of these characteristics of the behavior of people in groups are to be found where people are or have been in groups: in public government and in private enterprise, in school, college, and fraternity, in the Bank Wiring Room of the Western Electric Plant in Hawthorne, Illinois, and in the Acropolis in an earlier and more classic time. The group struggle, then, is apparent in the universe of unofficial groups and in that of official groups. Furthermore, these are not separate universes. They are one. Official groups are simply inhabitants of one pluralistic world which is an aggregation, a collection, an assemblage, a throng, a moving multitude of human clusters, a consociation of groups, a plurality of collectivities, an intersecting series of social organisms, adhering, interpenetrating, overlapping—a single universe of groups which combine, break, federate, and form constellations and coalitions of power in a flux of restless alterations.

VII. CONCLUSION

To some, this view of the political process may seem formless, inchoate, ambiguous, and disordered. It may be felt that little is gained in making the interaction of groups the central fact of politics without further definition and characterization of the groups that interact. But the state of the discipline is such that one is scarcely justified in being more precise. It is suggested here only that a framework exists within which political processes may be more specifically and accurately described. Galbraith's concept of the "countervailing power" is an example of the application to economic phenomena of the method advocated here. If American history could be reconsidered and rewritten in terms of the dynamics of group struggle, history would indeed provide that insight of the past leading to an understanding of the present which it frequently claims to provide, but seldom does. What is called "political history" is at present usually the life and hard times of the official functionaries of public government, when it is not the chronicles of the wars we have fought.

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[33] Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, *Task Force Report on Organization and Policy in the Field of Natural Resources* (Washington, 1949), Appendix 7, "The Kings River Project in the Basin of the Great Central Valley—A Case Study," pp. 149–182.

Some may miss in the concept under discussion the *mystique* of the law, with its authoritarian constructs, its assumption that there *must* be a supreme power, like father in the household or the Absolute, some authority which arranges disorder and judges our transgressions and supplies us in an infinite universe with a finite demesne of which we can see the walls, and feel secure. A political process which is circular, as Einsteinian space is thought to be, which bends back upon itself, in which the directions of North and South are meaningless, is an unhandy place in which to try to locate finality. However, we deceive ourselves to clothe men in gowns and call them supreme, or sovereign, or all-powerful. We sometimes deceive ourselves when we call them "Excellency," or "honorable." The celebrated finality of Supreme Court decisions, which was part of the folklore of the law before 1937, is seen in 1952 to be chimerical. Yet since 1937 the justices have only more obviously performed the function that they performed before 1937, namely, that of serving as one more level of official compromise in the never-ending march and countermarch, thrust and parry, among economic groups, enforcement agencies, legislators, and executive functionaries. The differences between the official and the unofficial groups are acknowledged, and they have been characterized; but it is the underlying similarity that strikes the eye. Both groups are points of power and compromise in a continuum of interactions.

Just as the political process described in the preceding pages may seem to some to lack the Euclidian perfection of the juristic view of the political world, others may feel that it lacks the quality of ethical sanction, that "values" are omitted, that purposive and normative elements in human conduct are neglected and ignored. But this is not so. Groups exist to fulfill the desires of those who comprise them, to achieve their choices, attain their goals—and to propagate ethical principle according to the lights of their members. If there is a multiplicity of such groups, so is there a multiplicity of ethical systems.

Finally, it may be asked, "Whatever became of the individual?" He was introduced briefly as the beneficiary of group forms and then whisked off the page. Are not individuals as well as groups important in the political process? What of a Roosevelt? What of a Ghandi? Were these not individuals, and were they not influential as political actors, and not memorable merely as the passive recipients of the fullness of group life? To this it may be said that individuals are, of course, important as political actors, when they move others to responsive behavior, or represent them, or acquire their support or tolerance. That is to say, they are significant politically in the group relations they establish and organize, or modify, or destroy.

And if it be said that these notes for a theory tell us nothing new, that we knew all of this before, the answer must indeed be the humble one suggested by the author of the *Anatomy of Melancholy:* "We can say nothing but what hath been said. Our poets steal from Homer."

THE EUROPEAN SCENE

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF 1951*

H. G. NICHOLAS
New College, Oxford

A good case could be made for the thesis that the election of 1951 was simply the second phase of the election of 1950. Not only were they near in point of time—nineteen months apart—but also the inconclusive nature of the 1950 results left all parties looking toward a second contest the moment the outcome of the first was known. In a sense the whole of the interval between February, 1950, and October, 1951, was a period of electoral campaigning. And to an extent unusual in British politics, the minds both of party leaders and of party members ran continuously on the contest ahead.

The resemblance between the campaigns was heightened by the virtual identity of the participants. All of the principal figures of 1950 re-entered the lists in 1951, and mostly in the same roles. Only 29 members of the 1950 Parliament failed to seek election to its successor. In many cases candidates were opposed by the same individuals as before—although the number of Liberal candidates fell from 475 to 109, and that of the Communists dropped from 100 to 10.[1] A fair number of candidates unsuccessful in 1950 tried their fortune in other constituencies in 1951. The general effect, however, was of two substantially identical teams of Socialists and Conservatives, whose contest was spotlighted by the withdrawal, in most constituencies, of third and fourth party candidates. In 1950 there were only 112 straight fights; in 1951 there were 497.

Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that 1951 was simply 1950 over again. The events of the intervening months, and particularly of the three or four months immediately preceding the October election, provided material for new issues and arguments on both sides, and the change in substance was accompanied by a change in treatment. 1950 had been a set battlepiece, with arguments long prepared and oft rehearsed on both sides. 1951 was a running fight, with fresh themes developing under the impact of events.

The formal programmes of the parties did not change much in the interval between elections. Nationalisation receded even further from view as a Labour objective—reflecting, no doubt, the indifference shown to the issue by the bulk of 1950's voters. A vague phrase about "taking over concerns that fail the nation" was all that was left to remind voters that Labour was a party dedicated by its constitution to "the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange." The Conservative proposals for denationalisation, on the other hand, confined themselves to steel and road transport. The welfare state was still a central theme—in both the Labour and the Conservative manifestoes—but there were some shifts of interest. Slightly less emphasis was laid on Full Employment, to which the great diapason of Labour propaganda had been devoted in 1950. Housing, prominent in 1950, was even more to the fore in 1951, with the Conservatives committed to a "target" of 300,000 new houses a year. The Cost of Living excited both sides, not because either had any particular new proposals for dealing with it but because it was an increasing preoccupation of every voter. There was perhaps a slightly increased concern (at least in the Conservative manifesto) about the Balance of Payments issue, but this continued to be the great lacuna of the election debate as it had been in 1950. Indeed, on both sides there was a general absence of clear-cut proposals, such as had marked Labour's appeal in 1945. Labour, as in 1950, tended to stand on its record, and the Conservatives tended to argue their case in terms of the need for a change of men and mood rather than of a detailed programme. Even the Liberals, who might have been expected to display that heroic indifference to mere vote-catching which is the historic privilege of third parties, rested their claims less on the distinctiveness of their policy than on the need for a party independent of its rivals and dedicated to the freedom of the individual.

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* The article which follows should not be taken as in any sense a definitive record of the 1951 General Election, based upon exhaustive study of the events it describes. A study on that scale has been written by Mr. David Butler under the auspices of Nuffield College, Oxford, and is at present in the press. What I am setting down is rather a series of impressions, based both on printed materials and personal observations, the latter restricted to constituencies in Southern England.

[1] None of these, on either occasion, was successful.

To this extent the party manifestoes departed only slightly from the precedents of the previous year. But one feature of them was novel and provided a hint of even more novel developments in the campaign that followed. This was the considerably greater prominence given to foreign affairs in the Labour manifesto, where "Peace" was given pride of place: "Our first aim is to save the peace of the world." In part this was a natural consequence of the increased international tension since the outbreak of the Korean War. But it may also have reflected an increased tension inside the Labour Party itself. The resignation in April of Mr. Aneurin Bevan and Mr. Harold Wilson over the scale of the Government's re-armament programme pointed to a division in the party which could easily become an electoral embarrassment. One obvious way of countering this was by emphasising those goals of foreign policy upon which all elements in the party could unite, such as the party's devotion to peace and its conviction that such a cause was safer in Labour than in Conservative hands. The tracing of the genesis of this electoral theme is a matter for a political historian, but one may safely hazard the guess that it was not unconnected with the assumption of the Foreign Office by Mr. Herbert Morrison, the party's principal political strategist.[2]

It was not, however, so much its place in the Labour Party's manifesto as its subsequent reiteration and development, that gave this peace-or-war theme its importance in the history of the election. To understand this fact, it is necessary to look at the course of public events during the period between Mr.

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[2] Mr. Morrison took office on the death of Mr. Bevin.

Attlee's announcement of the Dissolution on September 19 and Polling Day on October 25. During these five weeks, the public mind, far from being absorbed by electioneering, was distracted by a succession of other anxieties. The King's operation on September 23, the Persian crisis, marked by the evacuation of Abadan on October 3, the Egyptian denunciation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty on October 8—all of these events stole the newspaper headlines away from election items proper; and the two continuing crises, of Persia and Egypt, went far to dictate the course of electoral controversy. While at first there was a reluctance to involve the government's Persian policy in the party political argument—on September 27 Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were still consulting the Prime Minister about it and avoiding all partisan comments—the beginning of October saw it become a dominant electoral theme.

It so happened that the Annual Labour Party Conference was scheduled to meet at Scarborough on October 1. The onset of the election turned this meeting into a campaign rally and provided Labour leaders with a sounding board for their electoral talking points. The moment the Conference met, it became apparent that it was the peace-or-war issue which most attracted the leaders and excited the delegates. In successive speeches Mr. Morrison attacked "the semi-hysteria of the Tory back-benchers over Persia and Egypt" and posed the question to Mr. Churchill, "Should we have gone to war with Persia or not?" Speaker after speaker took up the same cry, the most frequent line of argument being either "I do not say the Tories want war, *but* . . . they do not know how to avoid it . . ." or "their deeply-ingrained imperialism makes war inevitable." From Scarborough, as the delegates went back to their constituencies, this "warmongering smear," as it was dubbed by its victims, spread in ever widening circles. The press took it up, in particular the Labour *Daily Mirror*, a tabloid with a circulation of five million. (Its polling day elaboration of this theme provoked a libel action by Mr. Churchill, which is still pending at the time of writing.) With the spread of the idea, its qualifying clauses disappeared until it was stripped down to its crudest emotional appeal, as in the streamer which spanned a street in Liverpool outside the headquarters of Mrs. Braddock, a Labour *militante*—"A Third Labour Government or a Third World War." The Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, was notable for the deliberate exclusion of foreign affairs from his speeches during his campaign tour; but with other Labour speakers, at every level, the "warmonger" issue in one form or another remained, it is fair to say, the central propaganda theme.

The Conservatives met the charge, of course, with counter-arguments about the dangers of appeasement as a provocation to aggression. They also dwelt on the national humiliation involved in, and the diplomatic and economic reverses consequent upon, a policy of "scuttle" and "bluff." But they insisted that they were being unfairly branded "warmongers." Mr. Churchill in, particular, repeatedly defended himself against this charge; in a political broadcast which was perhaps his most effective since the war, he went out of his way to stress that he remained in public life only in the hope of securing peace. To Mr. Morrison's reiterated question, Mr. Churchill and other Conservatives replied that a wise conduct of the Persian and Egyptian affairs would not have led to the alternatives of force or evacuation. The Conservatives also made a great deal of the disunity over foreign policy in Labour ranks and claimed that a third Labour government would be ham-strung by Bevanite pacifism and anti-Americanism.

Without doubt the focussing of so much electoral controversy on this theme had a damaging effect on bipartisanship in foreign policy. Perhaps the death of Mr. Bevin and the rise of Mr. Bevan, as well as the burden of re-armament and the consequent decline in living standards, were making this inevitable anyway and the election merely sharpened existing disagreements. However that may be, from a strictly electoral point of view the division was no bad thing. In 1950, save for Mr. Churchill's eruption in his famous Edinburgh speech, foreign affairs had been carefully screened from public debate. The electorate could reasonably complain that one result of the agreement of their rulers was that they were being denied the right to hear and pass upon the claims of rival courses in foreign policy. In 1951, by contrast, there was a real developing argument, which derived its propulsion in large part from contemporaneous events themselves. Mr. Morrison, Labour's strategist, was also the Labour Government's Foreign Secretary. Mr. Churchill, his critic, would, if successful, be dealing within a few days with the identical problems of Persia and England which formed the stuff of their arguments. As a shrewd observer in the *Economist* pointed out, this was the first British general election since 1931 "to be fought with live ammunition." There can be no doubt that the campaign, regarded as an instrument of public education, gained enormously thereby.

In thus campaigning on the foreign policy issue, Labour politicians were doubly courageous in that not only was it a vulnerable (some would say the *most* vulnerable) part of their record, but it also involved issues on which the party was openly divided. Moreover, although the rearmament pledge in their manifesto was skilfully contrived to cover the crack in their ranks—the question of the *scale* of rearmament being ignored—Mr. Aneurin Bevan and his followers made little pretence of soft-pedalling their distinctive point of view. In thus boldly assuming that attack was the best defence, the party's strategists may have been wise. Public opinion polls and private enquiries alike certainly confirmed that foreign affairs took first place in the public's concern before, during, and after the election; and in presenting a united front on the goal to be attained, whatever the disagreements about the methods of attaining it, the party almost certainly profited. It was not true, as some observers hastily concluded, that the Bevanites were the special beneficiaries of this. Their candidates fared neither better nor worse at the polls than Labour candidates of more orthodox persuasion. The voting public seems to have been entirely indifferent to the distinctions within the Labour ranks and voted for or against Bevanites in almost exactly the same proportion as held true for other Labour candidates.

As these remarks imply, Labour's strategy was fundamentally a defensive one. They, after all, were trying to hold on to what they had while the Conservatives, in Mr. Churchill's expressive phrase, felt that "one more heave" would land them in the seat of power. In planning their offensive strategy, the

Conservatives seem to have directed their greatest efforts in two directions—territorially on the Lancashire and East Anglia constituencies and politically on the Liberal voters.

Of Lancashire's 64 constituencies, 29 were marginal, if "marginal" is defined as meaning "held by a majority of 10 per cent or less of the votes cast in 1950." Nineteen of these were held by Labour members at the Dissolution. In East Anglia, the most purely agricultural region of England, Labour had scored sensational gains in 1945, but was left in 1950 holding 7 of its 8 seats by small, sometimes minute, majorities. In hopes of winning or holding seats in these crucial areas, both sides sent a wealth of front-bench talent to address urban rallies and to tour the rural districts. Mr. Churchill (who did not repeat his 1945 and 1950 "tours") spoke at Liverpool and Mr. Eden at Manchester. The Prime Minister toured East Anglia and spent two days in Lancashire. Mr. Morrison spoke at Manchester and Preston.

Liberal voters all over the country had in 1950 numbered some 2¾ million, and in 47 constituencies their votes had exceeded the Labour majority. With only 109 Liberal candidates offering themselves in 1951, there was obviously a particularly good chance of increasing the Conservative poll in constituencies which had no Liberal candidate. Moreover, in several constituencies "pacts" were arranged with local Liberal associations; in 7 of them Conservatives supported well-disposed Liberals, such as Lady Violet Bonham-Carter, and in 3 of them Conservatives stood with avowed Liberal support.[3] Elsewhere there was assiduous wooing of the Liberal vote by both major parties, a wooing conducted, incidentally, with much less truculence and much more finesse than either side had displayed the previous year.

However, despite the special concentration of attention on the vulnerable points, the battle was fought with vigour along the entire line. Observers noted that local Conservative party workers displayed as much vigour in fighting forlorn hopes in Durham (where Labour can count on enormous miners' majorities) as in marginal seats elsewhere. And Labour, in order to remedy its shortages of properly-trained organisers, often sent workers from strong constituencies to reinforce weakly organised neighbours; this strategy was most readily observed in the London area.

Broadly speaking, the character and strength of the Labour and Conservative organisations in 1951 were much what they had been in 1950.[4] Only the Liberals, impoverished and in many cases disheartened by their disasters in 1950, failed, despite their concentration on a narrower front, to put forth a comparable effort. Each of the other main parties had taken steps to repair, so far as means and man-power permitted, the deficiencies revealed in the previous contest. In numbers of agents—who are virtually the only professional party workers in British elections—this still left the Conservatives comfortably in the lead; but Labour had great success in training even its volunteer agents in some of the refinements of electioneering technique that had eluded them last time. Thus Labour's organisation of the postal vote, which had been one of the party's serious weaknesses in 1950, was considerably improved in 1951. Much effort, however, on each side had to be expended not on improvements, but simply on maintaining existing levels of performance on reduced budgets—reduced, that is, in terms of real purchasing power. The limits of constituency expenditure, already drawn tight in the 1948 Representation of the People Act, were in 1951 considerably tightened by reason of the marked increase in costs, particularly of paper and printing. This meant that the most careful attention had to be given by agents to the budgeting of the campaigns and that each side had to reduce its expenditure on most forms of visual and printed publicity in order to keep within the statutory maximum. In consequence, the tendency already observable in 1950, for the election almost to disappear from the public view, was intensified in 1951; and everyone agreed that this was the "quietest" election he had known. Furthermore, the behaviour of the public reflected the subdued tone of the propaganda addressed to it. There can never have been an election in English history which gave the police so little trouble. When a crowd in Southampton almost overturned a loud-speaker car which tried to heckle the Prime Minister, the incident, although no one was hurt, became headline news.

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[3] There were many other constituencies where individual Liberals worked and spoke for Conservatives.

[4] For a description of party organisation in the 1950 election, see Ch. 2 of my book on *The British General Election of 1950* (London, 1951).

It is clear, however, that the lack of violence was not the reflection of inactivity on the part of the electioneers or apathy on the part of the voters. Canvassing, the great, distinctive mass-activity of British elections, was conducted with vigour. There can have been very few voters who did not receive a statement of the political record, faith and proposals of each candidate in their constituency—"the election address" of tradition. A Gallup poll revealed that 81 per cent of the adult population heard some, at any rate, of the broadcasts which were an almost nightly feature of the campaign, while 30 per cent attended a meeting of at least one of the parties. A notable feature of the campaign, incidentally, was the employment of television as a medium for political appeals for the first time; it was estimated that some four to five million people watched appearances, on successive nights, of spokesmen for each of the three main parties. The results of these efforts were apparent in a high poll—82.6 per cent of the electorate.

The total of votes cast was only slightly below the record of 84 per cent reached in 1950, and the reduction was no doubt largely attributable to the smaller number of Liberal candidates who offered themselves. Nevertheless, the expectation in Liberal headquarters that large numbers of Liberals would abstain, does not appear to have been borne out by the figures. Most Liberals, quite certainly, when lacking a candidate of their own, gave their vote to the Conservatives.[5] Many of them, it was also clear, even when they had candidates of their own, deserted them for the Tories. Thus the Liberals lost all round.

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[5] Although Liberal leaders (Lady Violet Bonham-Carter excepted) were careful to give no direction to their followers on this point, the *Manchester Guardian* was less inhibited and quite explicitly informed its readers that it thought it was "time for a change" and that Conservatives, in the circumstances, were to be preferred to Labour.

They lost 66 deposits and won only 6 seats, of which 5 might be said to be held on Conservative sufferance since by agreement no Conservative candidate had contested them. Of their leaders Sir Archibald Sinclair had not stood and Mr. Fothergill, their president, Mr. Byers, their chairman, and Mr. Dingle Foot and Lady Megan Lloyd George, their ablest parliamentarians, were all defeated. Even Lady Violet Bonham Carter, Asquith's daughter, who was aided by official Conservative backing and Mr. Churchill's personal oratory, failed of success. The *Manchester Guardian* was forced to the conclusion that this marked "the end of an independent Liberal party as a force in the electoral field."

There can not be much doubt that ex-Liberal votes contributed powerfully to Conservative success. To begin with, of the 21 seats which Conservatives won from Labour, 16 were seats where in 1950 the Liberal vote had exceeded the Labour majority and where in 1951 no Liberal candidate appeared; and it is not likely to have been an accident that in many other constituencies of this type the increased polls for Labour and Conservatives were so closely equivalent to last time's Liberal poll—as if the Liberal vote had divided in the rough proportion of two to the Tories to one for Labour. It is also possible to detect the probable source of Conservative converts in another way by noting that in constituencies where there was a straight Labour-Conservative fight in each election, the Conservative gain averaged 1 per cent of the total poll; but that in constituencies where Liberals had intervened only in 1950, the average gain was 3.6 per cent.

So much might have been anticipated. What came as a surprise to most people was the almost microscopic scale of change that the results revealed. If one thinks of it in terms of the composition of the House of Commons, it meant that only 58 faces in the new Parliament were different from those in the last—and this figure allows for the 29 members who were not seeking re-election. If one thinks of the totals of votes cast, the result is equally striking:

	Labour	*Conservative*	*Liberal*
1950	13,266,592	12,502,567	2,621,548
1951	13,948,605	13,717,538	730,556

Translated into percentages of votes cast, this becomes:

	Labour	*Conservative*	*Liberal*
1950	46.4	41.7	9.1
1951	48.8	48.0	2.6

Finally, if one thinks in terms of parliamentary seats, the results show the smallest change since 1910:[6]

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[6] The paradox of Labour's winning a majority of votes but a minority of seats is due largely to the excessive concentration of Labour strength in certain constituencies. (See the Appendix by D. Butler to my *British General Election of 1950*). The Conservatives' voting total would, however, be somewhat increased if allowance were made for their voting strength in the four constituencies in Northern Ireland where their candidates were returned unopposed.

	Labour	*Conservative*	*Liberal*	*Others*
1950	315	298	9	3
1951	296	321	6	2

Nor do these national figures conceal wide local variations. So even was the movement of opinion across the country that there were only trifling deviations from the 1.1 per cent figure of swing (calculated as the average of Conservative percentage gain and Labour percentage loss) which was the national average. Bradford with 2.7 per cent was exceptional among the big towns for the volatility of its citizens' opinions. Sussex among the counties was unique in swinging as far as 2.3 per cent from its 1950 moorings.

In fact, there can be no doubt that the most striking feature of the results is the hardening of political attitudes which they reveal. During the nineteen months between the elections the British public had been exposed to a bombardment, not only of electoral propaganda, but also of brute facts, in the form of misfortunes and setbacks, both domestic and foreign. It was a period packed with the kind of events that are normally supposed to change votes. Yet, judged by this test, the net effect of it all seems to have been that one person in a hundred voted differently in 1951 from the way he voted in 1950—and that person appears to have been, more often than not, a Liberal who had no candidate of his own to vote for. Some of this effect was attributable, no doubt, to the virtual elimination of local issues; parliamentary elections in Britain today are unquestionably fought on national issues and personalities. Along with this goes an increased dominance of the whole battleline by the national party organisations—armies whose rank and file are local volunteers operating in their own constituencies, but whose fighting is largely directed from the centre. The result is a marked diminution in the role of the individual candidate. What kind of a man he is, what kind of things he says, appear to matter less and less; his label is what determines his support. At the same time as they have tightened their control, the two major parties seem to have extended their appeal. Each has a larger membership and a larger vote than before, mainly at the expense of the Liberals, but also, it would appear, at the expense of the voter previously of no fixed allegiance—the man who does not like to wear a regular label. The question that the 1951 election poses is whether this type of voter, who has traditionally been accorded the role of the pendulum in the British constitutional clock, is a disappearing species. Is he declining to a point at which electoral struggles of increasing severity will result in party majorities of diminishing adequacy?

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PLANNING MACHINERY

R. S. MILNE
University of Bristol

This article is a critical description of developments in the governmental machinery for taking economic decisions in Britain between the end of the war in 1945 and October, 1951. The changes known to have been made by the Conservative Government between October, 1951, and May, 1952, are indicated near the end. The word "planning," is used in the title for the sake of convenience only; there will be no discussion of whether or not the degree of state economic intervention in Britain has been sufficient to qualify as "planning" in a strict sense.[1] The term has now become too much the subject of British party wrangles to have any generally accepted single meaning. However, to use neutral terms, we may say that the machinery to be investigated is that for taking high policy decisions on economic matters in which the Government has decided to intervene, including machinery for seeing that these decisions are compatible with each other.

What has been the extent and form of state intervention between 1945 and the autumn of 1951? Apart from the working out of the Labour Government's nationalization programme,[2] perhaps the most obvious summary is that measures taken during the period have been related to "shortages." Peace in 1945 did not put an immediate end to wartime import restrictions, controls, and rationing. The loss of income from pre-war overseas investments, adverse changes in the terms of trade, and the need to devote a large proportion of resources to capital re-equipment—all combined to make the problem of settling "priorities" in peacetime as difficult as during the war.

One basic reason for Labour Government intervention in economic affairs, therefore, was the need to reduce the foreign trade deficit, particularly that with hard currency countries which was augmented by the shortage of supplies from European sources. Allied to this necessity was a bias in favour of the redistribution of income and a general belief that for certain selected commodities, notably foodstuffs such as meat, tea, and butter, quantitative rationing was preferable to what some Labour politicians have stigmatized as "rationing by the purse." To prevent inflation from damaging the export drive, heavy taxation was retained to drain off purchasing power, and this was supplemented by a deliberate policy of budgeting for a surplus. In addition, physical controls were employed: imports were limited, and exporters' receipts of foreign currency had to be handed to the state; investment of all kinds, including the building of houses, was limited; some raw materials, such as steel and paper, were controlled; consumption of clothing (until 1950) and some foodstuffs was rationed.

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[1] For an analysis of the term "economic planning," see H. D. Dickinson, *The Economics of Socialism* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 14–16.

[2] Vol. 21, no. 2, of the *Political Quarterly* (London 1950), is devoted to this subject. See also the article on "Nationalised Industries in Britain and France" by W. A. Robson in the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 44, pp. 299–322 (June, 1950).

Generally speaking, however, the controls were less rigid and less pervasive than in war time. The difference was described in the following way by the *Economic Survey for 1947*, the first of a series of annual reports on the economic state of the nation: "During the war, the Government could direct labour and was the direct purchaser of a large part of the nation's production. These two factors gave the Government a control over the course of production which no longer exists. The Government's influence in peacetime must be exercised by other less drastic measures."[3] The private sector, even allowing for the transfer of the nationalized industries to the public sector, still employs about three-quarters of the occupied population, although it accounts for only about half of the investment now undertaken. The postwar controls in existence in this sector have not been of a sufficiently strict nature to ensure that detailed amounts of particular commodities could be produced to order. On several occasions Sir Stafford Cripps (Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1947–1950) pointed to this difference between "democratic planning" in Great Britain and the "totalitarian planning" of some other countries.

Detailed control over manpower, for instance, was not attempted. The powers to direct labor which existed between 1947 and 1949 were sparingly employed: their main function was to retain in their jobs those already working in the textile and coal mining industries, not to direct workers there from outside. In fact, the limitations of the controls used were admitted from the start; the 1947 *Economic Survey* granted that "The controls cannot by themselves bring about very rapid changes or make very fine adjustments in the economic structure."[4] A further illustration of this point is the disappearance from the 1950 *Economic Survey* of the "targets" for the number of workers required in certain industries. Such "targets" had been included in previous *Surveys*, although those for coal mining, agriculture and textiles had been attributed by *The Economist* to "wishful thinking" on the part of the Labour Government. No attempt had been made to achieve the goals either by large-scale direction or by big enough wage-inducements. Appeal by exhortation in posters and other types of publicity were the chief means of recruiting used, along with improvements in working conditions such as the five-day week, the basis for the publicity for coal mining. It was not remarkable that these partial and indirect methods failed to achieve the "targets," or that this was admitted in the 1950 *Survey*. The forecast it gave for the numbers to be employed by the end of the year in different industries was "not of the requirements of the industries listed, but of the changes in the distribution of the working population which it is expected will take place."[5]

The policy just described was attempted under conditions of great stress. The central problem of foreign trade was intensified by such occurrences as the sudden end of lend lease in 1945, the hard winter of 1946–47, which hit coal exports, and the drought in Australia and the Argentine, which curtailed supplies of meat and maize. At the same time the tasks of nationalizing some of the country's basic industries (including several, such as coal and the railways, which badly needed re-equipping) and of launching both the National Health Service and a new comprehensive insurance scheme were undertaken. Furthermore, because international relations were never really settled after the war, the uneasy suspension of disarmament was succeeded by the process of active rearmament. The need to produce reports and papers for bodies concerned with "international planning," such as the Committee of European Economic Co-operation, increased the strain. Altogether, the pressure of external events and a succession of "crises" over balance of payments difficulties forced the planners to concentrate on immediate issues and prevented the formulation of any genuine long-term economic plan.

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[3] Cmd. 7046 (1947), par. 13. [4] Par. 27. [5] Cmd. 7915 (1950), par. 111.

Remarkably little is known about the tone and spirit, as opposed to the formal organization, of the economic planning machinery developed to carry out the activities just described. In the first place, there has been no published survey of the British governmental structure as a whole since the war; there has, in fact, been none since the report of the Committee on the Machinery of Government in 1918.[6] The only available sources containing much relevant material on economic planning machinery are short articles by ministers or ex-ministers, such as Mr. Herbert Morrison and Lord Waverley (formerly Sir John Anderson), general accounts of the problems of planning by former civil servants, and a few references in *Parliamentary Debates.*[7] These sources are barely adequate for discovering the formal pattern of machinery which is experimental and has been changing all the time; and the truth is that it is the *informal* parts which matter. Organisation charts, even if correct, are quite useless in showing how the most important decisions are made—decisions which, it has been remarked, are arrived at by "a huddle of Treasury knights." The fact that the present writer has been privileged to talk with some of the officials concerned may have helped him to avoid some of the errors which an "outsider" might make. But a full interpretation of the machinery could be given only by someone who has worked inside it, and then only after such an interval that he would be permitted to quote "case histories" of how particular decisions of importance come to be made.

Before proceeding to the discussion, it may be wise again to warn the reader that another obstacle to clear understanding is the terminology. It is in an extremely peculiar sense of "planning" that the Central Economic Planning Staff can be said to "plan," and the Economic Planning Board is purely advisory in spite of the fact that the term "board" in Britain usually denotes a body with executive powers—for instance, the National Coal Board or the National Assistance Board.

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[6] Cd. 9230 (1918).

[7] For articles by Morrison and Anderson, see, respectively, "Economic Planning," *Public Administration* (London), Vol. 25, pp. 3–9 (1947), and "The Machinery of Government," *ibid.*, Vol. 24, pp. 147–155 (1946). For material by former civil servants, see Sir O. Franks, *Central Planning and Control in War and Peace* (London, 1947), J. E. Meade, *Planning and the Price Mechanism* (London, 1948), and the article by R. C. Tress in *The Manchester School*, Vol. 16, no. 2 (1948). For Parliamentary Debates see later references. Note 31 below indicates a source not easily available in Britain.

The first point to notice about the planning machinery is that the total number of civil servants centrally employed in it is small. Including those in the various units inside the Treasury and the Cabinet office and in the "economic" departments such as the Board of Trade and the Ministries of Fuel and Power, Food, and Supply, there are fewer than a hundred equivalent in rank to the administrative class, about two per cent of all administrative civil servants.

The second clue to the planning machinery labyrinth is that the easiest way to visualise it is to concentrate on the basic structure of ministerial and civil service committees. What economic planning occurs is done in the main by these "traditional" bodies, a conclusion as startling as that reached in Poe's story, "The Purloined Letter," when the missing document is discovered not hidden in upholstery or screwed up inside the leg of a chair, but carelessly displayed in a letter rack. The backbone of the structure is the Cabinet, two levels of committees of ministers below it, and, below them, two levels of committees of officials. The Planning Staff, along with the advisory Economic Planning Board and the Information Division of the Treasury, may be likened to improvements made to the original structure of a building. The additions would correspond to a balcony, giving a more extensive view, and perhaps to an elevator allowing more frequent and rapid communication. The original structure consisted of a number of committees composed of ministers specially interested, by the nature of their departments, in economic problems; of corresponding committees made up of senior civil servants; and of two bodies performing the "intelligence" function of feeding economic and statistical information to these committees, the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office and the Central Statistical Office. The committees, ministerial and official, give instructions to the government departments, but are themselves largely composed of representatives of these same departments. The entire structure is similar in principle to the British organization for defense.[8]

In theory, of course, the main economic decisions are made by the ministerial committees or, sometimes, by the Cabinet itself. It is these committees which are said to determine issues of policy, giving instructions to the official committees and receiving their reports.[9] But this picture probably no more describes what actually happens than does the copy-book maxim that in Britain the minister decides "policy" and the civil service carries it out. In order to verify this contention it is necessary to glance at the sort of job the official committees are doing with an attempt to appreciate its complexity.

The system of committees of officials drawn from the departments chiefly interested in economic questions is, of course, not unique. It is also found, for instance, in the sphere of town and country planning. The technique of these inter-departmental committees is a subtle one: there is no voting, and the system works only because all who attend are determined to reach the fullest possible amount of agreement. The system of committees under discussion is, however, a little more complicated because of the esoteric quality of economics and the numerous quantitative relationships concerned.

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[8] See *Central Organization for Defence*, Cmd. 6923 (1946).

[9] *House of Commons Debates*, 5th ser., Vol. 420, cols. 2130–2131 (Feb. 28, 1946).

The activities of these committees, outlined in the opening pages of the *Economic Survey for 1947*, consist largely of drawing up "budgets." (These quantitative budgets must not, of course, be confused with the annual budget of projected government revenue and expenditure, voted on by Parliament and itself a major instrument of "Planning" in that it lays down the share of total state expenditure to be devoted to different uses.) Resources and requirements for the coming year are set out in terms of different units, such as national income and expenditure, and are "supplemented by analyses of particular problems," such as foreign exchange or investment. This system is the child of the war time method: the problem is tackled by the same device of "budgets," the main difference being that the principal shortage, around which the rest of the program rotates, has changed. During the war it was either shipping or manpower; after 1945 it has been foreign exchange,[10] and, to a lesser extent, savings. In the light of the "budgets," decisions have to be made on how requirements can be cut to fit resources, or resources expanded to meet requirements. Generally speaking, the details of a cut in requirements would probably be largely accepted by the ministerial committee receiving an official committee's report. It would be a matter for decisive ministerial intervention only if a cut came too near a politically sensitive nerve, for instance, the house-building program. An expansion of resources, say a decision to combat inflation not by reducing investment but by staging a government drive for more voluntary savings, would usually be a matter in which a ministerial committee would be interested.

These "budget-making" activities are so complex that ministers are unlikely to formulate particularly explicit directives about them. Thus ministerial instructions might be given to officials to produce figures on proposed rearmament expenditure; the figures would have to be based on assumptions arising from present rearmament and production figures and existing plans. Officials would know the political sensitivities of the ministers; and if they failed to take adequate account of them, they would get the figures back to do again, with an indication of what was politically unacceptable. But ministers have been too busy plugging the leaks to draw up elaborate charts of the seas to be navigated in future years. Apart from a few broad directions, policy has often been shaped by the "logic of the situation" and, to a lesser extent, by the initiative of officials.

It may help the reader if, before describing particular parts of the planning machinery, the main stages of its operation are tabulated. The left-hand column of this table is adapted from Mr. Morrison's account in *Public Administration*.[11] The other column indicates the bodies chiefly concerned in each process in October, 1951. This column is not exhaustive; the Central Economic Planning Staff, for instance, influences the third stage, too, because it is represented on the committees of officials.

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[10] Sir E. Bridges, *Treasury Control* (London, 1951), pp. 20–22.

[11] Cited above, n. 7.

Stage:	*Agencies:*
1. Deciding to plan and determining the main assumptions on which planning is to be done.	The Cabinet.
2. Assembling the necessary facts and figures from the "economic" departments, etc.	Economic Section of the Cabinet Office; the Central Statistical Office; The Central Economic Planning Staff.
3. Devising a program or alternative programs.	Committees of officials drawn from the departments, helped by the Economic Section and the Planning Staff.
4. Adopting a program or rejecting it with instructions on how to make it politically acceptable.	The Cabinet or ministerial committees.
5. (a) Carrying out of plans.	(a) Government departments.
(b) Explaining plans.	(b) Speeches of ministers; the Information Division of the Treasury.
(c) Adjusting plans.	(c) Committees of officials, aided by the Central Economic Planning Staff.

At the head of the whole structure is the Cabinet, collectively responsible for all major decisions, whether in the economic field or outside it. In it the Chancellor of the Exchequer combines his office with responsibility for economic affairs, subject only to this collective responsibility and to the paramount authority of the Prime Minister. The way in which this function was acquired is one of the most persuasive examples of chance in politics. The announcement of the appointment of Sir Stafford Cripps as Minister for Economic Affairs in September, 1947 (soon after the "convertibility crisis" caused a sudden fall in foreign exchange reserves) did not solve the question of the exact relationship of "physical economic planning" (under Cripps) to finance (under Dr. Dalton, at that time Chancellor of the Exchequer). When Dalton resigned on November 13, 1947, as the result of a parliamentary indiscretion, Cripps was given the powers and responsibilities of both offices. To enable him to carry the additional load, the Chancellor was given the help of a new Economic Secretary to the Treasury in February, 1948. Later, in the Labour Government formed after the election in February, 1950, this junior minister was replaced by a Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. Gaitskell, of "Cabinet rank" although without a seat in the Cabinet. When Gaitskell in turn became Chancellor in the autumn of 1950, and took over Cripps's Economic Affairs functions as well, his own previous job was abolished and the junior post, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, was re-created.

Below the Cabinet are a number of ministerial committees, some relatively permanent, others set up to meet a temporary need. Their constitutional position was described by the Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, in October, 1946:

> We have standing committees of the Cabinet acting under authority devolved from the Cabinet. They can make decisions or they can make recommendations to the Cabinet. There always remains . . . the right of departmental Ministers in the last resort to bring matters to the Cabinet, but, in fact, experience has shown that a great many inter-

departmental matters can be settled in committee and a great deal of preliminary work done, so as to free the Cabinet from an excessive amount of work over detail.[12]

The role of the ministerial committee has become that of a "cement" to bind together activities falling within the same broad field, e.g., economic affairs or social services performed by more than one government department. This solution has been adopted in preference to that of the *Machinery of Government Committee Report*, 1918,[13] which recommended cutting down the number of departments and therefore the size of the Cabinet; and the system in existence is, in many ways, a typically British compromise. The Cabinet, through delegation, has got rid of some of its work while retaining its responsibility. It has also been possible to keep down the size of the Cabinet by excluding some ministerial heads of departments and yet enabling them to shape co-ordinated policies at the lower level of the ministerial committee. All of this, however, has been done in a quite unsystematic and haphazard way. The neat solution put forward by some writers,[14] of a Cabinet composed mainly of ministers without a major department who would spend much of their time presiding over ministerial committees, has been only partially accepted. Thus the ministerial heads of the three armed services departments, excluded from the Cabinet and replaced by the Minister of Defence, are represented in the Defence Committee, presided over either by the Defence Minister or the Prime Minister;[15] but this pattern is not strictly observed in economic affairs. For instance, the Chancellor of the Exchequer is himself the virtual head of a major department, and the President of the Board of Trade, who is in a sense his "subordinate," sits both on a ministerial economic committee and in the Cabinet itself.

A peculiar convention of secrecy surrounds these ministerial committees. Mr. Morrison's guarded and modest remarks about them have been so cloaked with reservations that the reader is made to feel that any further illumination would result in indecent exposure. Furthermore, this secrecy extends not only to the detailed business they do, but also to their composition and even their existence. The usual explanation offered is the necessity for preserving the British doctrine of collective responsibility: not only is each minister responsible for what his department does, but they are collectively responsible for general policy. Details about committees might, it is said, enable responsibility for a decision to be attributed to the relevant committee, or part of it, rather than to the Cabinet as a whole. There is a basis of truth in this argument, but it is not completely convincing. It has been shown that under the system of ministerial committees the ultimate collective responsibility of the Cabinet itself has been firmly maintained, and that the committee device does no more than bring the ministers interested in any given topic together for discussion preliminary to a meeting of the Cabinet itself. Even if no committees at all existed, one might be justified in concluding that, *ceteris paribus*, the Foreign Secretary has less interest, as a minister, in the provision of milk to school children than the Minister of Food or the Minister of Education, and that those two play a greater part than he does in shaping policy in this sphere. In any case, what cracks there are in the façade of collective responsibility are sometimes revealed from different angles than the committee viewpoint. The wide circulation late in 1950 of Mr. Bevan's reported views on the relative priorities of re-armament and social services revealed that disagreement existed several months before his resignation from office in April, 1951.

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[12] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 428, cols. 622–623 (Oct. 30, 1946).

[13] Cited above, n. 6.

[14] See the letters of Lord Samuel in *The Times* (London), Feb. 3 and Feb. 9, 1950.

[15] See *Central Organization for Defence* (above, n. 8).

The chairmanship and membership of the committees concerned with economic matters have changed a good deal in the last ten years. A broad picture of development can be seen; but the exact title or composition of a committee at any given moment depends on the relative importance of different issues and on the personalities of the Prime Minister and his colleagues. The main alterations during the war are outlined in *The British War Economy.*[16] Between the end of the war and autumn, 1947, responsibility for the broadest economic policy was divided on the ministerial committee level. Questions affecting mainly Great Britain were handled, together with other principal "domestic" matters such as social services and health, by the Lord President's Committee under Mr. Morrison, while overseas economic matters were the province of another committee under the Prime Minister. Morrison's illness in 1947 made some other arrangement desirable. When Cripps became Minister for Economic Affairs in September, 1947, Morrison's committee lost its economic functions to the other committee, later called the Economic Policy Committee, and Cripps was made its deputy chairman under the Prime Minister. At the same time Cripps replaced Morrison as chairman of a subordinate ministerial economic committee, the Home Economic Committee, containing the ministerial heads of the main "economic" departments—a committee which afterwards became known as the Production Committee. As far as can be ascertained, this broad pattern held good until October, 1951. The top ministerial economic committee, the Economic Policy Committee, consisted in 1948 of the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, and certain others when required. It is this committee which has decided the general policy to be followed nationally and internationally in finance, trade, and industry, and has determined the broad distribution of manpower and material resources and "the correct balance between capital and consumption expenditure."[17] The Production Committee, subordinate and larger, has had more frequent meetings, perhaps as often as once a week. In addition to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, it included in 1948 the President of the Board of Trade and the Ministers of Supply, Fuel and Power, Agriculture, Transport and Works, as well as the Minister of Labour on questions affecting manpower and the Minister of Health by reason of his responsibility for housing.[18] It has dealt with more detailed and "day-to-day" aspects of policy than the Economic Policy Committee, apparently being used by the Cabinet for such tasks as studying and making recommendations on the investment programme and supervising the preparation of the yearly *Economic Survey.*

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[16] By W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), pp. 93–94 and pp. 216–220.

[17] F. Williams, *The Triple Challenge* (London, 1948), pp. 45–46. In January, 1951, responsibility for housing was transferred to the Ministry of Local Government and Planning, renamed the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, October, 1951. Since June, 1951, the newly created Ministry of Materials, which took over some functions from the Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade, is presumably represented as well.

Matching these committees on the official level, are similar groups drawn from the departments chiefly concerned with economic questions and from the Central Economic Planning Staff, the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, and the Central Statistical Office. (It is worthwhile remarking that there is also a committee structure *inside* each of the departments concerned with economic questions.) These official committees are the successor of the inter-departmental committee mentioned in *The British War Economy,* which in October, 1939, was appointed "in order to keep under review and to co-ordinate the functioning of the departments in relation to the economic life of the country as a whole . . ." At present there appears to be one chief committee of officials, formerly called a "steering" committee but now known as the Official Committee for Economic Development, assisted by a number of sub-ordinate committees. The major body, which came into existence shortly after the end of the war, is of great importance in the planning mechanism, and has on many occasions been compared with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Mr. Morrison stressed the key position it held when he called it "the central economic team responsible for gathering and assessing economic intelligence, preparing forecasts, framing economic plans, advising Ministers on the advantages and disadvantages of these plans, and keeping under review the execution of plans when authorized and put into operation."[19] The actual job of gathering intelligence and preparing the forecasts and plans is done by the specialized bodies such as the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office and the Central Statistical Office. In its reviewing function the Committee is assisted by the departments themselves and, since 1947, also by the Central Economic Planning Staff. It will be observed that its tasks embrace the drawing up the economic "budgets" previously mentioned. The full committee has the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, the official "Head of the Civil Service," for its chairman, and includes the permanent secretaries, or deputies representing them, of those departments represented at a ministerial level on the Production Committee, together with representatives of the Planning Staff, the Economic Section, and the Central Statistical Office.

For much of its work, the Official Committee for Economic Development is assisted by subordinate committees, and it is in these that particular types of problems are considered and that particular budgets, such as those for investment, are drawn up. Their exact number is uncertain, but it can be deduced from the Introduction to the 1947 *Economic Survey* that there were then at least four subcommittees—for manpower, foreign exchange, investment, and fuel and power. Others have been set up since for such fields as agriculture, colonial development, and economic co-operation in Europe. When a particular budget is under consideration, each department represented is responsible for sponsoring the requirements, for both the public and the private sectors, of a particular "slice" of the economy. For instance, when the budget for foreign exchange is drawn up, the Ministry of Food would be the sponsoring department for food requirements from abroad, the Ministry of Supply the sponsoring department for certain metal imports, etc. The requirements of the whole economy would thus be covered by the departments. Perhaps it should be added that the committees are business-like for the simple reason that each department present does its best, within the bounds of friendly co-operation, to secure the maximum allocations for the interests it represents. In addition to the regular committees, the device of "working-parties," consisting of groups of officials from the various departments and from the Central Economic Planning Staff, etc., is often used for ad hoc problems.

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[18] Williams, p. 46.

[19] "Economic Planning," p. 6.

Feeding information to these committees is part of the work of the two bodies which provide economic intelligence, the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office and the Central Statistical Office. These also had their origin in the war.[20] The intention of the Coalition Government to maintain them permanently was made clear in the 1944 *White Paper on Employment Policy*, which stated that "The Government intend to establish on a permanent basis a small central staff qualified to measure and analyse economic trends and submit appreciations of them to the Ministers concerned."[21] The functions of the Economic Section and the C.S.O. have not changed much since the war. Nor have their numbers noticeably expanded: neither has as many as twenty officials in ranks corresponding to the administrative class, the highest class of civil servant. In the economic field they have fulfilled, after a long interval, the recommendations of the Machinery of Government Committee on the need for better research. Given the more limited scope of planning in the United States and the completely different governmental structure, there is a close correspondence between the work of these two bodies and that of the Council of Economic Advisers set up in 1946 to recommend national economic policies to the President.[22]

The Central Statistical Office performs "common service functions" over a limited and selective range. It collects statistics from the departments, but it has not attempted to take over all their statistical work; only a statistical section which lives and works in a department can appreciate exactly what kind of statistics that department wants and how they must be presented. The concern of the C.S.O. is with statistics which may be of interest to more than a single department. Assembling statistics that relate mainly to the past, the C.S.O. is more occupied with routine work than the Economic Section, which is largely concerned with making future estimates. The statistics which the C.S.O. produces can be viewed as serving three concentric circles. First, if certain information is requested by the official committees recently mentioned, the representative of the C.S.O. on the committee will be expected to produce figures bearing on the problem under discussion. From this aspect, the C.S.O. provides material for the drawing up of particular budgets or "plans." Second, the C.S.O. is concerned with figures which are regularly produced and circulated to the interested departments, but are not made available to the public. Third, the C.S.O. produces statistics intended not only for government departments but also for the public, through the medium of publication by Her Majesty's Stationery Office. The *Annual Abstract of Statistics* and the *Monthly Digest of Statistics* are examples of this service, each containing tables of figures on trade, production, labor, and other items. And in addition to these specific activities, the C.S.O. has since its earliest days, been charged with the task of eliminating, by a process of tactful erosion, particularly glaring discrepancies in nomenclature, etc., which have hindered comparisons of statistics between departments.

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[20] *British War Economy*, p. 93.

[21] Cmd. 6527, par. 81.

[22] E. G. Nourse and B. M. Gross, "The Role of the Council of Economic Advisers," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 42, p. 283 (April, 1948).

The function of the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office is rather similar, at least in so far as the purely "intelligence" aspect of the work is concerned. Its job is one of collecting economic intelligence from the relevant departments, of filling in gaps, and of using the result to provide either periodic reports or specifically commissioned studies of what has happened and what is likely to happen. The periodic reports, which go up to ministerial level, represent a "stocktaking" of the economic situation at a particular moment of time. It is believed that the ministers concerned study them carefully and that they are not dismissed as mere "routine" reports. Ideally, every major twist and turn in the economic climate of Britain should lead to a ministerial request for a study of the probable effects. Thus ministers might ask for estimates by the Economic Section of the consequences of devaluation and of the effects of British rearmament. Representatives of the Economic Section, like those of the C.S.O., sit on the official Committee for Economic Development and on its subordinate committees.

The Central Economic Planning Staff is, constitutionally and organizationally, a more difficult body to classify. The announcement of the creation of the Planning Staff and that its head, the Chief Planning Officer, was to be an industrialist with war time experience in the civil service, Sir Edwin Plowden, was made by the Prime Minister in March, 1947. It was clear that ministerial responsibility was to be retained: the Chief Planning Officer would work under the Lord President of the Council, and would have access to all ministers concerned with production; but the responsibility for all decisions on economic policy would remain with the Cabinet.[23] As the responsibility for economic affairs has moved from minister to minister, so the Chief Planning Officer and his staff have moved as well. After Cripps became Chancellor (November, 1947), they were incorporated in the Treasury, where they have remained.

The Planning Staff is perhaps most correctly viewed as the personal staff of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It consists of a small number of officials headed by the C.P.O., only some fifteen or twenty of whom are in the administrative class, who perform a "general staff" function. That is to say, in theory, the C.E.P.S. has no direct executive authority over officials in the economic departments. As an extension of the Chancellor's personality, its job is to act as a lubricant in helping the other parts of the planning machinery to operate and to report back to the Chancellor any special difficulties it sees in the fulfilment of plans. In practice, this picture needs modification. In the first place, some members of the C.E.P.S. sit on the committees of civil servants which help to draw up the plans; this makes its work partly executive and not entirely of a "general staff" kind. In the second place, the prestige of the Chancellor, added to the high position of the C.P.O., makes it unlikely that any suggestions which the C.E.P.S. cared to press would be brusquely turned down.

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[23] *H.C. Deb.*, Vol. 435, cols. 1412–1413 (Mar. 27, 1947).

Strictly speaking, however, the title "Central Economic Planning Staff" is liable to mislead, carrying an implication that it consists of people selected for their knowledge of "planning" and that if the staff did not exist the planning would not get done at all. Neither of these implications is supported by facts. No "planning type" of civil servant has yet evolved; nor are there signs that all members of the existing planning staff have passed an examination on the organization of the Russian Gosplan, nor even that many of them have studied economics academically or possess first-hand knowledge of industry. The reason is that the type of work which they do is not perceptibly different from that of civil servants in other departments. A large part of their time is spent in attending committee meetings and in liaison with the economic departments; some is spent in comparing observations, finding out how the plans are faring in practice, and making reports to the Chancellor. The planning would not fail to get done if the C.E.P.S. did not exist; it would not, perhaps, be done so well, but it was done somehow before the Staff was formed in March, 1947.

We would like to know, of course, what effect the introduction of the C.E.P.S. had on the existing machinery, and just what defects it was meant to remedy. There seems to be general agreement that one main intention was that it should relieve the pressure on the committee of officials (the Official Committee for Economic Development) and its subordinate committees. Apart from the representatives of the Economic Section and the C.S.O., these committees consisted of the top civil servant (permanent secretary) in each economic department or his deputy, men already too busy to follow up the implications of the "planning" being considered. After the creation of the C.E.P.S., the official committees remained, but they became more efficient. The C.E.P.S. was able to provide better preliminary documentation, and the arguments of departmental representatives were now liable to be more closely scrutinized than before. The general belief is that the C.E.P.S. has succeeded in welding the planning mechanism together more closely than previously.

The difference between the functions of the C.E.P.S. and those of the Economic Section which relate to internal economic affairs is not so great as might be imagined by a superficial consideration. It might be considered important that the first is in the Treasury while the second is in the Cabinet Office. But in reality the Economic Section (and the C.S.O. as well) has little to do with the rest of the Cabinet Office, apart from a certain amount of liaison with the Cabinet Secretariat over the taking of minutes for some committees. And while it may seem anomalous to students of pure organizational forms that such a split should exist, in practice it is mitigated by the fact that the two bodies are physically close together. It is possible, by taking a short walk inside the same building, to pass from the offices of the "straight" (i.e., non-economic planning) Treasury to those of the C.E.P.S. and then to those of the Economic Section and the C.S.O. In practice there does not seem to be much difference between much of the work of the two bodies. They are sufficiently small to allow new ideas to circulate quickly. Both use the language of persuasion and not the language of command. The most effective appeal for action is quite likely to be the British one "not to let the side down."

Little is known about the mechanism by which the "planning" organs, such as the Planning Staff, the Economic Section, and the C.S.O., are co-ordinated with the financial and fiscal parts of the Treasury—for instance, that part concerned in drawing up the annual budget or that interested in the balance of payments.[24] The need for this co-ordination is clear and has been recognized in principle by putting the C.E.P.S. in the Treasury and thus concentrating there the responsibility for both "financial" and "physical" planning. Presumably liaison is achieved by the use of official committees. The essential point here is that the Economic Section and the C.S.O. could hardly be integrated more closely with the Treasury than they are at present merely by being nominally included in it.

About the same time as the Central Economic Planning Staff was created, two further pieces of the planning machinery were set up. One of these was intended to solve a problem inherent in "democratic" planning—that because the plans are not rigidly enforceable their fulfilment depends on co-operation, which in turn depends upon informing the public of what it is required to do. This is the function of the Information Division of the Treasury, which was founded in the summer of 1947 as part of the office of the Lord President of the Council, and has traveled with the Economic Planning Staff to the office of the Minister for Economic Affairs and then to the Treasury. The work of the Division, until 1951 called the Economic Information Unit, has recently been admirably described by its Director.[25]

The other piece of the machinery, also set up in 1947, was the Economic Planning Board. Its functions are purely advisory; according to its terms of reference they were "to advise his Majesty's Government on the best use of our economic resources, both for the realization of a long-term plan and for remedial measures against our immediate difficulties."[26] In 1947 there was already in existence an impressive array of bodies to give the government advice on certain aspects of economic affairs. There were, for instance, the Regional Boards for Industry with their district committees, the National Joint Advisory Council for consultation on labor problems, and the National Production Advisory Council on Industry.[27] The Government desired, however, to consult on wider issues with industry as a whole, and the composition of the Economic Planning

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[24] Referred to in *The United Kingdom Balance of Payments, 1946 and 1947*, Cmd. 7324 (1948).

[25] C. S. Leslie, "Work of the Economic Information Unit," *Public Administration*, Vol. 28, pp. 17–26 (1950).

[26] *Government and Industry* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948).

[27] *Ibid.*

Board was intended to fulfil this wish. There have been several changes in membership since 1947, but the general basis of its composition has not altered. The C.P.O., Sir Edwin Plowden, was to be chairman, with the stipulation that Mr. Morrison might on occasions take the chair himself. Neither he, Sir Stafford Cripps, or Mr. Gaitskell did this very often, however. From the civil service were chosen the permanent secretaries to the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Labour, and the Ministry of Supply, along with three members of the Economic Planning Staff and the Director of the Economic Section. Three members were nominated jointly by two associations of employers, the Federation of British Industries and the British Employers' Confederation. Three were nominated by the Trades Union Congress, one being its general secretary. These six "outside" members, equally representing "both sides" of industry, are unpaid.

Some criticism has been made of the composition of the nominated section of the Board. It has on different occasions been urged that there should be representation of smaller manufacturers (through the National Union of Manufacturers), agricultural interests, and Scottish trade interests. This has been countered from the ministerial benches in two main ways. It has sometimes been denied that the board is intended to be "representative" at all—in which case it seems strange to go through the motions of having members nominated by the F.B.I. and B.E.C. or the T.U.C. Thus Sir Stafford Cripps said in February, 1949, that it was "not a body on which sectional or regional interests are represented. Its members sit as individuals."[28] Mr. Morrison, soon after the Board was set up, used a different defence. To the charge of the Board's being insufficiently representative, he replied that either there could be co-optation or the Board might from time to time meet bodies such as the National Union of Manufacturers and "consult agriculture specifically."[29] There is no evidence to show how often these devices have been used.

The worth of the Economic Planning Board is hard to estimate. It meets on the average less than once a fortnight, and it does not submit regular reports. It is simply an advisory body, very roughly representative of employers and labour as a whole. The value of its work must depend on the role which the Government allows it to play. The main flow of ideas is perhaps more likely to run from the official to the non-official than vice versa; and *The Economist* described the primary function of the Board as enabling the Government "to put across more easily any policy that it may decide upon."[30] It is impossible to be certain, in the absence of reports of the meetings, whether this interpretation is true or not. No doubt the Government could use the Planning Board to "put across" a policy if it so desired. On the other hand, it could allow its policy to be shaped by the assessments of the economic situation which it is the Board's duty to provide; not only does the Board present the advantage of associating management and labor continuously with the Government's economic policy, but it also enables the Government, if it wants to, "to receive and take into account in good time" the views of the Board on that policy.[31] If properly used, the Board could undoubtedly help in solving one of the main problems of "democratic planning," namely informing and consulting a section of "the public" whose co-operation is essential for success.

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[28] *H.C. Deb.*, Vol. 460, written answers to questions, col. 210 (Feb. 1, 1949). Also *ibid.*, Vol. 440, col. 790 (Apr. 13, 1948).

[29] *Ibid.*, Vol. 439, col. 1806 (July 7, 1947).

[30] July 12, 1947, p. 56.

There are perhaps two main features of interest in this description. The first is the close resemblance which the basic methods of planning today bear to war time methods. The drawing-up of quantitative budgets has been derived from war time experience, although shortage of foreign exchange has in peace time replaced other considerations as "the strategic factor." The rough method of planning in bulk by means of total quantities has still been serviceable because there has been little attempt at detailed control of reproduction, as in the U.S.S.R. It is true that the Labour government between 1945 and 1951 was engaged in activities which were not present to distract the planners before 1945, such as the expansion of social services and nationalization. But although these had to be allowed for in the same way as any other factors calling for the diversion of resources from one purpose to another, they did not substantially alter the principles on which the planners worked. Furthermore, the view that the British planning machinery is not particularly "socialist" but largely the product of external forces acting on the traditional framework of government, is now confirmed by its maintenance, substantially unaltered, under a Conservative government.[32] It is possible, of course, that the machinery is still under review; but up to the middle of May, 1952, few major changes had been announced. The various planning units were maintained, as was the control of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. R. A. Butler, over both financial and economic affairs. Sir Arthur Salter, an experienced economist and former M.P. for a university seat, was made Mr. Butler's assistant minister with the title of Minister of State for Economic Affairs.

One big alteration brought about by the Conservatives concerns the structure of the Cabinet. A further step was made towards a Cabinet consisting of ministers without a major department of their own but charged with co-ordinating two or more departments without cabinet ministers. Lord Woolton, Lord President of the Council, is responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Food. Lord Leathers' task of co-ordination is sufficiently indicated by his formidable title of Secretary of State for Co-ordination of Transport, Fuel and Power. These appointments were not intended to supplant the previous system of ministerial committees, although they may result in changes in the membership of particular committees. They were meant to be an additional link for tying together ministries which were believed to have numerous common problems. Lord Leathers' field, for instance, is almost coincident with that of the major nationalized industries, except steel.[33]

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[31] "Britain's Planning Machinery" in *Labor and Industry in Britain*, British Information Services (New York, 1948), Vol. 6, no. 2.

[32] For a development of this view, see the author's article in the *Political Quarterly* (London), Vol. 23, pp. 147–154 (April–June, 1952).

[33] The precise extent of the responsibility of these co-ordinating ministers has recently been hotly debated in both houses of Parliament. See especially *H.C. Deb.*, Vol. 499, cols. 190–198 (May 6, 1952), and *ibid.*, Vol. 500, cols. 1116–1118 (May 13, 1952). A hint that

The second main change under the Conservative government is the restoration, under Lord Cherwell, formerly Professor Lindemann, of the statistical section which worked for Winston Churchill during the war. Lord Cherwell's office of Paymaster-General conceals his twin functions of supervising atomic research and production and, with the help of this section, interpreting statistics for the Prime Minister. The re-creation of the section and Lord Cherwell's appointment with a seat in the Cabinet can be explained only by his long association and friendship with the Prime Minister. In the middle 1930's, for example, he was in constant communication with Churchill over the problem of air defence.[34] In a Commons debate on the appointment, the Labour party opposition has alleged that the new section will needlessly duplicate and confuse the work of the Economic Section and the C.S.O.[35] This need not happen, however; the new staff will be very small (only about half a dozen) and fortunately the chief economist in it is a personal friend of the head of the Economic Section.[36]

The second striking feature of the economic planning machinery under both recent governments is perhaps the most puzzling. It may be expressed in the form of a question: How does the system manage to work at all? "Democratic planning" is not a concept capable of easy formulation and is exposed to attack from both right and left. The machinery used has been largely improvised; formally it merits condemnation as severe as that of the President's Committee on Administrative Management on federal administration in 1937. The titles of some of the component parts, such as Economic Planning Board, seem almost wilfully non-self-explanatory. The exact relationship between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for Economic Affairs was not clear in 1947, and potential misunderstanding was removed only with the fortuitous resignation of Dr. Dalton which permitted the two offices to be amalgamated. The C.E.P.S. and the Economic Section, which work so closely together on economic planning are nominally, separate, one in the Treasury and the other in the Cabinet Office. However, the planning system does work, for the same reason that the entire system of government works in Britain. What the text books say about the administrative class as a whole between the wars, applies equally to the way in which the "planning" part of it works to-day. An intense disregard for rigid organizational arrangements is accompanied by close personal contacts inside the small circle of individuals who really matter in the taking of economic decisions. On the official, as opposed to the ministerial, level, counting both those in the central machinery and in the "economic" departments, this circle might include something under fifty people at most. Formally the exchange of relevant information is assured by means of sending copies of documents to all those likely to be interested; informally, such institutions as clubs allow more general ideas to circulate. It is the use of these methods which accounts for both the efficiency and the obscurity of the British economic planning machinery.

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there may now be only one ministerial economic committee is given in a leading article in the *Times* (London), May 6, 1952.

[34] Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 1 (London, 1948), p. 120.

[35] *H. C. Deb.*, Vol. 494, cols. 440–444 (Nov. 21, 1951).

[36] *Ibid.*, cols. 1683–1684 (Nov. 28, 1951).

FRANCE REOPENS THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE

ROY PIERCE

Smith College

Less than six years have passed since the Constitution of the Fourth Republic was put into operation, yet every political group in France with the exception of the Communist Party, which has its own special plans for France's future, is currently participating in a movement for constitutional revision. Since July, 1950, no candidate for the post of Prime Minister has neglected to assert in his ministerial declaration the need for constitutional reform. The parties of the Third Force majority of the first legislature of the Fourth Republic set into motion for the first time, in November, 1950, the machinery for the amendment of the Constitution. The momentum which the revisionist movement had already gathered was given greater impetus by the elections of June, 1951, which reinforced markedly the political groups opposed to the Constitution at its inception. These groups had been able to muster only 106 votes in the Second Constituent Assembly of 1946. Later, in the first legislature but after the formation of a Gaullist parliamentary group, their strength rose to approximately 160 seats. And as a result of the elections of June, 1951, the same groups now command 300 seats in the second legislature.

The strength and significance of the revisionist movement can not be doubted. The outcome of the movement, however, is less certain, for the abundant proposals for constitutional revision thus far presented provide a striking example in the constitutional sphere of the fundamental disunity which prevails in France. It is the purpose of this article to examine the various programs for revision which have been offered and then to suggest what elements must enter into a consideration of how constitutional revision may actually be accomplished.

I. THE RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER, 1950

The Resolution of November, 1950, is less a program for constitutional revision than a case study in the difficulty of securing agreement upon any constitutional amendment among France's parties. It has the merit, however, of being the only concrete step toward constitutional amendment that has been taken during the Fourth Republic. The provisions of the Constitution which deal with constitutional amendment divide the process into at least two stages.[1]

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[1] The amendment procedure is as follows: First, a resolution stating the object of the amendment must be passed by an absolute majority of the members of the National Assembly. The resolution must be accepted again by an absolute majority of the members of the National Assembly not less than three months later, unless the Council of the Republic has adopted the same resolution by an absolute majority of its members. After either of these procedures has been followed, the National Assembly draws up a bill to amend the Constitution, which is treated like any other bill. Once passed by both houses, the amendment is submitted to popular referendum unless it has been accepted by a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly or by a three-fifths majority in both houses, in either of which cases the referendum is not required.

Since it has been adopted by large majorities in both houses of Parliament, the Resolution of November, 1950, has passed through the first of these stages. Whether it can successfully pass through the later ones is a matter for the future to decide, but the circumstances surrounding the passage of the resolution in the first instance indicate that agreement on the desirability of constitutional change by no means is equivalent to agreement on what changes should be made.

The steps leading to the passage of the Resolution of November, 1950, are simple to trace. The Radical Socialist and Conservative elements of the Third Force majority of the first legislature of the Fourth Republic objected from the beginning to the present Constitution. Their major complaint, although not their only one, has been that the Council of the Republic does not have sufficient authority in the legislative process; essentially, these two groups want to give greater weight to the role of the second chamber in order to be able further to exploit their strength in that chamber. (Because of the peculiarities of the electoral law which governs the election of members of the Council of the Republic,[2] the Radical Socialists and Conservatives have been able to win more seats in the second chamber than in the National Assembly.[3]) The MRP, also, is a revisionist party. When the Constitution was first adopted, it announced that it had reservations about certain constitutional features, which it declared should be improved at a later date.[4] The MRP was dissuaded from pressing its revisionist claims throughout 1948 and 1949 by the fear that they would mistakenly be construed as representing approval of the intensive revisionist campaign of the RPF,[5] but by 1950 the MRP felt that postponement of the question was no longer required.[6]

Of the groups which constitute the Third Force, the Socialist Party has been the least inclined to support a program of constitutional revision, but early in 1950 even the Socialists became persuaded of the desirability of amending the Constitution. The way in which they became so persuaded is not entirely clear, but two motives at least seem to have contributed toward bringing them into the revisionist camp. The first was the desire, before the elections of June, 1951, to "cut the ground out from under the feet of the Gaullist propaganda for constitutional revision."[7] The second was the fear that the provision of Article 45 of the Constitution, which requires that a candidate for the post of Prime Minister receive a vote of confidence from an absolute majority of the deputies of the National Assembly before he can be formally appointed, might have made it impossible, after the June, 1951, elections, to form a "republican" government.[8] These two considerations, which were introduced but not debated at the Socialist Party congress in 1950, must have carried weight with the party's leaders.

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[2] There are three such peculiarities: 1) the method of election is indirect, proceeding through three stages; 2) proportional representation applies only in the eleven largest departments; whereas in all the others a majority system *à deux tours* is used; and 3) the rural areas are over-represented relative to the urban areas.

[3] The Radicals (including the UDSR) hold 15 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly, 27 per cent in the Council of the Republic. The Conservatives (Peasants, PRL and Independents) hold 16 per cent of the seats in the Assembly, 22 per cent in the Council.

[4] See *L'Aube*, Nov. 3, 1946.

[5] In *Notes d'information politique* (an internal mimeographed bulletin of the MRP), No. 26, Nov. 5, 1947, it was asserted that after the RPF's success in the elections of October, 1947, MRP pressure for constitutional revision "would take on a significance and lead to consequences which have nothing to do with the specific constitutional preoccupations of the MRP." At the fifth MRP congress in May, 1949, Albert Gortais implied, in his report on general policy, that the Constitution would already have been revised had it not been for the "intensive propaganda campaign" of the RPF (MRP, *En marche vers l'avenir*, *Travaux du Vᵉ Congrès National*, p. 25).

[6] See François de Menthon's report on general policy to the sixth MRP congress, May, 1950 (mimeographed).

After the failure of Henri Queuille (whose ministerial declaration was the first of the Fourth Republic to advocate amendment of the Constitution) to form a Cabinet in July, 1950, Guy Mollet, the Secretary-General of the Socialist Party, was asked by President Auriol to try to bring about general agreement among the various groups of the Third Force on the basis of which a government could be formed. Mollet secured agreement on a minimum program which included a limited revision of the Constitution,[9] and the Socialist deputies unanimously approved Mollet's actions.[10] All the groups of the Third Force, then, were convinced of the need for constitutional revision, and representatives of the groups met in November, 1950, to draft the resolution which was later passed by both houses of Parliament.

The Resolution of November, 1950, is a singularly uninformative statement. Because of the nature of the amendment process prescribed by the Constitution, the parties were able simply to enumerate the articles of the Constitution which should be amended, postponing until the second stage of the amendment process the drafting of the precise changes to be made in these articles. But if the resolution itself conveys little about the intentions of its framers, the debates that took place over it in both houses of Parliament reveal clearly the conflicts of motives and aims in the constitutional sphere.[11]

Two categories of reforms are envisaged by the Resolution of November, 1950. These are minor procedural changes, which would in no way alter the basic constitutional structure,[12] and a number of substantive changes bearing on two of the most important and controversial features of the constitutional system: the role of the Council of the Republic in the legislative process and the relationship between the Cabinet and the National Assembly. Although the parties which adopted the Resolution of November, 1950, could reach complete agreement on neither of these features of the Constitution, the clash of intentions is most evident in their approach to the position of the second chamber, which is now determined by Articles 14 and 20 of the Constitution.

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[7] The quotation is from Daniel Mayer's speech, in which he almost apologetically raised the question of constitutional revision, at the Socialist Party congress in May, 1950. See *Parti Socialiste SFIO, 42e Congrès National, Compte Rendu Sténographique* (Paris), p. 316.

[8] *Idem.*

[9] See *Le Monde*, July 8, 1950.

[10] *L'Année Politique 1950* (Paris, 1951), pp. 149–150.

[11] The basic parliamentary documents to consult are: *Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale*, Nov. 30, 1950, Dec. 1, 1950; *Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, Conseil de la République*, Jan. 26, 1951; *Assemblée Nationale, Rapport*, No. 11431, Nov. 28, 1950; *Conseil de la République, Rapport*, No. 895 (*rectifié*), Dec. 28, 1950.

[12] The minor changes concern Articles 7, 9, 12 and 22.

The Position of the Council of the Republic. Article 14 requires that all bills introduced in the Council of the Republic be sent, without debate, to the National Assembly, where they must be acted upon before they can be returned to the Council of the Republic for consideration. The Radical Socialists and Conservatives want this article amended so that the Council of the Republic may have a share in the first reading of legislation, especially the bills of its own members. The Socialists and the MRP are willing to accede to the desires of the other groups, but only at a price. This price was indicated by the report of the Committee on the Franchise of the National Assembly, which steered the Resolution of 1950 through the Assembly. This report cited three arguments for amending Article 14. The first two were that the present system, which gives a monopoly of the first reading of bills to the National Assembly, "leads to an extraordinary congestion of the agenda" of that chamber; and that the Council of the Republic either must wait "whole weeks before receiving a text which it can usefully debate or is suddenly deluged (usually at the end of the session) with bills which are sent to it." The third was that a new distribution of the work of legislation is necessary in order to avoid the subterfuges that the second chamber has devised in order to overcome the constitutional limitations that are placed upon it. The subterfuges include the introduction of new material in amendments to bills already passed in first reading by the National Assembly, a technique which has, of course, the same effect as the introduction of an entirely new bill for debate in the Council of the Republic, and "the procedural abuse called 'oral questions with debate.'" The use of oral questions with debate is a device by which the Council of the Republic has adopted for its own use the system of the interpellation of ministers which is employed in the National Assembly. The procedure is not called "interpellation" and, of course, the vote of a hostile resolution after the debate over the oral question does not entail the resignation of the Cabinet, as would an adverse order of the day voted in the National Assembly after an interpellation; but the Council's intention in adopting the procedure clearly was to go through the forms, if not to enjoy the substance, of interpellation. The National Assembly was annoyed at the introduction of the procedure in 1949, and the President of the Assembly then wrote a letter to President Auriol, complaining that the Constitution conferred no right on the Council to conduct "debates of a political character." Auriol was forced to reply that he could, unfortunately, see nothing that the National Assembly, the government, or the President could do about it.[13] The Council has continued to utilize the procedure.

[13] The correspondence is published in *L'Année Politique 1949* (Paris, 1950), pp. 334–335.

The implication of the report is clear enough: the Socialists and the MRP would permit the Council of the Republic to debate bills in first reading, but only if the Council abandons the practice of oral questions with debate. As they made clear during the debate on the Resolution of 1950 in the Council itself, the Radicals and Conservatives have no intention of making such a concession.

Moreover, the conditions under which the MRP and the Socialists would permit the Council of the Republic to act on bills in first reading are hardly designed to satisfy the more vigorous bicameralists. The latter would like an amendment authorizing the Council of the Republic to discuss in first reading all bills introduced by senators, in addition to permitting the government, when it so wishes, to present bills to the second chamber for its action before sending them to the National Assembly. The MRP, and it can safely be assumed the Socialists also, wish only a change that would permit the National Assembly, at its discretion, to send bills to the Council for a first reading. The bicameralists' attitude toward this proposal was aptly summarized by Gaullist Michel Debré when he said that such a procedure would amount only to subjecting the Council of the Republic to humiliation.

Article 20, which defines the relationships between the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic, was also made amendable by the Resolution of 1950. The main objection to this article, an objection shared by the MRP as well as by the Radical Socialists and Conservatives, is that it reduces the possibility of compromise between the two chambers. A bill passed in first reading by the National Assembly is sent to the Council of the Republic, where it may be amended. If the Council amends the bill, the Assembly must hold a second reading, during which it may accept or reject the amendments proposed by the Council of the Republic, but during which it may not accept some compromise between the original measure as passed by the Assembly and the measure as amended by the Council. Any deviation from the bill either in its initial form or as amended by the Council, except where the Assembly can accept part of an amendment made by the Council and reject another part without altering the language of the amendment, produces, according to the Constitution, an entirely new bill—which must go through the whole legislative process all over again.[14]

The Radical Socialists and Conservatives (and the Gaullists as well) desire to alter Article 20 in a way which would give the second chamber greater influence over the content of legislation. One of their proposals is to restore the *navette*, the process by which, during the Third Republic, bills were shuttled back and forth between the two houses of Parliament until agreement was reached on them. In addition, these groups are bent on establishing complete equality of powers for the two houses of Parliament, so that the approval of the Council of the Republic would be required for every legislative act.

The gap between this position and that of the MRP and the Socialists could hardly be wider. The latter indicate a willingness to make the legislative process more flexible than it is, by restoring some sort of *navette*; but instead of extending the power of the Council of the Republic, they wish to narrow it. The Assembly's Committee on the Franchise frankly implied that if legislative intercourse between the two chambers were to be made flexible, the effective power of the Council should be reduced by removing the single provision of the Constitution that confers significant legislative authority upon the Council of the Republic, namely, the clause of Article 20 which requires the National Assembly, if it wishes to override amendments which have been accepted by an absolute majority of the members of the Council, to do so also by an absolute majority of its members.

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[14] This rigidity has created some absurd difficulties. Several amusing examples are cited in *Assemblée Nationale, Rapport*, No. 11431, and in *Conseil de la République, Proposition de Résolution*, No. 329, April 8, 1949.

This two-pronged proposal, to ease the exchange of ideas between the two chambers while reducing the effective power of the Council, was completely unacceptable to the Council of the Republic, where there is a majority of bicameralists. Since the Council wanted to change Article 20, however, and since it would have to decide on the precise nature of the change only during the second stage of the amendment process, the Council willingly voted to amend Article 20. It also passed a resolution which said in part, "The Council of the Republic affirms solemnly its unshakable will not to permit any attack on the rights that it holds from the Constitution." As this clause was voted unanimously by the Council of the Republic, it would seem that there is, among the parties, a variety of interpretations of what rights the Council actually does hold from the Constitution. The MRP has unequivocally stated that it favors removing the absolute majority requirement; certainly the Socialist Party also wants to remove it; the Committee on the Franchise of the National Assembly implied that it should be removed. Yet the Socialists and Popular Republicans in the Council blithely voted for the resolution quoted.

Relations Between the Cabinet and the National Assembly. The Resolution of November, 1950, also opened the amendment procedure for five articles of the Constitution which affect the relations between the Cabinet and the National Assembly. The purpose behind the proposed changes in this sphere was nothing short of an attempt to solve the two most important problems of French politics: how to form a government and, once it is formed, how to keep it in office long enough to accomplish useful work. On these issues, agreement among the supporters of the resolution was virtually complete.

Concern over the formation of governments centered upon Article 45, which prescribes the procedure for the investiture of the Prime Minister. This procedure requires the Prime Minister designated by the President to appear before the National Assembly and to submit to it the program and the policy of the Cabinet he intends to form. If he receives a vote of confidence by an absolute majority of the members of the National Assembly, he is formally invested and his Cabinet may be formally appointed. Two aspects of this requirement disturbed the Third Force parties. First, it is exceedingly difficult to build an absolute majority of the members of the National Assembly around any man or program. Second, the investiture of the Prime Minister by no means guarantees the formation of a Cabinet that will be acceptable to the Assembly,[15] and the implication of Article 45 that there shall be only one debate over the formation of a government has been altered by the almost-regular parliamentary practice of holding a second debate, after the Prime Minister has been invested, over the composition of his Cabinet.

The supporters of the Resolution of November, 1950, made it clear that they intend to meet the first problem by altering Article 45 so that a Prime Minister can be invested by a simple majority of those deputies voting. They intend to meet the second difficulty by requiring a return to the practice of the Third Republic, when the Prime Minister and his Cabinet were invested simultaneously by a single vote of the Assembly.[16] The question may be raised at this point whether it is necessary to amend the Constitution at all in order to achieve the investiture of the entire Cabinet at once. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent each future candidate for the Premiership from informing the Assembly, before it votes on him, of the composition of the Cabinet he intends to form.

The Third Force parties appear to have been in complete agreement over the changes to be made in four other articles of the Constitution, changes designed to make it easier than is now the case to create the conditions under which the National Assembly may be dissolved. Inasmuch as the Socialist Party is the least enthusiastic of the revisionists about creating an effective dissolution power, the changes proposed during the debates in November, 1950, may be regarded as the extent of Socialist concessions on this score.

The first point worthy of note is that the Resolution of November, 1950, ignores Article 51, which is the main provision of the Constitution governing the dissolution power. The Third Force parties want to change Articles 49 and 50, which require that an absolute majority of the deputies of the National Assembly must register their lack of confidence in a Cabinet before it is constitutionally compelled to resign. They have agreed that a simple majority should be sufficient to overthrow a Cabinet on a motion of confidence or of censure. Such a change could be of considerable importance because it would make the now notorious provisions of Article 51 more susceptible of application. No party or group of parties would be able to prevent the machinery for dissolution from being set into motion simply by employing the expedient of abstaining on a vote of confidence. The effectiveness of this change would depend, of course, upon the willingness of France's Prime Ministers to insist on leaving office via defeat on a motion of confidence rather than by resignation; and the attitude of the Prime Minister will always depend upon what he feels the consequences of dissolution would be. At the present time, the consequences of dissolution are enough to discourage most Prime Ministers from taking the steps necessary to bring it about. According to Article 52, in the event of dissolution the Prime Minister in office must resign and be replaced by the President of the National Assembly; the Minister of the Interior must be replaced by an appointee of the new Prime Minister; and members of the opposition parties must enter the Cabinet as Ministers of State. This unique requirement is one reason why Henri Queuille refused to consider dissolution of the Assembly.[17] The Third Force parties indicated their desire to remove one of the discouragements to dissolution contained in Article 52, but not the others. They would no longer require that members of the opposition enter the government when a dissolution is announced, but they would maintain the requirement that the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior must resign. No doubt the Conservatives and the Radicals would prefer to see both special requirements removed, but they have been restrained by the Socialists and the MRP.

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[15] Two Prime Ministers, Robert Schuman in September, 1948, and Henri Queuille in July, 1950, fell shortly after the composition of their Cabinets was announced. Two others, Jules Moch and René Mayer, both in October, 1949, were formally invested by the Assembly but were unable to form Cabinets at all.

[16] Actually, the MRP's plan for revising the investiture system is not the same as that of the Socialists, Radicals and Conservatives, but it would produce essentially the same result.

The determination of the Socialists and the MRP to maintain the death-sentence clause of Article 52 led the Third Force parties as a group to support the revision of Article 11, which requires that the officers of the two houses of Parliament be elected annually by proportional representation. Their intention here was simply to avoid being forced to accept members of the opposition, especially Communists, as vice-presidents of the National Assembly. The post of senior vice-president of the Assembly can be important because, in the event of the coincidence of a dissolution and the inability of the President of the National Assembly to serve as Prime Minister, the incumbent becomes Prime Minister of France.

II. THE PROPOSALS OF THE MRP

During the debates over the Resolution of November, 1950, MRP Deputies Paul Coste-Floret and Robert Lecourt announced that their party, while supporting the limited revision agreed upon as necessary by the Third Force majority, also considered it to fall short of what was required, and that the MRP would later introduce a resolution for the amendment of other provisions of the Constitution as well. This resolution was submitted to the National Assembly on the very day after the chamber had adopted the majority's resolution for a limited revision,[18] and an identical resolution has also been presented by the MRP to the second legislature.[19]

The MRP's bill proposes to amend no fewer than thirty-nine articles of the Constitution; but if the eleven articles already made amendable by the Resolution of November, 1950, are discounted, as well as those in which the recommended changes are relatively unimportant, there remain only four proposals which would alter in more than a minor way the present operation of the Constitution.

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[17] During a debate on the composition and policy of his government, Queuille said: "Whether I am reversed today . . . or at a later date . . . I have no intention of using the weapon of dissolution. Given the consequences that dissolution would have on the government of the country, to put into motion the constitutional machinery in its present form would, in my opinion, lead to a catastrophe" (*Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, Assemblée Nationale*, July 4, 1950, p. 5349).

[18] *Assemblée Nationale, Proposition de Résolution*, No. 11480, Dec. 1, 1950.

[19] *Assemblée Nationale, Proposition de Résolution*, No. 402, July 31, 1951.

The MRP advocates three changes which it apparently feels will strengthen the executive. It proposes that the electoral college for the election of the President be enlarged to include, in addition to Parliament, the Assembly of the French Union, so that the President will really be, as the Constitution proclaims him, the President of the French Union. The prestige of the President is the only factor susceptible to change because of this amendment. Of additional concern with regard to the election of the president, the MRP has also reopened a question which badly entangled the Constituent Assembly of 1946, that of whether his election should be by secret or open ballot. Unable to arrive at any agreement in 1946, the constitution-makers ignored the point in the constitutional text, while tacitly agreeing that the law governing the election of the first President would provide for a secret ballot. The MRP wants the secret ballot arrangements incorporated in a constitutional requirement.

The most important change that the MRP proposes concerns the dissolution power. It would give the President and the Prime Minister the authority to dissolve Parliament whenever the Cabinet is defeated on a vote of confidence or a vote of censure, whether or not by an absolute majority. While this change would inject some life into the dissolution power, it would not actually, as the MRP's resolution says it would, make dissolution always possible. By making dissolution contingent upon an adverse vote in the Assembly, the MRP proposal would deny the Prime Minister and the President the unqualified right to set the date of a general election. And although the MRP would remove all of the chronological limitations from the exercise of the dissolution power, it would retain the serious obstacle to dissolution in the present requirement that the Prime Minister who makes the decision to dissolve, as well as his Minister of the Interior, must leave office. The MRP has thus retreated considerably from the position it held in 1946, when it favored the unrestricted right of the Cabinet to dissolve the National Assembly and also to remain in office until the results of the new election become known. It is impossible to tell if this shift represents a genuine change of attitude or simply a concession to the Socialist Party, which is largely responsible for the present language of the Constitution.

The third change suggested by the MRP to strengthen the executive would make the right of private deputies to initiate legislation creating new expenses or increasing existing expenditures contingent upon their also initiating measures to create new resources or to produce economies. This proposal is clearly motivated by a desire to restrict demagogic and irresponsible parliamentary activity, but its effectiveness as a restraint would seem to be limited. The Communists, for example, could continue to demand all kinds of public expenditures while proposing to stop defense preparations as an economy. Even for deputies who might take the rule seriously, actual economies or revenue could fall far short of what they proposed, while the expenditures remained as large as estimated.

One other proposal of the MRP would make a measurable change in the Constitution. It advocates giving the Assembly of the French Union the same legislative powers over bills specifically concerning the French Union as the Council of the Republic would possess over all bills after the latter's role has been altered along the lines indicated by the Resolution of November, 1950. One of the consequences of putting this change into effect would be to endanger passage of the legislation concerning the French Union that is desired by the National Assembly, for the method of election of the Assembly of the French Union makes it entirely possible that its political composition will be sharply different from that of the National Assembly.

III. THE PROPOSALS OF THE RPF

By far the most vocal revisionist campaign being carried on in France is that of Charles de Gaulle and his RPF. Unfortunately, the RPF's proposal for a "just and strong" state has never been thoroughly and concretely stated. Although the party has announced that it will introduce specific proposals for the amendment of the Constitution,[20] none has thus far been proposed. Instead, the way in which the Gaullist constitutional program has been presented, through brief declarations by the General and through a variety of reports and motions of the deliberative organs of the RPF,[21] has produced a spotty and confusing picture of the intentions of the RPF in the constitutional sphere.

It is essential to distinguish three separate aspects of the constitutional ideas of the RPF. There is, first, the program that can be pieced together from the public statements of de Gaulle himself. Second, there is the more detailed program which has been formulated, under the leadership of René Capitant, by the various deliberative organs of the RPF. This program is distinctly corporative in nature; and although de Gaulle has never personally endorsed it and it appears to have been by-passed recently in favor of the more clearly democratically-inspired proposals made by Michel Debré (who apparently has replaced Capitant as the RPF's second thinker on constitutional matters),[22] it must be noted that the RPF has never repudiated any of it.[23] Third, there is the "minimum" program which the RPF contributed to the constitutional debate at its National Council meeting early in November, 1951. This program includes a few specific proposals which the RPF has announced it will be willing to support in conjunction with the other parties, although it does not regard these proposals alone as an adequate constitutional program.

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[20] *Le Rassemblement,* Nov. 30–Dec. 6, 1951.

[21] The basic party documents are: the motion on constitutional reform passed by the second National Council, in *Le Rassemblement,* Oct. 9, 1948; RPF, *Deuxièmes Assises Nationales, Documentation, Rapport sur la Révision de la Constitution par M. René Capitant;* the motion passed by the second congress, in *Le Rassemblement,* Feb. 19, 1949; the motion passed by the third congress, *ibid.,* July 1, 1950; Capitant's report to the third congress, *ibid.,* July 22 and Aug. 12, 1950; the motion passed by the National Council in Nov., 1951, *ibid.,* Nov. 9–15, 1951; the motion passed by the fourth congress, *ibid.,* Nov. 30–Dec. 6, 1951.

[22] Louis Vallon, one of the RPF leaders, in his book *Le Dilemme Français* (Paris, 1951), pp. 170ff., relies for his description of the RPF's constitutional program on a report edited by Michel Debré. This report has not been published.

[23] On the contrary, the motion on constitutional reform passed at the fourth RPF congress said: "All these points of our program have been the object of declarations and studies of which we have nothing to change . . . ."

The Program of the General. If we rely only on de Gaulle's public statements, the constitutional structure that emerges is one in which the real center of political power would be the President. De Gaulle has never suggested that the President be elected by popular vote, and René Capitant has expressly rejected this system. The President would, however, certainly be chosen by an electorate larger than the one which selects him now, the members of the two houses of Parliament.[24] The objects of this change in the method of election of the President are both to clothe the office with greater prestige than it now has, through the largely psychological implications of election by a wide body of constituents from the entire area of the French Union, and also to remove the election of the President as much as possible from the direct influence of political parties. Presumably, de Gaulle assumes that as the electorate is increased and refined to include persons not as closely linked to their party machines as are the members of Parliament, this condition is more likely to be approached.

In addition to changing the method of election of the President, de Gaulle would increase the power of the office. This augmentation would be accomplished in two ways: the President would name not only the Prime Minister but also the entire ministry, and the President, with the consent of the Prime Minister, would be able to dissolve Parliament at any time. Despite his assurance that the Cabinet would be responsible to Parliament, de Gaulle has left no doubt that its primary allegiance would be to the President. He has said that "in my conception of the system . . . there can be no disagreement between the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, for the President of the Republic would be the chief of the executive power . . . and . . . would choose the ministers."[25] This statement implies that the ministers would be obliged always to support the position of the President in conflicts, which it would be absurd to assume would never exist, between Parliament and the President. A further inference from the statement is that the President would be able to dismiss ministers as he saw fit.[26] Moreover, de Gaulle has implied that the President must be free to refuse to dissolve the legislature even if the Cabinet wishes to do so;[27] that is, in a conflict between the Cabinet, on the one hand, and the President on the other, the President's view must prevail.

One other device to enhance the power of the executive, the use of decree-laws, has recently been advocated by de Gaulle. Although the separation of powers is supposed to be the underlying principle of his constitutional program, after the June, 1951, elections de Gaulle announced that "we would not be able to do what we have to do, especially in the financial realm, without . . . the possibility of Parliament's delegating, on specific matters, its legislative powers to the government."[28]

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[24] Vallon, p. 171, says the President might be elected by the members of Parliament, representatives of the local and departmental councils, and representatives of "economic and intellectual activities."

[25] *Le Rassemblement*, Oct. 9, 1948.

[26] *Ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1948, specifically says that the President "will name and revoke the ministers."

[27] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1948. Capitant's report to the second congress says that the President "must be free to grant or to refuse his signature to the dissolution decree. . . ."

This framework of relationships among the President, Cabinet, and legislature resembles that of the Weimar Republic. Unless the President chose to employ self-restraint, the Cabinet would be bound by the mechanism of the system to support his policies, regardless of the attitude of Parliament. The ministers would quickly become subordinates of the President, the executors of his policies. They would have to abandon the policies of their parties (unless they were members of the RPF, which is not, by its own definition, a party) because a minister must not be a party man: "a minister, no more than a magistrate, has the right to be a party man," according to de Gaulle.[29] Clashes between the President and Parliament would be submitted to the electorate, either through new elections or through referenda on the issues over which the disputes arose. If the President's position were to be rejected by the voters, presumably the President would acknowledge his mistaken interpretation of the national will (if not rescind his interpretation of the national interest) and submit to the popular verdict. He might seek another election or referendum if he felt that he might be more successful at a second try. The only other alternative would be to depart from the legal framework.

The program thus far outlined conforms to a certain logic. De Gaulle would be the President, controlling the Cabinet and able to dissolve Parliament. In addition, he would constitutionally be able to secure powers to rule by decree. Ironically, in view of the Gaullists' propaganda against parties, it is because de Gaulle is a party man and not "above parties," that he is able to increase his present power. His control of the RPF enables him to govern the nomination of candidates, and any rebellious RPF deputy would find himself forced to run on another ticket. In fact, de Gaulle's attachment to list-system electoral laws may well be at least in part due to his awareness that the larger the constituency, the more difficult it becomes for a candidate deserted by his party to be reëlected. Once given an RPF majority in Parliament, de Gaulle would be firmly in control of the government as a result of his dual position as head of his party and head of the state.

The Program of the Party. De Gaulle has said little more about the structure of the legislature under his proposed system than that it should consist of two "balanced" chambers, "one of which—the Senate—should represent, in three sections, the local administrative units of metropolitan France, the territories of the French Union, and the economic, social and moral elements of our national life."[30] The other chamber would be elected by universal suffrage.

The pluralist basis of the second chamber is one of the more interesting features of the RPF's constitutional program. De Gaulle has expressed vague pluralistic notions since 1946, but has never outlined them in any detail. He has apparently turned this job over to the RPF's main program-building organ, the National Council. In defining the precise organization of a pluralistic structure, the National Council, under the leadership of René Capitant, has produced a corporative scheme which is certainly surprising at this stage of European political experience.

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[28] *Ibid.*, June 29, 1951. [29] *Ibid.*, June 15, 1951.

[30] *Ibid.*, Nov. 30–Dec. 6, 1951.

The RPF's view of the second chamber is that it must be "the representative and the defender" of what the RPF calls "secondary communities."[31] These are economic and social as well as geographical units. Among them would be the Chambers of Agriculture, Chambers of Crafts, Chambers of Commerce, and organizations of the liberal professions after they have been "reorganized in such a way as to ensure validly the economic and social representation of the country."[32] How these organizations are to be reorganized is not spelled out in detail; they are, however, to be "autonomous," "decentralized," and governed by a democratic election procedure.[33] It should be noted that the RPF does not suggest representing the major economic interest organizations in the country: the industrial unions, the National Council of French Employers, and the General Confederation of Agriculture. They are presumably excluded because they are not decentralized. Moreover, France's three main unions, in the RPF's view, are not autonomous; they are the instruments of political parties. To those who claim that the unions or employers' associations nevertheless represent economic forces, René Capitant and de Gaulle reply that there is a valid distinction between an economic force and economic activity. "It is dangerous to speak of *forces* and to want to represent forces in a democratic assembly," wrote Capitant.[34] Activities, however, after they have been reorganized by the state to ensure their representative character, would be represented in the second chamber.

The RPF's deliberative organs, although not de Gaulle himself, have carried this corporate concept beyond its use to determine a part of the composition of one house of parliament. Starting from the proposition that Parliament may pass only laws that are "general," that is, laws that create rights or obligations for *all* the citizens without discrimination,[35] the RPF has come to the conclusion that special rules must be prescribed, "not by Parliament, not by the government, but exclusively by decentralized Assemblies or organs."[36] The various relevant published reports of the RPF make it clear that the party, in distinguishing between "general" laws and special rules, does not intend the distinction that must be made in every governmental system between statutes and administrative acts. Many perfectly valid laws under a representative system would be excluded from the RPF's definition of "general"; hence, there would be, under this scheme, an area of what would ordinarily be considered legislative activity allotted to various "Assemblies or organs," both of a territorial and functional nature. This is corporatism beyond any doubt, and the RPF has done well to have, apparently, dropped the idea. For de Gaulle could hardly promote his basic stated purpose, which is to submerge group differences and concentrate the nation's energies on making France strong and invulnerable to Communist attack either from within or without, if legislative authority were atomized among a plethora of corporate organs. And if such organs were created, but were to act with a remarkable unanimity, they could hardly be democratic. It would, perhaps, be better if the RPF were to swallow its pride and repudiate the entire episode.

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[31] Motion at the second congress.

[32] Motion at the third congress. For a brief description of the roles of the *chambres d'agriculture*, *chambres de commerce* and *chambres des métiers* during the Third Republic, see W. R. Sharp, *The Government of the French Republic* (New York, 1947), pp. 229–235. More up-to-date information on the *chambres d'agriculture* can be found in *Le Monde*, Feb. 11, 1950 and in *l'Economie*, June 9, 1949. A handful of presidents of Chambers of Commerce and of Chambers of Trade have been members of the Economic Council during the Fourth Republic.

[33] Capitant's report to the second congress.

[34] *Idem.* See also de Gaulle's statement in *Le Rassemblement*, Oct. 9, 1948.

[35] Capitant's report to the third congress, *ibid.*, July 22, 1950. Also see Paul Derais, *ibid.*, June 10, 1950.

[36] Capitant's report to the second congress.

The "Minimum" Program. For four years, from October, 1947, until November, 1951, the RPF maintained an intransigent demand that the Constitution be revised along lines that would entirely fulfill its constitutional program. In November the party changed this attitude; for the first time, it announced that it would support a limited revision of the Constitution, provided only that such revision meet certain minimum conditions. The four conditions prescribed by the RPF are: 1) the granting of equal authority to both houses of Parliament; 2) the granting of power to dissolve the National Assembly to the executive; 3) the granting of priority to government bills for discussion in both houses of Parliament; and 4) the passage of a new electoral law.[37] It should be pointed out that only two of these demands require a constitutional amendment to be satisfied: priority can be given to government bills simply by changing the rules of both chambers, and a new electoral law requires only statutory action.

The motives behind this change in a four-year-old tactic are not hard to find. By moderating its views, the RPF is facilitating the achievement of an immediately realizable portion of its constitutional program, and it is also trying to exploit its strength in the Council of the Republic. But the RPF's attitude toward the constitutional problem cannot be considered apart from the general political practice which the party has been following since it emerged from the June, 1951, elections as the largest single group in the National Assembly. This maneuver, which the RPF calls "constructive opposition," has been directed at destroying the uncertain cohesiveness of the sector of parties which sit between the Communists and the RPF by concentrating its propaganda on issues upon which the other groups are divided, and by offering a seductive 120 votes to those groups which might be tempted to break away momentarily from their neighbors. It is the success of this maneuver which has until now made the formation of a consistent majority so difficult during the second legislature, and there can be no doubt that the RPF's sudden conciliatory move in the constitutional area is an application of the tactic.

The move was an astute one, for it places great temptations in the way of the Radical Socialists and even of the MRP. (The Conservatives can be counted upon to support de Gaulle's constitutional views in any case, for they are basically identical.) But while the Radical Socialists have for about seven years been vainly suffering from nostalgia for the Third Republic's Senate, they have never been enthusiastic over granting a dissolution power to the executive. De Gaulle has offered them the Senate in exchange for the dissolution power, and he has thrown in a new electoral law for good measure. The Gaullist bait no doubt is also somewhat attractive to the MRP, although in a very different way: the MRP hopes to see a more effective dissolution power established, but it does not wish to restore the Senate or to change the electoral law. However, Radical Socialist and MRP considerations cannot stop there; they must include the attitude of the Socialist Party, which wants neither a new Senate nor an effective dissolution power. Should the Radicals or the MRP accept the RPF's offer, they would be driving one more wedge between the links of what has been called the Third Force.

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[37] See the motion on general policy and the motion on constitutional reform passed by the National Council, in *Le Rassemblement*, Nov. 9–15, 1951, and the motion on constitutional reform passed at the fourth congress, *ibid.*, Nov. 30–Dec. 6, 1951.

The only concrete result that the RPF's new attitude has brought about has been the formation in the Council of the Republic of an "intergroup for reformist action," consisting of some 160 members embracing the RPF, the Conservatives, and some of the Radicals, which has proposed a resolution calling for the amendment of the Constitution on five major points: 1) to grant equal legislative powers to both houses of Parliament; 2) to give government bills priority of discussion; 3) to permit the executive to dissolve the National Assembly; 4) to change the method of investiture of the Prime Minister; and 5) to make it possible for Parliament to delegate its legislative functions in exceptional circumstances and for limited periods.[38] The decree-law item is quite possibly included as much to please the Radicals as it is to meet de Gaulle's personal desires, for at their forty-fourth national congress in October, 1951, the Radical Socialists decided that the use of the degree-law was a necessity.[39]

IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR REVISION

There is no reason to believe that any program of constitutional reform will be easily or quickly enacted. Regardless of which alternative the present legislature follows, that of building on the Resolution of November, 1950, or that of starting anew with a fresh program, the problem of finding the necessary majorities in both chambers is formidable. While the Resolution of November, 1950, could be followed through with a bill of amendment which would require only a simple majority in both houses of Parliament, a successful referendum would also be required before the amendments could become effective. And if the advocates of constitutional amendment are to avoid submitting their proposals to a referendum, they must find a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly or a three-fifths majority in both houses to support them. The prospects of building such large majorities around any given program are slight indeed.

A variety of majorities might be formed, but each one would contain contradictions which it would require a prodigy of negotiation and compromise to overcome. The largest potential majority would extend from the Socialists to the RPF, but it is difficult to envisage the Socialists acceding to the RPF's desires regarding the second chamber and the dissolution power, just as it is impossible to imagine the RPF contracting its claims to suit the Socialists.

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[38] *Conseil de la République, Proposition de Résolution,* No. 727, Nov. 15, 1951.

[39] *L'Information Radicale-Socialiste,* Oct.–Nov. 1951, pp. 5, 21, 22.

A decisive majority extending from the MRP to the RPF could be formed without the Socialists. Despite some differences of opinion, such as the hesitation of the Radicals and of the MRP to establish the unrestricted dissolution power sought by the RPF, and the unwillingness of the MRP, as opposed to all the other groups, to increase the importance of the second chamber, this majority is actually quite homogeneous with respect to the constitutional problem. But the MRP would undoubtedly undergo severe soul-searching, as it has in the past when faced with similarly difficult choices, before it would participate in such a majority. If the MRP were to refuse to join such a majority, it would expose itself to the charge of denying its public professions since 1946 on the constitutional question. Yet it is by no means certain that its decision would be to desert the Socialists and join a bloc which bears the stigma of being composed of parties of the Right. Since the beginning of the second legislature, the MRP has already separated itself from the Socialist Party on the issue of the allocation of public funds for private education and by supporting the Pinay government. If it were to divide from the Socialists again, on basic constitutional questions, the MRP would be taking a major step toward destroying an alliance it has painfully cultivated since the Liberation, first to prevent a Communist seizure of power and later to avoid being identified as a party of order rather than of progress. The choice of the MRP is a difficult one.

A third potential majority would embrace the Socialists, MRP members, Radicals, and Conservatives. These groups—the *apparentés* of June, 1951, in one-third of the departments—proved their inability to form a durable governing majority when the Pleven and Faure Cabinets successively fell early in 1952, and they are divided on the constitutional issue over the role of the Council of the Republic, the reinforcement of which has become as much a fetish for the Radicals and Conservatives as the Senate has been a scapegoat for the Socialists and the MRP.

A fourth majority is that which has supported the Pinay Cabinet since March, 1952, and which consists of the Radicals and Conservatives, most of the MRP deputies and, as a result of a breach in party unity, a varying number of RPF deputies. This majority is, however, a slim one, and the MRP's participation is uneasy and tentative. Moreover, before acting on the Constitution within this coalition, the MRP would be forced, because of the absence of the Socialists, to weigh its revisionist intentions against its desire to maintain the possibility of reconciliation with the Socialist Party.

Each majority which can reasonably be envisaged would find it difficult to arrive at a plan for constitutional reform. Revision of the Constitution hardly seems imminent; but the constitutional debate will continue. As long as France remains divided on fundamental issues, its parties can be expected to suggest that the consequences of disunity can be overcome by the alteration of constitutional forms.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON REËLIGIBILITY OF NATIONAL AND STATE CHIEF EXECUTIVES

JOSEPH E. KALLENBACH
University of Michigan

On March 1, 1951, the Administrator of General Services certified that the proposed presidential tenure amendment submitted to the states by Congress in 1947 had been ratified by thirty-six states, thus making it a part of the United States Constitution.[1] Adoption of this proposal, which becomes the Twenty-second Amendment to the United States Constitution, disposes of an issue that has agitated American politics periodically since the establishment of the Presidency. Hereafter no person will be eligible for a third term as President if he has served two full elective terms or one full elective term plus more than one-half of another term through succession to the office. President Truman, who would otherwise be rendered ineligible for reëlection following completion of his current term, is exempted from the ban by a qualifying clause which excludes from coverage "any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress."[2]

Hostility to long continuance in office, particularly for executive officers, has been a prominent feature of American political thinking since Revolutionary times. Seven of the original state constitutions, all of which were formulated prior to adoption of the federal Constitution, carried clauses limiting reëligibility of the state chief executive. These provisions reflected a widely-held belief that a rotation in executive office was essential to the preservation of liberty.[3] A sectional preference for the principle of limitation was noticeable;

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[1] 16 Fed. Reg. 2019 (1951). Favorable action by the legislatures of Nevada and Utah on February 26 had brought the total of ratifying states to the constitutional three-fourths majority.

[2] The Amendment reads: "No person shall be elected to the office of President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once.

"But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term."

[3] Article 31 of the Declaration of Rights in the Maryland constitution of 1776 endorsed the principle of rotation in the following language: "That a long continuance, in the first executive departments of power or trust, is dangerous to liberty; a rotation, therefore, in those departments, is one of the best securities of permanent freedom" (Francis Newton Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies*, Washington, 1909, Vol. 3, p. 1689).

In a similar vein Section 5 of the Bill of Rights of the Virginia constitution of 1776 declared: "that the [members of the legislative and executive branches of government] may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burdens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from for it was found only in the constitutions of the group of states lying from Pennsylvania to the southward.[4] The method by which the governor was chosen was evidently a factor in the situation. Legislative selection was the mode of choice in all of the seven states where limitations on reëlection were imposed; while New Jersey was the only state employing this mode of selection without imposing also a tenure restriction. In the four New England states and New York, where the governor was chosen by popular election, there were no provisions barring reëlection. Prevention of intrigue and bargaining with the legislature by a governor intent upon securing his own continuance in office seems to have been a major objective of these early state constitutional restrictions on reëligibility. A survey of the record demonstrates that continuation of chief executives in office for term after term was by no means viewed everywhere as dangerous in Revolutionary times. In those states where tenure limitations were lacking, repeated reëlections of governors were common during the Revolutionary period and immediately after.[5]

These differences in attitudes and practices among the original states help to explain the vacillations of the framers of the federal Constitution on the question of reëligibility of the President. The issue was closely associated in their minds with the manner of his election and the length of term. If the President was to be chosen by Congress, it was generally conceded that a reëligibility limitation was necessary in order to avoid, as George Mason expressed it, "a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment."[6] Consequently the advocates of this mode of selection tended

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which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular elections, in which all, or any part of the former members, to be again eligible, or ineligible, as the laws shall direct" (*ibid.*, Vol. 7, p. 3813).

[4] Georgia's constitution of 1777 was the most restrictive in providing that no one should be eligible for the office of governor more than one year in any three-year period. As a further precaution the governor was obliged by his oath to relinquish his office "peaceably and quietly" at the end of his term. South Carolina's constitution of 1778 gave the governor a two-year term, but made him ineligible for more than one term in any six-year period. Delaware, with a three-year term for its "president," forbade an immediate reëlection. Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania permitted no more than three one-year terms in any seven-year period; while North Carolina set a limit of three annual terms in any six-year period.

[5] New Jersey's first governor, William Livingston, was elected for fourteen consecutive annual terms, running from 1776 to 1790. George Clinton, the first governor of New York, was elected for six consecutive three-year terms running from 1777 to 1795. Jonathan Trumbull served as colonial and state governor in Connecticut by annual election from 1769 to 1786. John Hancock, the first governor of Massachusetts, served five consecutive annual terms from 1780 to 1785 and was returned to office in 1787 for six additional terms. William Greene, second governor of Rhode Island, served eight consecutive annual terms running from 1778 to 1786. Meshech Weare, "president" of New Hampshire under its temporary constitution, served nine consecutive annual terms extending from 1776 to 1785; while John T. Gilman, the sixth governor, was elected for eleven consecutive annual terms from 1794 to 1805.

[6] "Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as Reported by James Madison," in Charles C. Tansill (ed.), *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States* (1927), p. 135.

to favor also the idea of a comparatively long term, since only in this way could continuity in the administration over a fairly long period of time be assured. Establishment of a term of six, seven, or eight years accordingly became their objective. Opponents of the principle of legislative selection emphasized the point that to place the choice of the President in the hands of an authority other than Congress would eliminate the necessity for a reëligibility limitation and make feasible the establishment of a relatively short term.[7] These considerations were undoubtedly factors of considerable importance in inducing acceptance of the plan of selection finally adopted. While a few members were firm in their conviction that the President should not be eligible for reëlection regardless of the mode of selection and others were opposed to a limitation of this nature in any case, the controlling factor in the minds of a decisive majority of the Convention on the point of reëligibility was whether his election was to be achieved through Congress or by some other mode.

The lack of a clause limiting the reëligibility of the President was a point advanced against the Constitution by some of its critics during the ratification struggle.[8] Hamilton felt obliged to devote the major part of one of the *Federalist Papers* to a defense of the Convention's conclusions on this point.[9] Three of the state conventions adopted recommendations that Congress should immediately submit to the states an amendment establishing a limitation on presidential tenure;[10] but the First Congress failed to act in accordance with these recommendations.

The fact that the idea of tenure restriction was associated so closely with the device of legislative election in the thinking of many of the founding fathers suggests that as popular election was substituted for legislative selection in the choosing of state governors, constitutional restrictions on reëligibility would be relaxed or abandoned. A trend in this direction did become manifest in the decade following the adoption of the Constitution. The constitution of Vermont, which was admitted to the Union as a full-fledged state in 1791, and that of Kentucky, admitted in 1792, provided for independent modes of choosing the governor and carried no clauses limiting reëligibility.[11] Tennessee, admitted in 1796, permitted three successive two-year terms under a system of popular election, followed by a two-year period of ineligibility. Georgia, although not adopting the direct election idea until 1824, abandoned the ineligibility rule in 1789 when it lengthened the term of the governor to two years. Pennsylvania in 1790 adopted direct popular election for a three-year term and at the same time liberalized the eligibility rule so as to permit three three-year terms in any twelve-year period. When Delaware went over to the popular election principle in 1792, however, it retained its original prohibition against a second successive three-year term.

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[7] For example, Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson, who were the leading advocates of the idea of direct popular election, favored a two-year and a three-year term, respectively, provided there was no limitation on reëligibility (*ibid.*, pp. 134, 410–411).

[8] For criticisms of this nature see the remarks of George Mason in the Virginia convention in Jonathan Elliot (ed.), *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution* (2nd ed., 1836–59), Vol. 3, pp. 484–485; and of James Lincoln in the South Carolina convention, *ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 314.

[9] No. 72 of the *Papers* contains an excellent theoretical analysis of the problem. In later debates in Congress and elsewhere on the issue, little has been added to the analysis of the principle of tenure limitation there presented.

[10] The New York convention recommended an amendment prohibiting the election of a President for a third term; while the conventions in Virginia and North Carolina advocated an amendment that would limit service to eight years in any sixteen-year period. *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union*, pp. 1032, 1042, 1049.

[11] In line with the practice of the other New England states, Vermont provided for popular election, with the legislature making the choice in case no candidate received a

The principle of rotation in office was a cardinal point in the lexicon of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democratic thought. As elements deriving their political philosophy from these leaders became dominant in American politics, their thinking was reflected in constitutional developments relating to executive tenure and reëligibility at both the national and state levels of government. Jefferson's refusal to seek a third term as President on grounds of principle laid the foundation for the "two-term tradition" with respect to that office. In 1824 and again in 1826 the Senate passed constitutional amendment proposals designed to incorporate this rule in the written Constitution.[12] Although Jackson accepted a second nomination and election to the Presidency, he repeatedly urged the adoption of a constitutional amendment limiting a President to a single term of four or six years.[13] Meanwhile, as the remaining original states which had at first embraced the legislative election device for choosing their governors changed to the system of popular election, they saw fit to retain strict limitations on reëligibility. Adoption of the principle of popular election in North Carolina in 1835, in Maryland in 1837,[14] in New Jersey in 1844, in Virginia in 1850, and in South Carolina in 1865 produced no change or only slight modification of their original constitutional rules limiting reëligibility of their governors. Of the fourteen states admitted to the Union between 1800 and 1850, nine entered with constitutions containing limitations of one kind or another on gubernatorial tenure, and one of the remaining five

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popular majority. Kentucky provided for a system of election by specially chosen electors, the system of choice being somewhat similar to the national plan for choosing the President. In 1799 the Kentucky constitution was revised to provide for direct popular election, and at the same time a provision prohibiting an immediate reëlection was adopted. Thorpe, *op. cit.* (above, n. 3), Vol. 6, p. 3755; Vol. 3, pp. 1268, 1281. The analysis which follows of state constitutional practices on the matter of reëligibility up to 1908 is based on documentary materials in this source.

[12] Herman V. Ames, *The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States During the First Century of its History*, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Doc. No. 353, pt. 2 (Ser. 3550, 1897), pp. 124–125. On the first occasion the proposal was passed by a vote of 36 to 3 in the Senate; the second time it was favored by a 32 to 7 majority.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

[14] The system in effect in Maryland from 1837 to 1864 was unique in that it required a rotation of the office of governor among different areas of the state. The constitution divided the state into three districts and required that the office be rotated in order among them; consequently no individual was eligible for the office for more than three years in any nine-year period.

(Mississippi) adopted a provision of this type soon after achieving statehood.

By 1850 approximately two-thirds of the states had constitutional limitations of this character. A sectional preference for the idea, as in Revolutionary times, was still discernible. The states with restrictions included all those, with the exception of Georgia, comprising the block extending from Pennsylvania and New Jersey to the South and West. The six New England states, New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa, along with Georgia, were the only ones in which the idea of a rotation in office, enforced by constitutional rule, had failed to win acceptance. In most of the states with restrictive clauses at that time, the prohibition was in the form of a limit of one term of two, three, or four years. It is significant that by 1860 a one-term tradition with regard to the office of President seemed also in process of establishment. Most of the amendment proposals designed to limit presidential tenure introduced in Congress from 1825 to 1860 were directed to this end.[15] No President from the time of Jackson to Lincoln, a period covering seven full presidential terms, was able to win reelection and only one, Van Buren, obtained renomination by his party for a second term. In his inaugural address in 1841, President Harrison pledged himself to one term only,[16] and the Whig party's platform of 1844 endorsed the single-term principle.[17]

Abandonment of the constitutional restriction on reëligibility of the governor by Ohio in 1851 marked the beginning of a period of reaction against this principle in the states. From 1850 to the decade of the 1870's, the idea was definitely on the wane as the Republican party, in some degree the intellectual heir of the original Federalist party which was not hostile to the idea of unrestricted executive tenure, rose to ascendancy. With the exception of Oregon in 1857, none of the eight new states admitted between 1850 and 1880 limited reëligibility of the governor by constitutional rule. Revision of constitutions in the southern states under Republican auspices during the era of Reconstruction brought about a general abandonment of the principle in that region.[18] Revisions in Maryland in 1864 and in Illinois in 1870 resulted in removal of reeligibility limitations on their governors. By 1880 only 12 of the 38 states comprising the Union at that time had constitutional provisions limiting in any way reëlection of their governors. Meanwhile the election of Lincoln in 1864 and of Grant in 1872 to second terms had laid to rest the "one-term tradition" in respect to the Presidency which had earlier seemed to be in process of establishment.

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[15] Ames, p. 127. It should be noted also that the constitution of the Confederate states adopted in 1861 limited the President to one six-year term.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] Kirk H. Porter (comp.), *National Party Platforms* (New York, 1924), p. 15.

[18] The Georgia constitution of 1865, drawn up under the terms of President Johnson's milder reconstruction policies, ran contrary to the trend in that it adopted a restriction on reëligibility of the governor, although that state had not had such a provision since 1789; but this constitution was replaced by another one in 1868 in which the reëligibility clause was omitted. Louisiana's revised constitution of 1864 omitted the restrictive clause of its original constitution. It was restored in the revised constitution of 1868 only to be omitted again in the constitution of 1879.

Near the close of President Grant's second administration suggestions began to be heard from some quarters in his party that he should be renominated for a third term. Opposition to the suggestion at once was quickly voiced by elements within the Republican party as well as by the rival party. On December 15, 1875, the House of Representatives passed by a vote of 234 to 18 a resolution introduced by Representative Springer, Democrat, declaring that a departure from the two-term tradition would be "unwise, unpatriotic and fraught with peril to our free institutions."[19] Nevertheless, four years later this tradition was subjected to its first serious challenge when in the Republican convention of 1880 a nearly successful effort was made to nominate Grant for what would have been a third, but nonsuccessive, term.[20] This rebuff to the third-term suggestion at the national level coincided with a reversal in the trend in state practice with regard to the governorship, particularly in the South. West Virginia, which had entered the Union in 1863 with a constitution carrying no limitation on reëligibility of its governor, adopted such a rule in 1872, and Georgia restored its provision in 1877. Eventually all but two of the former Confederate states which had more or less willingly abandoned the principle at one time or another, returned to it.[21] Two new states, Oklahoma in 1907 and New Mexico in 1912, entered the Union with provisions of this nature in their constitutions. The most recent converts to the principle have been Idaho (1944) and Maryland (1948). Although some states have modified their reëligibility provisions in recent years, none has abandoned the principle since 1880.[22]

Currently the constitutions of 21 states carry provisions limiting the reëligibility of the governor in some fashion. Fifteen states[23] limit him to one four-year term but permit his election again after an interval of four years. Three states[24] permit two successive four-year terms followed by a four-year period of ineligibility. New Mexico permits two successive two-year terms followed by two years of ineligibility, while Tennessee has continued its original plan of permitting election to three two-year terms in an eight-year period. Only one state, Delaware, has a provision similar to that recently applied to the President by the Twenty-second Amendment. In that state after two four-year terms a governor is disqualified from ever holding that office again. In addition to those states which limit the tenure of governors by constitutional rule, in a number of others "two-term traditions" of more or less force have been observed for some time.[25] But as was demonstrated with respect to the presidential two-term limit in 1940, traditional barriers do not always prove effective in barring reëlection of incumbents.[26]

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[19] Ames, p. 125.

[20] Grant, who led the balloting on 33 roll calls, secured at one point a total of 314 votes, with 378 being necessary to win nomination. Fred Rodell, *Democracy and the Third Term* (New York, 1939), p. 73.

[21] The dates of restoration were Florida, 1885; Mississippi, 1890; Louisiana, 1899; Alabama, 1901; and South Carolina, 1926. Texas and Arkansas are the only ex-Confederate states which have failed to reinstate their reëligibility limitations.

[22] In 1941 the Georgia provision was changed from a prohibition of more than two successive two-year terms to a prohibition of a successive four-year term. New Jersey in 1947 liberalized its prohibition of an immediate reëlection under a three-year-term plan by permitting two successive four-year terms.

[23] Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma and Idaho.

[24] New Jersey, Maryland and Oregon.

Implicit in the system of limiting executive tenure by constitutional rule is the question of whether such a limitation shall apply to a person who falls heir to the office by reason of the death, resignation or removal of the regularly elected incumbent. The framers of the Twenty-second Amendment were aware of the problem of the partial term and disposed of it explicitly in the Amendment. The debates over whether Theodore Roosevelt and Calvin Coolidge would have been given "third" terms if they had been elected in 1912 and 1928, respectively, were sufficiently fresh in mind to account for the inclusion of specific language on this point; and the case of President Truman, who was at the time of submission of the Amendment serving out the remainder of F. D. Roosevelt's fourth term, was also directly at hand. Few of the states have had the foresight to deal explicitly with this question in their constitutional provisions. The matter is further complicated by the fact that in a number of states, including New Jersey, Delaware, Kentucky, Georgia, and Oregon, a vacancy in the office of governor occurring during the first part of a four-year term is filled by special election at the next succeeding general election. In all these states except Delaware, the ensuing election is for the unexpired portion of the current term. In Delaware the special election is for a full four-year term.[27]

The constitutions of only two states deal specifically with this question. North Carolina under its one-term rule excludes from consideration service as governor by an incumbent "when the office shall have been cast upon him as lieutenant-governor or president of the senate."[28] The New Jersey constitution of 1947 provides that election to complete an unexpired term shall be regarded as election to a full term under its rule prohibiting more than two successive terms; but the reëligibility limitation does not apply to an officer who succeeds only temporarily to the powers and duties of the governorship.[29] Immediate reëlection of incumbents who have served partial terms in recent years in Mississippi, Georgia and Kentucky, all of which have a one-term limit of four years, indicates that their constitutional limitations are not construed to forbid an immediate reëlection of a succeeding officer who has served less than a full term.[30] On the other hand, by judicial interpretation the Oklahoma constitution has been held to forbid immediate reëlection of an incumbent who succeeded to the office after removal of the regularly elected governor.[31]

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[25] States with two-year terms in which a two-term limit has been observed for more than half a century are Kansas, Maine, South Dakota, and Texas. No governor has been elected for a third successive two-year term in Arkansas since 1905.

[26] Thus Governor Albert C. Ritchie, of Maryland, in winning reëlection three successive times beginning in 1924, broke a one-term tradition of long standing in that state. Governor John G. Winant, by winning a second, but nonsuccessive term in New Hampshire in 1930, defied a tradition against a second election; and in 1932 he set a new precedent by obtaining another, successive term. In 1926 Governor John E. Weeks, of Vermont, by his reelection to a second successive term, broke a one-term tradition which had persisted in that state for over fifty years.

[27] Constitution of Delaware, Art. 3, Sec. 9.

[28] Constitution of North Carolina, Art. 3, Sec. 2.

[29] Constitution of New Jersey, Art. 5, Sec. 1, par. 5.

The continuing support given to the principle of limited tenure for chief executives, as evidenced in the adoption of the Twenty-second Amendment and in the practices of a considerable number of states, invites inquiry into the factors accounting for its wide acceptance. As has already been shown, one of the main considerations which led to its adoption originally has long since vanished with the abandonment of legislative election of chief executives. Modern defenders of the principle of limited tenure, however, are still able to capitalize upon the traditional popular distrust of the executive which had its origins in American experience prior to the Revolution. The modern tendency toward strengthening the legislative and executive powers of chief executives at the national and state levels operates to keep such fears alive. Supporters of tenure limitation therefore continue to stress the arguments that it will tend to give an executive greater freedom from narrow partisan considerations in the conduct of his office; curb his lust for power; free him from the temptation to use his powers, especially the patronage power, to achieve his own renomination and reëlection; and in general afford greater security against the threat of "dictatorship." They deny or discount materially the counterarguments that adequate protection is afforded against executive usurpation in a limited term of office, the system of separation of powers, and a written constitution; that the opportunity of securing a vote of confidence from the people by obtaining reëlection gives a chief executive a powerful incentive to deport himself with rectitude and administer his office with due consideration to the public interest and desire; and that in time of crisis an enforced rotation in the office of chief executive may be highly undesirable. They ignore the contention that a genuine would-be "dictator" would have ample time to attempt to accomplish his purposes during one term of office, to say nothing of two, and would be as little inclined to respect a written constitutional limitation on his tenure as any other part of the constitutional plan which stood in his way.

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[30] Governor Fielding L. Wright, of Mississippi, served out the last fourteen months of the term of Governor Thomas Bailey, who died in office. Wright was then elected for a full four-year term in 1947. Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia, now serving a regular four-year term to which he was elected in 1950, was elected in 1948 to complete the last two years of the 1947–1951 term. To clear the way for his reëlection to a full term immediately after serving an elective partial term, the Georgia Legislature passed two statutes in 1949. One provided that the state executive committee of a party should determine all questions relating to the qualifications of a candidate for nomination for state office at its primary, including the question of his eligibility for the office sought. The other made the General Assembly the sole judge of the constitutional qualifications and eligibility of the person elected as governor. See *Georgia Laws* (1949), pp. 967, 1948. The Georgia constitution provides that a governor "shall not be eligible to succeed himself and shall not be eligible to hold the office until after the expiration of four years from conclusion of his term of office" (Art. 5, Sec. 1, par. 1).

In October, 1939, Lieutenant-Governor Keen Johnson, of Kentucky, who was subsequently chosen for a full term as governor in the November, 1939, election, succeeded briefly to the governorship upon the resignation of incumbent Governor Chandler, who had resigned to accept appointment to the United States Senate. Johnson thus served some two months more than the normal period of four years.

[31] *Fitzpatrick v. McAlister*, 121 Okla. 83, 248 Pac. 569 (1926).

While public reaction to the debate on the issue in terms of these arguments accounts in some measure for current practice, considerations of party advantage of the moment, personal politics, the traditional jealousy of legislative bodies toward the executive, and the character of the party system are factors which also help to account for constitutional limitations on the chief executive. The records of the two major parties on the issue since the time of the Civil War have been curiously inconsistent. By and large, up to 1940 the Democratic party had shown more hostility to the idea of unlimited tenure for chief executives than had the Republicans. The two most serious challenges to the anti-third term tradition in connection with the Presidency were made in the Republican conventions of 1880 and 1912; while Democratic members of Congress more consistently supported efforts to prevent its violation than did their Republican colleagues.[32] In most of the states which limit the tenure of governors the Democrats are the majority party. But in the struggle over the Twenty-second Amendment, these party roles were in large measure reversed.

The fact that this proposal came so soon after the two-term tradition had been successfully challenged by a Democratic President gave it the character of a pro-Roosevelt, anti-Roosevelt partisan issue in much the same sense that earlier actions by Congress had reflected anti-Grant, anti-Theodore Roosevelt and anti-Coolidge partisan sentiment. Not a single Republican vote was cast against it in either House of Congress. Those Democrats in Congress who supported it were for the most part identified with the anti-Roosevelt faction of the party. In the first three years of the period in which the Amendment was before the states for ratification, Democratic-controlled legislatures generally showed a reluctance to act favorably upon it, while Republican-dominated legislatures rushed to approve it. Only after political developments in the post-war period had begun to raise increasing doubts in Democratic ranks concerning the soundness of President Roosevelt's judgment as a policy-maker did Democratic-dominated state legislatures display in any numbers a favorable attitude toward the Amendment. During 1950 and 1951 reaction against President Truman's leadership within the Democratic party also played a part in bringing about favorable action in states where this party controlled the legislature, after it came to be realized that adoption of the Amendment might operate in some degree to discourage his seeking reëlection in 1952.

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[32] The Springer Resolution of 1875, noted above, was passed by a Democratic-controlled House of Representatives. On February 1, 1913, shortly before the inauguration of President Wilson, the Senate passed, by a vote of 47 to 23, an amendment resolution which would have limited a President to a single six-year term. It was favored by 28 Democrats and 19 Republicans and Progressives, and opposed by one Democrat and 22 Republicans and Progressives. *Congressional Record*, 62nd Cong., 3rd sess., Vol. 49, p. 2419 (1913). On February 10, 1928, the Senate passed the La Follette Resolution, which was essentially a restatement of the sentiment expressed in the Springer Resolution of 1875 opposing the third-term idea. The 56 votes in its favor were cast by 37 Democrats, 18 Republicans, and one Farmer-Laborite, and the opposing votes were cast by four Democrats and 22 Republicans. *Congressional Record*, 70th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 69, p. 2842 (1928). For reviews of efforts in the past to limit presidential tenure see Rodell, *op. cit.* (above, n. 20); *The Congressional Digest*, Vol. 26, pp. 14–23 (Jan., 1947).

The injection of political considerations of a partisan or personal nature into the question of ratification of the presidential tenure proposal accounts for what may be regarded as an inconsistency in the attitude of the states on the basic issue. In general, the legislatures of those states without provisions in their own constitutions limiting reëligibility of their governors displayed greater enthusiasm for the proposal than those of states which have. Of the first 18 states to ratify the Amendment, all of which acted within a few months after its submission, only five had constitutions limiting the tenure of their own chief executives. The legislatures of California and New York were among the earliest to ratify; yet in each of those states a governor who had been one of the standard-bearers of the Republican party in the 1948 presidential election was reëlected for a third successive four-year term in 1950. Eventually, all but five of the 27 states which do not have restrictions in their own constitutions on reëlection of their governors were numbered among the 36 ratifying states.

Support of the principle of constitutional limitations on the tenure of chief executives by members of national and state legislative bodies can be explained further by reference to its implications under the system of separation of powers. Separation of powers tends to place the chief executive and the legislative branch in the role of competitors for power and prestige. Legislators are therefore inclined to look with favor upon a device designed to break the grip of any individual who has achieved the position of head of the executive branch. A forced rotation in this office, they reason, will weight the scales on the side of the legislative branch in the struggle between the two. An additional justification for such a rotation from the standpoint of the legislators arises from the fact that the chief executive, for a variety of reasons, has come to be accorded the position of party spokesman and leader. The two major parties are, in the national sense, essentially federalizations of state parties. Even at the state level, they are combinations of local and factional elements which compete among themselves for power within the group. These factional elements of the party, if important enough, are represented in the legislative branch and have their spokesmen there. What is more natural than for the representatives of all these factions except the one temporarily in possession of the executive office to regard with favor a constitutional rule which compels retirement of the party chief at periodic intervals and thus opens the way for advancement to the top for others, particularly when the legislative membership itself usually includes a number who themselves aspire to this higher rung on the political ladder? In the southern states where the contest for the governorship is essentially a struggle between factions within the Democratic party at its primary, a restriction on reëligibility of the chief executive becomes especially significant as a device for disqualifying the incumbent party chieftain in the periodic competition for power.[33] The point is often more euphemistically stated in terms of an argument that rotation in executive office must be enforced to permit the rise of a new leadership.[34] Naturally enough, the legislators who advance this argument see no need to apply this principle to themselves as holders of positions of power and importance in the party hierarchy.[35]

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[33] Cf. V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York, 1949), especially Part I.

A constitutional restriction on reëligibility is in the final analysis an expression of lack of faith in the electorate's ability to make an intelligent decision on whether to continue in office a chief executive who has had an opportunity to make a record upon which he can be judged. It is a denial of power to the voters to retain in office a chief executive who would otherwise win renomination and reëlection, for a fixed term of office provides them with opportunity at periodic intervals to dismiss an unsatisfactory incumbent. Consequently the attitude of the people on the general issue, rather than that of persons of influence in party affairs who may be suspected of reflecting a certain amount of bias arising from their own partisan or personal interests is of particular significance.

Popular approval of state constitutional amendments of this character in three states since 1925 and popular rejection of a proposal to repeal the tenure limitation provision of the New Mexico constitution in 1937 indicate that the idea has some measure of support by the people. However, the issue was not presented to the electorate in clear-cut fashion in all these referenda. When South Carolina reinstituted the reëligibility limitation for its governors in 1926, the question was submitted as a part of a proposal to extend the term from two to four years.[36] When Idaho's voters approved a similar limitation in 1944, the issue was again complicated by being made part of a proposal to extend the term of the governor and of other major state administrative officers to four years and to require them to reside in the county where the seat of government is located during their incumbency in office.[37] Modifications of tenure limitations in Georgia in 1941 and in New Jersey in 1947 also were approved in connection with changes in the length of term of office, and therefore provided no clear test of popular sentiment on the general issue of tenure limitation. The refusal of the electorate in New Mexico in 1937 to abandon the reëligibility limitation of that state,[38] and the adoption of a two-term limit in Maryland in 1948, after the electorate had earlier refused to approve a more restrictive proposal,[39] were clearer expressions of popular approval of the general principle. Over against these indications of popular support for the principle of tenure limitation stand the actions of many state electorates which have in recent times refused to be bound by the anti-third term rule and have retained governors in office for three consecutive terms or longer.[40]

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[34] In the Senate debate on the presidential tenure proposal, Senator O'Conor, of Maryland, stated the point as follows: "Certainly nothing could act more definitely to halt or impede development of potential leadership in the city, State, or Nation than to permit any one man or any one party to persuade the people that he or they alone are competent and therefore must be perpetuated in office" (*Cong. Rec.*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 93, p. 1780 [1947]).

[35] When in the course of deliberations upon the presidential tenure proposal Senator O'Daniel, of Texas, offered an amendment to apply a six-year limitation to the Presidency and to legislative officers as well, it received only his own vote. Senator Kilgore, of West Virginia, also questioned the logic of limiting executive tenure without likewise limiting the tenure of legislators, but his query stirred no debate (*ibid.*, pp. 1963, 1947).

[36] *South Carolina Acts and Joint Resolutions* (1924), p. 1492; *South Carolina Acts and Joint Resolutions* (1926), p. 960. For a considerable time prior to adoption of this amendment, a "two-term tradition" under which a governor was limited to two consecutive two-year terms had been observed in this state.

[37] In *Keenan v. Price*, 68 Idaho 423, 195 Pac. (2nd) 662 (1948), the Supreme Court of Idaho overruled a contention that the amendment was invalidly submitted in that the electorate was not permitted to vote separately on the different propositions contained in it. In 1928 a similar amendment, but lacking the ineligibility clause for the governor, was ratified by the state electorate. It was declared by the Idaho Supreme Court to have been invalidly submitted on the ground that the question as presented on the referendum

Whether the Twenty-second Amendment is merely a "politician's amendment," introduced into the Constitution by action of national and state legislators who registered only their own partisan and personal views, or was the reflection of a strong, genuine public opinion remains a debatable point. Provision for its reference to popularly chosen state conventions, as was made in in the case of submission of the Twenty-first Amendment, was deliberately avoided by its backers in Congress.[41] In view of the fact that the two-term tra-

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ballot was stated as whether the terms of the state officers involved should be "limited" to four years. *Lane v. Lukens*, 48 Idaho 517, 283 Pac. 532 (1929).

[38] *New Mexico Laws* (1937), p. 693. The provision which the voters refused to eliminate was one which forbids a third consecutive two-year term. In November, 1948, a proposed constitutional amendment extending the term of office of the governor and other state administrative officials from two to four years, and making such officers ineligible to succeed themselves after one term, was defeated by an affirmative vote of 28,914 and a negative vote of 30,364 (*New Mexico Statutes Anno.*, 1949 Supp., Vol. 1, p. 13).

[39] *Laws of Maryland* (1949), p. 1968. The popular vote in favor of the anti-third term proposal was 162,043 to 106,255. Senator O'Conor of Maryland asserted on the Senate floor that the two-term limit proposal had the unanimous support of the 123 members of the House of Delegates when it was voted on by the legislature in 1947 (*Cong. Rec.*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 93, p. 1780 [1947]). In 1940 the voters of Maryland rejected a constitutional amendment which would have prohibited an immediate reëlection of the governor to a second four-year term (*Laws of Maryland*, 1939, p. 828).

[40] States in which governors have been elected for three consecutive two-year terms in the period since 1900 include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Wisconsin and Wyoming. States in which governors have been elected for three consecutive four-year terms include California, Maryland, Montana and New York. The "record" for number of terms elected in recent times is held by the first governor of Arizona, George W. P. Hunt, Democrat, who was elected for seven two-year terms in the period from 1912 to 1932. Governor Albert C. Ritchie, Democrat, of Maryland, had the longest period of continuous service, which extended over four four-year terms running from 1920 to 1935.

[41] An attempt to make the convention method of ratification applicable to the proposal failed in the House by a vote of 134 to 74. The Senate Judiciary Committee report on the resolution recommended use of the convention device, but this recommendation was rejected 63 to 20 (*Cong. Rec.*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 93, pp. 871, 1862 [1947]). Discussion of the alternative modes of ratification revealed a startling lack of understanding by members of Congress of this aspect of the amending process. Cf. Everett S. Brown, "The Term of Office of the President," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 41, pp. 447–452 (June, 1947).

dition had been repudiated by the voters of the nation by the reëlection of President Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944, supporters of the proposal in Congress had good reason to mistrust a ratification method which would have, in effect, permitted a popular referendum, state by state, on the issue.[42] Polls of popular opinion on the issue of maintaining the two-term tradition with reference to the Presidency showed a considerable shifting of attitudes in the nation from 1936 to 1947. Prior to 1937 there was majority support for the two-term principle. Then, in line with the action of the voters in breaking the tradition with the reëlection of President Roosevelt in 1940, there was a shift to the contrary view. Republican voters consistently favored the principle by a heavy margin; while Democratic voters opposed it by a somewhat lesser margin.[43] These polls suggest that the Amendment might still have been approved if its ratification had been left to popularly chosen conventions; but the public's attitude on the issue was by no means so clear as to have assured this outcome.[44]

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[42] In the congressional debate no backer of the proposal frankly stated this as a reason for opposing the use of the convention device. Reasons advanced in support of the legislative method of ratification were that it was more expeditious, less complicated, and less expensive than the convention method; that the public was not greatly concerned and interested in so "technical" a question; and that conventions might be "manipulated." Perhaps the most astounding statement was that of Senator McClellan, of Arkansas, who in opposing the convention system declared: "I know that the process of ratification through action of the State Legislatures affords the best opportunity for getting the correct sentiment of the people, because legislators are elected, whereas in many States delegates to conventions are appointed and the question is not made an issue and debated before the citizenship and the electorate, before the votes are cast" (*Cong. Rec.*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 93, p. 1800 [1947]).

[43] American Institute of Public Opinion polls, as reported in the *Detroit News* for June 14, 1936, and the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 2, pp. 304–305 (1947–1948), show the following results:

Date	Per Cent For Two-Term Limit	Per Cent Against	Democrats For	Democrats Against	Republicans For	Republicans Against
June, 1936	57	43	44	56	78	22
1937	49	51				
1938	48	52				
1939	42	58				
1940	41	59				
1943 (April	46	54				
1943 (Dec.)	54	46				
1944 (April)	57	43	32	68	84	16
1945 (May)	60	40				
1947 (Feb.)	57	43	41	59	74	26
1947 (May)	59	41	43	57	79	21

[44] It may be contended, of course, that the fact that the amendment proposal received a two-thirds majority vote in each House of Congress and majority approval in the legisla-

The ultimate effect on the Presidency of the now-formalized rule of compulsory retirement after two terms is difficult to assess. A backward projection gives some indication of its future impact. If the Twenty-second Amendment had been in effect since 1789, it appears that the outcome of two presidential elections in addition to those of 1940 and 1944 would have been affected. If General Grant had not been a strong contender for a third-term nomination in 1880, the "dark horse" Garfield might well have never emerged as the candidate of the Republicans, and the election of that year would probably have placed some one else in the White House. Again in 1912 Theodore Roosevelt would not have been eligible for the Presidency, and the split in the Republican party which resulted from his candidacy and made possible the election of Woodrow Wilson conceivably would not have occurred. Of the 32 persons who have occupied the office of President, ten would have been rendered ineligible for further service. Those who would have been forever disqualified include six of the seven Presidents who are generally recognized as having been our most outstanding and able ones.[45]

To judge from the experience of the states in connection with the governorship, one probable result of the Amendment will be to diminish somewhat the effectiveness of the President as a legislative leader as the time for his enforced retirement nears. Competent observers agree that this is an effect of reëligibility restrictions on state governors.[46] The reasons for this are rather obvious.

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tive bodies of 36 states is *prima facie* evidence that it had overwhelming popular support. However, eighteen of the state ratifications were given by state legislatures within less than three months of its submission. Obviously few, if any, of them could be said to have acted in accordance with a popular mandate on this question, since it was not formally before the voters as an issue when the members of these legislative bodies were elected. It may also be questioned whether the issue of ratification of the pending amendment played any significant part in the election of members of the remaining state legislatures which ratified at later dates.

[45] Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The other outstanding President, Lincoln, would not have been affected since he was assassinated before the end of his second term. Some might include Grover Cleveland, who would also have been disqualified, among the "outstanding and able" Presidents.

[46] Dealing with this point in the Senate debate on the presidential tenure, Senator Kilgore of West Virginia asserted: "I have had the opportunity during the past 8 years to study the record of governors in States in which there are limitations as to terms, and I have discovered that the last half of the term was a record of failure" (*Cong. Rec.*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 93, p. 1949 [1947]).

Another observer states: "One state official felt very strongly that the inability of the governor to succeed himself placed him in a position where 'he has no incentive for good administration other than his own desire to perform efficiently.' Others interviewed were skeptical about the effect of this provision on the administration of the governor's program, pointing out that the people, even if they had an opportunity to express themselves, 'weren't interested in good administration,' but judged a governor by his ability to get his promised program through the legislature. It was generally conceded, however, that this provision did have a deleterious effect on the governor's relation with the legislature. This is particularly true of the second half of his term when the legislators were more concerned with the programs of potential candidates for the governorship and with potential

On the one hand, his fellow partisans in the legislative branch, knowing that he can not present himself to the voters again as a candidate seeking vindication for his party and its record under his leadership, will be under less compulsion to remain loyal to him. As election time approaches they will become more and more concerned with promoting the candidacies of the various aspirants to the succession. The chief executive on his part may feel less inclined to pursue a course calculated to maintain party harmony and solidarity. In such an atmosphere the relationship between the executive and the legislative branch can hardly fail to become less cordial and coöperative. This is not to say, of course, that as the time of his enforced retirement approaches, the executive will become wholly powerless and ineffectual as a party leader. He will retain to the end of his term his constitutional powers, which are the basis of his control over his party; and the realization by him and by his fellow partisans in the legislative branch that they and the party will be judged at the next election in large part on the record achieved under its current head will operate as a restraining influence against these divisive tendencies.

Comparison of the practices of those states which impose limitations on reëligibility of their governors with the system prescribed by the Twenty-second Amendment reveals two major differences which to some minds should be assessed in favor of the prevailing state practice, if it be conceded that a tenure limitation should be imposed by constitutional rule. The Twenty-second Amendment, in contrast to the constitutions of three-fourths of the states having limitations of this character, fails to prevent an incumbent chief executive from seeking to succeed himself in office. One of the most persuasive arguments for a limitation on reëligibility is that it discourages the use of official powers by a chief executive to promote his own renomination and reëlection. His ineligibility to succeed himself permits him to render judgment on public issues with which he must deal without taking into account his immediate personal ambitions and interests. A President, moreover, acquires such a grip on the party machinery that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, for the party to refuse him renomination if he seeks it.[47] If the evil to be eliminated is an incumbent's prostitution of official power for personal and partisan ends, then a prohibition upon an immediate reëlection, rather than a prohibition of a third

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patronage from those candidates than with the incumbent who had distributed most of the lucrative state positions and contracts and who could not be looked upon as a candidate for at least another four years, if at all" (Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., *The Office of Governor in the South*, University, Alabama, 1951, pp. 59–60).

Key, *op. cit.* (above, n. 33), p. 102, summarizes the observations of an official in the state house in Florida, where a single four-year term rule obtains: "A governor usually goes out of office with many enemies. He can control his first legislature with patronage and favors, but the second is often beyond his control. As his term wears on even his own appointees become independent . . . . Among the enemies of the administration, those seeking to organize a group powerful enough to take over the governorship find their most willing recruits."

[47] Every one of the ten Presidents since Grover Cleveland who has lived to complete a first full term or partial term has been renominated by his party. Six were returned to office and a seventh, Cleveland, was reëlected after an intervening term.

term, is the logical remedy. If it be answered that a President or a governor should be entitled to win vindication once on his record at the hands of his party and the voters, the question arises, if once, why not a second or a third time?[48]

In the second place the Twenty-second Amendment rule stands in contrast to those of the states in that it imposes a permanent ineligibility upon an incumbent who has occupied the Presidency for the permissible length of time. With the exception of Delaware, all the states with reëligibility restrictions on their governors impose only a temporary disqualification. A temporary ineligibility makes possible the return to office of a chief executive whose performance affords a basis upon which the voters may render a judgment, without their being influenced by his direct use of the powers and prestige of the chief executive's office. While the number of governors who have been returned to office after a period of ineligibility is not large,[49] there have been enough instances to demonstrate that the voters, on occasion, may prefer such an experienced chief executive over an untried one. If the people can be trusted at all to choose their chief executives, they ought to be capable of making an intelligent choice under these conditions. A similar disposition of this aspect of the issue as it relates to Presidents who have served the permissible period of time would have rescued them from the role of "discontented ghosts, wandering among the people and sighing for a place which they are destined never more to possess,"[50] and saved to the nation their talents as leaders in case of future need.

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[48] "In their haste to register disapproval of the late President for seeking a third and then a fourth term, these gentlemen [who sponsored the Twenty-second Amendment] neglected or ignored the really critical issue, which is *whether a President should be permitted to succeed himself at all.* Inasmuch as the Presidency is a 'killing job,' to which few men come until they have passed the peak of their physical vigor, few Presidents will be likely to seek a third term, and certainly not a fourth, remembering the penalty which Mr. Roosevelt paid for doing so.

"The chief objection to presidential reëligibility, to my mind, is just as valid against a *second* successive term as it would be against a *third* one. It consists in the fact that a President who is looking forward to reëlection will evaluate all programs and policies primarily for their probable effect on his political fortunes and will, in fact, be expected and required by his party to do so" (Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers*, 3rd ed. rev., New York, 1948, pp. 48–49).

[49] Among state governors of recent years who have been returned to office after periods of ineligibility are Gifford Pinchot, of Pennsylvania; A. Harry Moore, of New Jersey; Olin Johnston, of South Carolina; David Bibb Graves, of Alabama; Eugene Talmadge, of Georgia; Theodore Bilbo and Hugh White, of Mississippi; and Henry Schricker, of Indiana. The number of governors who have been returned to office after a period of ineligibility would undoubtedly be larger were it not for the fact that many of them in the meantime successfully sought federal offices, especially seats in the Senate, which they have preferred to retain rather than to seek the governorship a second time.

[50] Cf. Alexander Hamilton in Number 72 of the *Federalist Papers*. During senate consideration of the presidential tenure proposal Senators Holland, of Florida, and Magnusen, of Washington, strongly urged an amendment which would have made possible the later reëlection of a President who had served the permissible two consecutive elective terms. The proposed amendment was rejected 50–34 (*Cong. Rec.*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 93, pp. 1941, 1955 [1947]).

The fundamental problem toward which constitutional limitations on executive tenure are advanced as solutions is the dangerous accretion of power in the hands of the chief executive. The trend toward concentration of authority and influence in the office of chief executive has become more pronounced at both the national and state levels of government in recent decades. That developments in this direction have carried to the point where there is ample cause for grave concern can hardly be questioned, particularly in the case of the Presidency. It may be seriously doubted, however, whether a constitutional limitation on executive tenure offers any substantial measure of relief. The causes for the recent growth of executive power and influence are to be found in the expansion of the functions of government generally, in the increasing complexity of the matters with which government must grapple in a period of worldwide economic and political dislocation induced by two world wars in one generation, and in the increasing reliance which must be placed upon a bureaucracy functioning under the immediate direction of the chief executive to effectuate the purposes of government. In the case of the Presidency, the rise of the United States to a position of leadership among the free nations of the world is another factor of momentous consequence in the situation.

Constitutional limitations on executive tenure fail to come to grips with the basic issue. By promoting a false sense of security, they may actually hinder the development of those types of safeguards in which salvation against the evils of an overweening executive power really lies. A reshaping of our political institutions to make the opposition party a more effective instrument for holding the administration to account, reëxamination by the legislative branch of the question of its proper role and function in the governmental process and the devising of means and methods to give it a more powerful voice in various areas of high-level policy-making, and insistence upon a rigid regard for the right of the people generally to criticize and oppose within the broad limits assumed by the democratic dogma—these are lines of action which offer far greater promise as safeguards against the threat of "dictatorship" than do measures of the sort illustrated by the Twenty-second Amendment.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE USES OF NATURAL GAS

RALPH K. HUITT
University of Wisconsin

The Natural Gas Act of 1938, as amended in 1942, requires natural-gas companies subject to the act to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Power Commission before transporting or selling natural gas in interstate commerce, as well as before acquiring, constructing, or extending facilities for those purposes. The issuance of such certificates is a conventional function of public-utility regulatory bodies, and the Commission has administered it in a conventional manner. The tests developed by the Commission to determine the "public convenience and necessity," relating primarily to the adequacy of natural gas reserves, physical facilities, financial resources, and market demand,[1] are commonplace standards, framed in the public-utility tradition to fit the economic and physical characteristics of the natural-gas industry. The real importance of the certificate power under the Natural Gas Act lies in the fact that issues raised in proceedings pursuant to it have transcended the scope of these standards, involving no less than an attempt to redefine in the broadest terms the public interest in respect to natural gas.

With parties in interest allowed by the Commission to intervene extensively, certificate cases became the battleground upon which coal, labor, and railroad interests sought to stay the invasion by natural gas of coal-burning market areas. Their case for restricting the growth of the natural-gas industry rested on the basic fact that, while both coal and gas are exhaustible resources, gas reserves are estimated in decades and coal reserves in centuries. From this premise, three arguments were made:

1) The coal and railroad industries are large-scale employers of skilled labor; natural-gas pipe-lines are not. Miners and railroad workers displaced by the substitution of gas for coal cannot be replaced when the gas is gone. Therefore, natural gas should be kept out of markets adequately supplied by coal.

2) Industrialization of the major producing states in the South and Southwest, based on natural gas as a fuel, would help to decentralize industry, foster regional development, and balance the economies of those sections. Therefore, the industrial needs of producing states should be considered in certificate cases.

3) Natural gas is a "luxury" commodity, having great value as a fuel for domestic consumption and as a raw material for the chemical industries, and perhaps for conversion into a liquid fuel. It is economic waste to burn vast quantities at low prices as boiler fuel. Therefore, the certificate power should be used for the selective control of end uses of gas.

These contentions clearly go beyond anything the Congress had in mind when it passed the Natural Gas Act.[2] Recognizing that these and other broad policy-questions could not be answered without more comprehensive factual data than could be developed from a case-by-case approach, the Federal Power Commission in 1945 and 1946 conducted a "stock-taking" investigation, giving all interested persons and groups an opportunity to be heard.[3] All aspects of the regulation of natural gas were covered, but much of the testimony had to do with the proper scope and exercise of the certificate power granted to the Commission.

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[1] The Commission first made a comprehensive statement of these standards in *Kansas Pipe Line and Gas Co. et al.*, 2 F.P.C. 29 (1939), and they are the criteria still relied upon. See *Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the Federal Power Commission* (1948), p. 57. For an analysis of the problems arising under the certificate power prior to 1946, see Carl J. Wheat, "Administration by the Federal Power Commission of the Certificate Provisions of the Natural Gas Act," *George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 14, p. 194 (Dec., 1945).

Most of the parties in interest who appeared were in the happy position of arguing from easily defined self-interest. The natural-gas industry wanted as much freedom as it could get to take natural gas anywhere and in whatever quantity it should believe to be profitable. The coal and railroad interests, both management and labor, wanted to be relieved of the competition of natural gas to the largest extent possible. States which were not then being served with natural gas wanted it. States which already consumed gas wanted more of it, with dependable service and supply. Only in the case of the gas-producing states was self-interest not clear. The officials of each of them knew the advantages of industrialization and a balanced economy, the dangers inherent in an extractive economy. The arguments for trying to keep their natural gas at home were strong, but not conclusive. Could industries really be induced to move to the producing states? Should landowners be required to wait many years for a return on their gas? What if future developments in a dynamic technology made natural gas a relatively valueless energy source? And what if the proposed expansion in the scope of national regulatory power should lead to another and another, until the states no longer controlled their raw materials at all?

Before the public forum of the Natural Gas Investigation, powerful groups clashed over the propositions summarily stated above, rationalizing their particular requirements in terms of the public weal, talking to the administrators but loudly enough for the Congress to overhear. Through conflicting testimony the Federal Power Commission, circumscribed by federalism, uncertain of the dimensions of its authority, and divided in its sympathies, groped for solutions which might in a changing economy be rendered obsolete the day after tomorrow.

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[2] Cf. *Hearing before a subcommittee on H.R. 11662* (Natural Gas Act), U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, 1936), and *Hearing on H.R. 4008* (Natural Gas Act), *ibid.*, 75th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1937).

[3] Natural Gas Investigation, Docket No. G-580. The transcript of the hearings will be cited as "Tr." Two reports were made by the Commission to Congress in 1948, one signed by Commissioners Nelson Lee Smith and Harrington Wimberly (cited hereafter as *Smith-Wimberly Report*), and the other by Commissioners Leland Olds and Claude L. Draper (cited as *Olds-Draper Report*). The *Smith-Wimberly Report* of 498 pages has numerous tables and charts, and includes the eleven staff reports summarizing and analyzing the testimony and exhibits presented in the hearings. The *Olds-Draper Report* is a 158-page presentation of their interpretations and conclusions regarding the investigation.

I. INTERFUEL COMPETITION

Some of the testimony of the consuming states and of the industries adversely affected by the competition of natural gas should be noted briefly. The natural-gas-consuming areas of the United States may be divided roughly into two regions: 1) the region west of the Mississippi, extending from Texas and Louisiana to Minnesota and the Dakotas, and 2) the region east of the Mississippi.[4] The region west of the Mississippi has neither coal nor water power adequate to maintain an industrial economy, but it has in its southern part the nation's greatest concentration of natural gas and petroleum. The region east of the Mississippi has abundant coal and water power in its northern portion, and until recently it had a large supply of natural gas. It also is the heavily industrialized section of the country. The argument of the consuming states west of the Mississippi therefore is that they need natural gas to "remove some of the economic disadvantages which we do possess as residents of that area of the United States."[5] The heavily industrialized region to the east of the river presents the obverse of this view: the maintenance of their great industrial capacity makes it necessary for the states of this area to replace their dwindling reserves with ever-increasing quantities of southwestern gas.

Scores of community and business leaders went to the witness stand for the consuming states and told of the importance of natural gas to their economic future. Many recognized the need for the conservation of natural gas; and, generally speaking, where there was another fuel source available, there was more amenability to some control of the use of gas as an industrial fuel. But where there was no other fuel to be had except after a long and expensive haul, putting the region in a disadvantageous position relative to other regions, citizens expressed the opinion that natural gas should be freely used to support industrialization.

Railroad, coal, and labor groups vigorously opposed the extension of natural-gas service in coal-burning territory. For example, the Association of American Railroads, in a statement filed with the Commission after the close of the investigation, pointed to the grave effects upon the railroads of the increasing competition of natural gas with coal. The statement said that coal traffic furnished almost 24 per cent of the total freight revenue of railroads in depression years and 20 per cent in normal nonwar years. Fuel oil traffic likewise was said to be important. The Association did not ask for specific relief under the certificate power, however. It suspected, although it could not furnish proof, that natural gas in unregulated direct sales to industrial users was being sold at less than the cost of its transportation in markets where it competed with coal. The Association therefore wanted the Act amended to give the Commission jurisdiction over direct industrial sales and to confer upon it the power to fix minimum rates and to permit the intervention in rate cases of parties already eligible to intervene in certificate cases.

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[4] *Olds-Draper Report*, p. 85. See the discussion of the testimony presented by the consuming areas in Sec. VIII of this report.

[5] Testimony of James W. Clark, executive director of the Minnesota Resources Commission, Tr., p. 5335.

A longer and more comprehensive statement was filed collectively by two coal associations and three labor groups.[6] It pointed out that there are approximately 500,000 mine workers engaged in the production of anthracite and bituminous coal in the United States. In the anthracite industry, which is located in a relatively few counties in northern Pennsylvania, "whole communities of substantial size rely almost wholly upon the industry for their continued existence." Natural gas already had made tremendous inroads into the employment of mine workers, it was claimed. Furthermore, several million people were said to rely directly or indirectly upon the coal-mining industry for their livelihoods. The applications of natural gas-companies for certificates of public convenience and necessity on May 31, 1946, "represented the potential displacement of close to 50 million tons of coal, or the equivalent of 31,000 mine workers' jobs. For every ton of coal displaced by competitive fuels, the equivalent of one job is lost when consideration is given to the fact that the mining industry creates jobs not only for miners but for railroad men and those who prepare and manufacture mine supplies."[7] Another great social cost was seen in the fact that coal mining is largely a mechanized process requiring skilled labor, the displacement of which would leave the country in a handicapped position if it should be necessary in a national emergency to step up coal production.

The statement, referring to an exhibit presented by the Railway Labor Executives Association purporting to show the effect of the building of long-distance pipe lines into certain states, which had an adequate supply of coal at reasonable prices, in the period from 1930 to 1943, asserted that "approximately 7½ trillion cubic feet of natural gas were sold for commercial and industrial purposes. This is the equivalent of 304,419,000 tons of coal. This would make an aggregate loss of railroad freight revenue of $681,898,560, of which $289,124,989 represented railroad wages. Applying the average annual compensation per railroad employee during the same period, it is shown that the wage loss meant the equivalent of approximately 11,304 railroad jobs a year."[8] With the same basis for calculation, the conclusion was reached that if all the applications for certificates pending on May 31, 1946, were granted, an annual wage loss of approximately $45,000,000 per year, or the equivalent of 16,592 railroad jobs, would result. By way of contrast, it was claimed that "the natural gas industry is virtually a laborless industry, as compared with those which produce, transport and distribute solid fuels."[9]

II. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AS INDUSTRY SPOKESMEN

The natural-gas-producing states, with the exception of Louisiana (whose position will be discussed later), opposed any restrictions, through the use of the certificate power, on the growth of the natural-gas industry. The attitudes of the officials of the State of Texas are suitable for illustrative purposes, both because of the elaborate presentation made by them and because of their complete cooperation with industry officials.

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[6] *Statement of National Coal Association, United Mine Workers of America, Railway Labor Executives Association, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, American Retail Coal Association.* Statements of a similar character were filed by the Anthracite Institute and the Operators of Coal Docks on Lake Michigan and Lake Superior.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 27; Exhibit 360. [8] *Ibid.*, p. 28; Exhibit 464. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

The State of Texas did not formulate a policy: it adopted and supported the policy of the oil and gas industry. A committee appointed by Governor Coke Stevenson to recommend what action the State should take in regard to the investigation, was composed entirely of oil and gas men except for its chairman, Olin Culberson, who also was chairman of the Railroad Commission (which regulates gas in Texas). This committee met in Washington with the Petroleum Industry War Council and other representatives of the natural-gas industry to coordinate state and national industry policy.[10] The committee then recommended to the Governor that the State should appear at the investigation and support as state policy a statement of principles, containing sixteen numbered points, which was almost verbatim a copy of a statement of principles formulated by the Petroleum Industry War Council and endorsed by all of the important industry groups.[11] Principle Number 14, which declared that "the end use of natural gas should not be regulated" and that "the whole field is best left to the determinations set up by relative prices in a free competitive economy," was, in fact, identical with Number 13 in the statement of principles drafted by the Petroleum Industry War Council. A second committee, appointed by the Governor to prepare and direct the Texas presentation, also was made up of oil and gas men except for its chairman, Commissioner Culberson.

State officials in Texas made no attempt to solicit the opinions of manufacturers' associations, chambers of commerce, railroads, employees' groups, or representatives of other natural-resource industries.[12] The only public statement that a policy was being formulated was made in a regular statewide hearing of the Railroad Commission, attended almost exclusively by oil and gas-industry people.[13] No legislative committee or group was consulted, and the legislature appropriated no money for the cost of the committee's appearance before the hearing. In answer to a question, Governor Stevenson said that he knew nothing of the cost of the presentation nor by whom it was financed.[14] No attempt was made to obtain the services of the Attorney General's department, and the Attorney General, who made a brief statement, took no part in the preparation of the presentation.[15] Charles I. Francis of Houston, the counsel for the Governor's Committee who also directed the State's presentation, replied, in answer to a question, that he got his "funds from the funds raised by the oil and gas industry."[16] Francis also represented the American Petroleum Institute before the hearing.

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[10] Testimony of Olin Culberson, Tr., pp. 3534–3535.

[11] For a list of the industry groups, see the testimony of E. H. Poe, Tr., pp. 12408–12413.

[12] Testimony of Stevenson, Tr., p. 3333; Culberson, Tr., pp. 3538–3539.

[13] Testimony of Culberson, Tr., pp. 3604–3605, 3624–3625.

[14] Tr., p. 3334.

[15] Testimony of Culberson, Tr., p. 3605.

[16] Tr., p. 3537.

Nothing in the testimony of Governor Stevenson indicated that there might be groups other than the oil and gas industry with a stake in the proceedings before the Commission. Stevenson said of the committee that it "included oil and gas men, representative of every interest affected by [the Commission's] hearing."[17] That other interests wished to be heard, however, was indicated by the fact that two dissenting points of view were presented voluntarily. Statements were made by a representative of the San Antonio Manufacturers' Association[18] and by the supervisor of public utilities for the City of Houston,[19] both sharply objecting to the exportation of Texas gas to areas which had other fuels available.

The hegemony of the oil and gas industry in official circles was not limited to Texas. On the same afternoon that Commissioner E. O. Thompson read into the record, in his prepared statement, the principles espoused by the Texas Governor's Committee, there appeared one R. R. Spurrier, who read into the record a letter from Governor John J. Dempsey of New Mexico and an attached "Statement of Policy of the State of New Mexico." The numbered principles were substantially the same as, and in most cases identical with, those of Texas. Upon being questioned, Spurrier said that he did not know who wrote the statement nor how the identical statements came to be made, and that he could not speak for the Governor.[20]

Two weeks later at Biloxi, Mississippi, there was read into the record for Governor Thomas L. Bailey a statement of principles and objectives for the State of Mississippi. The statement had been prepared by a special committee of forty-three members, designated an Advisory Committee to the State Oil and Gas Board. Seven of its members were state officials; of the remainder, twenty-three were independent operators or royalty-owners, eight represented large companies, and the other five (four of whom were lawyers) were said to be interested in oil and gas. Twelve members were definitely identified as non-residents of Mississippi.[21] The statement which they "prepared" corresponded almost word-for-word to that of Texas and New Mexico.[22] Once again the order of items was modified; the statement on end uses, which was Number 13 for the Petroleum Industry War Council, Number 14 for Texas, and Number 10 for New Mexico, here was firmly numbered 11.

III. THE "FREE TRADE" POLICY

Of all the witnesses who appeared in support of the Texas policy, the most important were the four officials most directly concerned with the problems of the oil and gas industry—the Governor and the three members of the Railroad Commission. Their testimony revealed by what different roads unanimity can be reached.

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[17] Tr., pp. 3317–3318.

[18] Tr., pp. 4911–4930.

[19] Tr., pp. 4874–4879.

[20] Tr., pp. 3449–3450.

[21] Tr., pp. 5140–5144, 5226–5228; Exhibit 231.

[22] The identical portions of the statements are found in that of Commissioner Thompson at pp. 3382–3385, in that of Governor Dempsey at pp. 3444–3449, and in that of Governor Bailey at pp. 5071–5074.

Governor Stevenson's attitude stemmed from his concern for the State's financial stake in the oil and gas industry and his fear of the federal government. According to him, "Fifty-three per cent of the State's revenue comes from this industry. Any legislation or regulation that reduces the State's earnings and income from privately owned lands or devalues such property, or decreases the revenues collected by it from the oil and gas industry or the property used in connection therewith is strenuously opposed by us."[23] Stevenson made it clear that he regarded the national government as an alien thing, whose actions were to be viewed with "fear" and "alarm" and "apprehension." What he feared from the national government in this instance was no less than a nationalization of natural resources, accomplished not forthrightly by Congress, but stealthily by administrators—a nationalization "achieved indirectly and with 'conscious obscurity' and with a finesse designed to hide a knowledge of such a program until after its practical accomplishment." This "administrative policy-making" he decried, for "State and national policy-making is the rightful and exclusive function of the legislative branches of our government."[24] However, it did not seem to trouble the Governor that the state legislature had played no part in formulating the natural-gas policy of the State of Texas. Altogether, the issues raised by the investigation presented no problems for Stevenson: whatever increased the power or the functions of a federal agency should be resisted.

The question likewise was simple for Commissioner E. O. Thompson. Price was for him the great regulator. "The free play of competitive forces as between various uses of gas, and in its competition with coal or oil, will determine its value" through the price mechanism, and the best use of gas is that which brings the highest price.[25] He held no reservations about the exportation of gas—"we are sellers of gas in Texas." As for the problem of reserves, Thompson said: "We rejoice and give a barbecue when a pipe line is built into an oil field and our oil will last less long than the present gas at the present rate of production."[26]

The other two commissioners did have misgivings about the exportation of gas from Texas. For Commissioner Beauford Jester, price and the extent of reserves were the key questions. He had opposed exportation because he felt that it was an "economic crime" to sell it at prices so low, compared with coal and oil. But if the price of gas could be made comparable to that of coal and other fuels, "economic factors and price would determine end use and federal regulation thereof would be unnecessary." And how was this higher price to be achieved? Jester firmly believed "that if left alone to economic forces," the price of gas would eventually settle on a reasonably competitive basis.[27] Inasmuch as he had come to feel better assured than formerly that the reserves of natural gas in Texas were adequate to maintain the current rate of exportation, Jester was able to support the policy adopted by the State.

The testimony of Commission Chairman Culberson was confused and contradictory. At one point he was opposed to regulation *per se*, including that which he enforced. Thus, although the Railroad Commission grants certificates of public convenience to trucks and buses, Culberson did not agree "with the philosophy or doctrine of public convenience and necessity." He thought that the statute creating the Railroad Commission represented "an unfortunate drift to regimentation and to the interposition of government to matters where it doesn't belong."[28] On the other hand he showed a cogent grasp of the importance of natural gas to the industrial future of Texas. And because he understood the folly of piping it out in great quantities at low prices to support industrial development elsewhere, he was willing at one point to grant the Federal Power Commission the power to refuse applications for certificates to carry more gas out of Texas.[29]

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[23] Tr., p. 3324.

[24] Tr., p. 3327.

[25] Tr., pp. 3371–3372.

[26] Tr., p. 3680.

[27] Tr., p. 3414.

On cross-examination, Culberson insisted that he knew cows, not gas; that "I am a cowpuncher and don't know much about it"; and that if the people of Texas "had put me on meat packing, maybe I would know a little bit more about it."[30] At the time of his testimony, he had been associated with the Railroad Commission for about fourteen years, including several years as director of the Gas Utilities Division and five years as an elected member of the Commission. Perhaps these statements were more revealing than he intended them to be. It is not difficult to understand why a public administrator who wants to be known as a cowboy, in a state not far removed from the frontier, should believe that the society he regulates could live better with less regulation.

In their testimony the state officials indicated an awareness of perplexities not acknowledged in the single-minded and unequivocal statement of the oil and gas industry which was made the official policy of the State. The common answer which emerges, nevertheless, is support of what some witnesses called the "free-trade" policy—a policy which means leaving the solution to whatever forces can organize and control the economy.

IV. NATURAL GAS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The only producing state to appear before the Natural Gas Investigation to urge that the Federal Power Commission consider in certificate cases the needs of the producing states was Louisiana. The policy of this State was established by its legislature, partially in response to the *Twentieth Annual Report* of the Federal Power Commission (for the year 1940). This report had expressed concern over the increasing rate of withdrawals from the fields of the Southwest, questioned the economic wisdom of unrestricted withdrawals of gas for transportation over great distances as a substitute for coal, and expressed apprehension as to the ultimate effect of such withdrawals on potentially recoverable petroleum reserves. The seriousness with which Louisiana took these comments resulted in the legislature's passing, in 1942, a concurrent resolution which on the one hand approved the Federal Power Commission's policy of inquiring into the consequences of the construction of additional pipe lines to coal-burning

[28] Tr., p. 3507.

[29] Tr., pp. 3497, 3503.

[30] Tr., pp. 3518–3526.

areas and, on the other hand, directed the State's Department of Conservation and Public Service Commission to support the State's policy in all certificate cases affecting Louisiana. It was pursuant to this resolution that the Louisiana presentation in the Natural Gas Investigation was made.

Many witnesses appeared to present the case for the Louisiana policy. Governor Jimmie Davis recounted the history of the destruction of Louisiana's resources, and especially her forests, by predatory private interests. Forests might be renewed by reforestation, he said, but "when our natural gas is gone it is gone forever," and with it the chance to bring industry to Louisiana. H. R. Bodemuller, industrial engineer for the State's Department of Commerce and Industry, analyzed the industrial potentialities of the State and the crucial role which gas, as the only readily available fuel, must play if they were to be realized. Among the others who testified in the same vein were the two Senators from Louisiana, Overton and Ellender, the former by telegram and the latter in person. But the chief burden of the State's argument was borne by Sam Jones, who had been Governor of Louisiana when the natural-gas policy was adopted.

Sam Jones' thesis was that natural gas was vital, as a fuel and as a raw material, to the development of a balanced economy in the South, and that the questions of who should get it and for what purposes should be decided in the light of that need. Early in his term as Governor, Jones had become convinced that "nearly all the South's problems sprang from the poverty that is a by-product of a raw materials and agricultural economy," and that these problems could be solved only by developing an economy balanced between agriculture and industry. This same problem was involved, Jones believed, in the Southern Governors Railroad Class Rate Case before the Interstate Commerce Commission, "a proceeding that affected the fundamental economics of three-fourths of the Nation in the South and West." An early exhaustion of Louisiana's natural-gas reserves would preclude the possibility of a balanced economy; and the time involved was not that required for depletion of the reserves, but the relatively short time needed to contract for their exportation.[31]

Moreover, the immediate problems which beset the State made urgent the need for progress on the long-run program of industrialization. War veterans were returning, war plants were shutting down, and the mechanization of the farms was working a revolution and creating widespread unemployment. The economic plight of the Louisiana farmer always had been bad: Jones cited figures to show that in 1929 the average southern farmer had an annual cash

[31] The Louisiana argument may have been hurt by the fact that much wastage of natural gas was occurring in Louisiana, as in other producing states, despite the State's clear jurisdiction over production and distribution of gas. Louisiana in effect was asking the federal government to curtail the flow of Louisiana gas to other states, while Louisiana itself failed to implement adequately its own conservation policy. But the problem posed here by Jones is a separate (though related) one; the quantities of gas saved from physical wastage still could be contracted for exportation without hindrance from the State. For analysis of the complex problems of conservation, see *Smith-Wimberly Report*, pp. 65–154; *Olds-Draper Report*, pp. 75–84.

income of $186 and the average southern tenant farmer or sharecropper one of $73, while the per capita income for all the people of the South in that year was $350. Now it seemed that these desperately poor people were to lose out on the farms. The rural Negroes would be especially hard-hit. Cotton farming absorbed 75 per cent of them, sugar-cane growing 20 per cent, and rice farming 3 per cent. In cotton farming, one man with machinery would soon do the work of 12 to 15 families. Mechanization in sugar-cane growing would change a ratio of one man to 10 acres to a ratio of one man to 100 acres. And combines in the rice industry would make it possible for two men to do work formerly performed by 25. Jones pointed out that the displaced persons would be untrained and illiterate, and that they would constitute a national problem in that they would migrate. In all, Jones believed the revolution in progress in the State's economy to be as momentous as the invention of the cotton gin, which fixed the slave economy on the South, and the reconstruction period after the Civil War. He estimated that the State would have to provide 5,000,000 new non-farm jobs by the middle of the next decade. With industrialization, it could move a great step forward; without industrialization its fate would be tragic. And to obtain this rapid industrialization, the conservation by the State of its uncommitted natural-gas reserves was an essential prerequisite.[32]

Jones recognized that Louisiana itself was helpless to prevent the draining away of its reserves to the industrial Northeast. He therefore wanted the Federal Power Commission to refuse to grant certificates to increase the rate of exportation of Louisiana gas for industrial uses to areas that were rich in other fuels. This power he believed the Commission already possessed under the certificate provision; but if this interpretation were not acceptable, then he wanted the Natural Gas Act amended to ensure it.[33] What Jones desired was not an arbitrary classification of states or regions, but a case-by-case approach by the Commission to the fuel needs of the sections to which it was proposed to pipe gas. Louisiana was "asking the United States government to decide how the natural gas resources of the country shall be distributed" by providing a tribunal to which interested parties could go and present their cases.[34] Jones was not worried about the increased exertion of national authority. Although an avowed states' rights Democrat, he declared: "I do not believe in destroying the economy of my state when the only agency which can save it is the Federal government."[35]

Jones did not wish to disturb existing contracts; neither would he restrict the use of gas anywhere for domestic purposes, or the free flow of gas to areas where there were no alternative industrial fuels. Moreover, he was opposed to federal regulation of end uses, believing it to be economically justifiable to burn natural gas under boilers where it was the only fuel available; and he was opposed to the formulation of a national fuel policy, arguing that the case for close controls over natural gas rested on its scarcity and exhaustibility, and on the present technological impossibility of importing it.[36]

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[32] Tr., pp. 2108–2129.
[33] Tr., p. 2278.
[34] Tr., pp. 2276, 2305, 2341.
[35] Tr., p. 2154.
[36] Tr., pp. 2319, 2328–2331.

Upon being questioned about the association of interest groups with the position espoused by Louisiana, Jones replied that the State's representatives were working in close contact with "the National Coal Association, with some of the railroads, with some of the labor groups, simply because our idea fits in with their idea." Jones stated at the time of the hearing that he was employed as a railroad attorney. He was not employed by the coal group, although he suspected "that some of the coal companies indirectly probably have brought about my employment." He asserted that he would have accepted employment by the labor groups if they had asked him, but that he had declined legitimate employment offered him by natural-gas companies because to accept it would not have been consistent with his attitude.[37]

Jones acknowledged that some interests in the South opposed the position adopted by Louisiana and advocated instead a so-called "free-trade" policy; but he pointed out that certain interests also had fought the southern governors' efforts to bring about a parity in freight rates and to conserve the pine and hardwood forests, as well as efforts of the federal government to conserve the soil and the oil reserves. "In brief," Jones said, "they are the people who live for their own selfish generation, and think not of the future and posterity. What they advocate, whether deliberate or unintentional, is not the right of free trade, it is the right to destroy."[38]

V. STATE CONTROL OF END USE IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The proposition which drew the least support from producer-state officials was that of end-use control. One public official who did endorse it was Redford Bond, Chairman of the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma; but he proposed that the producing state, rather than an agency of the national government, could and should be responsible for carrying it out.

Using his own state for illustrative purposes, Bond pointed out that the Corporation Commission had very broad statutory powers to prevent waste of natural gas, either in its production or in its utilization. He believed that they included the power to determine the character of a wasteful utilization. Bond approved a Supreme Court decision in 1911 which nullified an attempt of the State of Oklahoma, under the guise of a conservation measure, to keep its gas within its own borders.[39] But he did not believe that the decision meant that "the State may not control the production of gas within the State so as to prohibit its waste or the wasteful utilization thereof out of the State." The State did not have to stand idly by while its gas reserves were dissipated by wasteful out-of-state use which it could prohibit within the State. To the contrary, "so long as there is no discrimination between intra and interstate uses, users outside the State should have little complaint."[40]

Bond gave some hypothetical examples to show how state control of end uses would work. If the Oklahoma commission were informed that gas transported from Oklahoma to Pittsburgh was being consumed there in an uneconomic use, and upon investigation found the charge to be true, it could prohibit the production of gas for that use in Pennsylvania. Again, if a railroad workers' organization in Pennsylvania believed that gas from Oklahoma threatened to deprive them of their jobs, they could bring their case before the Oklahoma commission. If, after a hearing, the Oklahoma commission determined that the producer was violating Oklahoma laws, or the rules and regulations of the commission, it could shut down or limit his production. In each case, control over the producer would provide the leverage for control over the end use.

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[37] Tr., pp. 2283–2284.

[38] Tr., p. 2157.

[39] *West v. Kansas Natural Gas Company*, 221 U.S. 229.

[40] Tr., pp. 1068–1069, 1073–1074, 1078–1081.

Bond believed that the national government could reënforce the authority of the states by a law, similar to the Connally "Hot Oil" Act, which would make it illegal to transport gas in interstate commerce when such gas had been produced in violation of state law. He agreed that the Federal Power Commission might also supplement a producing state's efforts by refusing to grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a new pipe line (or for increasing the capacity of an old one) to be used for the transportation of natural gas for uses which the state had declared to be uneconomic and for which it had prohibited production. But in the case of a disagreement between the Federal Power Commission and the state, the Oklahoma commissioner believed that "every state ought to control its natural resources."[41]

VI. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

Because of differences of opinion on numerous policy questions among the commissioners, two reports were made to the Congress by the Federal Power Commission in 1948. One was subscribed to by Commissioners Leland Olds and Claude L. Draper, the other by Commissioners Nelson Lee Smith and Harrington Wimberly. Basil Manly had resigned in September, 1945, and Richard Sachse, who succeeded him, resigned in June, 1947.

The commissioners divided on certificate questions, as well as on others. Commissioners Olds and Draper subscribed, at least in part, to all three of the propositions, favoring increased regulation, considered above. They recommended that the Commission give "increased consideration to the conservation aspects in the delivery of natural gas" from gas-producing states to coal-producing regions. This consideration would include the interest of the producing states in reserving enough of their natural gas resources for their own industrial development, the needs of the "essentially consuming states" for adequate and dependable service, and the end uses to which gas from the southwestern states could be put.[42] Commissioners Smith and Wimberly confined themselves to counseling the producing states and the industry to cooperate in increased efforts to conserve natural gas, and the industry to develop alternative supplies of gas fuel to replace natural gas, as and when natural gas reserves decline.[43]

VII. THE TESTIMONY CONSIDERED

The four points of view expressed by the Texas officials represent common responses to the question of whether some regulatory power, such as the certificate provision, should be consciously employed in the furtherance of broad social goals. One response is that it enlarges national power and therefore is bad. Another is that the public interest, whatever it is, will best be served if business is good; it is all "a matter of selling." For those who hold either of these convictions, life is made simple because complexities are assumed away and bad results of their policy are attributed to other causes. But there are troubled persons. Perceiving the need for public action, they still encounter the problem of ways and means, which is especially acute when the perceiver is a state official and the means appears to be national action. One way out then is to make an affirmation of faith that natural processes, which have not hitherto worked to bring about the desired end, will in the long run surely do so. Another answer, though not a way out, is to be confused and admit it. An assumption underlying all of these viewpoints is that when the natural gas is gone, some substitute will appear.

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[41] Tr., pp. 1673–1683.

[42] *Olds-Draper Report,* pp. 12–13.

[43] *Smith-Wimberly Report,* p. 28.

It is obvious that there are no "right" answers to the questions discussed in this paper. It seems safe to say, however, that two of them—whether the "economic waste" of natural gas should be eliminated through selective control of uses, and whether the certificate power should be used to adjust the clashing economic interests of various groups—are national questions which must be answered by agencies of the national government. Commissioner Bond of Oklahoma was led by his fear of an increase in national authority to make a proposal against which his experience as a regulator surely should have warned him. Leaving aside entirely the question of whether a state legally may make such determinations as Bond suggested, we may well ask what would be the consequences of an effort by Oklahoma to control end uses in Pennsylvania.

First, it would make the Oklahoma commission, and every other regulatory body willing to undertake such considerations, a tribunal for the kind of protracted interest-group conflicts which by 1945 had become an almost intolerable drag upon contested certificate proceedings before the Federal Power Commission. For instance, a witness for the gas industry presented before the Natural Gas Investigation an analysis of five certificate cases in which coal, labor, and railroad interests had been allowed to intervene.[44] In each of these cases the facilities in question were for the purpose of increasing the volume of gas to markets already served by the applicants and were "required by normal system growth, accentuated by war industry demands." The five cases took up 111 hearing days, filled 16,193 transcript pages (of which 4,602 were chargeable to coal, labor, and railroad intervenors), and amassed 64 exhibits. By way of contrast, it was pointed out that the authorization of a new $70,000,000 pipe line project, which was not opposed by these interests, was completed in 12 days with a transcript record of only 1,700 pages. The former is the kind of administrative burden which Bond was inviting for his commission.

Worse still, the burden would be shouldered in vain, for the Oklahoma commission could not give relief. Clearly it could not prevent the importation into a coal-burning area of gas from other states. But neither, for that matter, could it stop the flow of Oklahoma gas. Interstate pipe-line systems are complex constructions. Gas ordinarily is purchased in several producing states and often from other interstate pipe-line systems; then the gas from all these sources is commingled. In fact, the requirement that gas sold to the consumer be of uniform composition and heat content makes it mandatory that natural gas be processed, and the blending of gas from numerous fields is frequently efficacious for technical reasons. It would obviously not be possible to segregate Oklahoma gas in such a system.

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[44] Testimony of Samuel H. Crosby, Tr., pp. 9473–9474.

Finally, the experiences of the states in other aspects of regulation should have made it clear that no state can regulate effectively what goes on a thousand miles from its borders. There is no reason to believe that regulation would be more successful if it were tried from the producing end than it has been when tried on the consuming end. Under our federal system the cooperation of states and national authorities is necessary to successful regulation. It is true that under state control the State of Oklahoma could embarrass the Federal Power Commission by prohibiting production for a project the Commission has certified. But Oklahoma could not prevent the issuance of the certificate, nor could it stop the furnishing of the gas by some other state. Therein would lie the defeat of its own efforts: it could not long prevent its gas from going where competing gas is allowed to go. In short, the only way that end-use control in interstate commerce can succeed is through national administration.

The question of what the national government should do about end-use control actually is indeterminate; the answer turns upon the extent of natural-gas reserves and the data is inconclusive. There are defects in present methods of making estimates, and there is no way to be sure either of the future rate of consumption or of the future rate of discovery.[45] Much testimony was presented at the Natural Gas Investigation concerning the extent of reserves; but even when figures were close together, there was disagreement as to whether they should be the basis for optimism or pessimism. One difficulty stems from the fact that while the rate of consumption has risen steadily, the rate of discoveries has risen faster, with each year showing a net addition to reserves.

Returning to the argument of Sam Jones that natural gas should be conserved to promote a balanced economy in the producer states, it will be recalled that Jones did not argue that the United States will run out of gas, or that the nation might not be able to find an adequate substitute. He did say that Louisiana can run out of gas and that the State has no satisfactory substitute fuel. This position seems unassailable; natural-gas-producing areas do become exhausted. The fine fields in the Appalachian area and in California already must augment their dwindling supply with Texas gas. Jones' point is plain: industries which move to Louisiana for gas may stay after it is gone, but industries which burn up Louisiana gas elsewhere will not then move to Louisiana.

Sam Jones and his Louisiana colleagues moved the natural-gas problem on to that larger stage which Mr. Justice Jackson seemed to have in mind in his dissenting opinion in the *Hope Natural Gas Co.* case.[46] In this case Jackson urged a fresh approach by the Commission to the regulation of an industry which in many ways is so dissimilar to the traditional utility. He would have had the

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[45] There is a good analysis of the problem in *Smith-Wimberly Report*, pp. 31–61.

[46] *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 608 (1944).

Commission use its power over rates deliberately to foster conservation and to encourage domestic use. But Jackson was restricted to the narrow issues of a rate case, and Jones in his testimony was not. Jones was thus able to say, with a sweep denied to Jackson, that the ramifications of the natural-gas problem involve the public interest in the very broadest sense.

Actually natural gas is not unique in the problems it raises, and one might have wished that Jones had gone further. If the national government is to consider how a fuel resource may be made to serve the public interest, why should it stop with natural gas? The estimated life of oil reserves is about half that of gas, and coal has been a sick industry for two decades. It would seem only a logical extension of the argument to urge a program for the intelligent utilization of all of our energy resources.[47] If natural gas is to be used as a tool to reconstruct the economy of the South, how can other comparable tools be rejected? And if the efforts of Louisiana, based on her natural gas, should fail, the needs of her people must be met in some other way; the nation's interest in the problem cannot be foreclosed. Once the terms of reference have been broadened to include the welfare of the people of a great section, it is difficult to restrict the discussion of ways and means.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The experiences of war and depression in this century may well indicate that the United States must look to its resources, human and material, with a view to maximizing their usefulness. Such a view could not abstract the interstate pipe-line from the integrated business of producing, transporting, and distributing natural gas; nor natural gas from the complex of energy sources which it complements and with which it competes; nor any or all of them from the lives of the people they serve. It would require a fresh look at the industries affected and a frank admission that a free people can plan for the future. If it should turn out, as some predict, that in a quarter-century or less our present fuels are obsolete and we are propelled into the future by the masterless atom, would we not be more secure for having learned to manage our resources with skill and foresight?

The decisive answers to such questions are for the Congress, not the Federal Power Commission. That a commission does and must make policy in carrying out the legislative mandate is a truism. But when the issues raised before it go beyond anything considered by the Congress in enacting the statute and when they involve decisions of far-reaching importance to the future of the nation, it is time for the Congress to restate its position. The Federal Power Commission performed its appropriate function in conducting the Natural Gas Investigation. It furnished a public platform for the contending groups, collected and analyzed the relevant data, and in its two reports made available to the Congress and the public the factual material necessary for a reconsideration of the problems of the industry. If in the political climate of the postwar years the Congress has declined the proferred invitation, the responsibility cannot fairly be placed at the door of the Commission.

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[47] Cf. Natural Resources Committee, *Energy Resources and National Policy* (Washington, 1939).

RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

RECENT POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES*

CLAUDE E. HAWLEY
National Security Resources Board
AND
LEWIS A. DEXTER
Democratic National Committee

This report is based upon a survey of research in progress in political science departments of American universities in the spring of 1950. Undertaken jointly by the Committee on Research of the American Political Science Association and the Division of Higher Education of the United States Office of Education, the survey was essentially an analysis of questionnaires sent to the chairmen of 112 departments of political science believed to be in a position that would enable them particularly to emphasize research. Seventy-five of the 112 chairmen replied to the questionnaire, fourteen merely to state that no research was being conducted in their departments.[1] Although several leading institutions did not reply, it is a fair guess that at least seventy-five per cent of the research being conducted by or in departments of political science was reported and subsequently analyzed.

No similar survey has, to our knowledge, been recently undertaken. For this reason, since it is frequently found that the greatest usefulness of replies to a first questionnaire is that those who sent it out learn how to formulate a better one next time, it probably will not surprise students of questionnaires to learn that in many respects the Committee did not get the type of answer for which it had hoped.

It must also be stressed that this report is not an analysis of all, or even of most, research in political science in the United States today. It is an analysis of replies by the chairmen of sixty-one graduate departments of political science as to the research being conducted in their departments. Obviously, much research in the field is thus omitted. Political science research is being carried on by federal, state, and local governments, by bureaus of municipal research, by some small colleges, occasionally by private individuals, by organizations such as the Brookings Institution, and by organizations associated with the Public Administration Clearing House. This, of course, is the reason that a number of projects reported in the annual surveys of research in public administration[2] and international relations[3] were not reported in response to the questionnaires.

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* We are grateful to Dr. I. Light, formerly Research Assistant in the Division of Higher Education, Office of Education, for aid in statistical analysis.

[1] The questionnaire was in the form of a letter asking each chairman for the following information about all staff members of his department and all Ph.D. candidates:

(a) Name of investigator
(b) Topic (including title and brief description)
(c) Method (kinds of sources? interviews? polling? size and distribution of sample?)
(d) Cooperating discipline, if any (field of collaborators? location of collaborators? project a fully joint undertaking or are others serving as consultants or partial collaborators?)
(e) Probable date of availability for use by others (including only projects to be available by the end of 1953)

The reports submitted by the department chairmen, with an accompanying card index, are available at the Washington office of the American Political Science Association.

What is probably one of the most serious omissions arose from the fact that a good deal of political science research is undertaken by persons who are not professional political scientists, but are sociologists, psychologists, lawyers, economists, and philosophers. A comprehensive picture of research in "les sciences politiques"[4] could be based only upon a cross tabulation of research in the social and moral sciences. Proposals are now being considered for such a census.[5]

Another, perhaps equally serious omission resulted from the volume of government-conducted or sponsored research, much of which is actually being carried on by political scientists in government employ, and some of which is restricted. Obviously a substantial number of items would be added in the field of international relations if research initiated, sponsored, financed, or directed by government were to be listed in quantity.

Certain results of interest and possible value were suggested by analysis of the survey as it stands, however, and the greater part of this note is a statement of these results. To state them required more decision-making than might have been expected; perhaps the point which the writers had most thoroughly impressed upon them was the difficulty of categorizing political science research according to "fields." This difficulty might have proved insuperable except for one circumstance: By good luck, one of the writers was exposed to the following ideas about classification, advanced by Dr. Charles Tompkins:

> The classifier must know enough about the subject matter of a document to predict the nature of future references to it and to try to include information relevant to these references in the classifying system.
>
> *Classification systems are probably best used to reject obviously unsuitable documents rather than to retain suitable ones. The twilight zone of documents whose suitability is not de-*

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[2] See *Current Research Projects in Public Administration* (Chicago, 1951), the ninth in a series.

[3] See "Current Research in International Affairs," *International Conciliation,* Vol. 466, pp. 589–678 (Dec., 1950), the fourth in a series.

[4] For a discussion of "les sciences politiques," see Raymond Aron, "Political Science in France," *Contemporary Political Science,* UNESCO Publication No. 426 (Paris, 1950), pp. 50 ff.

[5] Under contract with the Office of Naval Research and under the administration of the American Council of Learned Societies, questionnaires are now being circulated for a national register of social scientists and humanists. Since some of the questions in this register will refer to research work in progress, the register could serve as the basis for such a census.

terminable from the classification scheme must be retained rather than rejected. **If this is fully realized, the classification system may be made more efficient.**[6]

The writers have employed Tompkins' rule throughout. This means that many studies, possibly relevant to quite different purposes, are classified in several categories. Obviously, however, several "common sense" considerations prevent the literal application of the rule as just stated. The difficulty in getting a consistent pattern of organization by different analysts arises largely from the fact that classification of this type is based upon expectations about how material will be used. Almost inevitably different people envisage different possible uses of material, and consequently they develop different categories for classification. Yet it must be admitted, that part of our difficulty arises from the lack of an adequate terminology for classifying political science hypotheses and data.

The following table gives a brief overview of the results of our analysis of the reports and may also illustrate the terminological problem just mentioned:

TABLE I. RESEARCH AREAS INTO WHICH POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH SUBJECTS MAY BE CLASSIFIED[7]

Total number of research projects		797
International relations	308	
Administration	306	
Political parties, public opinion, and pressure groups; the legislative and representative process	204	
Public law and related fields	83	
Political theory (history of political doctrines)	65	
Comparative politics and government	34	
Social science methodology and epistemology	15	
Works formally designed to contribute to a systematic treatment of a theory of politics	12	
Problems of teaching of political science	3	
Collection of resource data for political science	2	

I. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Charles E. Merriam's recent discussion of trends in political science research[8] has been of great benefit to us in organizing this report. In this discussion, Merriam points out that international relations have been an increasingly important subject of inquiry for political scientists "alike in the traditional historical and legal fields, and the more novel modern approaches." Although we have no previous studies on the basis of which to construct trend lines, the data which we have suggests that this assertion is correct. About three-eighths of all the projects reported to us—308 from 797—can be classified as falling within the field of international relations.[9]

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[6] Dr. Tompkins is Principal Investigator, Logistics Research Project, George Washington University. The quotation is from a memorandum prepared in May, 1951. The italics are ours.

[7] It should be stressed that, because we use Tompkins' rule here and in the following tables, the sum of the subclasses often is greater than the total number of topics. Since this rule provides that documents whose suitability is not determinable from the classification scale must be retained rather than rejected, many items, which might be used for more than one purpose, are included in more than one subclass.

[8] "Political Science in the United States," in *Contemporary Political Science*, pp. 233–248, especially pp. 247–248.

The tables below will indicate the areas in which political scientists who undertake research in international relations are concentrating. Although the reports submitted to us often were not specific enough to justify positive assertions, our findings tend to support Gabriel A. Almond's analysis of political science research in international relations:

> Judging by published articles in the general political science journals since the end of the war, we conclude that the political scientist has primarily played the role of providing the historical and descriptive background on foreign governments and politics, foreign and international legal institutions, and foreign ideologies. . . . Not only was the subject matter still limited to the traditional conceptions of political science, but the methods were primarily historical and descriptive. Fifty-two per cent of the articles [analyzed by Almond] were straightforward historical, descriptive, or expository treatments of government, law, politics, and political ideas. Most of the remainder contained analysis in a quite subordinate relationship to historical and descriptive treatment. Much of the primarily analytical material was legal analysis, or analysis of the characteristics and consequences of particular types of governmental institutions. The systematic analysis of policy alternatives, or the analysis of basic social, psychological, and economic factors as they apply to policy problems, was definitely a very minor theme among political scientists.[10]

Like Almond, we find very few projected studies dealing with the political aspect of military security problems, and slight emphasis upon economic and socio-cultural factors affecting the process of international relations.[11] Nor do we find many studies designed to contribute to an "awareness of the essential value conflicts underlying foreign policy controversies."[12] Unlike Almond, however, we find a substantial number of projects which focus on analysis of the relationship between the domestic politics of the United States and problems of foreign policy, although apparently few studies will attempt to relate a general theory of politics to the day-to-day conduct of international affairs or to the day-to-day activities of the United Nations.

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[9] We have included all topics which it is reasonable to suppose may contribute to the development of generalizations about international relations or to the verification of information about international law, international organization, or foreign countries. We have excluded, however, topics which are affected by, but do not appear seriously to affect, international relations. The reason for this exclusion is not hard to see. In the world of 1952, studies of management may and do, for instance, deal with such problems as "current executive development programs in the U. S. Army and Air Force." Probably, however, this study has no more bearing upon international relations than has any other study of management and personnel. On the other hand, an analysis of "The Strategy of Air Power" may contribute directly to the analysis of international events.

[10] *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), pp. 154–156.

[11] A number of area studies, of course, pay some attention to these factors, but apparently few, if any, are focused upon the way in which they affect political processes *concretely*.

[12] Almond, p. 154.

It may be worth noting that a rather high proportion of the studies would seem to be prepared by persons who have some personal connection with the particular area which they are analyzing. One may raise the question as to the desirability of this condition from a pedagogical and scientific standpoint. In terms of the discipline, there is perhaps some danger that most of the studies of particular nations or ethnic groups should be undertaken by those whose involvement with the object of their studies is so great that they do not in fact prepare fully objective reports. For the graduate student himself, if we believe that he should broaden his horizon through studies in a foreign country probably a thesis about his native land is not the most profitable of subjects. He might well learn more if he attempted to develop the perspective which sometimes comes from suspending one's personal identification and involvements in order to concentrate attention on some quite novel or general topic.[13]

TABLE II. STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Total[14]		308
Area studies	198	
Studies of the United Nations and other supranational or international organizations	51	
Studies of political factors in the formation or execution of United States foreign policy. (Among these are 12 on Congress and foreign affairs, 7 on the general nature of the foreign policy of the United States, and 6 on economic foreign policies.)	29	
Studies on the general theory of international relations	25	
Studies on international law, excluding the United Nations	21	
Studies of relationships between the United States and other nations	15	
Studies on theorists of international relations	9	
Studies on grand strategy	8	

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[13] This is a special case of a more general problem which our questionnaire was not constructed to study but which, in our reflections on the data, became of considerable importance. What plan or plans can or should we make so that the preparation of the Ph.D. dissertation might have deeper scientific and civic value to the candidate?

It is, for instance, generally agreed by political scientists, as reported in footnote 25 below, that "political theory" is or ought to be the core of our discipline. Yet the number of studies in the field is small and the number of Ph.D. dissertations proportionally even smaller. Would it be feasible to permit, encourage, or even require candidates to prepare, as part of their graduate training, a paper on some problem of theory which would be substantially more serious than the typical term paper, and accordingly would diminish the labor required in the major dissertation itself? This idea may be utterly impractical, but pedagogic inventions of this sort, if not this particular one, appear to be needed. See the Report of the Committee on the Advancement of Teaching of the American Political Science Association, *Goals for Political Science* (New York, 1951), *passim.*

[14] See above, n. 7.

TABLE III. SUMMARY OF REPORTED AREA STUDIES[15]

Total			198
USSR and its spheres of influence[16]		40	
Western Europe political area studies		33	
France	11		
Scandinavia, Switzerland, Low Countries	8		
Italy and Italian colonies	5		
French colonies	3		
Spain	3		
General	3		
Latin-American political area studies[17]		31	
British Commonwealth political area studies		23	
Canada	8		
India and Burma	7		
Australia and New Zealand	4		
Caribbean	3		
West Africa	1		
General	1		
German political area studies[18]		20	
British political area studies[19]		18	
China and the Far East (excluding Japan)		15	
Japan and Japanese colonies (including 1 on Korea and 4 pre-1945 studies)		15	
Eastern Europe and the Middle East		11	

II. ADMINISTRATION

Three hundred and six of 797 projects may be regarded as being concerned with some aspect of public administration. The simple fact is, however, that, so far as our analysis goes, this has turned out to be a catchall category. We have included here most studies in state and local government, many of them being recorded as "The Government and Administration of. . . . " We have included descriptive records of what particular branches of government do (health departments, public welfare boards, etc.). We had to use very subtle clues indeed in an attempt to distinguish between studies which may relate to some general theory of administration or management and studies which are predominantly concerned with description of particular concrete cases. Here, more even than elsewhere, we were baffled by our awareness that vocabulary spreads faster than hypothesis or theory; the fact that the title of a study uses the vocabulary of a particular theorist is no guarantee that the study is in fact oriented towards the theory of that scholar.

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[15] Area studies might include, of course, studies of language, culture, literature, ethics, epistemology, etc. Such studies are not customarily prepared under nor reported by the political science departments, however. Again see above, n. 7, for an explanation of the total.

[16] Studies about China, not directly related to Sino-Russian relations, are not included here. However, studies of Rumania's relationships with the Nazis are included under this heading in the belief that most persons studying Rumania would do so because of its current status as a "satellite." *It should be noted that no studies whatsoever are reported of Yugoslavia.* Studies of the activities of the Cominform are also included here. Of the studies dealing with the USSR, 9 are predominantly historical, dealing with events before 1944; 9 deal with internal problems of Russian economy, government, and law; 7 deal with Russian military and diplomatic theory and practice; and all the others deal with USSR relationships with other nations—i.e., the focus of emphasis is heavily upon the USSR in its role as a threat to international peace.

[17] Excluding studies of Puerto Rico, including studies of the Inter-American security system. Fifteen of these studies deal with a particular nation, 12 with groups of nations, and 4 with relations between the United States and Latin America.

[18] Six of these studies deal with the Weimar period, 6 with the Nazi period, and 6 with the occupation period, while 2 cover longer periods.

[19] Of the British political area studies, 9 deal especially with effects of the Labor Government since 1945; 9 deal with administration; 8 with politics and Parliament; and 2 with civil liberties.

Many institutions, for one reason or another, specialize in a certain type of study. Most studies of state government are undertaken by agencies of state universities, organized for service purposes. Possibly because bureaus of municipal research are often independent of university connection, our reports showed relatively few studies of municipal government.

By and large, if we consider the great majority of these studies—those reported to us may very well be an inadequate sample, of course—the composite picture which emerges is one of no picture emerging. There the studies are. Few would have any special interest in consulting them except those interested in the same or very similar problems, and they would not help writers of synthetic studies[20] because they do not define conditions, state variables, and so on. Many of them are doubtless thoroughly worthwhile because they aid particular administrators to resolve particular problems. Many others might be called *ersatz* service studies—that is, they appear to be designed to help an administrator but are not in fact likely to help any *particular* administrator. This, it must be admitted, is a statement which the writers are not prepared to fight to the death to defend. It may be that every single one of these studies does have some practical use. Certainly, however, many of them have no theoretic value visible to us. We believe that it should be possible to organize some of the practically-oriented studies in theoretic terms without sacrificing their immediate utility.

In Professor Merriam's analysis of trends in American political science, he reports a "very great attention to the technological and practical application of political assumption and principles (not always explicit) in such fields as public administration, personnel, management. . . . "[21] We would be inclined from our data to modify this statement and to say that the *explicit* analysis of political assumptions and principles in these fields is so uncommon that it is often difficult to determine whether studies in progress are purely descriptive or whether implicitly they do contribute to such analysis. Our analysis would not permit us to disagree with Marver H. Bernstein's indictment of traditional studies in public administration, which incidentally appears in the same volume as Merriam's essay:

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[20] For example, such authors of texts in public administration as Leonard D. White, John M. Pfiffner, or Herbert Simon.

[21] *Contemporary Political Science*, p. 247.

> The poverty of the traditional approach in public administration is evidenced not only by the content of the research and study characteristically pursued, but also by the areas of study which are neglected. In many respects the failure and inability to ask the most significant questions, which stem from such hallmarks of research and study as the political-administration dichotomy and the emphasis on dogmatic principles of administration, are the severest indictments of the academic tradition in public administration.[22]

Apparently none of the reported studies make special use of the conceptions and findings of such allied disciplines as anthropology,[23] sociology, sociology of knowledge, and intellectual history, although some of these have doubtless been influential through osmosis.

TABLE IV. STUDIES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Total[24]		282
General problems of public administration, either directly or through discussion of some administrator (4 such studies) or administrative theorist	35	
Personnel problems in the United States and abroad	28	
Fiscal, taxation, budgeting, and insurance problems	23	
Regulation and administration of transportation and power	21	
Education, welfare, social security, non-discrimination	18	
Government and labor or government and business	17	
Intergovernmental relations (excluding studies at the University of Minnesota Institute of Research in Inter-Governmental Relations)	16	
National and state departments of agriculture	14	
Health and housing administration	10	
Administrative procedure, administrative law, and civil liberties	9	
Colonial administration, United States and foreign	7	
State Department	4	
Efforts to apply quantitative methods to administrative problems (excluding problems of reporting and budgeting)	4	
Administration of non-state large-scale organizations	3	
Relationship of an American government agency to private organizations, *not* labor or business	1	
Post office	1	
Comparative administration	1	

Since the administration studies spread over a very wide range of topics, any attempt to classify them results in seeming incongruities. For example, in our category "fiscal," we have included both "The Work of the Council of Economic Advisers in Interpreting the Concept of the Nation's Economic Budget" and "Insurance of Public Property Units in New Mexico." Yet it is doubtful whether these two studies appeal to the same audience.

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[22] "Research in Public Administration in the United States," *Contemporary Political Science*, p. 433.

[23] Several studies by anthropologists specializing in colonial areas or Indian tribes illustrate the type of study which is *not* found here. One of the more systematic of these is Clyde Kluckhohn, "Covert Culture and Administrative Problems," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 45, pp. 213–227 (April–June, 1943).

[24] Because of the heterogeneity of studies in public administration, many of the 282 studies listed under the heading "public administration" were not included in the subclasses above. At the same time, the use of Tompkins' rule caused some overlapping among the subclasses.

Finally, it perhaps should be noted that the total of studies concerned with administration would be increased if we counted thereunder research about the organization of political parties, election laws, and judicial practice. However, because there is nothing "on the face of the returns" to suggest that these researches contribute, except incidentally, to any verified knowledge about administration or management, they were omitted from the administration category.

III. THE LEGISLATIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE PROCESSES: POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OPINION, ELECTIONS, AND PRESSURE GROUPS

The long-established categories of legislative and representative processes[25] do not seem adequate for the purpose of classifying the relevant reports submitted. Why this is so is not clear. It may be that in fact the conceptions used for discussing problems of representation are only of macroscopic value and cannot be applied microscopically. It may be, and this appears more likely to the writers, that the conception of representation is alien to the frame of reference in terms of which contemporary political scientists approach the study of politics. The "realistic" approach associated with Bentley, Wallas, Merriam, Laski, and others has been influential to the point that students of legislation or legislative bodies think almost automatically in terms of pressure politics, power, influence, or social recruitment. Whether this is the only way to tackle problems of representation is open to question. Certainly it is a valuable way; but it is possible for one good custom to corrupt the academic world by leading scholars to neglect other equally good customs.

Some readers of our analysis to this point may feel that we are deeply enamored of empirical research for its own sake. While in the field of public law we deplore the absence of empirical research, so far as our own preferences and values go, in the field of representation and the legislative process we deplore its omnipresence; in other words, we believe that in this particular area more consideration of the problems raised by Bagehot, Madison, Mill, Jordan, Calhoun, and the pluralists is desirable.

In the UNESCO survey of political science, Professor Thomas I. Cook, asserts that "Concern with techniques of power, of opinion formation, of administration, of legislative-executive relations and functioning of diplomacy, have unduly turned the student's attention from the purposes of statecraft, the needs of the ruled, and the resources and potentialities for their satisfaction."[26] Throughout our analysis of reported research, we find that this point of view can be supported. The warning is, however, particularly relevant to the present section.[27] Only two studies of this group are quite clearly focused upon problems of representation as Mill or Bagehot would have envisaged them. Four others may have a similar orientation. But it simply does not make sense to classify most current studies of election laws, voting statistics and pressure groups in such a framework because they are focused on a different set of problems. Unquestionably many of those who make them would feel that Madison and Mill are totally irrelevant to their researches.

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[25] See, for example, Roland Young's report on research in "Representative Government and the Legislative Process," in Ernest Griffith (ed.), *Research in Political Science* (Chapel Hill, 1948), pp. 32–52.

Studies of legislation for the most part neglect to consider the processes of deliberation and legislative decision which can be studied as such rather than as mere concomitants of pressures and influence. In fact, no studies were reported that are clearly devoted to the development of such a general theory of legislation or deliberation. Our findings as to the type of studies which are being carried on, suggests that studies in representation and legislation must be classed with studies of pressure groups and their influence on policy formation. A distinction might have been drawn, had the questionnaire been differently phrased, between studies which are essentially concerned with mechanics or the "tricks of the trade" and studies concerned with underlying socio-political processes.

We had also thought that we might be able to distinguish between studies concerned essentially with the theory or formation of opinion and studies of pressure groups. There are only six studies, however, which appear to be concerned with the theoretical aspects of opinion formation. To our surprise, political scientists seem to have left this subject to psychologists and sociologists. In and of itself, there is nothing in that fact to be criticized, yet many of the concrete phenomena of political science can be "understood" only in the light of an awareness of the genesis of opinions.

Here we confront one unfortunate result of the fact that nearly all studies reported are being carried on by individuals. Of the 797 projects reported, only 50 were being carried out by 2 or more individuals in collaboration; and in nearly all cases, the collaborator was another political scientist. Nonetheless, since public opinion is clearly an interstitial area, we might profit from a greater number of cooperative studies between political scientists, sociologists, and psychologists particularly.[28]

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[26] "The Methods of Political Science, Chiefly in the United States," *Contemporary Political Science*, pp. 75–90, quotation from p. 78.

[27] The point we are making here was indicated in an exaggerated form a quarter of a century ago by William Yandell Elliott in his *Pragmatic Revolt in Politics* (New York, 1928). Because Elliott appeared to reject, or was read as rejecting, the instrumentalist approach to politics, his warnings have for the most part gone unheeded.

[28] Here as elsewhere, some critics of our manuscript felt that we favored interdisciplinary cooperation unduly. We admit that a large proportion of allegedly cooperative studies have focused exclusively on problems of interest to social psychologists or students of small group dynamics, and have not therefore yielded results of value to the student of political processes. But that genuine collaboration has not been achieved does not prove that it cannot be achieved in the future.

TABLE V. STUDIES IN PRESSURE GROUPS, POLITICAL PARTIES, PUBLIC OPINION, REPRESENTATION AND LEGISLATION

Total[29]			204
Studies of legislation, legislators, or specific attempts at legislation		86	
Including the following:			
Lobbying, regulation and practice, before legislative bodies	30		
General theory of legislation	26		
Studies of the organization and membership of legislative bodies	24		
Studies of particular legislators[30]	3		
Studies of political parties and party organization (of these, 6 are studies of individual party leaders, 17 deal with foreign political parties, and 8 deal with the relationship of party organization to the legislative process)		43	
Studies which appear to use voting statistics		24	
Studies of United States election laws and administration		12	
Legislation in international bodies		8	
Theories of federalism		6	

IV. PUBLIC LAW AND JUDICIAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS

Eighty-three studies deal with legal and constitutional matters (excluding international law). Presumably research in such problems is also being conducted in law schools or by lawyers. Nevertheless, there is little to suggest that the profession has been seriously influenced by the five-year old declaration of the American Political Science Association's Panel on Research in Public Law to the effect that political scientists have a special contribution to make "in exploring relations between law and government, both historically and in present day operations,"[31] except, perhaps, for the limited number of studies reported to be concerned with civil rights and civil liberties.

Fifty-five of these 83 studies are primarily oriented towards problems of public law as such. Of these 55, no less than 13 deal with individual justices. The 28 studies not focused on public law as such are primarily service studies for those wishing to know about some particular aspect of law, such as "A Guidebook to the Justice of the Peace" in a particular state.

None of the 55 studies in public law seems to involve any actual field work (aside perhaps from interviewing living judges, their clerks, and friends). It is admittedly true that many high legal matters can be studied predominantly in the light of written evidence and legal conceptions. In fact, some say that what judges say and how they say it remains the essence of the judicial process. But if it be true that "the life of the law is experience," it might be desirable to have empirical studies of legal practice similar to those which have enriched our knowledge of political parties, propaganda, public opinion, and the like. Only one of the studies reported to us seems designed to find out what actually happens in judicial and legal practice. That one is "A Study of the Judicial Process in a Selected Jurisdiction." Aside from it, no analyses were reported, for example, of how judges actually are influenced or how lawyers plan their cases. As Judge Jerome Frank has pointed out, to get this sort of information, apparently we still must resort to the novelists rather than to lawyers or political scientists.[32]

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[29] Because of the heterogeneity of studies in pressure groups, political parties, public opinion, representation, and legislation, many of the 204 studies listed under the above heading were not included in the subclasses above; at the same time, however, the use of Tompkins' rule caused some overlapping among these subclasses.

[30] It may be noted that whereas there are 16 studies of United States Supreme Court Justices, there are only 3 of United States legislators. Yet it would be very difficult to argue that some Speakers, long-time Majority Leaders, and chairmen of important committees have not been as important as individuals as Supreme Court Justices. Certainly as types, they are at least as deserving of study.

[31] Carl B. Swisher, "Research in Public Law: Report of the Panel on Public Law," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 40, p. 557 (June, 1946).

Eleven of the 61 studies deal with problems of civil rights and civil liberties. Most of the judges studied dealt with important civil liberties issues.

V. POLITICAL THEORY

Political theory in the classic sense—doctrine about the state and politics involving justification as well as description—is regarded by many political scientists as the "hard core" of the discipline.[33] Yet even if we include under the heading of "political theory" all doubtful cases—for example, 12 efforts to help construct a general theory of politics cited below—we find that this attitude is not reflected in the research activities of the profession. Only 65 studies can be so classified.

Only 4 of the studies are concerned with political theory as it applies to non-state organizations—e.g., "The Conception of Managerial Responsibility." A single study is concerned with political theory outside Western European culture, although, because of the increasing perception of the wealth of cultural variations and the importance of area studies, political scientists often say we need more studies of Oriental and Hellenic societies.[34] Only one study of European political theory is concerned with theorists or problems of the pre-Reformation period. And there is only one study of what may be styled the practice of political theory, entitled "An Empirical Investigation of Political Value." That is to say, there are no other attempts to determine what are the ideologies by which men actually live.[35]

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[32] *Courts on Trial* (Princeton, 1949), p. 1. Judge Frank mentions Earl Stanley Gardner as one well worth study in this field. For a perhaps slightly less bizarre reference, one might cite James Gould Cozzens, *The Just and the Unjust* (New York, 1942). We are repeating here the plea made by Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal in their "Legal Education and Public Policy; Professional Training in the Public Interest," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 52, pp. 203–295 (1943), reprinted in Lasswell's *The Analysis of Political Behaviour* (London, 1948).

[33] "Political theory is not in practice the core of political science teaching but there is a widespread feeling among political scientists that it should be made the heart of the subject" (*Goals for Political Science*, p. 126).

[34] See, for example, Eric Voegelin, "Research in Political Theory," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 38, p. 751 (Aug., 1944).

[35] Gunnar Myrdal, in *The American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), and James Gould Cozzens, in *Guard of Honor* (New York, 1948), are concerned with discovering in the con-

Professor Merriam, in his survey of political science in the United States, indicates that there is now a "renewed interest and concern with problems of political philosophy in the broader sense";[36] but such a concern is not manifest in the actual initiation of projects. We are led to conclude that this interest and concern probably has expressed itself in teaching and discussion rather than in research.

TABLE VI. STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY

Total		65
Works dealing with a particular theorist	20	
Works dealing with a particular theoretical problem	13	
Approaches to a general theory of politics	12	
Works concerned with Marxism (not classified under the preceding headings)	10	
Works dealing with a particular theoretical tradition or school	6	
Miscellaneous	4	

VI. COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

"Comparative government . . . may lead to general laws of political science or to the understanding of common problems."[37] If we define comparative government in terms of the approach suggested by this sentence, only 7 studies of the 797 may be included within the category. If we include a number of extremely doubtful cases,[38] there are altogether 34 studies which might possibly be included under the heading.[39] At best, emphasis on the field is slight.

VII. POLITICAL SCIENCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

A "comparative political science" might be a very useful adjunct to the study of comparative politics because it would help us to discover where reported differences between governments are differences of phenomena and where

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temporary American scene what are the ideologies by which men are governed. Perhaps the most systematic effort to find out what an ideology really means is to be found in Gregory Bateson, *Naven* (New York, 1937). See also the analysis of American ideology in Robert S. and Helen N. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition* (New York, 1937), especially Chap. 12, pp. 413–415.

[36] *Contemporary Political Science*, p. 248.

[37] Cook in *Contemporary Political Science*, p. 81.

[38] Our dubious cases would include such items as "The Methodology of Max Weber" and "The Administration of Private Colleges in the Midwest" because there is a fair chance that they are undertaken in political science departments due to an interest in comparative politics.

[39] One of the great difficulties in classifying research in this area is a terminological one. Other people apparently use the term "comparative government" in a different sense. This may perhaps explain the difference between our report and the prediction made by Karl Loewenstein, in his "Report on the Research Panel on Comparative Government," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 38, p. 540 (June, 1944), that comparative government "is about to undergo a rejuvenation not hoped for by its most ardent devotees."

they are simply differences in what political scientists with differing preconceptions happen to notice. The UNESCO survey of contemporary political science describes a good deal that would sound strange and unfamiliar to American political scientists.

For example, of German "political science," the following is said: "General State Science . . . is derived from German legal science which, after having been a descriptive science for many years, has acquired and retained for quite a long time the character of a dogmatic discipline."[40] Very few of the studies reported by American political scientists "define a position with respect to the fundamental problems of state phenomena and . . . deal with the basic questions of the birth, justification, and purpose of the state";[41] although in the days of Burgess and Willoughby efforts of this type might have made sense to their students. Nowadays General State Science is conspicuous in the American scene only by its absence. "The pure doctrine of state and the law, first propounded by Hans Kelsen . . . in which the State . . . is simply the legal scheme of things considered as a unified whole"[42] is not so much opposed among American political scientists as ignored.

Spanish political science, with its metaphysical discussion of such topics as "the reality of the state," is also somewhat different from American political science. Such sentences as the following are not very frequent in contemporary American writing: "The State is a kind of precipitate, or normative expression of a series of events in social life, with a political sense, that is, with the sense of establishing supreme power with claims to legitimacy."[43] In addition, the present writers at least—and probably many other American political scientists—would find themselves both challenged and somewhat puzzled by the discussion of pre-satellite Polish political science by George S. Langrod.[44] The methodology of the praxeologist Kotarbinski or of Petracycki, who worked out a rather elaborate picture of political science as having a practical and teleological dual nature, would not sound familiar to us.

It is, of course, worth bearing in mind that quantitatively there are far more practicing political scientists in the United States than in most other countries. Where the total number of their colleagues is small, a few scholars may exert a much greater influence on what kind of work is done.

VIII. AND WHAT WASN'T THERE

The preceding sections suggested that perhaps the most interesting feature of this survey is what is *not* being done. Critics might say that more or fewer titles should have been listed under international relations or public administration, and it is possible that we erred in the classification of titles dealing with political theory. But the omissions are clear-cut.

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[40] Massimo Salvadori, Introduction to *Contemporary Political Science*, pp. 7–8.

[41] Ludwig Adamovich, "The Science of the State in Germany and Austria," *Contemporary Political Science*, p. 25.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[43] Luis Recasens Siches, "Political Science in Spain during the Last Thirty Years," *Contemporary Political Science*, p. 269.

[44] "Political Science in Poland," *Contemporary Political Science*, pp. 178–195.

It is painfully apparent that only 3 studies of the 797 reported deal primarily with problems of teaching and training, although almost everyone covered by this report is a professional teacher and spends a substantial proportion of his time in teaching.[45]

Only 2 studies focus on the collection of resource data. Yet clearly there is substantial need for the collection of all sorts of information. For example, one of the major difficulties in extending the study of comparative politics into the field of non-state associations is that the records of non-state associations often are not collected, indexed, and classified as well as those of the political government. In many jurisdictions, voting studies are difficult to undertake because voting records have not been properly classified or preserved.

From 3 to 15 studies might be classified as concerned with methodology and epistemology—the relationship of the social sciences to other sciences, the application of philosophy of science to political science, and so on. Here we would almost certainly find a marked contrast with research in sociology or physics.

As we have seen in passing, two articles in the UNESCO survey indicate trends and tendencies in American political science. Professor Cook's "The Methods of Political Science, Chiefly in the United States" describes trends of which he disapproves, or as to the merit of which he is dubious, while Professor Merriam's "Political Science in the United States" indicates tendencies of which he approves.[46]

Professor Cook describes a political science in which "innumerable observations are made, endless measurements taken . . . , " involving "the denial of proper relativism." It may be that such a political science would be a danger, but it does not exist. At the very maximum, less than 10 per cent of the studies reported made any extensive use of measurement or statistics; and with 3 or 4 exceptions, those studies involved the use of either election or fiscal records which in the nature of the case are stated quantitatively. It could very well be argued from our data that we do not as a class observe.[47] We rely upon observations which other people have recorded for other purposes. It would seem to be truer to say that "few observations are made" than that "innumerable observations are made." On the other hand, there can be little question that Professor Cook is correct in declaring that "the study of international politics has generally remained unduly descriptive," and that "similarly work in comparative government has been too largely descriptive of . . . structure."

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[45] There are two types of problems which might be dealt with here: (1) problems of the objectives of teaching political science (and indeed other disciplines), and (2) empirical problems in which political scientists make use of the findings of educational psychology and sociology. Of the former, it might be said that among eminent political scientists of former days, both Plato and Rousseau were concerned with such issues; and it could be argued that traditionally political philosophy and educational philosophy have been inseparable. An analysis of the type here implicitly recommended for political science teaching has already been made, by one of the authors, for the teaching of physics. See Lewis A. Dexter and Robert A. Thornton, "Analysis of the Transfer of Training," *American Journal of Physics*, Vol. 19, pp. 538–545 (1951).

[46] See above, nn. 8 and 26.

[47] An example of a political study using observation is P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1944). These authors are not professional political scientists.

In addition to those of Professor Merriam's observations about trends which we have discussed throughout this article, several others are worthy of comment. It is probably true that there is an increasingly "broad range of collection and clearance of political data," but political scientists, for good or ill, function almost entirely as consumers of this data rather than as collectors. In our survey, there was little quantitative manifestation of the conventional application of the scientific method, described by Mr. Merriam as "a growing effort to interpret data, to use them as a check on assumptions and hypotheses, in turn to develop new assumptions and hypotheses . . . examining implicit assumptions and making them more explicit." We also found few studies which utilize "psychological and socio-psychological methods, notably in the area of personnel and action patterns"—indeed, none in action patterns. Thirty-two of the 797 studies profess to involve some use of psychology, but in most instances this use is technical or peripheral. We have already pointed out that what Professor Cook describes as "interest in measurement . . . through the approach to precision in the observation of results at a variety of points . . . " may exist, but did not manifest itself in research planning and procedures reported to us.[48] Not more than 60 researchers profess any collaboration with economics in their research, and the use of economics, like that of psychology, is for the most part peripheral. We therefore found the trend "towards the development of more intimate relationships with economics in dealing with political-economic relationships" to be weak, at best. And in view of the fact that only 9 researches of 797 were described as making any use of anthropology, with not more than 3 or 4 giving signs of employing such conceptions as culture patterns, we must also question the strength of the trend towards "intimate relationships with anthropology in the field of culture patterns."

Since we concur with Professor Merriam in thinking that all of these things *should* be true, and since we thought that most of them *would* be manifest, we ended our analysis of what *is* being done with some disappointment.

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[48] Here probably psychologists, sociologists, and economists have done more than political scientists, even in connection with political problems.

THE QUANTIFICATION OF ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF REVOLUTION

FRED KORT

University of Connecticut

The decisive impact of classical Greek thought on medieval scholasticism and the Renaissance failed to prevent the general neglect of Aristotle's theory of revolution. The first noteworthy attempt to revive the theory must be attributed to an English political theorist of the seventeenth century, namely, to James Harrington. The subsequent prevalence of Aristotle's idea in American political thought, from the defense of an agrarian democracy by Jefferson to the crusade against trusts by Roosevelt and Wilson, can be explained in terms of Harrington's influence. Nevertheless, this conceptual persistence contributed little to the empirical verification of Aristotle's theory as a scientific hypothesis. Twenty-three centuries elapsed before the idea of the classical Greek philosopher was cast into a form which has opened new avenues for investigation. The hypotheses on income and political disturbances of the contemporary American mathematician Harold T. Davis, which are based on Vilfredo Pareto's theorem of income distribution, are virtually a restatement of Aristotle's theory of revolution. In its ultimate perspective, the Pareto-Davis theory constitutes a quantitative presentation of a relationship that was conceived in qualitative terms during the fourth century B.C.

I. ARISTOTLE'S STATEMENT OF THE THEORY OF REVOLUTION

The diversity of the causes of revolution under different forms of government, which Aristotle discussed in the fifth book of the *Politics*, did not preclude his conviction that all revolutions originate in a condition of inequality: "In all these cases [whether sedition is directed against the constitution, or only towards its modification] the cause of sedition always is to be found in inequality—though there is no inequality [and therefore no justification for sedition] when unequals are treated in proportion to the inequality existing between them. . . ."[1]

A notion of equality in terms of natural rights is an idea that belongs to a later period in political thought and cannot be attributed to Aristotle. His concept of inequality must be understood in terms of the relative political and economic status of individuals, in terms of what he called "equality proportionate to desert."[2] Accordingly, a condition of inequality is created by a situation in which (a) groups that occupy a privileged political status do not enjoy a corresponding economic status, or (b) groups that have decisive economic advantages are deprived of corresponding political privileges. The result of this incongruity is a dominant consciousness of inequality, for which a remedy is sought in revolution. A consistent pattern of thought thus can be ascribed to the statement that "there is no inequality . . . when unequals are treated in proportion to the inequality existing between them". According to Aristotle, inequality between different strata of society is not a cause of revolutions; only inequality in the sense of an incongruity of the respective political and economic status within social classes is a factor which promotes political disorders. In its essential features, Aristotle's theory may be reduced to the proposition that whenever political and economic power are separated, a revolution is likely to occur.

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[1] Ernest Barker, trans. *Politics* (Oxford, 1948), Bk. 5, Ch. 1, §11. The portions in brackets are comments of the translator. The term "sedition" in Barker's translation should be noted. Benjamin Jowett uses the term "revolution." Barker prefers "sedition" as a translation of the Greek word *stasis* in order to do justice to the comprehensive meaning of *stasis*, which is not confined to armed rebellion. In view of the fact that the term "revolution" acquires a definite denotation in the Pareto-Davis theory, Barker's concept of "sedition" is helpful for the purpose of this inquiry.

[2] *Ibid.*, §12.

An extensive illustration of Aristotle's general theory is found in his discussion of revolutions under democracies, oligarchies, aristocracies, kingships, and tyrannies. According to Aristotle, revolutionary changes in democracies are the result of political attacks upon the wealthy by the demagogues. The members of the propertied class unite under this challenge and overthrow the democratic institutions. Such a situation existed at Cos, where notables formed an alliance against the rising demagogues and abolished the democracy. Similarly, when the demagogues of Rhodes withheld funds which were due the trierarchs, the trierarchs combined and terminated the era of democratic government. In Heraclea democracy came to an end when the notables, exiled by the demagogues, returned and destroyed the democracy. A parallel situation existed at Megara. The demagogues expelled the notables in order to confiscate their property; however, the notables returned from their exile, defeated the people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. And the same fate befell the democracy at Cyme, which was overthrown by Thrasymachus.[3] It should be noted that in all of the foregoing instances political power was vested in a numerical majority, which supported the demagogues, whereas economic power resided with a few notables.

A similar separation of political and economic power is Aristotle's explanation of revolutionary changes in oligarchies. At Massilia, Istros, Heraclea, and in other city-states, he reported, the oligarchies were overthrown because only a few members of the economic elite held public office. The excluded members created disorders until they became office-holders. As a consequence, the oligarchy at Massilia was changed to a form of government that resembled a polity, at Istros it was transformed into a democracy, and at Heraclea it was extended to include six hundred members.[4] In the foregoing instances, political and economic power were separated, and revolutionary changes ensued. Aristotle also indicated that the existence of oligarchies could be undermined by the assumption of demagogic power by a member of the governing body. This was the case in Athens in the days of the Thirty and in the days of the Four Hundred, and it was also the case in Larisa.[5] The rising demagogues gained the support of the masses, and political power shifted from the privileged holders of public office to the popular majority; but the wealthy few—the former holders of political power—still retained economic power. The resulting separation of political and economic power led to a revolution. Other instances to which Aristotle referred show how competitive oligarchies were organized within the same city-state. Political and economic power were separated, and this condition promoted the ultimate destruction of the entire oligarchial system.

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[3] *Ibid.*, Bk. 5, Ch. 5, §§1–4.

[4] *Ibid.*, Bk. 5, Ch. 6, §§2–3.

As in oligarchies, Aristotle saw revolutionary changes in aristocracies as caused by the concentration of political power in the hands of a wealthy elite, while other economically powerful groups do not have a commensurate share in government. This was the case in Sparta, where the illegitimate sons of Spartan peers, called the Patheniae, formed a conspiracy to overthrow the existing government. Their intentions were detected, and they were sent into exile to Tarentum.[6] A different situation existed at Thurii, where the concentration of economic power in the hands of the few was challenged by the ascending political power of the people. The ruling aristocracy had acquired more land than it was allowed to have by law, but, as the result of a war, the people had acquired virtual rather than nominal political power; they protested against the concentration of economic power in an elite, and forced the notables to abandon their excessive property.[7]

A detailed examination of Aristotle's discussion of revolutions under kingships and tyrannies does not seem to be warranted here. His general statement to that effect should suffice: "The aims pursued by revolutionaries, like the origins of revolution, are the same in tyrannies and kingships as they are under regular constitutions."[8]

The preceding account of Aristotle's historical illustrations should be sufficient to justify the initial inference made here regarding the essence of his theory of revolution: that whenever political and economic power are separated, a revolution is likely to take place. To be sure, nowhere in the *Politics* is his theory of revolution stated in this particular form. Nevertheless, the specific illustrations with which Aristotle supplemented his theory, added to his concept of inequality, hardly permit an alternative interpretation. Supplementary support for its validity can be obtained if the corollary of Aristotle's theory of revolution is considered, namely, the concept of constitutional stability in a polity. That an equitable political balance may best be maintained in a polity where economic and political power are unified, was a conclusion which Aristotle reached in the course of his extensive comparative study of governments. (The theory that democracy—polity in Aristotle's sense—is most stable wherever there is a strong middle class, is a contemporary version of the relationship originally ascertained by Aristotle.) "Constitutional stability," the concomitant phenomenon of a unification of political and economic power, and "revolutionary trends," the result of a separation of political and economic power, thus appear as conceptual manifestations of a consistently integrated pattern of thought. They are the product of Aristotle's inquiry, but their ideational basis was prevalent in the Athenian commonwealth even before Aristotle's time. According to Plutarch, their inception may be ascribed to Solon:

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[5] *Ibid.*, §§6–7.

[6] *Ibid.*, Bk. 5, Ch. 7, §§1–2.

[7] *Ibid.*, §9.

[8] *Ibid.*, Bk. 5, Ch. 10, §14.

> Solon, however, himself says that it was reluctantly at first that he engaged in the state affairs, being afraid of the pride of one party and the greediness of the other; he was arbitrator and lawgiver; the rich consenting because he was wealthy, the poor because he was honest. There was a saying of his current before the election, that when things are *even* there never can be war, and this pleased both parties, the wealthy and the poor; the one conceiving him to mean, when all have their fair proportion; the others, when all are absolutely equal.[9]

II. THE PARETO-DAVIS THEORY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POLITICAL DISTURBANCES

The familiarity of Pareto and Davis with Aristotle's theory of revolution would not justify the assumption that the two contemporary thinkers relied on the ideas of their classical predecessor. As a unified product of a related endeavor, the Pareto-Davis theory of income distribution and political disturbances indicates a development of thought which has maintained its independence from its precedents. Inasmuch as Pareto limited his analysis to income distribution, he apparently did not exhibit particular interest in the political implications of Aristotle's theory. Davis certainly is concerned with the ramifications of income distribution for politics, and there is evidence that he formulated his hypotheses with full knowledge of Aristotle's theory, but without reliance on this classical precedent.

The essence of Pareto's theorem is contained in the hypothesis that, in all places and at all times, the distribution of income conforms to a definite pattern, and that this relationship may be stated in the following mathematical terms:

$$N = \frac{A}{x^{\alpha}}$$ [10]

N represents the number of people whose income is equal to or higher than income denoted by x; A is a constant, depending upon the size of the economy; α is a parameter. If the logarithms of the values of N and x are graphically represented in such manner that the logarithms of N are projected along the vertical axis of the graph and the logarithms of x along the horizontal axis, the resultant curve is a straight line with a slope of $-\alpha$. This curve represents the distribution of income.[11]

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[9] *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans*, trans. John Dryden and rev. Arthur Hugh Clough (Modern Library ed., New York, 1932), p. 104.

[10] Vilfredo Pareto, *Cours d'économie politique* (Lausanne, 1896–97), Vol. 2, p. 306.

[11] Representative samples were found by Pareto in the income distributions of the following countries and cities during the specified periods: England, 1843, 1880, and 1894; Prussia, 1852, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1890, and 1894; Saxony, 1880 and 1886; Florence, the

Pareto failed to explore the political implications of variances in income distribution; but these neglected implications became the focal point in the inquiry pursued by Davis. The examination below in terms of graphical representation reveals that Pareto's original relationship encompasses various degrees of income concentration. Inasmuch as the numerical value of α determines the slope of the curve which represents income distribution, a high numerical value of α indicates a wide dispersion of income, and a low numerical value of α denotes a high concentration of income. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 illustrate hypothetical situations of extreme values for α. In Fig. 1, where α approaches infinity, almost complete equality of income prevails. In Fig. 2, where α approaches 0, a very high concentration of income exists. In differentiating between various degrees of income distribution, Davis made a distinction between situations which may be identified with a *stable economy* and contrary situations, as shown by these two figures, which are characterized by a high concentration or wide dispersion of income. Fig. 3 represents graphically a *stable economy;* in this case, α is approximately 1.5. According to Davis, such stability in the economy of a society (*i.e.* a "normal" income distribution) is indicative of political stability; on the other hand, high concentrations or wide dispersions of income are correlated to political disturbances.



FIG. 1



FIG. 2



FIG. 3

To avoid the inverse relationship between values of α and the concentration of income, Davis introduced a new concept in his modification of Pareto's theory, namely, the *concentration ratio.*[12] Symbolized by ρ, the *concentration ratio* can be related to the parameter α by means of the following equation:

$$\rho = \frac{1}{2\alpha - 1}$$ [13]

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city and county of Perugia, Aconia, Arezzo, Parma and Pisa combined, and other Italian cities in combination (no dates specified); Augsburg, 1471, 1498, 1512, and 1526; Peru, at the end of the 18th century (*ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 312).

[12] Harold T. Davis, *Political Statistics* (Evanston, Ill., 1948), p. 185. Davis points out that this concept originally was proposed by C. Gini in "Intorno alle curve di concentrazione," *Metron*, Vol. 9, 1932, Nos. 3–4, pp. 3–76.

[13] *Political Statistics*, p. 185. Davis uses a different notation in this formula; the parame-

In accordance with this formula, the *concentration ratio* ρ varies from 0 to 1 as the parameter α varies from infinity to 1. With the aid of a simple process of substitution, it can be readily seen that a value of 0.5 for ρ corresponds to a value of 1.5 for α.[14] In other words, a *stable economy* is characterized by a *concentration ratio* ρ of 0.5 as well as by a parameter α of 1.5. Moreover, as α increases beyond 1.5, ρ falls below 0.5 and indicates a relatively dispersed distribution of income. On the other hand, as α decreases below 1.5, ρ rises beyond 0.5 and denotes a relatively high concentration of income.

The two main hypotheses that Davis formulated with the aid of the *concentration ratio* constitute a decisive amplification of Pareto's original theory: (1) whenever the *concentration ratio* exceeds a certain critical value above 0.5, *i.e.*, whenever a critically high concentration of income prevails in a society, a revolution is likely to occur; (2) whenever the *concentration ratio* is lower than a certain critical value below 0.5, *i.e.*, whenever income is dispersed beyond a certain critical minimum of concentration, a civil war is likely to take place.[15]

No claim is made by Davis that the relationships between income distribution and political disturbances have attained the status of scientific laws. They are presented in the form of hypotheses, with the definite understanding that their validity is contingent upon extensive empirical verification. To be sure, a noteworthy amount of empirical evidence has been obtained by Davis himself. He has interpreted the French Revolution of 1789, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Spanish Revolution of 1931 as situations which support the first hypothesis. All of these revolutions were preceded by an unduly high concentration of income and wealth, *i.e.*, the *concentration ratio* exceeded the critical value above 0.5. The Spanish Civil War of 1936–39 and the American Civil War serve as verifying instances for the second hypothesis. The latter event is of particular interest inasmuch as its detailed examination by Davis yields a *concentration ratio* of 0.20, a value that is definitely below the critical minimum of income concentration.[16]

III. ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF REVOLUTION RESTATED IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS

The correspondence of the Pareto-Davis theory of income distribution and political disturbances with Aristotle's theory of revolution is exhibited by two

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ter α is symbolized by ν. In order to maintain a consistent set of symbols, the formula has been modified here accordingly, and Professor Davis has approved the change for the purpose of this presentation.

[14]
$$\frac{1}{2\alpha-1} = \frac{1}{3-1} = 0.5 = \rho.$$
$$(\alpha = 1.5)$$

[15] *Political Statistics*, p. 195. The distinction which Davis makes between "revolution" and "civil war" obviously is the following: a revolution is a political disturbance that is created by an underprivileged majority; a civil war is a political disturbance that is initiated by a privileged minority.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 195–202.

fundamental parallels. First, Davis' concept of a *stable economy* is analogous to Aristotle's idea of a polity. A *stable economy* is characterized by a "normal" income distribution (a *concentration ratio* of 0.5), and no political disorders are anticipated. A polity finds its distinctive feature in the presence of a strong middle class, and constitutional stability is assured by a unification of political and economic power. Second, although Aristotle made no distinction between "revolution" and "civil war," it would be justifiable to identify his concept of "sedition" with both "revolution" and "civil war" as employed by Davis. On this basis, an agreement between the two theories under investigation can be established. The first hypothesis of Davis—*i.e.*, that whenever the concentration of income exceeds a certain critical point, a revolution is likely to occur—can be stated in Aristotelian terms as follows: Whenever a separation of political and economic power results from the fact that economic power is vested in the wealthy few, whereas *real* (not necessarily *nominal*) political power resides with the many, the holders of political power, in an attempt to eliminate the concentration of economic power in the elite, probably will advocate a revolution. The second hypothesis of Davis—*i.e.*, that whenever income is dispersed beyond a certain critical minimum of concentration, a civil war is likely to take place—would read in Aristotle's sense as follows: Whenever a separation of political and economic power exists because economic power has shifted to the many, whereas *real* (not necessarily *nominal*) political power is retained by the few, the few, in order to regain their economic power, will probably resort to a civil war.[17] In both cases, it is a separation of political and economic power which entails political disorders.

The validity of the Pareto-Davis theory is not a focal point of concern in this inquiry. It has been emphasized that Davis presented his observations in the form of hypotheses, that he obtained significant verifying instances in support of his hypotheses, but that he has not claimed the status of scientific laws for the relationships which he formulated. The relevance of his investigation which can be ascertained within the limits of the present inquiry manifests itself in two respects: (1) a qualitative relationship has been restated in quantitative terms; (2) the pertinence of a theory of the fourth century B.C. for contemporary problems has been established, and a new method for its investigation has been devised.

Aristotle, of course, conceived his theory of revolution in qualitative terms. He detected a cause of "sedition" in the separation of political and economic power, but he was not able to determine what degree of such separation would assume alarming proportions. The concept of the *concentration ratio* supplies numerical values for the critical points in the separation of political and economic power; *i.e.,* it specifies that if the separation of political and economic power has proceeded beyond certain values (above or below 0.5), political disturbances will ensue.[18] In this manner, the qualitative relationship which Aristotle formulated has been restated in quantitative terms.

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[17] The distinction between *real* and *nominal* political power can be illustrated by the following examples: (1) During the Russian Revolution of 1917, *nominal* political power was vested in the Provisional Government; *real* political power resided with the soviets. (2) During the Spanish Civil War, *nominal* political power could be identified with the Republican Government; *real* political power would have to be ascribed to the supporters of Franco. In any case, *real* political power is the decisive criterion; for it is the residue of *real* political power which enables groups to commence a revolution or a civil war.

The applicability of Aristotle's theory to contemporary situations appears to be beyond dispute if it is noted that Davis supported his hypotheses primarily by referring to events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is in this connection that the quantitative restatement of Aristotle's theory by Davis attains its full significance. To be sure, qualitative relationships can be empirically verified; Aristotle himself succeeded in obtaining verifying instances for his qualitatively conceived theory. The difficulty of dealing with qualitative relationships is to determine the pertinence of a particular situation to the general content of the hypothesis under investigation. For example, in order to appraise the adequacy of the American Civil War as a possible verifying instance for Aristotle's theory, it would be necessary to compare the degree of separation of political and economic power in that particular instance with the degree of separation envisaged by the theory. A comparison in qualitative terms would entail decisive handicaps. If, however, the degree of separation of political and economic power can be expressed in quantitative terms, the pertinence of the particular situation to the general content of the theory can be readily determined. The contribution of Davis, therefore, is a method of inquiry which immensely facilitates the ultimate verification (or possible refutation) of Aristotle's theory of revolution.

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[18] An index that would measure the distribution of political power in the same manner as the *concentration ratio* measures the distribution of economic power, would be an additional aid. Research in that direction would be an extremely difficult, but worthwhile, undertaking.

"DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION": REPLIES AND COMMENTS

The first two comments, recently received by the Editor, are brief critiques of Professor Dwight Waldo's article on "The Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," which appeared on pages 81–103 of the March, 1952, issue of the REVIEW. They are followed by a reply from Professor Waldo. (ED.)

I

Since Dwight Waldo has credited me with "contributions" to public administration, I suppose that I might be flattered rather than dismayed by his treatment of the fact-value issue in his recent article on "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration" in the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. Although under these circumstances silence is perhaps the more modest and the wiser policy, I cannot forbear from making a few comments on his paper. I am impelled to do this in part because the faults of Waldo's analysis are characteristic of the writings of those who call themselves "political theorists" and who are ever ready to raise the battle cry against positivism and empiricism. (*Vide* the last paragraph of Morgenthau's review of the book by Lasswell and Kaplan in the same issue of the REVIEW, pp. 230–234.)

Love me, love my logic. A scientist is not (and, in my system of personal values, should not be) flattered by being told that his conclusions are good, but do not follow from his premises. If Mr. Waldo's footnote 40, on page 97, is correct, then I should be condemned, not flattered. I will perhaps be pardoned for believing the assertion in the footnote to be incorrect, and for wishing that Mr. Waldo would indicate more specifically just where the gaps in logic occur, and what are the correct premises and lines of reasoning for reaching the conclusions that I reach. I hope that, if Mr. Waldo someday undertakes this task, he will apply the same standards of rigor in his reasoning that I tried to apply (perhaps not always successfully) in *Administrative Behavior.*

Study of logic and empirical science has impressed on me the extreme care that must be exercised, in the search for truth, to avoid logical booby traps. For this reason the kind of prose I encounter in writings on political theory, decorated with assertion, invective, and metaphor, sometimes strikes me as esthetically pleasing, but seldom as convincing. Since I am unable to discover definitions in Mr. Waldo's paper for his key terms, since he does not set forth his basic premises in any systematic fashion, and since his propositions appear to skip from philosophy to psychology to history and back, I have not succeeded in reconstructing the syllogisms by which I presume he reached his conclusions.

Fact and Value. Even more worrisome to me than that I cannot discover most of the premises on which Mr. Waldo bases his argument, is the fact that one of the crucial premises that I do find is false. No one who has studied seriously the writings of logical positivists, or my own discussion of fact and value in *Administrative Behavior*, could attribute to us the "proposition that there are 'value decisions' and 'factual decisions.'" The phrases "value judgment" and "factual judgment" are employed on page 5 of *Administrative Behavior* in a context indicating clearly to any careful reader that the term "judgment" refers to an element of decision, not to a decision as a whole; and if this passage is adjudged obscure, clarification is easily obtainable from the elaboration of the point in Chapter 3.

I will not attempt to rehash here the whole fact-value question. The chapter of *Administrative Behavior* just mentioned treats the problem at length and cites additional references for the intellectually curious. For the sake of those who have not examined the literature, but who have been confused by the caricatures of positivism encountered in contemporary political theory, I would like, however, to restate briefly the hard core of the issue. The explanation is intended to appeal to anyone who is familiar with the rudiments of English grammar and the nature of logical proof.

A *proof* is a finite series of sentences in a particular form. Some of the sentences of a proof are *assumptions,* asserted without proof. The remainder, including the conclusion, are derived from the assumptions by means of certain rules called *rules of logic.* There is little disagreement, except in certain sophisticated parts of mathematics that need not concern us here, as to what the rules should be, although it is sometimes a matter of considerable practical difficulty to ascertain whether they have been correctly applied in a particular proof.

A *decision* is a sentence in the imperative mode. It is a direction to the self or to some other person or persons. In order for a decision to appear as a conclusion in a valid logical proof, one of the following must be the case: (1) it is possible, by the rules of logic, to derive imperative sentences from assumptions that are all in the indicative mode, or (2) among the assumptions are one or more sentences in the imperative mode. Logical positivists reject the first alternative on the ground that no one has shown by what sleight of hand it can be accomplished. Hence they conclude that a decision can be logically validated only if at least some of the unproved assumptions from which it is derived are sentences in the imperative mode. These unproved imperatives they call *value premises.* Moreover, they argue that these value premises cannot be derived solely from empirical observations, since empirical observations establish sentences of the form that "such and such is the case"—i.e., declarative sentences.

Therefore, if Mr. Waldo fears that the proposition previously quoted, which he attributes to the positivists, creates a "roadblock in the way of democratic administration" (what rich prose, and how unsuitable for close reasoning!), he can regain his peace of mind. It is a verifiable empirical proposition that a positivist would rather be broken on the rack than admit that there are "value decisions" and "factual decisions."

Political Theory. Having criticized Mr. Waldo's rhetoric, let me indulge in a bit of my own. Philosophy is a serious study. The history of human error demonstrates repeatedly that philosophers will inevitably reach the conclusions they wish to reach unless they subject themselves to a merciless discipline of rigor—and the chances are good that they will fall into error even then. The danger is greatest in political philosophy, for here we are concerned with our very deepest values and prejudices.

Quite apart from whether Mr. Waldo's premises are right or wrong, I do not see how we can progress in political philosophy if we continue to think and write in the loose, literary, metaphorical style that he and most other political theorists adopt. The standard of unrigor that is tolerated in political theory would not receive a passing grade in the elementary course in logic, Aristotelian or symbolic.

If political philosophers wish to preserve democracy from what they regard as the termitic borings of positivism, I suggest that as the first step they acquire a sufficient technical skill in modern logical analysis to attack the positivists on their own ground. Most of the positivists and empiricists of my acquaintance will then be likely to receive them more as allies in the search for truth than as enemies.

HERBERT A. SIMON.

Carnegie Institute of Technology.

II

I wish to underscore strongly Professor Dwight Waldo's criticism, in his paper on "Development of Theory of Democratic Administration," of the approach of some of the social scientists to the problems of administration in the large-scale organization. He rightly points out that this approach, as exemplified by the late Elton Mayo and his disciples, results in a new paternalism, a Freudian paternalism rather than the Sunday School paternalism of fifty years ago, but paternalism nonetheless. He also rightly points out that one basic reason for this result is the horror of conflict which is central to so many of today's social scientists. A horror of conflict has always been the rationale of "enlightened despotism"; but it is, I think, a duty of political scientists, particularly in a free society, to emphasize that the suppression of conflict is no solution, and that the job of the statesman is either to resolve conflict or to make it socially constructive for the entire community.

I wish only that Professor Waldo had also brought out some of the other underlying concepts of the social scientists which explain why such a strong tendency towards a manipulative and purely paternalist despotism runs through their approach. There is the fact that so many of them start out from abnormal psychology, with its assumption that everybody else is "maladjusted." There is also the tacit assumption that beliefs and convictions—that is, ideas—do not exist, let alone matter, and that therefore differences and conflicts of beliefs and convictions are "personality problems" or "cultural traits." This assumption is one reason that so much of the social scientist's attention is focused on the outward "how" of behavior rather than on the "what" or "why."

But while in whole-hearted agreement with Professor Waldo's emphasis on the *political character of the basic problems of large-scale organization*, I feel that in his concrete approach he fails to meet the challenge which he himself raises.

In fact, I feel strongly that he sidesteps the real problems which the emergence of large-scale organization presents to the political scientist. He does this through his "loose construction" of the term "democracy." If by this term is meant "participation"—which is what Professor Waldo seems to me to mean in many instances—we are exactly where the social scientists are: we are talking of manner rather than of substance. Professor Waldo himself seems to say that much in his implied criticism of the Lilienthal approach of "manipulative grass-roots democracy." "Democracy" in this sense is in effect nothing else than what the popular newspapers mean when they call the King of Norway "democratic" because he rides his bicycle through the streets of Oslo. "Participation" then becomes the *tool* of efficient administration—a psychological gadget, if not, ultimately a tool to obscure the reality of power and of decision-making. If, however, "democracy" is used strictly, as denoting the actual exercise of responsibility and decision-making by the citizens, we have a real issue. For then we are face to face with the basic problem: who should be responsible in the large-scale organization and for what decisions?

The difficulty, as I see it, is that the large-scale enterprise (though I shall confine myself to discussing the big business enterprise, most observations apply to the big public agency as well) is not a "society" in the sense in which we use the term in political science. To apply terms, concepts, and ideas of the political scientists which derive from the national state to the large-scale organization of the business enterprise or the public agency, can only create confusion. For there is one absolutely basic difference. The business enterprise or the public agency does not exist for the sake of its "members," that is, its employees. These "members" are indeed subject to governance. But the organization as such cannot be defined, not even by the most ardent "democrat," as existing primarily for their sake. Using formal terms, I would say that the "members" are "subjects," but that they are not "citizens."

Waldo points out—quoting me as his authority—that we no longer consider the business enterprise as existing for the sake of the property-owners. It is this, I believe, that underlies the change in American business ethos over the last fifty years, and Professor Waldo rightly emphasizes it. We believe today, both inside and outside the business world, that the business enterprise, especially the large business enterprise, exists for the sake of the contribution which it makes to the welfare of society as a whole. Our economic-policy discussions are all about what this responsibility involves and how best it can be discharged. There is, in fact, no disagreement, except on the lunatic fringes on the Right and on the Left, that business enterprise is responsible for the optimum utilization of that part of society's always-limited productive resources which are under the control of the enterprise.

This means in effect that society, and especially free society, could not tolerate an order of the large enterprise that defines its authority in terms of the welfare of the members, let alone one which gives the members (employees) decision-making powers—any more than free society could tolerate a "democratic" army, if this would mean an army conceived as existing for the sake of the military. Society must insist that the large-scale organization put first its contribution to society's welfare, not the welfare of its members.

There is indeed an alternative, but it only proves my point. The large-scale business enterprise can be organized "democratically" if it enjoys a monopoly. For then it is, by definition, run in its own self-interest. It is no coincidence that the one student of administration whose thoughts are closest to Professor Waldo's, that pioneer of "scientific management," Henry Gantt (whom curiously enough Professor Waldo omits to mention), came out with the demand for complete cartelization of the American economy in order to establish "democracy in industry"—anticipating N.R.A., even in details, by more than a dozen years. Nor is it, I believe, coincidence that the "democracy in industry" solution, the solution of "co-determination" now being tried out in Europe today, is the brain child of the most convinced believers in the cartel, the German trade unions; and it is, indeed, all over Europe, interpreted as the nullification of the program of "decartelization" which this country, rightly or wrongly, imposed on Germany.

But as long as we believe that competition in the economy is essential to the welfare of our society, we must, as political scientists, face the political issues inherent in the emergence of large-scale enterprise. We cannot sidestep, by means of terminological looseness, problems which are much bigger and much more important than Professor Waldo seems to think.

The central problems lie, I believe, in three areas. The first of these problems involves the relationship between the big-business enterprise and society as a whole. It is a relationship which has very little to do with the *internal* organization of the enterprise; and, as Professor Waldo rightly points out, nationalization, i.e., the change in the legal locus of ownership, has proved not to be the solution—indeed, is not even relevant. Here belong questions such as: (a) Are market and trade union sufficient to limit the power of the enterprise—whether privately or publicly owned—and to ensure its responsibility? As any one with experience in both private and public large-scale organization will testify, market and union are more powerful as balances, and more restraining as controls, than anything the large public agency is subjected to, including even congressional control of the purse. (Incidentally it is certainly rather amazing that the trade union is not even mentioned in a paper entitled "Theory of Democratic Administration," as Professor Waldo's is.) But are market and union enough? (b) Is the direction in which we are travelling today the right direction ? We are moving fast towards a concept of the big-business enterprise as the focus of a series of status relations which are clearly public-law in their character but which are embodied in private contracts. (A historian of the law would be justified to speak of the "feudalization" of the large corporation.) This trend is shown in the rapid change of the legal construction of the stockholder from an "owner" to a "special claimant." It is evidenced even more clearly in the incredibly rapid growth of the concept of a "property right in the job" inherent in the *status* of employee but expressed contractually. (How fast this trend has been moving very few people realize. But an unpublished study made by Professor Joseph M. Juran of the Graduate Engineering School of New York University shows it to extend all over American industry.) Business seems to consider this new concept of the enterprise the right one; the definition of management as a "trusteeship" which has become so popular of late in business circles is nothing but a legally imprecise way of expressing it. But is it socially and politically desirable?

The second basic problem of the large-scale enterprise is that of the appropriate internal organization of management, the governing organ of the enterprise. (a) Professor Waldo talks of "decentralization." But both theory and practice have gone well beyond that point; the organization form which I have called "federalism" goes as far beyond "decentralization" as our federal union went beyond the Confederacy. (Incidentally, in this connection the work of James C. Worthy of Sears, Roebuck & Co., not even mentioned by Professor Waldo, should be emphasized.) "Federalism" in the big-business enterprise attempts to establish decision-making at the lowest possible level; to make the decision as much "situation-focussed" as possible; and to release human energy throughout the organization. (b) What are the areas within the management job that are "affected with the public interest"? In my *New Society*[1] I have included such concerns as that for equal opportunities for advancement and for the adequate development of tomorrow's management. But the analysis of the management function as a social and political function has barely been begun. (c) And what about the strong trend towards the professionalization of management? Is that the right way for us to go? I submit that this question and (*a*) and (*b*) are central to the problem of the political order in an industrial society. Yet, to me, they seem to have little to do with "democracy." "Federalism," for instance, is a principle of the economy and efficiency of group organization; its value concepts lie in the realm of the social rather than in that of the political. It would be valid whether administration be based on the monarchic, the aristocratic, or the democratic principle.

Finally, there is the big problem of the relationship of the employee to the decision-making process. Is there a meaningful area of actual decision-making for the employee? Or is there only the "participation" which is primarily a means of obtaining consent of the employee to decisions made by others, and which therefore is almost bound to degenerate into semantics and propaganda? Professor Waldo lightly dismisses my concept of the "self-governing plant community." He calls it "traditional." That I consider a compliment since I am convinced that we have to build on what we have. But he also sums up my concept in the words that "at most, employees may be permitted *only* a share in the operation of employee services"—which, apart from not being a correct statement of my concept at all, seems to me to miss the point. To hand over to the employees, as I suggest, the entire responsibility for all the matters which are primarily plant community matters, is going very much further than anything Professor Waldo seems to me to propose. And I can assure him, on the basis of considerable experience, that such an approach makes quite a noticeable difference both in the actual climate and in the actual structure of the organization. (I have enough experience by now with the actual workings of such an approach to make such a statement.) In other words, it would seem to me that Professor Waldo, in not focussing on actual decision-making, is likely to come out exactly where the social scientists, whom he rightly criticizes, come out: in a lot of talk about "democracy" but in very little actual self-government and responsibility.

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[1] *The New Society; The Anatomy of the Industrial Order* (New York, 1950).

Yet this particular result does not, to my mind, diminish the tremendous contribution that his article makes by emphasizing that the internal structure of the large organization is a field for political theory. In my opinion, it is the most fruitful field for the political theorist today.

PETER F. DRUCKER.

New York University.

III

Before writing my essay on democratic administration, I read or reread Mr. Drucker's several books dealing primarily with large-scale industrial organization. Although I often disagree with him both in diagnosis and prescription, I find Mr. Drucker one of the most stimulating and useful writers in the area of my special interests. I am pleased that he, in turn, found some merit in my essay. I offer the following brief comments on some of the points in his letter:

1. That I did not meet the challenge I raised is quite true. But my aim was to challenge, not to present responses of my own to the challenge. Similarly, I would deny that I "sidestepped" the real problems of large-scale organization. What the "real problems" are is, of course, subject to argument. But apart from that, I could not address myself to all of them in a short essay, and had no such intention.

2. Curiously, Mr. Drucker and I accuse each other of the same fault; to his contention that I misconstrued one of his central concepts I add mine that he misconstrued a part of my thinking. To me, he says, democracy means "participation," which readily "becomes the *tool* of efficient management—a psychological gadget." Now that is the manner in which, I tried gently to suggest, his "self-governing plant community" appears to me: as a psychological sop, another way of keeping employees ("subjects") happy and out of the hair of management. Perhaps I have misunderstood; I will reconsider.

I agree with Mr. Drucker that the problems of organization should be solved in the context of the larger society of which organizations are a part. That he has not credited me with agreement is one aspect of the misconstruction about which I am concerned. I am no disciple of Henry Gantt; and given the present level of our social skills, I think further "cartellization" dangerous. Incidentally, however, I should like to see if Mr. Drucker could sustain the thesis that "monopolies" have been, are, or can be more democratically organized than nonmonopolies.

The second aspect of Mr. Drucker's misconstruction concerns "participation." I did not argue that democracy means "participation," though those who have argued for "participation," as did Mary Parker Follett, certainly meant participation in decision-making. What democracy in administration may mean precisely I confess I don't know. What I said was—let's find out.

3. Mr. Drucker's conceptual framework seems to be somewhat ambivalent. While eager to assert the "political character of the basic problems of large-scale organization," he is, I think, reluctant to accept the necessary implications of this point of view—at least to admit into the "private" corporation adequate theoretical baggage of the modern democratic state. Most readers of this REVIEW will, I think, be startled at the assertion that federalism is not a political concept, but has to do rather with "the economy and efficiency of group organizations."

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Professor Simon charges me with profaning the sacred places of Logical Positivism, and I am afraid I have. I use this figure of speech because Professor Simon seems to me that rare individual in our secular age, a man of deep faith. His convictions are monolithic and massive. His toleration of heresy and sin is nil. The Road to Salvation is straight, narrow, one-way, and privately owned. We must humbly confess our sins, accept the Word, be washed pure in the Blood of Carnap and Ayer. Then, he says, we will no longer be "enemies."[1]

Even if we should be inclined to elect salvation by logical positivism, the matter is not so simple as it is represented by Professor Simon. According to my philosopher friends who regard themselves as empiricists, logical positivism has performed a useful function as an apparatus of criticism; but we have already reached a point from which it can be viewed in perspective, not as the end of philosophy, not as The Philosophy, not even as the Philosophy of Science, but merely as another chapter in the history of philosophy. Presently, three "generations" contest for leadership of a movement that is seriously divided.

May I state for the record, though I had hoped that I had made it clear, that I am not opposed to positivism and empiricism as whole bodies of thought or techniques of investigation or action. I am indebted to self-labelled positivists and empiricists for much information, clarification, and stimulation. It would be folly to refuse to scrutinize carefully everything they have to offer, to believe it if it seems true, to use it if it seems useful. I want, however, to reserve the right to find truth and usefulness wherever they may lie. And it seems unlikely to me that self-styled positivists and empiricists have a monopoly on either.

Unless Professor Simon wishes to rest his reputation solely on his proficiency in logic, his wish to be known by the strict logical derivation of his conclusions from his premises rather than by the truth or usefulness of his conclusions, makes little sense. That correct conclusions can be reached by means other than those formally alleged, I need not prove, for Professor Simon has recently stated as much in the pages of this REVIEW: "In this comment, I shall argue that Mr. Perry's first conclusion is incorrect, and that his second conclusion is correct—but not for the reasons he gives."[2] That the creative processes of the mind are still a mystery and at best are merely aided by training in logic, Professor Simon must know. That scientists often reach important conclusions which invalidate their premises, Professor Simon also must know. Indeed, the history of scientific progress can be written largely in these terms. Perhaps Professor Simon needs to examine whether the logical positivism of which he is enamored has become an obstacle in his pursuit of the science to which he is dedicated. To me, at least, logical positivism, empiricism, and science are far from being the nearly or wholly congruent things which they seem to be to Professor Simon.

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[1] I am suddenly self-conscious about my purple prose. My embarrassment is relieved somewhat, however, by Professor Simon's offer to break a positivist on the rack to witness his Truth. Or perhaps he really means it.

I do not deny that the findings, observations and conclusions of Professor Simon's *Administrative Behavior*[3] may be in accord with the logical apparatus there elaborately set forth—I don't know at this point. I do fail to see that the findings, observations, and conclusions have any *necessary* connection with the logical apparatus. The chapter on communication, for example, could be interpolated with no essential breach of logic or continuity into any one of several books written by persons of widely varying philosophy, all quite innocent of the intricacies of logical positivism. And long prior to publication of *Administrative Behavior*, philosophic idealists, whose very shadow would make Professor Simon feel unclean, had said many of the things there set forth.

Since a major issue has been made of precision, I hope that I may be pardoned the following petty finger-pointing. But at the "transitions" in *Administrative Behavior*—the hinges between the logical apparatus and the subject matter—it does seem to me that the author speaks out of the side of his mouth rather than in his usual careful manner. Consider the following sentence: "Democratic institutions find their principal justification as a procedure for the validation of value judgments" (p. 56). First, this is the first reference to, and the most careful definition of, "democratic institutions," though much of the book concerns the relation of policy and administration in a democracy. Second, it is an empirically verifiable proposition that the principal justification of democratic institutions is *not* as a procedure for the validation of value judgments, unless we charitably allow the author the interpretation that anyone making a case for democracy is (regardless of what he *thinks* he is doing) validating his value judgments or arguing that other people should be allowed to validate theirs. Third, if this latter interpretation is allowed, "democratic" loses any significance in the sentence because *all* political institutions exist to validate value judgments in this loose sense. What, precisely, the sentence is meant to assert, I am at a loss to know. Professor Simon seeks to avoid meeting political theorists on *their* own terms by placing himself behind a screen lettered "Quiet! Scientist at Work." But if he is really interested in the consistency and relevancy of his work, he obviously should spend more time studying traditional political theory and less time with his logic books.

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[2] Discussion of Charner Perry's "The Semantics of Political Science," Vol. 44, p. 407 (June, 1950).

[3] (New York, 1947).

In the sentence immediately preceding the one quoted, Professor Simon asserts that value judgments are validated "by human fiat." In the opinion of hundreds of millions of persons who are at least legally sane and millions of whom are well-educated, this is not true. If I state that "all anarchists should be shot," I haven't "validated" it, I have merely stated it. I think I understand the chain of reasoning by which, according to the "system," I am supposed to escape from this tautology. But following it to infinity I never, from my point of view, find an answer.[4]

The assertion that I did not define my key terms nor set forth my basic premises simply puzzles me, since Part I of my essay was devoted to these matters. I am unrepentant about skipping from "philosophy to psychology to history and back," as my administrative universe is pluralistic. But there probably is "unrigor" in my syllogisms; I didn't even know I had any.

To Professor Simon's charge that I misquoted him, substituting "value decision" and "factual decision" for "value judgment" and "factual decision," I plead guilty and offer public apology. Still worse, I may have misinterpreted him. Whether and, if so, how badly, I still don't know; to decide will take more time for study than I now have. I don't *think* that the distinction between "decision" and "judgment," however important to a logical positivist, is more than a quibble from the viewpoint of my own argument.[5] But I may be mistaken; I often am. I may change my mind; I sometimes do.

It is one of the ironies of the history of political theory that it has been created by men who would have been affronted at the idea that they were "theorizing." They have considered themselves to be hard-minded men seeking answers to problems, and each thought that he was probing reality at its very core. I hope Professor Simon will not be too deeply insulted (since I intend it as praise) if I say that I think he is a political theorist. I think that plainly he is already a significant one. I think that he may become a major one if he can resist the temptation to make a career of defense of his first book.

DWIGHT WALDO.

University of California (Berkeley).

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[4] If the point is that I do not have "authority" to validate this value judgment, then I am entitled to ask a central question of political theory: What makes authority legitimate? The positivist answer to this is in turn tautological.

[5] Perhaps my present conviction will be deepened by understanding the distinction. On the one hand, questions of value are airily or arbitrarily dismissed; the question of the "validity" of a value is meaningless. On the other hand, as I now understand it, *all* decisions flow in part from unproved value premises. I understand it, if at all, crudely and by theological analogy: fact and value are like body and soul, distinct in essence, subject to different laws, in life inextricably joined, separable only at the will of God. Facts are facts and can be dealt with as such—unless they happen to concern people and action. If they concern people and action, then facts become fused with values, "in fact" but not in logic. Thus it is possible at the same time to admit the pervasiveness of values but to refuse to deal with them as values. In reply to any question concerning them, the logical positivist points to an escalator that ascends and ascends but never arrives anywhere.

"GOALS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE: A DISCUSSION": REPLIES AND COMMENTS

The following comments have been received, some in letters to the Editor, in response to "Goals for Political Science: A Discussion," which appeared on pages 996–1024 of the December, 1951, issue of the REVIEW. Professor Dimock was the chairman of the Association's Committee on the Advancement of Political Science Teaching when it published the Report on *Goals for Political Science* that was the subject of the December symposium. (ED.)

I

I have read the symposium on the *Goals* report, in the December number of the REVIEW, with considerable interest. It is quite a stimulating experience and I hope that the diversity of viewpoint and earnestness of contention expressed there will have the effect that the editors as well as the Committee desire—that is, to encourage serious and sustained thinking on the part of the members of the profession.

It is especially interesting to observe how widespread, apparently, is the desire for certainty. Some of the correspondents are apparently not content with clearly delineated goals—they want a single, all-embracing goal. My personal reaction is one of mixed feelings about this particular manifestation. On the credit side, it shows a concern with methodology and content that is considerably more intense and more articulate than a few years ago—and that is decidedly to the good. On the debit side, it probably reflects the anxieties of our time and the quest for certainty and security—a quest which, as William A. Robson points out, is not without its potential dangers. I am increasingly, I think, a Jeffersonian, with a growing distrust of centralization and the regimentation of men's minds and behaviors.

The procedure that the Committee used to develop the Report illustrates this problem. At the outset of our deliberations, we could have determined, as some of your correspondents suggest we should have done, just what our position and our "values" were going to be. Instead, we concentrated upon the problem areas and decided to find out what our brethren were thinking and doing. We sought a profile (passport, no doubt) of the profession's collective thinking and behavior—and this from questionnaires, opinionaires, observations, and interviews. Then each member of the team wrote his chapter without instructions from the Committee. After all the drafts had been completed, the Committee spent a great deal of time going over each chapter in detail, discussing questions of interpretation, matters of recommendation, and quirks of style. We started with the initial agreement that this was to be a consensus Report, which meant that no one was to be allowed to ride his hobby. Taking our own injunction seriously, we proceeded to "tone down" positions taken by individual authors and to express "watered down" conclusions to which the entire group could subscribe. There has never been any doubt in my mind that the Report would have been more controversial, and hence more interesting, if we had allowed each author to express his individual point of view, without conference, instead of trying to reach a consensus. It was clearly understood that everyone had a right to record a dissent, but by the time we got through "talking it out," there were no dissents. We simply decided that, as representatives of the Association, we had an obligation to express consensuses and not our individual viewpoints and interests. Writing independently as individuals, we could champion our individual viewpoints to our heart's content; as members of a group representing the Association, we did not think that such conduct was in the interest of a greater accord. It would divide our membership instead of strengthening it.

You will agree, I am sure, that this is an important issue. The Executive Council has appointed a committee to study it (as part of a larger problem) and to recommend a future policy. Speaking for myself alone, I believe that the Association should continue to deal as a professional group with the most controversial and difficult substantive and procedural matters that arise to perplex us. At the same time, I urge two things when we consider such matters: first, that we try to get as many facts as possible and not merely vote our preferences and predilections; and second, that in any reports put out by committees of the Association, every effort be made to reach a true consensus. I am as aware as anyone else, I think, of the shortcomings of the consensus procedure. A person need not be an "authoritarian personality" to have a secret yearning for neat little bundles.

The important distinction, it seems to me, should be this: let the Association, through its committees, set forth the alternative policies and solutions, and then let individuals, under their own steam, tell the world at large which of the alternatives is the better one, or how two or more can be reconciled. Our committee never looked upon itself as a group that had any mandate to tell the profession definitively what political science is and to describe the one best method of furthering its interests. I, personally, would oppose the adoption of any such attitude and policy on the part of any committees of the Association that might be created in the future.

I am satisfied that if we keep these considerations in mind, we need not worry too much about a growing centralization in the work of the American Political Science Association.

MARSHALL E. DIMOCK.

II

Since three of the seven participants in the discussion of *Goals for Political Science* trained their critical guns directly on me as well as on the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching, will you permit me to point to what I know is one mistake and to what I think are two misconceptions?

1. The published Report of the Committee gives me credit (n. 10, pp. 35–36) for "Characteristics of the Good Democratic Citizen," *Social Education*, Vol.

14, pp. 310–13 (Nov., 1950). I did not write this article, and therefore can hardly be cited (as I was by Mr. Robson) as believing that "The Good Democratic Citizen" must accept "responsibility for the maintenance and improvement of a competitive economic system assisted and regulated when necessary by governmental action." In my teaching I have always stressed the ethical rather than economic underpinnings and content of democracy, and I doubt that I would ever make such a statement. Mr. Robson, of course, had no way of knowing that the Committee put my name to this article by mistake, and I for myself have no idea how it came about.

2. I am sorry that the participants, especially Mr. Hartz and Mr. Hallowell, failed to read my original article, "Political Science 1 and Political Indoctrination," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, vol. 42, pp. 542–49 (June, 1948), more carefully. I spoke in that article, as Mr. Hartz acknowledges in a footnote (p. 1003), of the very special problem of the *introductory* course; and I spoke, as I remember, in a light-hearted, apologetic, undogmatic manner. Certainly I did not expound a general philosophy of education in political science. I must, however, continue to believe, as a matter of practical pedagogy, that "we can well make a distinction between the introductory course and its upper-class offshoots, reserving to the latter that close and critical scrutiny of all institutions and principles which we will renounce at peril of losing our intellectual sovereignty." In any case, having conducted a symposium that the celebrated Mr. Buckley assaulted violently in *God and Man at Yale,* I see no need to protest further my devotion to the liberal tradition in education.

3. I think the word "indoctrination" lies at the bottom of most of our troubles. I apparently failed miserably in my attempt to give the nasty word a narrow definition, and I would hate to have the participants in this discussion subside in the belief that I favor indoctrination as they define it. *I do not.* What I do think is simply this: where the active inculcation of values cannot be avoided, the teacher of introductory political science should face this truth and speak out boldly for the values that most of us accept as democratic, liberal, and rational in the best sense of those words. That, I think, is made clear at pages 545–46 of my original article. I am certain that Mr. Hartz, for example, "indoctrinates" his graduate students with the idea that indoctrination—as the world defines it—is a very bad thing in the context of a liberal education. I should hope that he does.

CLINTON ROSSITER.

Cornell University.

III

While I was much impressed by Mr. Hartz's views on methods of teaching as distinguished from indoctrination, I must confess that it seemed to me that in his vigorous attempt to unhorse Mr. Rossiter, he succeeded in unseating himself. It is not within my province to defend Mr. Rossiter's views on "indoctrination"; if he chooses to redefine words, he must take on the task of justifying his semantic maneuvers. However, I do feel that Mr. Hartz so strenuously overstated the case against "manipulation" that he succeeded only in aligning himself with the educational anarchists who delight themselves endlessly with the openness of their minds.

To begin with, Mr. Rossiter, in the article referred to, was discussing a specific educational context: the large basic course in American Government. In teaching such a course, especially at a large state university, one encounters several situations which pose educational dilemmas. Many of the students, if not most of them, may be majoring in agriculture, home economics, veterinary medicine, or other similar vocational courses, and may never again sup at the table of politics. A large proportion of them, coming from rural high schools, may never have thought of the problems of government before. And the thrifty, not to say parsimonious or miserly, administration seldom will have allowed enough money to hire an adequate teaching staff. Consequently, the teacher is likely to face a class much too large for decent discussion, composed as it is of students with largely inadequate backgrounds. Mr. Rossiter was not discussing, as I read his paper, the basic course at Harvard, Haverford, or Hamilton.

What can a teacher do in such a situation? Inevitably there will be in a class one or two students who wish to raise metaphysical queries or question the laws of logic. But to what extent is such an argument, although perhaps highly enjoyable to the instructor, fair to the other members of the class who are inadequately prepared for the discussion? I would suggest that the teacher, without hazarding any final judgment on the substance of these problems, is justified in asserting as operational ground rules that reality *is* objective, that the laws of logic *do* apply.

To take another situation, a student who wishes to force his views on another by physical violence should be restrained, although perhaps Thrasymachus' view that justice is the will of the stronger has not been finally refuted, and may even have been endorsed at the trial of General Yamashita. While a teacher should freely concede that these and related questions have not been settled, he must act as if they have been if he is to accomplish anything in a particular situation. In fact, the refusal to establish such ground rules can lead to educational nihilism—as it did for the open-minded professor of Biblical Literature who, receiving from a fundamentalist student a paper describing in great detail the architecture and interior decoration of Noah's Ark, could only comment "How ingenious!"

The argument then between Professors Rossiter and Hartz comes down, I submit, to one of degree. The question might be put in this fashion: To what extent and under what circumstances is a professor justified in acting as though a matter has been "closed"? I would suggest that we can not avoid "manipulation" of some sort—the very nature of the teaching process requires that we establish a frame of reference for discussion—but that we must attempt to explore and make explicit what would otherwise be our "inarticulate major premises," so that the students may understand that the doors which have been closed have not been closed by God or by History. The second problem, growing from the first, concerns what doors to close and by what criteria. Here I think the situation of the teacher must be taken into account. As I read Mr. Hartz's comment, I detect a certain note of educational absolutism, a feeling that the only good teaching method is the life-giving dialectic. To say this is one thing (and it is an assumption with a good deal of merit); but to put it into practice in all types of classes is obviously impossible. I suspect that Mr. Rossiter too is in full accord with this ideal, but he was not addressing himself to the noumenal in the paper under discussion.

Where can the line be drawn between teaching and manipulation? I frankly do not know, but I feel that there is as much danger in the extreme of educational anarchism based on the absolute that there are no absolutes, as there is in the extreme of manipulation based on confident insight into the laws of History or of the Universe. Somewhere in between these two poles the teacher must find his way guided mainly by his dedication to truth and his humility in expounding the truth as he sees it. If for expediency's sake he closes some doors to his students, a burden is laid upon him to explain to them that the doors have not been bolted, only latched.

JOHN P. ROCHE.

Haverford College.

IV

In view of some of the comments provoked by the committee report *Goals for Political Science* which appeared in the December, 1951, issue of the REVIEW as "Goals for Political Science: A Discussion," it would seem that some small voice should speak out in behalf of training for citizenship. As one who has entered the presumably tainted field of citizenship education with, let us hope, an open mind, I feel justified in offering a few words of defense.

The most useful approach might be to suggest to the skeptics that training for the responsibilities of citizenship is not necessarily a form of political indoctrination; that it should, indeed, be taught by "the liberal teacher"; and that the education of an effective citizenry lies well within the range of intellectual honesty and academic respectability. I shall not attempt to describe the efforts of my own institution in this general area since that has been done elsewhere,[1] and I am not sure that the limited experience of one college is very convincing in one way or the other. Nor shall I attempt in a few brief paragraphs to offer a full defense of citizenship education. However, it may be possible to indicate several rather obvious points that are not always noted by those who are apprehensive of the dangers involved in educating college students in the responsibilities of citizenship.

First, we ought to realize that many political scientists, who are not motivated toward indoctrination, feel that the training of citizens is one of their most important objectives. The evidence which the Committee on the Advancement of Teaching brought forth on this point is overwhelming. Without benefit of a formal survey of the field, we recall that Syracuse University has a graduate school of "citizenship and public affairs," and that universities as diverse as Ohio Wesleyan, Minnesota, and Toledo, to mention but three, are presenting courses which offer the undergraduate a first-hand acquaintance with the political processes of our American democracy. We might note in addition the efforts being made in various ways by a number of smaller colleges —such as Smith, Amherst, and Tufts—to give their students an insight into the realities of American politics. There evidently is no thought in any of these cases that the offerings are a form of indoctrination. And before writing off the whole field of citizenship education, we should certainly want to study in more detail the broad program being carried on at Kansas State College in the Institute of Citizenship.[2]

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[1] John C. Donovan, "The Citizenship Laboratory at Bates College," *School and Society*, Vol. 75, pp. 42–44 (Jan. 19, 1952).

In view of the extensive activity just described, I question seriously Professor Hartz's tendency to identify training for citizenship with indoctrination. If Professor Hartz feels that he has a case against Professor Rossiter on these grounds, that is one thing; but it would be highly unreasonable to use one instance as the basis for wholesale condemnation of citizenship education as it is being formulated in many American colleges and universities at the present time. It is probably true that an indoctrinator (as distinct from Professor Hartz's "liberal teacher") can operate with equal ease and equanimity in Citizenship Education, in Political Theory, in Principles of Government, or, for all I know, in Basic Geology. It therefore may well be that the only real guarantee against indoctrination is the integrity and intellectual breadth of the individual teacher.

Consequently, I find it difficult to accept the attitude that Professor Fesler apparently is expressing when he writes: "My fear is that 'citizenship education,' *as widely understood*, covers our sins as well as our virtues." If this is a criticism of citizenship education, it would seem in fairness to be also a criticism of political science, since Professor Fesler has referred to *our* sins.

The second fact which we should recognize is simply that American colleges and universities graduate each year large numbers of young men and women who are already citizens. In terms of the issue we are discussing, the most pertinent questions arise in connection with the kind of citizens they are likely to be and with the bearing that their undergraduate training may have upon the quality of their citizenship. Professor Hartz's position, as I understand it, would be that if we fulfill our obligation to train the intelligent man, the problem of citizenship will take care of itself. One wonders if we are justified in accepting this point of view uncritically. For example, if we were to follow the excellent advice offered by Professor Hallowell and hence turn to Aristotle for guidance on this question, we would discover, as Professor Hallowell suggests, the unsettling notion that the good man and the good citizen are not necessarily identical. Furthermore, we would find in Aristotle the pertinent reminder that the kind of citizen we are seeking depends to a very large degree on the kind of society the citizen is going to be living in.

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[2] See Robert A. Walker, "Citizenship Education and the Colleges," in this REVIEW, Vol. 42, pp. 74–85 (Feb., 1948), for the general approach taken by those responsible for formulating the program at the Institute of Citizenship of Kansas State College.

It seems desirable, therefore, to stress a third point: namely, that we are educating young men and women who are citizens of a national community which is constitutional in form and democratic in content and purpose. The American citizen today is a member of a society in which ultimate power rests with the generality of people, and in which offices of public responsibility are open to those who can capture them in periodic electoral contests between competing political parties. Is it too much to suggest that our colleges and universities have a distinct responsibility to offer their students at least an introduction to the methods they may use as responsible citizens in making their influence felt for the common good in this particular kind of political environment?

I am perfectly aware of the standard objection to the effect that, in carrying out this responsibility, we may produce mere political activists without genuine understanding of the values, ideas, and historical growth of their own basic institutions—that we may stimulate a superficial zeal for activity which might unwittingly damage or destroy the very values we cherish most deeply. (Of course, it is easily forgotten that there are grounds for fearing the wholesale production of political *inactivists*, but that is an issue to be dealt with another time.) I am willing to acknowledge that someone may have the ingenuity to design a course that would produce mere political activists. If an entire curriculum were channeled in that direction, it might well be cause for serious alarm. Actually, however, this whole disagreement with respect to citizenship education tends to become somewhat absurd. It is not likely that anyone will contend that a course in "practical politics" constitutes citizenship education. I personally doubt that there are many among us who believe that training for citizenship is the only object of political science. But I also doubt that many of us would be prepared to deny that American higher education has an obligation to prepare students for their civic duties.

To be worthy of our best efforts, citizenship education would involve, it seems to me, at least these three objectives: first, broad understanding of the cultural traditions of western civilization; second, development of the student's ability in valuation; and third, analysis of the political processes of our American democracy with attention to the methods that the intelligent man can use to make his influence felt for the public good. If the issue is framed in this manner, then we would probably want to acknowledge that achievement is not simply a problem for the political scientist. It would appear to be a problem for the entire faculty and a problem related to the whole curriculum.

I submit that the liberal teacher in political science must join with liberal teachers in other departments in contributing towards the fulfillment of the first of these objectives. It also seems clear that the political scientist plays a vital role, along with other teachers, in developing the student's capacity for valuation. With respect to the third objective, can it be doubted that specialists in the field of politics have a special responsibility to help the undergraduate understand the means by which he may participate constructively as an intelligent citizen advancing the basic purposes of liberal society?

Professor Hartz is justifiably concerned with current threats to academic freedom. One wonders, however, whether it is possible to defeat McCarthyism and similar threats except through the processes of "practical politics." It is only proper that we should have a deep concern for the future of the free university. If it is still free at the close of this century, the liberal teacher may discover that those who labored in the field of citizenship education deserve some of the credit.

JOHN C. DONOVAN.

Bates College.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SERVICE VOTING

The REVIEW is republishing below the findings and recommendations included in the Report recently prepared by the Special Committee on Service Voting of the American Political Science Association and presented to the President of the United States, who submitted it to Congress. The Committee was composed of the following members: Paul T. David, chairman, Robert Cutler, Samuel J. Eldersveld, Bertram M. Gross, Alexander Heard, Edward H. Litchfield, *ex officio*, Kathryn H. Stone, and William B. Prendergast, secretary.

In a letter of April 7, 1952, to Luther Gulick, President of the Association, President Truman expressed his appreciation for the work of the Committee and of the Association in the following words:

> I wish to thank you, and the members of the Special Committee on Service Voting of the American Political Science Association, for the outstanding report on "Voting in the Armed Forces" which you sent me with your recent letter. This report more than fulfills my request to the American Political Science Association for an analysis of the progress made on soldier voting, and recommendations for steps to be taken to see that a maximum number of servicemen vote this year.
>
> As you can see from the attached Message to Congress of March 28, 1952, many of my recommendations are based on this fine, impartial report.
>
> The report is particularly valuable for its analysis of the State voting laws and its recommendations for the steps which are necessary to improve them. It is also very helpful to have an analysis of our wartime experience with Federal legislation on servicemen's voting, and the suggestions of your Committee with regard to Federal legislation in the future.
>
> For some time, I have been increasingly impressed by the genuine public service performed by the American Political Science Association. The reports of the Association's Committees on Political Parties and Reapportionment—to mention only two—have been helpful in clarifying a number of issues of vital importance to our form of government. People need an organization like this to study government and politics in a scientific way, without a lot of drumbeating and headline-hunting. I hope your Association will continue to make studies like this, which contribute to the improvement of this great Republic of ours.

The full Report has been published as *Voting in the Armed Forces*, House Document No. 407, 82nd Congress, 2nd session. The portion reprinted here is from the first of the five chapters. Bills along the lines of the Committee's proposals had been introduced in each of the two Houses and were under active consideration when this issue of the REVIEW went to press. (ED.)

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This committee was constituted by the American Political Science Association to make a special study of voting in the Armed Forces. In requesting the study, President Truman made the following statement in his letter of October 23, 1951, to the Association:

> During World War II, an effort was made through State action and congressional action to facilitate voting by men and women in the armed services, but it was never

really as successful as it should have been. Today, as we face this problem again, it is important to survey the progress that has been made in State legislation, and to be sure that we have a completely effective program for voting in the armed services.

In accordance with this assignment, we have reviewed the history of the pertinent Federal and State laws. We have analyzed the experience in voting under those laws, particularly in 1944. We have canvassed the various obstacles and difficulties that seem likely to hamper service voting in 1952. . . . Here we state our major findings and agreed recommendations, and also include a brief statement on the areas of disagreement in the committee.

FINDINGS

1. In 1942, the legislative efforts to facilitate voting in the Armed Forces came too late. The Servicemen's Voting Act of September 16, 1942, had almost no effect upon the number of servicemen who were able to vote in the general election of that year.

2. In 1944, after a winter of intense controversy, Congress passed the amendments that came into effect without the President's approval on April 1, 1944. The amended law was mainly in the form of recommendations for State action. It also included limited provision for a Federal ballot. Certain mandatory provisions of 1942 were left unchanged and are still in effect.

3. The number of persons of voting age in the Armed Forces in 1944 was about 9,225,000. Of that number, 4,487,540 were reported as applying for ballots for the general election of that year and 2,691,160 sent in ballots that were counted. In that election about 60 per cent of the civilians of voting age voted; nearly 50 per cent of the servicemen of voting age were reported as applying for ballots and about 30 per cent succeeded in voting. The service vote was 5.6 per cent of the total popular vote for President, 48,025,684. No factual information is available that would make possible any comparison between the extent of voting among servicemen overseas and that among servicemen in continental United States.

4. The extent and importance of service voting varied widely from State to State in 1944. . . . In several States the record was much better than the national average, while in several others it was much worse.[1] A part of this variation may have reflected combat and transport conditions that affected the military contingents of some States more than others. Most of the variation was probably due to differences in the constitutional, legal, administrative, and political situations in the respective States.

5. The States with the poorest records of service voting in 1944 were Alabama, South Carolina, Delaware, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana. The service vote was not more than 3 per cent of the total vote cast for President in any of these seven States. Next in order and also with poor records were

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[1] Here, as elsewhere in this report, voting records are pronounced good or bad on the basis of the extent of participation in voting by those in military service. A State is said to have a good record if a relatively high percentage of service votes are cast and a bad record if the percentage is low.

Kentucky, Illinois, Nebraska, Kansas, South Dakota, Montana, Iowa, Oklahoma, Vermont, New Mexico, Maine, Indiana, North Dakota, Missouri, and Arizona. In all of these 15 States the service vote was less than 5 per cent of the total. In four States, on the other hand, the service vote was 8 per cent or more of the total vote: Georgia, Virginia, New Jersey, and Wyoming.

6. The Federal ballot of 1944 accounted for an unimportant fraction of the total vote. The threat of an effective Federal ballot was, however, a means of stimulating action by the States. Fewer than 85,000 votes were cast by means of the Federal ballot actually available. It was available only to the overseas servicemen of 20 States, and to each of them only if he had applied for a State absentee ballot by September 1 and had failed to receive it by October 1. The Federal ballot could be used only if the governor of a State certified that it would be accepted under the laws of the State. Most of the governors who so certified were in States with relatively good laws. Among the seven States where service voting was most difficult, only Texas accepted the Federal ballot.

7. In 1946, Congress enacted amendments to provide permanent service-voting legislation. The amendments came into effect with the approval of the President on April 19, 1946. The permanent statute differed from that of 1944 in two major respects: (1) All provision for a Federal ballot was eliminated; (2) the recommendations for State action were applicable in time of peace as well as war. However, the war clause was left unchanged in the basic declarations of rights that had been continued from 1942.

8. The act of 1946 was a comprehensive and carefully drafted attempt to deal with the problem of service voting on the basis of the experience of 1944. It contained 17 recommendations to the State governments; and it directed the necessary cooperating action by the appropriate Federal officials. It continued the standardized post-card-ballot application, to be prepared and distributed at Federal expense, and provided for the free transportation of ballot mail.

9. The 17 recommendations of 1946 called for immediate legislative action by the States, acceptance of the post-card-ballot application, waiver of registration requirements, ballot availability at least 45 days before the election, and action to facilitate voting by veterans who were discharged from the armed services too late to register. Recommendations were included as to the weight of the ballot, printing of the envelopes for easy identification of ballot mail, and the necessary forms and procedures. States were asked to express their voting instructions in simple terms, and "not by use of words of the statute alone."

10. No nation-wide statistical record appears to be available as to the extent or importance of service voting in 1946, 1948, or 1950. The Department of Defense has collected no statistics as to the number of ballot applications or the number of ballots transmitted by persons in the Armed Forces. The Bureau of the Census has collected no recent statistics of service voting, having stopped collecting election statistics as an economy measure after its appropriations were reduced.

11. The Department of Defense and its predecessor agencies have regularly

compiled information that indicates the extent of State compliance with certain of the recommendations passed in 1946, but no systematic survey has been made of the extent to which the States have complied with all of the 17 recommendations. No Federal agency has been directed to bring these recommendations to the attention of the appropriate legislative and executive officials of the various States, or to report to Congress on their action.

12. The situation has become worse rather than better since 1944 so far as State legislation is concerned. Many States enacted merely temporary laws in 1944; these laws have since expired. Several States have enacted new permanent laws on service voting, but the congressional recommendations for permanent legislation have been overlooked or disregarded in more than half of the States.

13. Known deficiencies in the existing State laws of 24 States that will affect service voting in the general election this year, unless corrected, include the following:

(*a*) No provision for absentee voting: New Mexico and South Carolina.

(*b*) No provision for voting by servicemen who are members of the Regular Military Establishment: Texas.

(*c*) Registration in person required even of servicemen: Alabama, Delaware, Florida (if over 21 when entered Armed Forces), Louisiana, South Carolina, and Utah.

(*d*) Special form of ballot application required; standardized post-card-ballot application accepted, if at all, only as an application for an application: Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Montana, and Utah.

(*e*) Ballot will not be sent out until 21 days or less before the last date on which it will be received for counting: Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.

(*f*) Ballot will not be sent out until 30 days or less before the last date on which it will be received for counting, although possibly available as much as 21 days: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,[2] Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas,[3] Utah, and Vermont.

The total number of States appearing in the above lists is 24, of which 8 are listed twice and 1 (Utah) three times.

In addition, there are five States for which the date of ballot availability is unknown and may be inadequate: Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wyoming.

14. Congress recommended that States make their absentee ballots available not less than 45 days before the election. This recommendation was based on experience. Under present conditions at least as much time is required for the

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[2] The committee has been advised by the legal adviser to the Governor of Michigan that legislation is currently pending to advance the primary date and shorten other procedures in order to make ballots available at an earlier date.

[3] In some circumstances ballots may be sent out earlier, depending on the date set for filing candidacy for local offices.

round trip by the ballot as in 1944. An allowance of 21 days is not enough for overseas areas; an allowance of 30 days is not enough for servicemen who are at sea, or who are located at the more remote stations, or who have had a change of military address to which their mail must be forwarded, or whose mail is subject to any unusual delay.

15. Most of the deficiencies listed in paragraph 13 are applicable to voting in primary as well as general elections. In addition, the following States make no provision for absentee voting in primaries: Delaware, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island.

16. In most of the States where deficiencies exist, corrective action will not be possible in 1952 unless the legislatures are called into special session. In 16 States the legislatures will be in regular session during the present year, but only a few of the States where legislation is needed are included. In 13 States the session began in January and may soon be over if it has not already adjourned.

17. Whether service voting will be difficult or easy will be determined in large part by the administrative activities of State and Federal officials. This will be particularly true for the States that have no serious legislative obstacles to service voting. Not much is known as to the current administrative attitudes in the States. The Department of Defense is performing its statutory functions to facilitate service voting, but the top levels of the Department have given little attention in recent years to the administration of functions pertaining to voting. Very little information is available as to the effectiveness with which voting information is currently being disseminated throughout the Armed Forces.

18. Difficult legal questions arise from the provisions of 1942 that still remain in force (50 U. S. C. 301, 302). These provisions seem to declare the right of qualified voters to vote in Federal elections on an absentee basis while serving in the Armed Forces, to do so without registering in person, and to do so without payment of a poll tax. The laws of the following States are inconsistent in one way or another with what appear to be mandatory provisions of the Federal statute: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. Further, all of the many States that fail to provide sufficient time for ballot transportation are in fact depriving servicemen of their right to vote and are at least acting inconsistently with the recommendations of the Federal statute.

19. Presumably an injured service voter from any of these States could bring a civil action for deprivation of rights against the appropriate election officials, if it appears that they are acting in violation of the Federal statute. The initial objective would be a declaratory judgment setting forth the nature and extent of the rights assured by Federal law. This might be followed, if necessary, by mandamus action against the appropriate election officials. Because litigation of this type has never been attempted in the field of service voting, the exact status and legal effect of the rights of service voters under Federal law remain unknown.

20. At present, the strength of the Armed Forces is approximately 3,500,000

persons, of whom about 2,500,000 are believed to be of voting age. Plans for the coming fiscal year contemplate a similar or slightly higher level of strength. No information is publicly available as to the number of servicemen of voting age who are serving overseas.

21. In the present state of world affairs, it cannot be assumed that the problem of service voting arises only in time of war. The problem is not a temporary one. It will exist as long as large forces remain under arms; and no end of that requirement is presently in sight.

AGREED RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee is unanimous in its views on the following points.

The Voting Rights of Servicemen. We believe that all servicemen of voting age, whether in the United States or overseas, should have the right:

1. To vote without registering in person.
2. To vote without paying a poll tax.
3. To vote without meeting unreasonable residence requirements.
4. To vote without meeting unreasonable literacy and educational requirements.
5. To use the Federal postcard application for a ballot.
6. To receive ballots for primary and general elections in time to vote.
7. To be protected in the free exercise of their voting rights.
8. To receive essential information concerning candidates and issues.
9. To receive essential information concerning the methods by which the right to vote may be exercised.
10. To receive essential information on the duty of "citizens in uniform" to defend our democratic institutions by using, rather than ignoring, their voting rights.

These rights are stated as ideals toward which the Nation should strive.

We hope that the State governments, the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government, both major parties, and many nongovernmental organizations will cooperate to translate these ideals into reality.

The Responsibility of the State Governments. By long tradition and accepted practice, the responsibility for election administration in the United States is vested in the State governments. We believe they should retain that responsibility and should take steps to exercise it more effectively.

We therefore recommend legislative action in those States where necessary to bring their voting laws into conformity with the following principles:

1. That the State will permit absentee voting on State ballots by all qualified voters of the State who are serving in the Armed Forces.
2. That personal appearance for registration or any other purpose is not required of absent servicemen.
3. That payment of poll tax is not required of servicemen as a condition of voting.

4. That the Federal postcard application is accepted as such and without any unreasonable restriction on when the application will be received.
5. That if a special application is required for registration by mail, the necessary forms will be sent with the State ballot and may be returned with it.
6. That absentee ballots will be available for mailing to servicemen not later than 45 days before the last date on which such ballots will be counted.

We further recommend that in those States where legislative action is necessary, and in which the legislatures are not presently in session, special legislative sessions be promptly convened to enact the necessary legislation, so that all qualified voters in the Armed Forces will be provided the opportunity to vote on State ballots in the general elections of 1952.

Amending the Federal Statutes. We recommend that the Servicemen's Voting Act be amended as follows:

1. To remove the words "in time of war" from each of the first two sections (50 U. S. C. 301, 302), so that the rights affirmed in those sections will be established on a permanent basis, and will not be effective merely in times of war or national emergency.

2. To require the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Attorney General, to bring to the attention of the Council of State Governments, the National Association of Secretaries of State, and the appropriate executive and legislative officials of the various States, the need for action by State governments to carry out the recommendations of Congress on voting in the Armed Forces.

3. To require the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress at the beginning of its session in January 1953, and thereafter biennially, on the extent to which the provisions and recommendations of the Servicemen's Voting Act have been executed by the respective States.

4. To require the Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Bureau of the Census and the several States, to compile and regularly publish statistical reports on:

(*a*) The number of ballot applications (effective and ineffective) received in each State from the servicemen of that State.
(*b*) The number of executed ballots (effective and ineffective, State and Federal, if any) received in each State from the servicemen of that State.
(*c*) The approximate number of servicemen of voting age in the Armed Forces from each State.

5. To direct the Secretary of Defense to maintain an effective information and education program to acquaint servicemen with their citizenship privileges and responsibilities in connection with voting at elections.

6. To recommend to the States that they enact appropriate legislation to extend absentee voting privileges to the spouses and dependents of persons serving in the Armed Forces, to civilians serving abroad with the Armed Forces or otherwise engaged abroad in national-service activities, and to the spouses and dependents of such civilians.

7. To require the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, to obtain information from the secretaries of state of the various States as to the eligibility to vote of civilians who are engaged in national service activities abroad although not attached to the Armed Forces, and of their spouses and dependents, and to circulate such information to the overseas missions and civilian staffs of the United States.

Action by Various Public Groups. The question of voting in the Armed Forces is a matter of active concern to many groups of citizens. These include the political parties, veterans' organizations, and other organizations of voters. We therefore recommend as follows:

1. That the political parties and other organizations interested in citizen participation in government take steps to bring the need for improved legislation on service voting to the attention of the governors and legislatures of the various States.

2. That in seeking the improvement of State laws on service voting, attention be given to the desirability of broadening the statutory definitions of "service voters" to include, in addition to military personnel, their spouses and dependents, certain civilians, and merchant-marine personnel serving outside the United States.

3. That the political parties include appropriate planks in support of improved service voting laws in their party platforms to be adopted at the national political conventions this year.

4. That organizations of voters in the various States consider the possibility of extending their good offices to their members currently serving in the Armed Forces who desire to ascertain by legal process (50 U. S. C. 301, 302; 8 U. S. C. 43; 28 U. S. C. 2201; etc.) whether they are being deprived of any enforceable voting rights in those States where the State laws are in conflict with provisions of the Federal statutes that may be controlling.

5. That civic organizations, such as the League of Women Voters, that are prepared to furnish accurate information about absentee and service voting laws and regulations in the various States and about candidates and issues, be permitted to operate voters' service information centers at suitable off-duty places where service personnel gather.

Review of Service Voting Experience in 1953. The experience of 1944 and later years will be merely repeated if a temporary flurry of interest in service voting in 1952 is followed by neglect in 1953, 1954, and 1955. Our recommendations . . . for reporting by the Secretary of Defense were intended to provide information that will be essential in any later consideration of the problem. The Secretary's reports, if made, will doubtless be referred to the responsible committees of the Congress, the Committee on Rules and Administration of the Senate and the Committee on House Administration of the House of Representatives. We urge those committees to schedule a definite review in 1953 of the entire experience with service voting this year, such review to include public hearings during the early months of 1953.

A National Bipartisan Commission on Voting. The difficulties encountered by servicemen in their exercise of the franchise are in part merely a reflection of the difficulties encountered by other citizens under existing election laws and practices. We therefore urge that active consideration be given to the general proposal for a national bipartisan commission on voting participation, as suggested a year ago by the American Political Science Association.

STATEMENT ON AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT

In addition to the recommendations unanimously adopted, a number of members of the committee favored additional action. Several members were of the opinion that Congress should forthwith memorialize the State governments, urging them to act. Several members urged one form or another of Federal ballot legislation. All of the members were agreed that the existing administrative situation in the Department of Defense is not fully satisfactory, but there was a lack of agreement as to what recommendations, if any, should be made in addition to those previously put forward in this report. Finally, the question of reducing the voting age to 18 was discussed, with disagreement as to whether the committee should make any recommendation.

The purpose of this section is to present briefly the opposing points of view and arguments for such value as they may have. If the committee had been in a position to continue its deliberations for a longer period of time, probably a greater degree of unanimity could have been reached; but the committee is aware of the impelling urgency that its report be submitted without further delay.

Memorializing the States. One member proposed, and at one stage in the discussion five members agreed, that Congress should be urged to memorialize the governors and legislatures of the several States, in order to bring to their attention the need for legislation along the lines earlier recommended in this report. It was thought that if the Congress would act promptly in passing the necessary joint or concurrent resolution, this would have considerable weight in securing rapid action by the States.

At least three members of the committee are opposed to this proposal, on the following grounds:

(1) The proposed action by Congress would be useful only if it could be taken with a minimum of delay, preferably within 2 weeks at the most. Under normal congressional procedure, however, and in view of the many controversial aspects of the present subject, it would be futile to expect that Congress would act to memorialize the States in less than 60 to 90 days. Committees of each House would probably find it necessary to hold public hearings.

(2) Other methods of dealing with the problem would be inhibited or delayed while Congress argued over the proposed resolution. Although the President might decide to write to the governors of the States concerned without awaiting congressional action, he would undoubtedly be criticized for doing so, if congressional action were currently pending along the lines proposed but had not passed. Most of the governors would probably delay a decision as to the summoning of a special session of their legislature during the pendency of a

congressional resolution on the subject; the effect could thus be more one of delay than of expedition of State action.

(3) There is some question as to whether the proposed action should not be considered beneath the dignity of Congress, in view of the inattention with which its previous recommendations on the subject have been treated by many State governments. It would seem that if the Congress desires to act, it should seek means of action that will be effective and in accordance with its own responsibilities.

The Federal Ballot. This committee began its work under the impression that it would probably not be necessary to devote much time to proposals for a Federal ballot. We were sufficiently familiar with the subject to know that the Federal ballot had been a failure in 1944 under the conditions on which it was then made available. We have not given serious consideration at any time to a revival of the Federal ballot provisions that were law in 1944 and 1945.

Early in our deliberations, before we realized how many States had allowed their service voting laws to lapse, we gave some thought to possibilities inherent in the Federal ballot as a means of perhaps stimulating action in States that were apparently resistant to all other means of inducing them to recognize their responsibilities toward their own voters in the Armed Forces. The committee, however was very much divided as to the merits of that kind of an approach.

It was only at the end of January that the full seriousness of the situation under existing State laws became apparent. We were then able, for the first time, to tabulate the deficiencies revealed in the responses of the States to the inquiries by the Department of Defense. At that point it became apparent that several hundred thousand servicemen of voting age would have no practical opportunity to vote in the elections this year unless some decisive action were promptly taken, either by the States or by the Federal Government.

We have agreed unanimously that it is the duty of the States to act, and that they should act, through special sessions of their legislatures where necessary. We are divided as to the merits of action to provide for a Federal ballot for use in the event that a number of the States fail to act.

One of our members, and the one most experienced in these matters, is emphatically opposed to any provision for a Federal ballot under any circumstances. During World War II, he served as the Secretary of War's coordinator for soldier voting and as executive officer of the United States War Ballot Commission. He opposes any form of Federal ballot on two grounds: (1) That the administration of voting by State absentee ballots is already burdensome to the Armed Forces, the primary function of which is national defense, and the addition of a Federal ballot would make the administrative burden excessive; and (2) that while the failure of certain States to provide voting facilities for their absent servicemen is morally reprehensible, nevertheless it would be inadvisable as a matter of high policy to take from the States any part of their traditional election function and lodge it in the Federal Government, even if that is constitutionally possible. . . . Here it may suffice to say that other members of the committee are not impressed by the administrative argument, believing that the administrative difficulties can be surmounted, but are very much concerned by the policy and constitutional issues.

On the policy issue, other members of the committee do not share the view that it is inappropriate for the Federal Government to act in this field when it becomes necessary for it to do so as a last resort. The wording of article I of the Constitution reflects the fact that the members of the Constitutional Convention deemed it unsafe to leave such matters wholly to the States, so far as Federal elections are concerned. We recognize, however, the confusion of the constitutional situation, particularly as it affects the election of Presidential electors.

Under the circumstances, a majority of the committee recommends:

1. That the Servicemen's Voting Act be amended to request the secretary of state of each State to certify by June 1, 1952, whether the laws of his State are in conformity with the six principles previously recommended (see above, pp. 517–518).
2. That the Servicemen's Voting Act be amended to provide a Federal ballot that would be available for the general elections of 1952 to all servicemen from States for which the secretary of state fails to certify that the laws of his State are in conformity with the first three principles previously recommended, and to all overseas servicemen and their dependents overseas from States for which the secretary of state fails to certify that the laws of his State are in conformity with all six principles previously recommended.
3. That the proposed Federal ballot provide at least an opportunity to vote in the election of Members of the Senate and House of Representatives, and provide also for voting in the election of President and Vice President in some practicable manner if the Congress is able to assure itself on the constitutional point involved.
4. That the proposed emergency legislation to provide for a Federal ballot expire at the end of the present calendar year.

In connection with the third majority recommendation, the committee is naturally aware that Members of Congress are unlikely to be able to resolve all doubts on a matter that can only be settled by the Supreme Court. The Court is not likely to rule directly on Federal-ballot questions unless and until legislation is enacted and a proper case comes before it, although rulings on existing provisions of Federal law would be helpful. . . . Some members of the committee would therefore go further than the above recommendation, and would recommend without qualification that Congress promptly enact legislation for the entire Federal ballot on the assumption that a test case can be quickly arranged. Since expedited procedure would be available, such a case could be settled before the election, and would provide guidance for the election officials accordingly.

We recognize that conceivably all of the States where action is needed might act during the next 2 or 3 months to provide adequately for service voting on State ballots. It seems unlikely that all of these States will forthwith hold special sessions of their legislatures, a course we have already recommended, but if they did so, no harm could be done by the proposed emergency Federal legislation. If the need for the Federal ballot is removed and the secretaries of state will so certify, the Federal legislation, under its own terms, would not come into effect; if, however, the need remains in some States, then the proposed legislation will be useful at least as far as those States are concerned.

Administration in the Department of Defense. Several members of the committee are inclined to believe that the administrative arrangements in the Department of Defense would be improved if the Secretary of Defense were to appoint a full-time representative on his own immediate staff to deal with service-voting matters. This would repeat, at the level of the Department of Defense, the arrangement that was in effect in the War Department during 1944.

Other members are skeptical as to the necessity for the proposed arrangement in the absence of Federal ballot legislation, and in any event are inclined to the view that the members of this committee are not sufficiently informed to make internal administrative recommendations as specific as the one proposed.

All are agreed that the Secretary of Defense should take such steps as may be necessary to assure adequate attention to the problem at high levels in his department.

The Right to Vote at Age 18. Early in our discussions, we concluded that our first obligation was to concentrate upon the voting problems of immediate concern to servicemen of voting age. Nevertheless, we have become increasingly aware of the fact that approximately 1,000,000 of the 3,500,000 persons in the Armed Forces are under 21, the voting age in all States except Georgia, where the voting age is 18.

It can be argued with considerable force that men and women who are old enough to serve in the Armed Forces are old enough to vote, and that they should be authorized to do so. Proposals to reduce the voting age to 18 have recently been considered in several States and a proposed constitutional amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 127, is pending in Congress on the subject.

We have had no adequate opportunity to give this subject mature consideration. Several members have favored reducing the voting age to 18 and all members have been sympathetic in discussing the problem, but it is evidently the view of the majority that we should refrain from making any recommendation on the subject. Clearly it involves questions different in character from those on which we have made recommendations, and, in the view of some members, possibly beyond the proper scope of this report.

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RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1933–1945

A significant change has recently taken place in the character and tendencies of German publications on World War II and its background. During the first years after Germany's total collapse in 1945, the favored subject was naturally the underground resistance and the attempt upon Hitler's life, July 20, 1944.[1] The leading writers of that period, members for the most part of the Resistance, had nothing to say that could ameliorate the picture of the Third Reich then emerging from the war crimes trials. Even if public feeling had been receptive to them, which it probably was not, apologists worked under various restraints, and publication was severely limited by the requirement of licenses from the occupying power.

Erich Kordt's widely read first book, published in 1947 under an American license, marked the beginning of a new period. Having had a foot in both camps as a close collaborator of Ribbentrop and as a member of the small opposition group in the Foreign Ministry, he was able to reveal much secret diplomacy and to narrate something of the efforts to block Hitler's war policy in 1938–1939.[2] The formation of the West German Federal Republic in 1948–1949 and the subsequent withdrawal of the license requirement for publication lowered the bars to a flood of memoirs and commentaries by former officials of the National Socialist regime. Since 1949, almost a score of the surviving diplomats, generals and ministers, most of whom had no connection with the Resistance and little or no sympathy with it, have published books, with more likely to follow.[3] Hitler's own views expressed during the war in uninhibited monologues in conferences and conversations have appeared recently.[4] Aside from its information on foreign policy, this voluminous material is important for the light it throws upon what may become a new "revisionist" movement.

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[1] The most widely known of these books, some of which have since passed through several editions, were published in Switzerland. H. B. Gisevius, *Bis zum bitteren Ende* (2 vols., Zurich, 1946); Rudolf Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand* (Zurich, 1946); Ulrich von Hassell, *Vom anderen Deutschland* (Zurich, 1946); Fabian Schlabrendorff, *Offiziere gegen Hitler* (Zurich, 1946). However, Friedrich Meinecke examined the more general causes of Germany's downfall in his *Die Deutsche Katastrophe* (2nd ed., Wiesbaden, 1946), which Sidney B. Fay has translated: *The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections* (Cambridge, 1950).

[2] *Wahn und Wirklichkeit: Die Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, Versuch einer Darstellung* (Stuttgart, 1947). A professional diplomat, Kordt joined Ribbentrop's staff as chief of his secretariat in March, 1938, after the latter became Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 4, 1938. In 1941, he was transferred to Shanghai as Consul General. It was there in 1944–1945 that he drafted this first analysis of the foreign policy of the Third Reich, largely on the basis of personal memoranda and his recollections. He has recently been reported as the director of a training school for the future foreign ministry of the West German Federal Republic. His more personal second book, *Nicht aus den Akten . . .* (Stuttgart, 1950), is distinctly more valuable.

[3] These books and their authors are identified on their first mention in the text. The following have not been used in the preparation of this paper: Geyr von Schweppenburg, *Erinnerungen eines Militärattaché, London, 1933–1937* (Stuttgart, 1949); Wipert von Blücher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie* (Wiesbaden, 1951). Schweppenburg

Dangerous pitfalls face the unwary in the exploration of these publications. The problem of reliability is more than usually difficult. None of these writers had access to the archives still in the possession of the Allies. Even where documentary evidence has been used, obviously by Kordt and Paul Schmidt[5] and perhaps by Otto Meissner,[6] nothing is said as to the nature and provenance of their sources. Three wrote in prison, a circumstance which helps to explain the special pleading of Ernst von Weizsäcker[7] and Otto Abetz.[8] The

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served as military attaché in London and Blücher as minister in Helsinki. For present purposes, the following have not been of much use: Siegfried Westphal, *Heer in Fesseln: aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt* (Bonn, 1950); Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse: Erinnerungen des deutschen Militärattachés in Rom 1936–1943* (Tübingen, 1951). The publication in London of the English version of Franz von Papen's *Memoirs* has been announced for July, 1952.

[4] Felix Gilbert (ed.), *Hitler Directs His War; The Secret Records of His Daily Military Conferences* (New York, 1950). The editor has selected significant parts from the small fraction that survived the burning of the stenographic reports of conferences at Hitler's headquarters. The dates fall between December, 1942, and March, 1945. Dr. Henry Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier, 1941–1942* (introduction and arrangement by Gerhard Ritter, Bonn, 1951).

[5] Since 1923 a member of the translation service of the Foreign Ministry, Schmidt became Hitler's chief interpreter in 1935 and continued to serve in this capacity until the end of the war. His book is especially valuable on the high-level interviews he attended from Stresemann's time. Although he warns historians of certain problems involved in his memoranda of these interviews, he unfortunately fails to explain the nature of the documents in his possession. He said nothing of such documents during an interrogation at Nürnberg in February, 1947, in which the author participated. Dr. Paul Schmidt, *Statist auf Diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–1945: Erinnerungen des Chefdolmetchers in Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas* (Bonn, 1950), p. 481. The part of this book dealing with the period from 1935 has been translated in somewhat abbreviated form: R. H. C. Steed (ed.), *Hitler's Interpreter* (New York, 1951).

[6] Meissner was successively chief of the presidential chancellery under Ebert, Hindenburg, and Hitler, the latter giving him ministerial status. Reports by Hitler to President Hindenburg are summarized in his book, but exact quotations are rare. Otto Meissner, *Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler: der Schicksalsweg des deutschen Volkes von 1918–1945, wie ich ihn erlebte* (3d ed., Hamburg, 1950).

[7] A naval officer in World War I, Weizsäcker's diplomatic service alternated between posts in Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway, with intervals of duty at the Ministry in Berlin until February, 1938, when Ribbentrop appointed him State Secretary in charge of the Foreign Ministry. In 1943 he sought and secured a transfer to Rome, where he served as ambassador to the Vatican until the end of the war. Sentenced to seven years imprisonment in 1948 by the American Military Tribunal, he was released in 1950 and died during the following summer (1951). From a long interview in February, 1947, at Lindau before his arrest, the author gained the impression of a man in the tradition of the German nationalists and of a sincere opponent of Hitler. His memoirs are diminished in value by repeated efforts to justify his remaining in office under Hitler and by the brevity of the excerpts from his contemporary notes. Ernst von Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen* (Munich, 1950). There is an English translation: *Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker* (Chicago, 1951).

[8] After service in Ribbentrop's personal foreign office (*Dienststelle Ribbentrop*) as its expert on France, Abetz served as ambassador in Paris during most of the occupation. He

more adventurous experiences of Rudolf Rahn are related with greater objectivity and equanimity.[9] While the writings of the generals should not be ignored, because they have much of interest about Hitler and because of the close connection between military and foreign policy, the form in which they were written creates special problems. The book on Halder contains postwar conversations with its author,[10] and Heusinger's consists of contemporary conversations and records of conferences whose literal authenticity is doubtful.[11] To a greater or less degree, all have an axe to grind in the exoneration of the General Staff and of the generals as a group. In any event, the importance of this material is not so much in the factual information as in the interpretations it contains. Perhaps of greatest significance, although foreign policy is not directly involved, is the effort in one way or another to tone down the satanic characteristics generally attributed to Hitler. It is no longer fashionable to marvel at the alleged hypnotic effect of his presence but rather to deny it. Some needlessly make the point that the picture of him as a *Tapetenfresser* was greatly exaggerated. Schmidt, who witnessed his meeting with President Hacha of Czechoslovakia in Berlin on the night before the occupation of Prague, March 15, 1938, denies the contemporary reports of his violence.[12]

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represents himself as having worked for Franco-German reconciliation and for the improvement of France's lot during the occupation. The French court which tried him remained unimpressed, for it sentenced him in 1949 to twenty years imprisonment. Otto Abetz, *Das offene Problem: ein Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Frankreichpolitik* (Cologne, 1951).

[9] Rahn's diplomatic service, beginning in 1928, included periods of duty in Constantinople and Lisbon, special missions to Iran, Turkey, and South America, and service in the legal, oriental and press divisions of the Ministry. He joined the Paris embassy in occupied France in 1940, played a part in the attempt to arm the rebels in Iraq from Syria in 1941, and represented the Foreign Ministry in Tunisia and in Italy until the surrender of the German forces there in 1945, in which he seems to have played a considerable part. Rudolf Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben: Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen* (Düsseldorf, 1949). Further light is thrown upon Germany's relations with Mussolini and his Italian Social Republic after Badoglio's surrender and upon the surrender of the German forces in Italy in Eitel Friedrich Moellhausen, *Die Gebrochene Achse* (Alfeld/Leine, 1949), a book which appeared originally in Italy under the title of *La Carta Perdente.* Moellhausen entered the Foreign Ministry in 1939, served in the Paris embassy, accompanied Rahn to Syria and Tunisia, and finally served with him in Italy, where he acted as Consul General in Rome before its capture by the Allies in 1943.

[10] Franz Halder succeeded Ludwig Beck as Chief of the General Staff in September, 1938 in which capacity he continued to serve until retired because of differences with Hitler in 1942 over the conduct of operations in Russia. Halder's valuable diary remains unpublished, and only excerpts revealed in connection with the Nürnberg trials are available. Peter Bor, *Gespräche mit Halder* (Wiesbaden, 1950). Halder's well-known pamphlet, *Hitler als Feldherr* (Munich, 1949), denies Hitler's alleged gifts as a military leader and, by inference, exalts the General Staff.

[11] Adolf Heusinger served as a member and as chief of the Operations Division of the Army High Command (*Oberkommando des Heeres*), 1937–1945, and is now one of the military advisers of the Bonn government. Adolf Heusinger, *Befehl im Widerstreit: Schickssalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923–1945* (Tübingen, 1950).

[12] Schmidt, *Statist auf Diplomatischer Bühne*, pp. 429, 430. He apparently thinks it significant that Hitler acted the part of a gracious and experienced host at the reception in honor of Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden in 1935. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

It would perhaps be unfair to see in these efforts to soften the popular image of Hitler, and thus to domesticate the tiger, a tacit conspiracy for the creation of a legend and for the revival of National Socialism. To some extent, there is an evident desire to explain years of service in a bad cause.

Much of what the former diplomats have to say about the control of foreign policy checks with information being revealed in the massive publication of German diplomatic documents sponsored by the French, British, and American governments.[13] The Foreign Ministry was surprisingly successful in defending itself against National Socialist penetration, although its personnel sooner or later became party members and officers in party organizations. Even Ribbentrop's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs was not followed by the wholesale transfer, as was feared, of the staff of his personal foreign office.[14] Except for the aggressive Martin Luther, a minor Berlin contractor and an ardent Nazi, who extended his influence from the division charged with contacts with party organizations to the Ministry's new wartime agencies until his clash with Ribbentrop sent him to a concentration camp in 1943, the personnel of the Ministry remained substantially intact. In 1939, Hitler himself decided to adjourn Ribbentrop's plan of thoroughgoing reorganization to the end of the war.[15] At the same time, the Ministry largely lost its capacity to determine or influence the essential policy-making decisions. Party agencies successfully invaded its jurisdiction, as in propaganda abroad by Goebbels' ministry, in contacts with German nationals abroad by the *Auslandsorganisation*, and in the establishment of relations with Quisling prior to the invasion of Norway, April 9, 1940, by Rosenberg's Party Foreign Office, despite Ribbentrop's jealous defense of his prerogatives.[16] Like Hitler, Ribbentrop regarded the Ministry as a technical agency for the carrying out of his own and Hitler's decisions. He monopolized the personal contacts with Hitler and apparently almost made it impossible for the State Secretaries, Weizsäcker and Steengracht, to see him privately.[17] Much is made in these writings of Hitler's well-known contempt for professional diplomats. Were a list to be compiled of the decisions attributed to him alone, it would probably include every important decision in foreign policy from Germany's departure from the World Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in 1933 to the end of the war. Nor can it be seriously doubted that Hitler did in fact have the final say.

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[13] The four volumes of *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1919–1945*, Series D, 1937–1945, that have so far appeared cover the period from September, 1937, to the occupation of Prague, March 15, 1939. The third volume, on the Spanish Civil War, begins in July, 1936. The same period is also covered by the four volumes of *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, Third Series.

[14] Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten . . .*, pp. 178, 183, 184. By requiring the normal examinations, Kordt claims he effectively locked the doors against them.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 388–399.

[16] Useful information on Ribbentrop's private foreign office, which was set up across the Wilhelmstrasse from the official Foreign Ministry appears in Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, pp. 78, 79, 88 and in Abetz, *Das offene Problem*, pp. 45–51. Upon the least-known and in some respects the most significant of these competing party agencies, *Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle*, which worked with German minorities abroad, these books throw no light whatsoever.

[17] Ribbentrop insisted that Weizsäcker was responsible solely to himself just as he was to Hitler. Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 167, 168. Weizsäcker told the author in February, 1947, in reply to a specific question, that he had no more than six private interviews with Hitler during five years of service as State Secretary. On March 26, 1946, von

How Hitler reached his decisions and whether advice counted for anything with him will doubtless never be known in detail. There are occasional hints that the Party's dislike of the Nazi-Soviet Pact may have had some connection with his turning against the Soviet Union and the invasion of June 22, 1941;[18] but no records of party conferences on this or other foreign policy problems seem to have survived, if indeed any were kept. Ribbentrop is generally written off as Hitler's echo, or as his "master's voice" in Schmidt's words, yet Weizsäcker and Kordt both tell of efforts to immunize Hitler from his bellicose influence during the Czech crisis in 1938, and Weizsäcker believes that Ribbentrop helped to confirm Hitler's own preference for war and a total solution in 1939.[19] From what is known of Hitler's reactions to crises, it is unlikely that advice reached him in an orderly manner. "A strange manner of transacting business prevailed there," writes Weizsäcker of the Chancellery on September 28, 1938, when the Munich Conference of the four powers was being decided. "Deliberations often occurred . . . not behind closed doors or in a conference room. Bystanders who just happened to be there, including the army of adjutants, usually participated."[20] If others influenced Hitler, it was likely to be his intimates who happened to be at hand, and Ribbentrop saw to it that he himself was available as often as possible. Kordt agrees that Hitler was the reverse of a man of reason, but he puts little stock in his famous intuition. It was, in his opinion, nothing more than the opportunistic exploitation of momentarily favorable circumstances, but Kordt's conclusion that Hitler had no clear foreign policy should perhaps be discounted as the professional's aversion to Hitler's taste for sudden improvisations.[21]

With scarcely an exception but with significant reservations, the writers under review agree as to Hitler's responsibility for the war in 1939. Kordt's verdict, in his first book, was more inclusive. The eventual opening of the diplomatic archives, he predicted, would not again acquit Germany of exclusive guilt as after World War I, whatever discoveries might be made about details.

Steengracht, Weizsäcker's successor, testified at Nürnberg he had seen Hitler only twice on official occasions. *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (40 vols., Nürnberg, 1947), Vol. X, p. 110.

[18] Heinz Guderian, *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten* (Heidelberg, 1951), p. 75. Sitting next to Hitler at luncheon, October 10, 1939, after the Polish campaign in which he commanded the armored forces, Guderian drew this conclusion from Hitler's astonishment when he replied, to Hitler's question as to what the army's and people's reaction had been to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, that the army had sighed with relief. Cf. Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, p. 254.

[19] Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, pp. 273, 274; Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 187, 188, 258.

[20] Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, p. 187.

[21] *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, pp. 311, 312. "Vergeblich sucht man in Hitlers Politik nach einer Linie." *Nicht aus den Akten*, pp. 396, 397.

"The decisive rôle of Hitler *and his government* in bringing on the war will thereby merely be revealed in clearer light."[22] The general tendency, however, is to blame Hitler alone, and Kordt himself obviously did not mean that the Foreign Ministry should share the responsibility for the major military decisions, especially after Hitler personally assumed the supreme command in February, 1938.[23] That the general acknowledgment of Hitler's guilt, like the claims of the former diplomats that the Foreign Ministry was deprived of all policy-making power, is in part due to the desire to evade or minimize the responsibilities of others cannot be doubted. Yet there is probably a good deal to be said for these views.

More important, as perhaps foreshadowing a new "revisionist" movement are the efforts to show that Hitler's intentions were peaceful during the first years and that other countries were partly responsible for his later resort to force. The thesis that real possibilities of a relatively moderate development existed is presented forthrightly by Hossbach, among the spokesmen for the military, and by Meissner for the civilians. The former diplomats, especially Kordt and Weizsäcker, stress the alleged partial responsibility of other countries. As the General Staff's liaison with Hitler from 1934 to 1938, Hossbach perhaps saw as much of him at close range as anyone who was not a party leader. In his interesting book, he writes that Hitler was still receptive to moderate and expert advice, at least in military matters, and that he then betrayed no signs of self-regard as a military genius. A devoted friend and great admirer of General Fritsch and of General Ludwig Beck, the former's successor as Chief of the General Staff in February, 1938, and leader of the Resistance, Hossbach apparently had no reason to be over-generous in his estimate of Hitler. Yet he claims serious grounds for believing that Hitler was considering, early in 1935, the restoration of some degree of responsible government, and suggests that he may have been dissuaded, as from other moderate thoughts, by the Party.[24] Meissner takes at their face value Hitler's assurances, in reports to President Hindenburg, of confidence in the peaceful union with Austria and the peaceful recovery of Danzig and the Polish Corridor (he does not include the Sudetenland) because France would continue to decline as Germany's economic and military power increased. Hitler, he claims, talked the same language in party circles after Hindenburg's death in 1934, and he concludes therefrom that his peaceful proposals in speeches and diplomatic notes after the occupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936, were sincere.[25]

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[22] *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, p. 13. The italics are mine.

[23] Such is the trend of the book on Halder and of the writings of Heusinger and Westphal. Cf. Walter Görlitz, *Der deutsche Generalstab: Geschichte und Gestalt* (Frankfurt am Main, n.d.). However, there is conflicting evidence in Hossbach, who states that he drafted the overall organizational plan for the army in 1935 when Hitler decided to restore universal service. Friedrich Hossbach, *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934–1938* (Wolfenbüttel, 1949), pp. 94–95. Hossbach was the General Staff's adjutant with Hitler from 1934 to 1938. Guderian, no great admirer of the General Staff's conservative views on military matters, claims that it favored the attack upon Russia and expected a decisive victory in a matter of weeks. Guderian, *Erinnerungen*, p. 128.

[24] *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler*, pp. 22, 34, 35, 47. It should be noted, however, that Hossbach acknowledges he was among those in 1933 who hoped for better things for Germany from Hitler's regime under Hindenburg's watchful care, and he is not one of those who claim to have foreseen the events of 1945. *Ibid.*, p. 9. Cf. Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, *Es geschah in Deutschland: Menschenbilder unseres Jahrhunderts* (Tübingen, 1951), pp. 306–307. Schwerin-Krosigk was Minister of Finance from 1932 to 1945. On the point of committing suicide in April, 1945, Hitler named him Foreign Minister in the shadow government of Admiral Dönitz. Cf. Walter Lüdde-Neurath, *Regierung Dönitz: Die Letzten Tage des Dritten Reiches* (Göttingen, 1951).

This thesis, which after all is practically identical with the assumptions of the "appeasement" policy of the 1930's, is tenable only if the aggressive purposes Hitler acknowledged in *Mein Kampf*, the acquisition of *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe and the destruction of France, were simply his reactions to circumstances long since past. Herbert von Dirksen is one of the few who agree that these were, in substance, Hitler's unchanging objectives: "the program presented in his book was not the irresponsible tirade of a youthful hothead but a plan pursued with unwavering tenacity. . . ."[26] Few of the other writers even mention *Mein Kampf*, but their disagreement with Dirksen is evident in their estimate of what is now known of Hitler's secret talks to his generals, and especially in their reactions to that of November 5, 1937, whose substance appears in the famous Hossbach Protocol. The main lines of this speech are too well-known to require detailed analysis. After dismissing the possibility of a peaceful solution of Germany's problems, notably those of space and food, Hitler affirmed the necessity of a solution by armed force by 1943–1945, when the superiority in arms would begin to pass to the Western powers. He mentioned Austria and Czechoslovakia as the first necessary installment of living space, without referring to Poland and the Ukraine. He expected a Mediterranean war caused by the tensions of the Spanish Civil War (continuation of which should therefore be encouraged) between Great Britain, France, and Italy, or social troubles in France to furnish a favorable moment to strike.[27] While those who comment add nothing to existing factual knowledge of this important event, what they say about its significance throws light even more upon their own points of view than upon Hitler's intentions. Hossbach concludes, what is obviously true but which has little bearing upon the essential question, from the absence of the technical branches of the armed services and of the Ministries of Economics, Finance, and Propaganda, that there was no question of war or of a specific campaign in the immediate future. Moreover, he suggests that Hitler's purpose may in part have been to find out how far he could rely upon Blomberg's and Fritsch's blind obedience.[28] To Kordt, who may not have known about the speech when he wrote his first book, Hitler's remarks, delivered in the intimacy of small circles, were not meant too seriously and are not of great importance, except as evidence of general tendencies. They were, he writes, a jumble of projects and fantastic schemes of which, in most instances, nothing more was ever heard. "It would be a mistake, I believe, to assume that all of the ideas that appeared in his speeches were fixed plans." They contained no evidence of a logical system but rather were a "complete mish-mash" ("*heillosen Wirrwarr*").[29] Meissner rejects Hitler's declaration for a solution by armed force as a fixed commitment and argues that it only meant his determination to go to war if he could not attain his aims by peaceful means.[30] None of these comments affect in any way the fact that his ultimate purposes could not possibly be attained without war. Indeed it is known from other sources that Hitler did not confide to his Foreign Minister and generals all of his objectives on November 5, 1937. They included Poland and the Ukraine, as Ribbentrop acknowledged to Churchill in a private conversation in London in 1937, and as was definitely implied in Hitler's secret speech of November 23, 1937, to the apprentice Führers of the Ordenburg at Sonthofen (Allgäu), especially in his condemnation of the Hohenzollern Empire's plan in World War I for a zone of satellite border states from the Baltic to the Black Seas.[31]

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[25] *Staatssekretär*, pp. 337–339. In the absence of printed sources and of direct quotations from documents presumably now in Meissner's possession, no adequate means of testing the truth of these assertions exist.

[26] Herbert von Dirksen, *Moskau-Tokio-London: Erinnerungen und Betrachtungen zu 20 Jahren Deutscher Aussenpolitik, 1919–1939* (Stuttgart, 1950), p. 202. This book has been translated: *Moscow, Tokyo, London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy* (Norman, Okla., 1952). After serving as head of the East European division of the Ministry, Dirksen went as ambassador to Moscow in 1928, to Tokyo in 1933, and to London in 1938. He was given no further diplomatic assignment after his return to Berlin in August, 1939. Because the Russians seized his private papers in Silesia, he wrote his memoirs largely from memory. Soviet Russia has published selections from his private papers. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., *Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War*, Vol. II, *Dirksen Papers (1938–1939)* (Moscow, 1948).

[27] The Hossbach Protocol may be conveniently consulted in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. I, *From Neurath to Ribbentrop (September 1937–September 1938)* (Washington, 1949), pp. 29–39. Konstantin von Neurath, Foreign Minister at that time, attended along with the Minister of Defense, Marshal von Blomberg, and the chiefs of armed services, General Fritsch, Goering, and Admiral Raeder.

Essential to the understanding of the present views of those former members of the Foreign Ministry and of the General Staff who opposed Hitler and who now regard the Hitler of the early years as relatively moderate, is a clear grasp of what it was that they opposed. They rejected his boundless ambitions, his disregard of the Bismarckian maxim that politics is the art of the possible, and his refusal to coordinate his policies with the realities of Germany's power and strategic situation. They, however, favored union with Austria, the gradual absorption of *Sudetenland* by the "chemical dissolution" of Czechoslovakia (as Weizsäcker put it in his contemporary memorandum[32]), the subordination of the remainder of the Czech state, and the recovery of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. What they objected to was the precipitous effort to attain these aims at the risk of a general war which they were certain Germany could not win. General Beck's numerous memoranda during the Czech crisis in 1938 were intended to gain time for the slower increase of the army and for its sounder training. When he conceded in principle the need of an eventual military showdown with Czechoslovakia and France and the need of more living space,[33] one wonders if the motive was merely tactical. Nor is Weizsäcker's version of his and Kordt's efforts to secure a firm statement of Britain's decision to intervene, if Germany resorted to force against Czechoslovakia, quite convincing now that more evidence is available.[34] The truth seems to be that Hitler's opponents were torn between their support of his objectives insofar as they were limited to the acquisition of German populations and their fears as to the ultimate consequences of his methods. For most this inner uncertainty doubtless ended when Hitler seized non-German territory with the occupation of Prague, March 15, 1939, and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia.

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[28] *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler*, pp. 191–193. Blomberg, in fact, joined Neurath and the chiefs of the armed services in warning against the dangers of war before the completion of Germany's rearmament. Hitler's removal of Blomberg and Fritsch along with Neurath some three months later may well have been influenced by their opposition at this time.

[29] *Nicht aus den Akten*, p. 227. Nothing, it is true, was done to follow up the idea of working out Hitler's idea of prolonging the Spanish Civil War. On the contrary, the diplomatic documents show that the *Wehrmacht* as well as the Foreign Ministry supported Italy's desire for as speedy an end to it as possible. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. III, *The Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939* (Washington, 1950), pp. 544, 545, 554–557, 628.

[30] *Staatssekretär*, p. 418.

[31] Churchill does not fix the exact date. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. I, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston, 1948). pp. 222–224; Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, appendix, pp. 443–450. Ribbentrop's memorandum of January 2, 1938, in which he wrote that a "change in the eastern *status quo* to Germany's advantage [*im deutschen Sinne*] can only be accomplished by force" is sometimes cited to prove Hitler's intentions to take the Ukraine. Neither the Ukraine nor Poland is mentioned. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. I, *From Neurath to Ribbentrop*, pp. 162–168.

Even among those who remained loyal to Hitler to the end, Meissner is probably unique in the forthright denial of the justice of the Nürnberg court's condemnation of certain of Hitler's actions as aggressions or as the waging of aggressive war. This is his conclusion in regard to the occupation of Austria, March 13, 1938, as well as the invasion of Norway, April 9, 1940; and he thinks the court did not give due consideration to Poland's refusal to negotiate the Danzig and Corridor issues in its condemnation of the invasion of Poland, September 1, 1939, as aggressive war (although he approves in general the position taken by the court[35]). The more serious signs of a nascent "revisionist" movement are, however, concerned rather with the policies and actions of other countries than with those of Germany. The Treaty of Versailles, which the Nürnberg court refused to accept as evidence, plays its expected rôle, and the point is often made that Hitler easily won the concessions that had been refused to the Weimar Republic. Britain is even blamed for being polite, as in Schmidt's rather naive criticism of Sir John Simon's and Anthony Eden's cordiality in Berlin after Hitler had torn up the disarmament provisions of Versailles.[36] The failure to react vigorously to the occupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936, helped to consolidate Hitler's control in Germany by giving him an easy victory, and, as Schwerin-Krosigk points out, convinced him of the fundamental weakness of the Western powers, thus encouraging him to even more risky enterprises.[37] In this respect, Schwerin-Krosigk merely confirms well-known and substantially accurate appraisals.

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[32] *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. II, *Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937–1938* (Washington, 1949), p. 504. By this Weizsäcker meant the autonomy of minorities in Czechoslovakia and its eventual break-up. He uses the same expression in his memoirs. *Erinnerungen*, p. 165.

[33] Memorandum dated May 29, 1938, on Hitler's speech to the generals on the preceding day. Wolfgang Foerster, *Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg: aus nachgelassenen Papieren des Generalstabschef Ludwig Beck* (Munich, 1949), pp. 90–96. The rapid influx of young officers of National Socialist orientation undoubtedly worried the General Staff.

[34] On September 10, 1938, Sir Neville Henderson, the British ambassador, wired Lord Halifax that Weizsäcker, while insisting that Hitler would not believe Great Britain would intervene, "recommends merely friendly message be sent him describing our difficulties and apprehensions." Henderson, who of course may not have reported Weizsäcker correctly, although they were seeing each other frequently at this time [N. Henderson, *Failure of a Mission* (New York, 1940), pp. 149, 150], in fact advised against a strong warning as it might precipitate the feared armed action. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939*, Third Series, Vol. II, 1938 (London, 1949), pp. 283, 284. *Cf.* Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 177–179; Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, pp. 245 ff.; Hassell, *Vom anderen Deutschland*, p. 17.

After helping to build Hitler up in Germany and to suggest the possibility of advancing towards his real goals, the actions of other countries, so the argument runs, precipitated his decisions to use force by failing to take into account or to understand the peculiar workings of his mentality. Criticism centers chiefly on the *Anschluss* in March, 1938, on the week-end crisis in May, 1938, occasioned by alleged German troop concentrations against Czechoslovakia, and on Great Britain's guarantee of Poland in March, 1939. In regard to the completion of the *Anschluss* by the military occupation of Austria, his original intention is said to have been quite different: the National Socialist penetration of the Austrian government and an eventual personal union.[38] Hitler's intention to proceed along these lines after extorting Schuschnigg's consent to the first phase at Berchtesgaden, February, 1938, is said to have suddenly changed after Schuschnigg's order of March 9, 1938, that a plebiscite should be held on March 12 on the question of maintaining Austria's national independence.[39] The military evidence indeed seems to support this thesis. No General Staff plan of operation for an occupation had been prepared. According to Guderian, who commanded the participating armored forces, the staff officers were absent on a training mission, and no arrangements had been made to release the army's stores of gasoline to his command.[40] Hossbach reports that his and

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[35] *Staatssekretär*, pp. 455, 520, 536. He also approves the verdict of guilty for the invasion of the Low Countries, May 10, 1940. *Ibid.*, p. 540. His book, though bulky and expensive, has, it should be noted, gone through at least three editions.

[36] *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne*, p. 302.

[37] *Es geschah in Deutschland*, p. 217.

[38] Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 148–149.

[39] Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, p. 192; Meissner, *Staatssekretär*, pp. 447–452. Meissner suspects that French influence was behind Schuschnigg's decision.

[40] Halder says that the part of the general directive for overall operations which applied to Austria (*Fall Otto*) was directed against an attempted monarchical restoration

General Beck's immediate reaction to the order to march was to attribute Hitler's decision to the desire for a foreign success in order to divert the attention of the officer corps from the Blomberg and Fritsch affairs.[41]

The week-end crisis of May, 1938, generates much more heat. That Hitler was already thinking of military action against Czechoslovakia is admitted, but he had not yet, it is argued, decided to force the issue within a specific period. The operational plan signed May 20, scarcely twenty-four hours before the crisis, seems to support this view, and Hitler is said to have remarked that time would be required to digest Austria.[42] Then followed reports from Prague of German troop concentrations, whose origins have never been entirely clarified, Britain's firm declaration on May 21 of intent to act if force were used, and the sensational reports in the world press of Hitler's retreat as shown in German denials of the existence of any unusual concentrations on the Czech frontier. Hitler's secret speech to his generals on May 28 and the new version of the plan of operations against Czechoslovakia signed two days later, in which he declared his unchangeable will to destroy Czechoslovakia by military force and fixed October 1, 1938, as the target date, are attributed to Hitler's resentful reaction to the publicity accorded to what he regarded as his personal humiliation.[43]

Even the most disillusioned among these former officials of the Third Reich, Kordt for example, regard Britain's unconditional guarantee of Poland of March, 1939, followed by France's and similar pledges to Rumania, Greece, and Turkey, as another example of the failure to foresee Hitler's inevitable reaction. Of course it enabled Hitler to raise again the pre-1914 spectre of "encirclement," although the situations in 1914 and 1939 were scarcely comparable from the point of view of the danger to Germany's security. The anti-Hitler group in the Foreign Ministry apparently shared something of his resentment, although the guarantee is now admitted to have been a logical consequence of the occupation of Prague. Kordt, for example, spoke disparagingly to Sir Robert Vansittart of Britain's "heterogeneous alliances" on a secret mission to London as the group's representative.[44] At the opposite extreme, Otto Abetz,

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and was never worked out in detail. Bor, *Gespräche mit Halder*, p. 117; Guderian, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 42–46.

[41] *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler*, pp. 147, 148.

[42] An excerpt from the diary of Colonel General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the *Wehrmachtführungsstabe*, who was among the war criminals executed following the principal Nürnberg trial. Foerster, *Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg*, p. 81.

[43] A tour of inspection of the Czech frontier by British military attachés had shown no evidence of unusual troop concentrations. The following are the more detailed accounts of this affair: Kordt, *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, pp. 109, 110; Kordt, *Nicht aus den Akten*, pp. 224–226; Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne*, pp. 388–392; Meissner, *Staatssekretär*, p. 459; Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 164, 165; Dirksen, *Moskau-Tokio-London*, pp. 212, 213. Hitler's speech of May 28, 1938, is reconstructed from Beck's notes in Foerster, *Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg*, pp. 88–90.

[44] *Nicht aus den Akten*, p. 313 ff. A new file, labelled *"Einkreisung,"* was set up in the Ministry before the end of March, 1939, as a catchall for correspondence relating to the general international situation.

one of the most unreconstructed of these writers, holds that the guarantee made war inevitable and therefore that it diminished Germany's responsibility for it.[45] In this, as well as in the other two instances of alleged provocations, the implication is that defensive actions by other countries should have been guided by a more realistic estimate of Hitler's probable reactions. There is perhaps something in this point of view. Nevertheless, the probability remains that Hitler would have regarded any action as provocative that did not permit him to have his way.

On specific problems of Hitler's foreign policy, the writings of the former diplomats throw some light which will doubtless have to be taken into account in the study of the diplomatic documents. Kordt and Dirksen, for example, attempt to explain why Hitler failed to achieve the close friendship with Great Britain that he had recognized as a necessity in *Mein Kampf*. They reveal useful information on the Simon-Edens mission to Berlin in 1935, on the negotiations leading to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935, on Captain Wiedemann's mission to London during the Czech crisis of 1938, and on the British contacts of the Wilhelmstrasse opposition group in 1938 and during the last months of peace. They conclude, probably correctly, that Hitler continued to desire an understanding even during the war, but one on his own terms.[46] He told his awed listeners at table during the war: "The end of this war will be the beginning of the enduring friendship with England. The '*Knock-out blow*,' which the English expect from those they respect [!!], is the condition for our living with them peacefully. . . . "[47] Britain's dislike of France's hegemony during the 1920's—the basis for Anglo-German friendship in *Mein Kampf*—obviously ceased to exist almost from the beginning of Hitler's rule, and the problem was to find a substitute. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, it is claimed, was at first regarded as an important step in this direction, but, according to Kordt, Edward VIII's abdication, December 10, 1936, removed the one person upon whom Hitler had counted to oppose the influences hostile to Germany.[48] Having ruled out colonies as a common ground for agreement with Britain, Hitler thenceforth never seriously considered any other basis than a free hand in Eastern Europe for himself in return for his guarantee of the security of the British Empire. Other things being equal, Britain might have accepted the Naval Agreement as a beginning of a businesslike arrangement, but the desired free hand in Eastern Europe would have created on a continent dominated by Germany a far greater threat to Britain's security than the French hegemony of the 1920's had ever presented. As Ribbentrop became convinced that Britain would never permit this development peacefully, he turned against Great Britain as Germany's real enemy and favored the Axis relationship with Japan and Italy.

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[45] *Das offene Problem*, pp. 100, 101.

[46] As is well-known, Hitler never regarded the question of colonies either as a serious obstacle or as an effective basis for an understanding. The question was discussed to some extent during the Hitler-Halifax conversations at Berchtesgaden, November 19, 1937. For the German memorandum on these conversations, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. I, *From Neurath to Ribbentrop, September 1937–September 1938*, pp. 54–67.

[47] Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, pp. 42, 43 (July 22, 1941).

[48] *Nicht aus den Akten*, pp. 103 ff., 159. Contrary to his expectations, the series, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, will presumably in due course throw light upon the contacts Ribbentrop established in Spain and Portugal with the Duke of Windsor in July–August, 1940, after the defeat of France. Kordt concludes that Edward probably had no conception of Hitler's and Ribbentrop's schemes in which he was to play so important a rôle. *Ibid.*, p. 399.

In general, there is little that is new in these volumes on Nazi-Soviet relations and the immediate background of the war. As ambassador to Moscow (1928–1933), Dirksen observed the swift cooling of the cordial relations, existing after Rapallo (1922), to the freezing point,[49] but it is worthy of note that Meissner attributed the transition to virulent hostility in 1934 largely to the influence of Goebbels and other party leaders.[50] That Hitler had little interest in the Ukrainian question is shown, in Kordt's opinion, by his sacrifice of the Carpatho-Ukraine, after the occupation of Prague, to the desire of Poland and Hungary for a common frontier,[51] but this move was probably regarded as temporary. Kordt also claims that an agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union in October, 1938, with Hitler's approval, stipulating restrictions on personal attacks in the press against Soviet and German leaders.[52] More interesting are Kordt's and Weizsäcker's accounts of their clandestine efforts to convince the British, during the summer of 1939, of the necessity of the successful conclusion of the Moscow negotiations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, if peace were to be preserved.[53] Schmidt, who accompanied Ribbentrop on the crucial flight to Moscow, August 22, 1939, notes the latter's enthusiasm over the "strong faces" of the men of the Kremlin; Schmidt also observed Ribbentrop's agitation just before he informed the Soviet ambassador, during the early hours of June 22, 1941, of the German invasion—as if Ribbentrop sensed the ultimate disaster.[54]

More significant is the evidence regarding Hitler's policy during the war, especially that which relates to his conception of the "New Order" and to the question of a separate peace. His aim, particularly after the attack upon Soviet Russia, was clearly nothing less than the "unconditional surrender" of all of his enemies. With all due reservations regarding the reliability of his table talk,[55] these records leave little doubt but that the "New Order" for him meant the establishment by conquest of the "Great Germanic Empire" and the exploitation of the peripheral areas beyond its borders. In his vague way, he may have briefly considered the possibility of a deal with the Vichy government after the armistice with France, June 22, 1940; but in the end Hitler's intention to parcel out French territory to Mussolini and to General Franco, while keeping choice bits for himself, his innate distrust of the French, and, above all, his refusal to tie his hands before final victory, turned him against a peace treaty and hence closed the only avenue to securing France's willing cooperation.[56] Nor was his attitude towards General Franco and Spain, despite their recent brotherhood in arms, essentially different. Resentment because of Franco's canniness about entering the war and at reports of clerical domination in Spain moved Hitler to talk of reserving the forty thousand Spanish Republicans who had done good work in the *Todt Organisation* for use in an eventual second civil war, presumably against Franco's regime.[57] He would settle the future of the Low Countries in "brief, to the point declarations."[58] In the administration of the occupied parts of Russia, he backed ruthless NSDAP commissars, such as Erich Koch in the Ukraine, against the more moderate but ineffectual Alfred Rosenberg and his Ministry of the Eastern Territories.[59] For sheer uninhibited brutality, his schemes for the future of Russia, zestfully elaborated in these extraordinary monologues, are surely unequalled. Hitler envisaged a network of model, splendidly constructed Germanic colonies, interconnected and united with the homeland by superhighways and peopled by Netherlanders and Norwegians as well as by Germans. Swiss settlers would serve only as innkeepers! In the Crimea he saw an admirable resettlement area for the Germans of the South Tyrol. These centers of civilization and power would be fortified islands in a Slavic sea. Deprived of all but local political organization and permitted only the most elementary educational facilities, the natives were to be allowed to live as best they could in their filthy and disease-ridden villages. He would, said Hitler, personally shoot any one who dared to teach them German public hygiene. Native delegations would be occasionally shown the glories of Germania, Berlin's new name as the capital of the Great Germanic Empire. An occasional bomb would suffice to discourage rebellious inclinations. As to the Balkans, Germany should control the Danube, a German river in Hitler's view; and, judging by his remarks about the good prospects of

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[49] *Moskau-Tokio-London*, pp. 120–122. Hitler nevertheless agreed that credits already arranged should be prolonged. The Treaty of Berlin of 1926 had been renewed May 5, 1933.

[50] *Staatssecretär*, p. 342.

[51] Kordt, *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, p. 142.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 155, n. 2. This claim is not confirmed by the published German diplomatic correspondence. *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, Series D, Vol. IV, *The Aftermath of Munich, October 1938–March 1939* (Washington, 1951), pp. 602–633.

[53] *Wahn und Wirklichkeit*, pp. 159, 160 fn.; *Nicht aus den Akten*, pp. 313 ff.; Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, p. 235.

[54] *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne*, pp. 444, 539.

[55] Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, *passim*.

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[56] Abetz, *Das offene Problem*, p. 126 ff.; Hitler in a situation conference, end of March, 1942, Heusinger, *Befehl im Widerstreit*, p. 180; Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, p. 60 (April 1, 1942), p. 78 (April 28, 1942), p. 83 (May 13, 1942); Meissner, *Staatssekretär*, p. 546.

[57] Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, p. 107 (July 7, 1942).

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101 (June 27, 1942).

[59] For a first-hand account of the struggle over the control of policy in Eastern Europe, see Peter Kleist, *Zwischen Stalin und Hitler, 1939–1945* (Bonn, 1950), pp. 129–225. Following service in administrative offices concerned with East Germany (1932–1936), Kleist worked in Ribbentrop's personal foreign office (*Dienststelle Ribbentrop*) in various capacities in connection with Eastern Europe until January, 1943, when he became one of the higher officials (*Ministerial Dirigent*) in Rosenberg's Ministry. The final phase of his career, as a member of Ribbentrop's personal staff (1943–1945), is mentioned in connection with peace moves.

Germanizing the Croats and other peoples, the control was to extend over a large part of the Balkans as well.[60]

For Germany, Hitler was determined that the war should mean all or nothing. If the German people's fanatical will faltered and Germany were defeated, it deserved, he told his intimates, to go down to destruction. Even he seems to have understood the impossibility of a decisive military victory after the successful Anglo-American breakout from the Normandy beachhead in July, 1944, but he still counted, as did Frederick the Great, upon divisions among the Allies to give him a peace that would secure "the life of the German nation for the next 50 or 100 years. . . . " What was required was an iron will, like his own, to hold out until the time came "when the tension between the Allies will become so great that the break will occur. . . . " He assured the possibly skeptical generals at a conference, August 31, 1944, of his capacity to exploit a favorable situation. "But it is childish and naïve to expect that at a moment of grave military defeats the moment for favorable political dealings has come."[61] He rejected out-of-hand suggestions from his allies, who did not share his Wagnerian acceptance of a *Götterdämmerung*, of separate treaties of peace—that of Mussolini, after the successful Anglo-American landing in North Africa in November, 1942, with Soviet Russia, and that of Antonescu of Rumania with the Western powers.[62] The evidence indicates that steps of a sort were taken towards a separate peace with the East as well as the West, but the extent of Hitler's knowledge and approval is uncertain. Weizsäcker's hopes of negotiations when he went to Rome in 1943 as ambassador to the Vatican could scarcely have escaped the suspicious Ribbentrop. Unfortunately Weizsäcker's account is brief and probably incomplete, but he does mention a German peace feeler in September, 1943, via Madrid to the Vatican. It was addressed to the Western powers and was supported by a hint of an attractive offer from Stalin, carrying with it a threat of an Eastern orientation. Early in 1945, Ribbentrop directed him to approach the same powers with a proposal for the cessation of hostilities in the West and to threaten Hitler's voluntary bolshevization of Germany in the event of a refusal.[63] What happened thereafter is still unknown. On the question of contacts with the Soviet Union, Kleist's book is so far about the only available evidence; and his narrative, it seems, must stand or fall on internal evidence alone, for apparently not one of those on the German side who could confirm it is living and nothing is likely to be learned from the Soviets. However, confirmation of his visits to Stockholm at or about the dates given in his book exists in the papers of the passport division of the German Foreign Ministry archives. For almost a year after November, 1942, he writes, the Soviets, through a middleman, a certain Edgar Clauss, pressed for conversations for reasons which were explained with curious candor. It is the strange reactions of the German authorities, however, that are of present interest. On first hearing of Kleist's initial contacts with Clauss through intelligence reports (as Kleist had gone to Stockholm on quite another matter), Hitler dismissed the whole affair as a Jewish provocation; and, indeed, Kleist was arrested and interrogated by the highest official in the Security Service [*Sicherheitsdienst*] and placed under "house arrest" on his return to Berlin. From first to last, Hitler and Ribbentrop refused to authorize conversations, but neither could they bring themselves to the point of breaking the tenuous contact completely. It was finally broken, according to Kleist, in the autumn of 1943 when the Soviets fixed a final time-limit. Ribbentrop's strangely persistent interest, shown in his repeated revival of the matter and in his urging Kleist to go immediately to Stockholm when Kleist had abandoned the entire affair, suggests not only an unwillingness on his part to sacrifice a chance for an arrangement but also a chronic incapacity for decisive action, especially when in doubt of Hitler's views.[64] Given Hitler's attitude towards the war, quite apart from the Allies' demand for unconditional surrender at Casablanca in January, 1943, there was no middle course for Germany between complete victory and complete defeat.

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[60] Picker, *Hitlers Tischgespräche*, pp. 44, 45 (November 8–10, 1941); pp. 71–72 (April 11, 1942); p. 303 (May 12, 1942); p. 102 (June 29, 1942); p. 314 (July 2, 1942); pp. 110, 111 (July 9, 1942); p. 114 (July 22, 1942); pp. 125–126 (July 27, 1942).

[61] Gilbert, *Hitler Directs His War*, pp. 105, 106.

[62] Schmidt, *Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne*, pp. 552, 576.

[63] Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 373–375. Guderian, Chief of the General Staff from the attempt upon Hitler's life, July 20, 1944, to March, 1945, says he suggested to Ribbentrop on January 25, 1945, that the two should together go to Hitler and propose an effort to secure an armistice with one side or the other. Ribbentrop refused, alleging Hitler's rejection of negotiations with the enemy. *Erinnerungen eines Soldaten*, pp. 364–368. In a second volume, Paul Schmidt writes briefly of three agents' having been sent to Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden in February, 1945, with Hitler's approval. Their mission was to secure a slackening of Allied operations in the West, not a formal armistice, to enable Germany to concentrate against the Red Army. As they could offer only the evacuation of occupied territory, while the Western Allies insisted upon the disappearance of the National Socialist regime, nothing was accomplished. There are obvious inconsistencies

Not enough historical writing on the foreign policy of the Third Reich has as yet been published in Germany to warrant firm conclusions as to trends. However, two books have appeared based upon a serious study of considerable evidence. Their conclusions are almost diametrically opposed to each other. Largely documented from the material revealed at the principal Nürnberg war-crimes trial, Holldack's admirable analysis reaffirms the guilt of Hitler and his regime; " . . . Hitler's policies, autarchy, rearmament and foreign policy and all his statements we have come to know, prove that he worked for war from the beginning and that he regarded it as providing the sole solution of the 'German Question' . . . ."[65] Assmann is less concerned with the background of the war

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between this and the evidence of Weizsäcker and Guderian. Paul Schmidt, *Der Statist auf der Galerie, 1945–1950: Erlebnisse, Kommentare, Vergleiche* (Bonn, 1951), pp. 10–13.

[64] Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin*, pp. 230–278. Kleist claims to have tried unsuccessfully for contacts with representatives of the Western powers in Stockholm, also that he personally regarded an agreement with the Soviet Union as a betrayal of the anti-Bolshevik Russians such as General Vlassov.

[65] According to late information, Holldack is a member of the staff of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich. Heinz Holldack, *Was wirklich geschah: Die diplomatische Hintergründe der deutschen Kriegspolitik* (Munich, 1949), p. 143. The book reprints a representative selection of documents.

than with its conduct, yet he does not hesitate largely to question the truth of such sweeping condemnations as that by Holldack. "The fact," he writes, "that the catastrophe of 1939 was precipitated by a German aggression does not in itself justify the conclusion that Hitler was by nature an advocate of war. A man who had undertaken so many peaceful tasks within Germany, some of which were in the process of being carried out, some of which were still in the planning stage, needed peace rather than war. *But, for him, the attainment of his political aims came first.* As soon as he became convinced that he could not attain them without war, he decided to take the road that necessarily led to war." Admittedly, he writes, his views are today those of a small minority, but of the eventual judgment of history he is confident.[66]

Whether German historiography will follow Holldack or Assmann is, of course, impossible to say. Some of the circumstances that produced the "revisionist" movement of the 1920's do not exist today. There is no equivalent of Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, with its implied collective condemnation of Germany, nor is there likely to be one inserted in a future peace treaty. Except for such National Socialist Party organizations as the SS, guilt in the verdict of the Nürnberg court was strictly personal. Nor is there so far in Germany a central authority interested in encouraging a movement for the rehabilitation of Hitler and the Third Reich. That powerful incentives to accomplish precisely this objective do exist, however, there can be little doubt. And, if there is no Treaty of Versailles to be revised, there remain the moral judgment of world opinion and the verdicts of the war-crimes trials to be changed. Much will doubtless depend upon Germany's internal political evolution, but, in any event, it would be surprising were Assmann not to have successors. Some of the lines such future writers are likely to follow are indicated in the recent publications of former National Socialist leaders.

E. MALCOLM CARROLL.

Duke University.

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[66] The italics are Assmann's. Kurt Assmann, *Deutsche Schicksaljahre: Historische Bilder aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und Seiner Vorgeschichte* (Wiesbaden, 1950), pp. 539–540. Had Hitler died after Munich, history would have regarded him, in Assmann's opinion, as one of the greatest and most successful statesmen of modern history. *Ibid.*, p. 38. In charge of the historical section of the German Naval High Command, Assmann worked for more than three years after 1945 in the German naval archives in London, where they are under the control of the British Admiralty. Several of Assmann's articles, some of which were used in the preparation of his volume, have appeared in American periodicals.

RECENT LITERATURE ON CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY HISTORY

Western scholars and Chinese propagandists have, with different motives, produced substantial additions to the literature of Chinese Communist Party history during the past year. Happily, the fruit of serious Western scholarship is reaching the market in good time to counteract the influence of Peking's presses—which seek to exemplify the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung's line through three decades of party history and to condemn the obliquity of all those who lacked prescience of that recently-established Marxist-Leninist "fact." Thus we may have reason to hope that Peking's labored rewriting of Chinese Communist Party history will not hold the relatively unchallenged monopoly enjoyed for nearly a decade in the 'thirties by analogous rewriting of the history of the C.P.S.U.

In the principal work now under review, *Mao's China; Party Reform Documents, 1942–44,*[1] Boyd Compton has very competently translated and introduced the important documents of the *Cheng-feng* (Party Reform) Movement of 1942–1944.[2] This movement had been formally initiated by Mao Tse-tung's address opening the Communist Party School in Yenan on February 1, 1942, when he emphasized the necessity for "a movement of enlightenment in our Party which will liberate our comrades' spirits from the darkness of subjectivism and summon them to resistance against subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism." The ensuing intraparty crusade definitively bolshevized the CCP, stamping upon it the "Marxist-Leninist" character that steadily becomes more pronounced. Insofar as the *Cheng-feng* Movement singled out for attack such deviationist "isms" as subjectivism (or dogmatism), sectarianism, and formalism, and their proponents, it exhibited some characteristics of a purge. But its principal emphasis was more constructively placed on instruction and indoctrination calculated to guide the rather heterogeneous party membership onto the correct Marxist-Leninist path and to reform or reëducate the deviationists—instead of driving them out of the Party. Marxism-Leninism was authoritatively interpreted and given effect in learning, in party life, and in literature and the arts. The leitmotiv throughout was: "Become a *good* Communist!"

The *Cheng-feng* Movement, intrinsically a significant episode in the history of the CCP, was also the prototype of the "party reformation" movement of 1948–1949 and the "ideological remoulding" movement of 1950–1951. Its teachings, compactly distilled in the General Introduction to the Party Constitution of June 11, 1945, throw important light on the Chinese Communist mind in 1952. The party reform documents, however, are somewhat misleadingly named. They do not deal with the working methods or experiences of the reform movement—about which we still remain largely in the dark—but comprise the selected doctrinal "readings" assigned to party members as guides to the reform of their own "thoughts" and "working style," constituting, actually, a textbook for party members.[3] The "readings" range, in date, from 1925 (Stalin, "The Bolshevization of the Party") through 1944 (Resolution of the Central Committee, CCP, December 17, 1944, on the Yenan Cadre School). Compton has taken two justifiable liberties in handling the original materials: (1) he has omitted six documents of Soviet origin (by Lenin, Stalin and Dimitrov) elsewhere available in English translations, listing them for reference in the Preface (pp. x–xi); and (2) he has added a translation of the Peking *Jen-min jih-pao* (*People's Daily*) editorial of July 1, 1950, on "Remolding the Party's Style of Work and Improving Its State of Organization." This editorial, an important directive during the "ideological remoulding" movement of 1950–1951, rather dramatically illustrates how the ideological struggles of 1942–1944 live on in the present. "*Mao's China*" is therefore a somewhat misleading title for the Compton volume, but its subtitle gives fair warning to the scanner of bibliographical lists and book reviews.

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[1] Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1952. Pp. liii, 278. $4.50.

[2] The "movement" is occasionally dated from July 1, 1941, when the CCP Central Committee adopted a resolution on "Strengthening the Party Spirit." Compton also suggests that a "second" *Cheng-feng* Movement, hardly distinguishable from the "first," began with a Central Committee resolution of June 1, 1943, on "Methods of Leadership." A precise terminal date for the movement can hardly be fixed because of its very nature and purpose—indoctrination in the "universal truths of Marxism-Leninism" which are permanent guides to the conduct and attitudes of party members.

Compton's translated materials fall into two general categories: (1) works by important leaders and theoreticians of the Chinese Communist movement, such as Mao Tse-tung (seven speeches or articles, including his "In Opposition to Liberalism" of September 7, 1937), Liu Shao-ch'i (three speeches or articles, including "On the Intra-Party Struggle," of July 2, 1941, and "Training of the Communist Party Member," of August 7, 1939[4]), and Ch'en Yün ("How to Be a Communist Party Member," of May 30, 1939); and (2) key official party documents, including six Central Committee resolutions of the 1941–1944 period. This bare suggestion of the content of the Compton volume should arouse the interest of everyone—specialist or nonspecialist—whose curiosity about Communist China has been stimulated by recent events. All should want this book on their shelves beside Liu Shao-ch'i's *On the Party*.[5]

Further evidence of awakening American interest in the internal history of the CCP is reflected in the recent publication of Benjamin I. Schwartz' *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*[6] and Harold R. Isaacs' revised edition of *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution.*[7] The Schwartz volume, painstakingly done and meticulously faithful to the limited documentation available, says more than any other volume published in English about the early history of the CCP from the pre-1921 period through 1925, and the intraparty struggles of 1928–1935 that culminated in Mao's emergence as supreme leader—casting critical light on Mao's standard condemnation of Ch'en Tu-hsiu (principal founder of the CCP) as a "right opportunist." Isaacs has considerably modified the tone of his earlier (1938) work of the same title, properly classified as Trotskyite, and offers what is probably the most readable and insightful account of the doctrinal and tactical problems of the 1925–1927 period. He offers sage judgments on Chinese internal politics and society in general, but places greatest emphasis on the effects in China and within the CCP of the Stalin-Trotsky feud.[8] With Schwartz and the revised Isaacs on his shelf beside Compton and Liu Shao-ch'i, the general reader or professional researcher will have important and suggestive guides to knowledge of perhaps the most significant and fascinating political development of this century. He will also want to add the forthcoming volume by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbanks;[9] and other American research projects, many well-advanced, promise to add substantially to the growing literature of the subject in the near future.[10]

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[3] The *Cheng-feng wen-hsien* [*Party Reform Documents*] was probably first published in 1943, but the earliest known edition available in the United States is the "revised edition" issued by the Chieh-fang she (n.p.), 1944. The technique employed is familiar in conducting "movements" in Communist China. The ideological remoulding movement in 1950–1951 revolved around the reading and discussion of prescribed articles, statements, or documents; other materials were "assigned reading" during the movement "to reform the intellectuals" in November, 1951.

[4] Also published in English translation as *How to Be a Good Communist* (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, Oct., 1951).

[5] The official English translation (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1950) of *Lun tang*, a briefer title for his 1945 report on the Party Constitution. See H. A. Steiner, "Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party:* A Review Article," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 11, no. 1 (Nov., 1951, pp. 79–84).

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[6] Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951. Pp. 258. $4.00. Using important source materials, Robert C. North, in "The Rise of Mao Tse-tung," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (Feb., 1952, pp. 137–145), has supplemented and enlarged upon Schwartz' account of the conditions under which Mao finally captured the leadership of the CCP. North has also written a valuable introduction ("Communists of the Chinese Revolution") to Nym Wales' *Red Dust; Autobiographies of Chinese Communists* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1952. Pp. xiv, 238. $5.00).

[7] Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1951. Pp. xiii, 382. $5.00.

[8] Steiner, "The Chinese Revolution," *Yale Review*, Vol. 41, no. 2 (Winter, 1952, pp. 311–314).

[9] Their *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* has been announced for 1952 publication (London: George Allen & Unwin; Cambridge: Harvard University Press) and has been examined in page proof. Portions of this long-awaited collection of documents and notes have already received a limited private or official distribution and have been used by researchers in the field. The *Documentary History* includes 40 selected documents covering the 27 years between 1922 and 1949; these are interspersed with 24 substantive or interpretative notes that make it something more than a mere collection of documents. Twenty-eight of the documents are from the 1922–1940 period, and only three are postwar (all of 1949). Five of the *Cheng-feng* documents are necessarily included, since the history concentrates on the development of the internal party line, and only in this respect is there duplication or overlapping of the Compton book. Where the Compton volume more intensively probes into a relatively brief interval in the history of the CCP, the Brandt-Schwartz-Fairbank work is broader and more comprehensive in scope. While complementary to each other, these two volumes each make contributions in their own right.

[10] As part of the current research project of the East Asian Institute of Columbia

Across the Pacific, the study of CCP history is pursued in a different vein. "There is not a shred of doubt," the Peking *People's Daily* declared on July 1, 1951, "that the systematic study of the Party's history will greatly strengthen Marxist-Leninist education throughout the Party, and will greatly heighten the consciousness and confidence of all party cadres and members. . . ." Party history is intensively popularized through all available mass media—the daily press, the popular periodical, the cheap book or pamphlet, the radio, the stage and cinema, and the popular mass meeting.[11] The tenets of Marxist-Leninist "historiography" are well enough known: the necessity for "uniting theory and practice" means that the study of history should not be undertaken merely to establish an objectively valid explanation of the past. Consequently, all CCP "histories" must somehow contribute to the legend of Mao Tse-tung's infallibility or to the consolidation of the "people's democratic dictatorship." Much that is circulated as "history" is sheer trash and nonsense, but with careful screening of the vast quantitative output the Western student may profitably follow even the daily Chinese press and fill in missing pieces of the incomplete mosaic.

The history-conscious CCP seems aware of the inadequacies of its own documentation and is strenuously seeking to recapture documents and other party materials before they are irretrievably lost.[12] The very process of converting

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University, under the direction of Professor C. Martin Wilbur, that group is now translating some 40 of the Russian documents relating to the CCP captured during Chang Tso-lin's raid on the Office of the Soviet Military Attaché in Peking, April 6, 1927. These documents, contemporaneously translated into Chinese by anti-Communist interests, are in *Su-lien yin-mou wen-chang hui-pien* [*Collection of Documents on the Soviet Conspiracy*] (Peking, 1928). First-draft English translations of eight of the documents, whose authenticity is being verified, have been informally circulated.

Two recent mimeographed bibliographies of the East Asiatic Library of Columbia University, based on its holdings of CCP materials, also have special interest for the political scientist: (1) *Guide to the Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Nov. 23, 1951, 16 pp.), with Supplement I (March 6, 1952, 8 pp.); and (2) *Writings of the Members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party* (April 5, 1952, 41 pp.).

Several studies relating to Communist China are included in *Research on China*, compiled by the External Research Staff, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State (ERS Research List No. 2, processed, Jan. 16, 1952, 11 pp.).

[11] New China News Agency announced (Shanghai, July 13, 1951) that "history reporting teams" had personally "reported" to 260 groups totalling 3,500,000 persons in the factories, schools and other organizations of the Shanghai area during the week of July 1, 1951. Comparable methods of popularizing party history for the masses were employed in nearly every urban center. The Peking Municipal Committee of the CCP issued a typical directive on this occasion: "Propaganda [for the 30th anniversary of the CCP] should center upon the revolutionary history of the CCP . . . . Reminiscences about the Party's historical struggles, and accounts of the struggles of revolutionary martyrs, model party workers and party organizations, should be collected from cadres and party members . . . ." (NCNA, Peking, June 22, 1951).

[12] The Propaganda Department of the South-Central Branch Bureau of the party publicly advertised in September, 1951, for photographs of scenes of CCP activity in Wuhan in the troubled days of 1926–1927, and for files of contemporary journals and newspapers.

historic sites and scenes of party activity into shrines throws light on some obscure historical details.[13] Tidbits of useful supplementary information show up in the published reminiscences of persons who were associated with Mao in earlier days.[14] The daily press is often studded with brief popular biographies of Communist personalities of the past and present: the daughter of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, who succeeded Ch'en Tu-hsiu as the leader of the Party on August 7, 1927, recites anecdotes of her father's life; personal relations between Sun Yat-sen and Wu Yü-chang, an important Communist personality of the present day, are related in such a manner as to emphasize the treachery and "renegade" character of Chiang Kai-shek; the murder of Mao Tse-min, "martyred" brother of Mao Tse-tung, is poignantly recounted to dramatize the latter's personal revolutionary suffering; and somewhat contradictory stories about Mao An-ying, Mao Tse-tung's Russian-trained son, suggest that nepotism is not dead in Communist China, since Mao An-ying emerges as a minor figure in the central party Secretariat who acts as translator and go-between in relations with Russians. While the historical objectivity of such accounts as these is always suspect, the bits and pieces are informative. They illustrate the version of CCP history that present leaders wish to perpetuate; they give insights into early episodes of party history not yet fully known; and the very act of clothing with respectability some of the skeletons in the party closet may reveal important trends in thought control.

Some evidence is already available of a concerted effort to subvert the very sources of historical information. Last year the Peita academician Liu Jen-ching, one of the original founders of the national party who long since retired from active politics, was obliged to lend credence to the Maoist legend by publicly recanting his "Menshevist" and "Trotskyite" errors of 1927–1929—with suitable embellishment of the history of those days.[15] Fung Yu-lan, China's most eminent philosophical historiographer,[16] felt obliged to say that Mao's revelations of Marxist-Leninist epistemology[17] proved "that the ancient philosophers of China held imperfect views on the problem of knowledge and practice," but that "*On Practice* solves the problem."[18] On July 10, 1951, the official news agency reported that Fung had accepted a "research" grant from the Academy of Sciences in order that he might revise his famous history of Chinese philosophy in the light of the new thinking.

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[13] Examples: The Shanghai *Ta Kung Pao*, September 28, 1951, identified three sites where sessions of the First (i.e., founding) National Congress of the CCP were held in Shanghai in July, 1921, in an account of their restoration—along with Mao's temporary residence at that time—as national shrines. The *Shanghai News*, October 5, 1951, carried one Wang Chi's colorful account of his pilgrimage to Mao's birthplace in Shaoshan, which is also becoming a shrine.

[14] Tu Sung-shou has reported intimate details of Mao's propaganda and organizational activities in Canton early in 1926 (Hong Kong *Wen Hui Pao*, June 24, 1951, reprinted from Sian's *Ch'un-chung jih-pao*). General Ho Lung's account of the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, reports on an important episode in Chinese Communist military history, "confessing" that the confusion then prevailing resulted from the military leaders' unawareness of Mao's military "genius" and strategic concepts (Peking, *Jen-min jih-pao*, August 1, 1951). Ho's dereliction is entirely understandable, however, in view of Mao's complete abstention from military affairs until some date after August 1, 1927! On the same occasion, General Ch'en Yi recalled the military experiences of the 1927–1928 period in "Learn from the Marxist-Leninist Creative Style of Work of Chairman Mao" (NCNA, Peking, July 31, 1951).

[15] Hong Kong *Ta Kung Pao*, January 15, 1951, reprinted from *Jen-min jih-pao*.

[16] His *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh shih* [*History of Chinese Philosophy*] became widely known with Derk Bodde's translation of its first volume (Peking, Henri Vetch, 1937).

The official view of party history is also reflected in a number of more substantial publications. The first of four projected volumes of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* was published on October 12, 1951,[19] and contains 16 of his articles and speeches of the 1926–1937 period, many of them not previously published. This long-awaited event initiated a new upsurge in the study of party history by the rank-and-file of party members and cadres. A handy officialized reference work about events and personalities of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement, Chinese and foreign, is the *"Study" Encyclopedia*,[20] which also includes texts of current basic documents. Somewhat less reliable, but helpful when used with care, is a two-volume compilation of biographies of 208 prominent Chinese Communists published late in 1950 as *Leading Personalities of the New China.*[21]

The thirtieth anniversary celebration of the CCP on July 1, 1951, occasioned the publication of several official "histories" of the Party. Ch'en Po-ta, a member of the Central Committee, produced a pamphlet whose title describes its content and purpose: *Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution Is the Combination of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese Revolution.*[22] This work by one of Communist China's most prolific polemicists devotes its nine brief chapters to reconciling the processes of the Chinese Revolution with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and to deifying Mao Tse-tung as "the outstanding representative of Marxism-Leninism in China." Ch'en's work has no scholarly standing whatever, despite its patient citation of the writings of Lenin and Stalin, but has special value in spelling out what Chinese Communists think about themselves and their role in the world revolution. As one reads of the infallible correctness of Mao Tse-tung's social and political judgments through a quarter-century, he is apt to wonder if there are any limits to sycophancy. Mao's leadership has "aroused the teeming millions of the people of the world to join in the universal world struggle against imperialism. . . ." He has applied the "general guiding principles of Marxism-Leninism to the nations of the East whose conditions radically differ from those of European nations," and the correctness of the "new" Marxist conclusion has already been "demonstrated" both in China and in the "countries of Southeast Asia." Ch'en aspires to establish two basic principles: (1) that Mao, following Lenin and Stalin, solved the problems of the Chinese revolution by reconciling the unique social and political situation in that country with Marxism-Leninism (actually meaning that Mao departed sufficiently from Lenin's and Stalin's generalized directives to create a new revolutionary concept with special application to Asiatic countries); and (2) that Mao's China, with its own special experiences and capabilities, is the natural new fulcrum of the revolutionary movement in other Asiatic countries. These conclusions can hardly be called new, but in the present context they have important implications for Sino-Soviet relations.

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[17] *Shih-chieh lun [On Practice]*, reissued December 29, 1950, and fully translated in *People's China*, Vol. 3, no. 11 (June 1, 1951, supplement, 24 pp.). *People's China* is itself an important source of Communist-inspired history and ideology. Published in Peking fortnightly since January 1, 1950, by the Foreign Languages Press, it is the direct successor to the *China Digest*, formerly published in Hong Kong (Dec. 31, 1946–Feb. 1, 1950). Although current exchange regulations prevent the placing of subscriptions, copies of *People's China* are usually found at left-wing, "progressive" bookstores.

[18] Fung Yu-lan, "Mao Tse-Tung's *On Practice* and Chinese Philosophy," *People's China*, Vol. 4, no. 10 (Nov. 16, 1951, pp. 5–7 *et seq.*).

[19] By Jen-min ch'u-pan she, Peking; but simultaneously published in other places. This publication shows how CCP history is being rewritten "by omission." In his famous *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* [*Hu-nan nung-min yün-tung k'ao-ch'a pao-kao*] (March, 1927), Mao had evaluated the respective contributions to the "democratic revolution" of city dwellers and military units, as contrasted with the peasantry, on a ten-point scale, and concluded: "The achievements of the urban dwellers and military units rate only three points, while the remaining seven points should go to the peasants in their rural revolution." This "most remarkable statement" (Schwartz, p. 75), which appears in every other edition of the *Report* and has always been regarded as an important key to Mao's "thought," is significantly deleted from the definitive text of 1951!

[20] *Hsüeh-hsi tzŭ-tien* (Peking, T'ien-hsia ch'u-pan she, May, 1951). The nine separately paged sections of this volume total 822 double-column pages.

[21] *Hsin Chung-kuo jen-wu-chih* (Hong Kong, Chou-ho-pao ts'ung-shu, 2 vols. bound in 1, pp. 278 and 268, respectively, 1950).

[22] *Lun Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang Ma-k'o-ssu Lieh-ning chu-i yü Chung-kuo ko-ming ti chieh-ho* (Peking, Hsin-hua shu-tien, July, 1951, pp. 58). Text also in *Hsüeh-hsi* [*Study*], Vol. 4, nos. 6–7 (July 1, 1951, pp. 7–20).

The same general attitudes are supported by two brief official histories of the CCP—one by Hu Chiao-mu, Deputy Director of Propaganda for the CCP Central Committee;[23] the other, even briefer, by the official *Hsüeh-hsi* (Study) Society of Peking.[24] Hu follows Ch'en in emphasizing the infallible leadership of Mao Tse-tung and the treacherous vagaries of those who stood at any time in opposition to him. He centers his history upon the *three* epochal "domestic revolutionary wars" of 1921–1927, 1927–1936, and 1945–1950, and finally lays to rest any surviving notions that the CCP might ever have been guided during its thirty years of history by peaceful or nonrevolutionary motives! The "correctness" of the decisions of various party congresses and conferences, from 1922 onward, is reappraised according to their conformity with the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung. This official party history, while briefer, is the Chinese counterpart of the famous *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*. It excerpts only those passages from party documents that are consistent with the Maoist conclusion, a method which suggests that important documents of internal party history will remain secret, and that critical studies of the official Maoist version of the Chinese revolution may be rendered even more difficult.

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[23] *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti san-shih nien* [*Thirty Years of the CCP*] (Peking, Hsin-hua shu-tien, June, 1951, pp. 77). Initial Peking press-run: 500,000 copies. Text also in *Hsüeh-hsi*, cited, pp. 33–53. English translation in *People's China*, Vol. 4, nos. 2–6 serially (July 16–Sept. 16, 1951).

[24] *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chien-shih* [*Brief History of the CCP*] (Peking, Hsüeh-hsi, July, 1951, pp. 49).

The thirtieth anniversary of the party also produced panegyrics by at least 32 prominent party personalities, most of them with heavy historical overtones. Many were published in English translations in *People's China.*[25] In ensemble, they appear in a three-volume edition published by the South China Branch Bureau of the CCP Central Committee.[26] This collection addresses itself to a broad range of current policies and problems—from party doctrine to administrative detail—but each contributor seems equally gifted with the capacity for identifying all "correct" policy and action with the infallible "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.

Sidelights on CCP history also appear in such "standard" histories of the Chinese revolution as those by Hu Hua,[27] Hu Sheng,[28] and Yua Ying-shen[29]—which are regularly reissued in new editions. In view of the current international situation, note might also be made of the scores of "histories" of "American imperialism" in China that come in endless streams from the propaganda presses. Perhaps the most ambitious of these, and certainly one of the most inaccurate, is Liu Ta-nien's *History of American Aggression in China.*[30] Works of this type glorify the national spirit of the CCP and the role of Mao Tse-tung as a savior of the Chinese people; they intimately associate the real or fancied machinations of American imperialism with the growth and development of the CCP.

H. ARTHUR STEINER.

University of California (Los Angeles).

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[25] Vol. 4, nos. 1–3 (July 1–Aug. 1, 1951).

[26] *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ch'eng-li san-shih chou-nien chi-nien chuan-chi* [*Reports on the Achievements of the CCP during its Thirtieth Anniversary Celebration*] (Canton, Hua-nan jen-min jih-pao, 3 vols., July, 1951).

[27] *Chung-kuo hsin min-chu chu-i ko-ming shih* [*History of the Chinese New Democratic Revolution*].

[28] *Ti-kuo chu-i yü Chung-kuo cheng-chih* [*Imperialism and Chinese Politics*].

[29] *Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang lieh-shih-chuan* [*Collected Articles on the CCP*].

[30] *Mei-kuo ch'in-hua shih* (Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1951). This is an enlarged edition of his original *Mei-kuo ch'in-hua chien-shih* [*Short History of American Aggression in China*] (Peking ?, 1949).

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Realism and Political Idealism; A Study in Theories and Realities. By John H. Herz. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. Pp. xii, 275. $3.75.)

This is a serious and interesting attempt to analyze a phenomenon which may perhaps be best described as the apocalyptic tendency in political thought. Particularly during the past two hundred years, doctrines like Marxism or the philosophy of the Enlightenment have periodically arisen to inspire men with the hope of an imminent Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Their prophets have proclaimed that the sole, or at least the primary, impediments to the realization of social perfection lay in such relatively simple things as private ownership of the instruments of production, or artificial restrictions on the free exchange of goods and ideas; abolish these impediments, so the argument runs, and all will soon be well. The revolutionary optimism generated by such doctrines has been a major factor in the political life of the time. But each doctrine, when put to the test of practical application, has fallen so far short of its announced objectives as to produce an equal and opposite reaction toward cynical disillusionment; the humanitarian hopes of a Condorcet are followed by the "*Enrichissez-vous*" amoralism of a Guizot. The result is a manic-depressive cycle, in which waves of exaggerated optimism alternate with troughs of equally exaggerated pessimism. What is the explanation of this phenomenon? What, if anything, can be done to prevent or mitigate these recurrent frustrations of the reformatory impulse? These are the questions to which the present book is addressed.

Like Hobbes, whose opinions he very largely shares, Professor Herz believes that any fruitful analysis of political behavior must begin with the analysis of human nature. His approach to the problem of politics is therefore essentially psychological in character. Man, he thinks, is driven in his relations with other men by two contradictory impulses. Through fear of others he is impelled to seek security in a competitive struggle for power; through compassion for his fellow men, he regrets the sufferings thus entailed, and yearns for universal peace. Thus there is a perpetual "antagonism between life and compassion" which places man in the unpleasant situation "of having a conscience and yet having daily to act counter to its demands" (p. 9). Unable to bear the contradictory character or, as Herz would say, the "irrationality" of actual social life, he tries to resolve the contradiction by denying its existence. This can be done in two different ways. One may assert that power is an accidental rather than an essential factor in human relations, and proclaim that a society based wholly on compassion is both desirable and possible; thought tending in this direction is "political idealism." Or one may assert that competitive power relations are the beginning and the end of social life, and that the way to success and happiness lies in the repression of compassion; thought tending in this direction is "political realism." But the antagonistic impulses to power and compassion are both rooted in human nature, and both demand expression. The longer the one or the other is neglected, the greater does the hunger for it grow. The result is a perpetual oscillation between the poles of realism and of idealism which constitutes, in Herz's view, the principal dynamic force in the history of political thought.

A new theory of "Realist Liberalism" is the author's own solution to this problem. "Realist Liberalism is a kind of 'second liberalism,' coming as a synthesis after the 'thesis' of utopian idealism and the 'antithesis' of cynical realism" (p. 146). This theory resembles idealism in that it recognizes the importance of the impulse to compassion, and accepts the peaceful reconciliation of interests as the natural and proper goal of human aspirations. It is realist, on the other hand, in that it denies the existence of any predetermined "natural harmony" which will make it feasible, either now or in the future, to neglect the importance of competitive power-drives as a basic factor in the social life of man. Through the techniques of constitutional democracy, and by the adroit balancing of power-drive against power-drive, it is possible for men of good will to satisfy some part at least of the impulse to compassion by frustrating the more painful manifestations of the competitive-power impulse. This is the only effective way to counter the "irrationality" of social life.

As a proper constitutional democrat, the present reviewer has no quarrel with Professor Herz's conclusions. He is by no means convinced, however, that these conclusions are compatible with the view of human nature on which they are ostensibly based. It seems, indeed, that our author has succeeded once again in entangling himself in the web first woven, to his own discomfiture, by the illustrious Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes too believed that men, by the necessities of human nature, are impelled to recognize the moral commandments of natural law, which aim at peace and reconciliation. But he also believed that these commandments speak with too small a voice to govern the actual behavior of men, who are driven by an obsessive fear of death to an endless search for power. Having set up this sharp dichotomy between the peaceful aspirations and the bellicose realities of human intercourse, Hobbes could find no better means of bridging the gap than to assume, or rather to hope, that men might one day find the wisdom to create a Leviathan which, by countering power with greater power, would neutralize the effect of competitive fears and give reality to the laws of nature. But how can men, whose every act is dominated by fear, be persuaded to take the enormous leap from the state of nature, where power is the essence of life, to the civil state, where power is frustrated by power? This was the unsolved and insoluble dilemma of Hobbes' political system. The same dilemma rises, once again, to plague Professor Herz. It is true that, by the relative modesty of his demands, he succeeds to some extent in concealing the problem. Whereas the Leviathan was expected to frustrate all power-drives, thus falling hopelessly into the category of political idealism, Realist Liberalism is asked only to frustrate *some*. Unfortunately this concession to the spirit of moderation is won at the expense of logic. Whereas it is at least conceivable that men might be willing to accept complete frustration of their power-drives in the interests of complete peace, it is difficult to see why they would accept partial frustration in a society which still remains essentially bellicose and competitive. Although Professor Herz is none too clear in his definition of these all-important concepts, the main line of his argument assumes that the struggle for competitive power constitutes the "reality" of political life, and that "ideals," far from having creative power of their own, can be achieved only by the manipulation of power "realities." In a world so constituted, Realist Liberalism is a creature no less artificial and improbable than the Leviathan itself.

In the reviewer's opinion, Professor Herz's book, like so many works of the currently modish school of political "realism," is vitiated by a very partial view of reality itself. Christians have always been taught, and non-Christians have repeatedly discovered, that human nature is a curious mixture of the divine and the bestial, of love and hate. When he says, therefore, that man must be content to accept a dual destiny, and that he courts disaster when he overweeningly attempts to disregard the limitations of his earthly condition, Professor Herz is to be welcomed as the exponent of an ancient and ever-valuable tradition of religious and humanistic common sense. But this same common sense compels us to recognize that all the aspects of human nature are equally "real," that compassion is no more and no less a "fact" than fear itself. The effective improvement of social life comes not by compelling "real facts" to conform to "ideals," but by striving to give "ideal facts" the largest possible opportunities for growth in the world of "reality." The reviewer believes that this was, more or less, the message Professor Herz hoped to communicate in this book. If so, it is all the more unfortunate that he fell so readily into the trap of Hobbesian "realism."

F. M. Watkins.

McGill University.

Philosophy of Democratic Government. By Yves R. Simon. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. Pp. ix, 324. $3.50.)

This is an important contribution to the current literature on democracy. It is not a book that can be easily summarized for it is one that needs and deserves to be read more than once. Not content with the clichés and generalizations that characterize much of the current writing on democracy, the author subjects the concepts associated with democracy to a profound and searching analysis. It is speculative political theory in the best sense of the word.

In his introductory chapter on the general theory of government, Professor Simon, a member of the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, gives particular attention to the problem of authority. It is a common mistake, he points out, to identify authority with coercion; but although a conspicuous instrument of authority, coercion is not identical with it. The essence of authority, moreover, should not be confused with any of the particular forms in which this essence is embodied. Authority has within itself a diversity of functions and may be embodied in a variety of forms. The author argues in some detail that "unity of action depends upon unity of judgment, and unity of judgment can be procured either by way of unanimity or by way of authority; no third possibility is conceivable" (p. 19). Where there is more than one means for the attainment of the common good, "anyone may disagree without there being anything wrong either with his intentions or with his judgment"; hence, when a problem of united action cannot be solved by way of unanimity, it can only be solved by way of authority (p. 30). Professor Simon examines the argument that "society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness" and concludes that government would be necessary even in a society of perfect people. It is a common illusion, he points out, "that the good will of each, if it were complete and enlightened, would suffice to guarantee the intention of the common good. This illusion is stubborn because it is hard to master the operation of the principles which, at the bottom of the question, seem to conflict but actually condition and supplement each other. The common good demands that particular persons should do full justice to the goodness of the particular good; but, if such is the case, an over-all direction toward the common good is necessary. Thus the most essential function of authority springs, in the last analysis, from the *autonomic* goodness of the particular good. The autonomy of the homestead and that of the function matter highly for the common good, but, without over-all government, these autonomies would mean the disintegration of society. Thus autonomy renders authority necessary and authority renders autonomy possible . . . " (pp. 70–71).

Upon this foundation Professor Simon proceeds to examine the meaning of democratic freedom, sovereignty in democracy, and democratic equality. He concludes with a discussion of democracy and technology. Although coercion is necessary in a democracy, democracy does favor the use of persuasion "in some special fashion." (1) Democracy "systematically prefers persuasion to coercion and endlessly struggles to extend the domain of government by persuasion (which is not at all the same thing as to cherish the illusion that state coercion can ever fall into disuse)." (2) Democracy "rules that persuasion shall play a decisive role in the designation of the governing personnel." (3) Democracy rules "that attempts at persuading the voter shall take place in open and public discussion" (pp. 118–119). Although it is not always easy to distinguish ends from means, democratic discussion involves deliberation with respect not to ends or principles but to means. "In democracy more than in any other regime it is a problem to assert principles in such a way as not to jeopardize the free discussion of means, and to insure free discussion of means without jeopardizing the principles without which social life no longer has end or form. The risks proper to democratic practice demand that the assertion of principles be more profound, more vital, and more heartfelt than elsewhere. Unless this assertion is embodied in the living essence of community life, it will be nonexistent" (p. 124). Common opinion often sets authority and democracy, authority and freedom, in opposition but the substance of authority cannot be denied without denying the freedom that is dependent upon it. The notion that government by consent of the governed means that "the governed are never bound except by their own consent . . . briefly, that they are never obligated to obey" represents "neither a political nor a democratic necessity but mere revolt against the laws of all community" (p. 194). A more valid interpretation of the theory of government by consent of the people, the author suggests, implies "that every government has a duty to seek the maximum of voluntary co-operation, to explain its purposes and methods, to educate the governed, to appeal indefatigably to whatever element of good will can be found in them, and never to resort to coercion unless persuasion proves impossible" (p. 194).

In examining the problem of democratic equality, Professor Simon points out that "to ask whether men are *essentially* equal, in spite of all the accidents which cause inequality among them, is the same as to ask whether there is one human nature, common to all men" (p. 197). He argues that there is such a common nature and, therefore, to speak of equal justice for all, natural rights, and of the brotherhood of men "makes sense." It would not make sense, however, in the framework of a consistently nominalistic philosophy. He goes on to argue that the democratic conception of equality of opportunity "forbids absolutely the legal exclusion of any person from any function on account of this person's group allegiance" and "requires, further, that society should take positive measures in order that group allegiance should never entail *factual* exclusion from any function"; further, "in the administration of measures designed to give merit a chance, the principle of the greatest possible autonomy should prevail . . . these measures should never be managed by public powers when they can be managed by private initiative, and they should never be managed by the larger unit of public administration when they can be managed by the smaller unit" (pp. 229–230).

It is impossible to do justice to the subtlety and detail of Professor Simon's argument within the limitations of a review. He refers to the central problem of authority throughout his book, and it is this concern which gives unity to his analysis. A realist, in the Aristotelian tradition, Professor Simon points out that "when idealistic absolutism combines with faith in a dogma" it leads to fanaticism. "Not so long ago . . . it was commonly believed that fanaticism was what causes man to feel ruthless toward his fellow-men; it was hoped, accordingly, that the end of dogmas would be a decisive step in the conquest of cruelty. Agnosticism was considered the essence of humanitarianism. This is one of the ideological constructs which were dealt fatal blows by the two world wars and by the revolutions and repressions of our century. In times of social and political convulsions, a skeptical thinker, an agnostic intellectual, may reveal that his sense for the absolute, diverted from being by idealism, rendered acute by culture, and frustrated by doubt, has grown into a destructive frenzy" (pp. 91–92).

The weakness of the book lies in the use of terminology which sometimes obscures rather than clarifies the author's meaning. When the author concludes an argument by saying: "To sum up: collective causality, communion in immanent actions, and communion-causing communications are the criteria of the community as distinct from mere partnership" (p. 66), my head swims. Though these words undoubtedly mean something, I cannot help wishing the author had stated their meaning in language requiring less effort to understand. Despite these occasional stylistic obstacles to clarity, the book deserves a careful reading by all students of government.

JOHN H. HALLOWELL.

Duke University.

Principles of Social and Political Theory. BY ERNEST BARKER. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 284. $5.00.)

Political scientists in America, as well as in England, will welcome Ernest Barker's most recent volume, *Principles of Social and Political Theory,* for it is the author's most comprehensive statement of his own political theory. Although he has shown his hand on many points before, nowhere else has he argued his basic position as intensively and as systematically as he has done here.

With the exception of Harold Laski, whose influence was so powerful during the 'thirties, probably no contemporary political scientist in England has left quite so strong a mark on our thinking about political theory as Ernest Barker. His influence has been a steady and cumulative one, gathering force over the years. It has been exerted perhaps most deeply through his scholarly studies of Plato and Aristotle, beginning with *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (1906), and continuing with *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors* (1918), and his translation of *The Politics of Aristotle* (1946). He has exerted an influence not only through his presentation of Greek thought, but also through a critical analysis of political ideas, as in his *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day* (1915), and in his introduction to *Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau* (1948). He has also spoken to us with authority on political institutions, as in his *Reflections on Government* (1942).

Barker's most recent publication, *Principles of Social and Political Theory,* may be considered the theoretical foundation of his *Reflections.* In his *Reflections,* he was concerned with the principles, difficulties and reform of parliamentary democracy, and with the alternatives to democracy, namely, Soviet Communism, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism.

His *Principles of Social and Political Theory* furnishes the underpinning for his conception of democratic government. Barker distinguishes clearly between the state and society, and is at his best in showing that although they are obviously connected, their purposes and their activities are essentially different. It is refreshing to find in his writing a strong emphasis placed upon the ethical aspect of politics. For him justice is the supreme, guiding idea. In his view, justice stands behind the state, and is the right ordering of human relations, giving to the greatest number of persons the greatest opportunity for the development of their personalities (p. 202). Barker displays not a little subtlety in showing the relationship of liberty, equality and fraternity to the idea of justice, and to the process of democratic government.

Among other subjects, Barker deals with law, rights, and political obligation, the functions of government and the issue of collectivism. No matter what idea or concept he analyzes, it is rare, indeed, when he does not give it a new twist, or reveal it in a new setting. It should also be said that his scholarship is a delight.

Although there is not adequate space to examine the basic views of the author. one or two questions may, nevertheless, be raised with respect to them. Has not the legal aspect of the state been over-emphasized? The author affirms that the "state *exists* for law" (p. 89). But he also says that the end is "to assemble and establish the external conditions required by every citizen for the development of his capacities" (p. 123). Is not the latter position sounder? The author holds that there is an absolute and unconditional obligation to obey law (p. 221). But in view of his declaration that this obligation may be transcended by a "super-political or social obligation" (p. 222), would it not be better to modify the former position? The author insists, as a rule, that the end of the state is the development of personality. But various personalities develop, undesirable as well as desirable. Would it not be well to explain this phrase? Furthermore, is not this end too limited? Are not such ends as security, justice, freedom, welfare and happiness just as important as the development of personality (or capacities); and are not these desirable in themselves, as well as means to personal development? Would not a more comprehensive term, such as the "common good," or the "good life," embracing all these ends, be preferable?

Barker's *Principles of Social and Political Theory* takes its place among the leading books in political theory written in England since the close of the nineteenth century. It keeps company with Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899), R. M. MacIver's *The Modern State* (1926), Harold Laski's *The State in Theory and Practice* (1935), Collingwood's *The New Leviathan* (1942), and A. D. Lindsay's *The Modern Democratic State* (1943).

Barker develops a view of the state and of society far more in keeping with the facts of political and social life, as most Americans and Englishmen think of them, than does Bosanquet. Unlike Bosanquet, he provides a framework of thought which does not undermine freedom, but preserves it. Although his bite into a particular theory is not as deep as that of Hobhouse, who aimed at an exhaustive criticism of the idealist conception of the state, his work is more comprehensive in scope than is Hobhouse's. Barker's writing does not convey as strongly as does Laski's the exciting quality of political principles in action, but neither does he oversimplify the world, as Laski does, by viewing it through economic glasses. Barker does not introduce as much history into his background as does MacIver or Lindsay. Nor, in thinking about terms, does he reveal the originality found in Collingwood. Yet he develops his thought more systematically, and shows a stronger sense of pattern, than does Laski, MacIver, Lindsay, or Collingwood.

Of all the writings mentioned above, none, in the reviewer's opinion, offers as satisfactory a guide in finding one's way around the foundations of the democratic state as Ernest Barker's *Principles*. This is the case not only because this book excels in systematic quality, in closely reasoned argument, and in balance, but also because it is distinguished by wisdom.

BENJAMIN E. LIPPINCOTT.

University of Minnesota.

John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 1782–1828; Nullifier, 1829–1839; Sectionalist, 1840–1850. By CHARLES M. WILTSE. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company. 1944–1951. 3 vols. Pp. 477, 511, 592. $6.00 ea.)

The Political Theory of John C. Calhoun. By AUGUST O. SPAIN. (New York: Bookman Associates. 1951. Pp. 306. $3.50.)

Emerson's dictum that an institution is the lengthened shadow of one man appropriately describes the relationship in which John C. Calhoun and his political principles stand to the South as a conscious political minority today. Since 1865 the South has been "nationalized" economically and politically far more than Calhoun might have wished, but it still shows an impressive measure of sectional solidarity, and the ability of southern congressmen to veto national policies achieves all that Calhoun could wish through his principle of the "concurrent majority." But Calhoun remains a prophet largely without honor in his own land. Ardent Dixiecrats prefer to quote Jefferson, whose views are frequently at odds with their own, rather than Calhoun, in whose spirit they often unconsciously act. Calhoun is remembered today as a curiosity in a collection of political ideas: advocacy of "states' rights" to the point of nullification and defense of the South's slave economy. He enjoys some of the faded glory which romanticists attach to all heroes of lost causes, but even in this respect Calhoun's luster is tarnished. As the chief architect of the South's "lost cause," Calhoun has been blamed by many Southerners for the disasters which they suffered; and, unlike Lee, Calhoun was too aloof and "intellectual" to rise as a popular leader out of the ashes of an unpopular event. He remains one of the great controversial figures in American politics.

The third and final volume of Wiltse's biography covers the years from 1840 to 1850 and increases the debt which all earnest students of American history and political thought owe the author; indeed this biography may properly be ranked with the work of Beveridge and Freeman. The parallel with Beveridge's *Marshall* is sharpened by the fact that Calhoun and Marshall tended personally to symbolize the two opposing theories of constitutionalism which competed for supremacy during the formative years of the Republic; and it is fitting that the great exponent of a body of doctrine that has been tagged (not entirely accurately) "states' rights" should find as patient and sympathetic a biographer as the famous exponent of nationalism and central government found in Beveridge. But has not Wiltse succumbed to the same sort of infatuation with his subject which characterized Beveridge's almost reverent treatment of Marshall? Throughout Wiltse's three volumes is a strong sense of dramatic conflict between *good* and *evil*, with Calhoun playing the noble hero to an assortment of villains that includes Crawford, Jackson, Benton, and John Quincy Adams, and with Webster supplying a verbose and magnificently stentorian comic relief. Calhoun is so constantly described as more incisive, more logical, more prescient, more conscious of public responsibilities than his contemporaries that the reader begins to wonder why he was doomed to political failure: his attempt to protect the South collapsed, though he was spared from witnessing the failure in his own lifetime; his own personal ambition to reach the presidency was thwarted, and he had to watch "the glittering crown" pass to lesser men. The truth of the matter is that Calhoun was a man obsessed with certain ideas which he pursued with such force and logical intensity that he lost that humanity which illuminates the career of, say, Jefferson. Such a man may be historically useful, but he can seldom become personally lovable, and judgments on the moral correctness of his actions are difficult to formulate.

Wiltse's biography is executed on such a scale that it can be considered under several headings. The first is as *personal history:* does the subject live for us as a vivid personality, not merely as an "important figure" on a vast historical stage? Wiltse has not quite succeeded in bringing Calhoun entirely "alive" in this respect, except for certain passages, such as Calhoun's relation to his daughter Anna. The trouble may lie with the subject, but Wiltse's tendency to regard Calhoun as incapable of committing any grievous error does nothing to overcome the impression that the South Carolinian was coldly impressive and occasionally dull. The second way to regard biography is as *public history:* is the subject properly oriented against the broad political and social movements of his time and is his role in them fully delineated? Here Wiltse's accomplishment is admirable. As a study of American politics at a period when the party system was still growing, of personalities, of campaign issues and techniques, and of the growth of sectional sentiment, this will remain an authoritative statement. In the second volume of his administrative history, *The Jeffersonians,* Professor White has already shown how valuable Wiltse's researches are. The most serious question which arises in this connection is whether Wiltse is committed to an economic interpretation of the political history he covers. It would not be surprising that the views which Calhoun held had influenced the biographer who searched them out with such pains; yet a more critical treatment of Calhoun on precisely this issue of the drives of political action would have immeasurably increased the worth of the study without depreciating the merit of its subject.

The third aspect of biography is as *intellectual history:* what ideas were held by the subject, how consistently were they developed and applied, and from what sources were they derived? It would be impossible to deal with such a man as Calhoun, whom Wiltse has described as primarily "a theorist, a metaphysician, a man of thought rather than action," without dealing at some length with his intellectual development. Here Wiltse's enthusiasm for his subject gets the better of his critical judgment: certainly Calhoun was no real metaphysician, and does not become one merely because he possessed a talent for logical analysis and thought which exceeded that of his contemporaries. Calhoun did not really dig into the ground from which his premises sprang, and little new light is thrown on the sources of those premises or their consequences. Professor Spain's study of Calhoun's political theory ought to fill in the gaps in Wiltse's analysis; but it offers no real help, surprisingly enough, since Spain confines himself entirely to Calhoun's intellectual history. Both authors list the books which Calhoun is believed to have read—Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, Cicero, Polybius, Machiavelli, Burlamaqui, Sidney, Locke, Rousseau, Burke, *The Federalist*, and contemporary constitutional commentaries—but fail to indicate what relative influence these various sources exerted on Calhoun's own developing thought. The famous "concurrent majority" principle is said to have been derived, in part, at least, from the Polybian balanced constitution. It would be helpful to have this relationship worked out in greater detail. The famous statement is repeated (on Calhoun's own authority) that he abandoned the natural-law doctrine which long dominated American political speculation. How does the rejection of natural law tie in with his adoption of Aristotle's so-called "organic" theory of political community and defense of "natural slavery"? Aristotle's *polis* expressly rests on the *moral* basis of "political friendship," and this hardly accords with Calhoun's profession of an essentially Hobbesian and utilitarian view of human nature, wherein the chief drives stem from *interests* (Hobbes' passions).

How does the rejection of natural law square with two other aspects of Calhoun's thought? On the one hand, he accepts Adam Smith's argument for free trade, and it is hard to imagine maintaining such a position without resting it (as Smith did) on natural-law foundations. On the other hand, even though Calhoun would add to the *numerical* majority another calculation of community interest, the *concurrent* majority, he never abandons the majority principle altogether. It is quite possible to suppose that both a numerical and a concurrent majority might so combine as to threaten jealously-guarded rights of an intransigent minority, and Calhoun's problem is as far from a solution as ever. His whole theory of the Constitution as a compact among states, with the corollary of state nullification of unconstitutional acts of Congress, rests on historical precedents whose meaning is at least arguable, and simply transfers to the states as corporate units all the rights and claims of Locke's individuals in the state of nature. If such a contract is to be observed at all, it must be under either Locke's natural-law sanction or Hobbes' sanction of sheer force. Calhoun nowhere allows for any genuine spiritual activity in man and its expression in political action; neither Spain nor Wiltse makes this point clear, and their failure to do so renders their justification of Calhoun's defense of slavery, for example, just as unconvincing as was Calhoun's own defense of the South's "peculiar institution."

Calhoun's concept of the "organic" nature of political community is actually much closer to Burke than to Aristotle. Professor Spain's hint that Calhoun had read Rousseau (and presumably was influenced by him) is suggestive, and it is regrettable that he did not show the connections. Nor is an attempt made to explore the pluralist elements in Calhoun's thinking. Such an inquiry might well be beyond the scope of Wiltse's biography, but Spain could appropriately have speculated on Calhoun's possible influence on later pluralist doctrines. The conclusion is difficult to avoid that, while "the Marx of the master class" has been provided with an adequate biography in Wiltse's admirable work, an equally adequate account of Calhoun as the last American to *attempt* systematically to treat of politics must still be awaited.

NELSON E. TAYLOR, JR.

Louisiana State University.

American Conservatives; The Political Thought of Francis Lieber and John W. Burgess. BY BERNARD EDWARD BROWN. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. Pp. 191. $2.75.)

The author of this study of "two leading academic figures of American political science of the nineteenth century" does not undertake a complete analysis or description of the political ideas of his two subjects. His purpose is to present certain features of the basic philosophy, the scientific method, and the conclusions of each in such a way as to show the background of German ideas upon which he drew and the manner in which his systematic thought, when applied to the interpretation of American political development, served the purposes of conservatives.

Although Lieber drew his ideas from Kant and early nineteenth century German liberals, whereas Burgess was influenced by the conservative historians of the latter part of the century who interpreted history in the spirit of Hegel and by Hegel himself, there was much similarity between the basic approaches of the two men to a systematic political science. Each sought to combine the philosophical approach with the historical-empirical by examining the play of sociological forces in the process of history. Thus, while both recognized the value of rational analysis of the idea of the state, both laid much emphasis on the sociological bases of government and law. The chief distinction between them lay in the greater rigidity and formalism in the interpretation of history which Burgess derived from Hegel.

This distinction is brought out most clearly in Brown's discussion of the ideas of the two men with reference to "The State and Society." Lieber attributed "sovereignty" not to "the state" but to "society," recognizing quite clearly that in so doing he was going beyond the sphere of public law. Moreover, his concept of "society" was pluralistic, so that he was actually doing no more than recognizing that law and government were ultimately shaped by social forces. Burgess regarded the formally organized community, the "state," as the determining force in social development. His concept of the mission of the state as "the product of the progressive realization of the human reason through history" required a monistic dynamic which, as a true disciple of Hegel, he found in the nation. Thus the distinction between Lieber and Burgess may be followed to its ultimate conclusions by comparing the mild nationalism of Lieber, in which there remained a strong infusion of cosmopolitanism, with the intense, exclusive, and almost mystical nationalism of Burgess.

The contrast between a loose pluralism and a formal monism is also to be found in the conceptions of Lieber and Burgess with reference to liberty and the circumstances under which it may be preserved. Both were passionately attached to the ideal of the liberty of the individual and regarded government based upon mass democracy as a serious threat to this liberty. Lieber's study of history and political systems led him to develop a theory of "institutional liberty" in which he maintained that the only adequate protection against despotism of any sort lay in the diffusion of power throughout "society" by means of independent institutions of all sorts—economic, intellectual, artistic and in all other aspects of human association, including the political. Burgess could find no protection of individual liberty against government except a "rigid" constitution which set the "state," as the constituent power, over against "government" as a check. Since this device was merely formal, he actually came to rely upon a limited or weighted suffrage and the rule of a "*noblesse de la robe.*"

The author of this study is to be commended for extracting and presenting, in a fashion that makes comparison possible, significant ideas of two men who have had great influence on the development of political science and even of political practices and beliefs in America. Somewhat less commendable is his tracing of these ideas to German sources. Here his treatment is so broad and summary as to be suggestive rather than satisfying. His case for the designation of Lieber and Burgess as "conservatives" rests mainly on the demonstration that both feared mass democracy and the interference of government in the economic sphere. There is regrettably little sustained attempt to relate this conservatism to the fundamental aspects of their systematic political thought.

CHARLES B. ROBSON.

University of North Carolina.

American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise; A Study of William Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field and Andrew Carnegie. BY ROBERT GREEN MCCLOSKEY. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 193. $3.25.)

Brooks Adams; Constructive Conservative. BY THORNTON ANDERSON. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1951. Pp. xiv, 250. $3.75.)

These two solid books deal with conservative political thought in America in the latter part of the nineteenth and the earlier years of the twentieth century. Mr. McCloskey analyzes the ideas of three representative thinkers of the age—William Graham Sumner, an academician; Stephen J. Field, a jurist; and Andrew Carnegie, a "captain of industry." Mr. Anderson, on the other hand, is concerned with Brooks Adams alone, "the unusable man." No attempt at biography, other than intellectual, is made by either author. Like Mr. Hofstadter a few years ago, both authors are preoccupied with the impact of Social Darwinism in particular and scientific determinism in general.

Since terms like conservatism "lend themselves to semantic confusion," both writers at the very beginning are aware of certain definitional questions. Mr. McCloskey states that the "doctrines considered here are organically related to earlier thinking that has been conventionally regarded as conservative," and as a result he has employed conservatism more as an "identification than as a description." Mr. Anderson, on his part, writes that etymologically conservatism is derived from the Latin *conservare*, and he then quotes approvingly Edmund Burke's classic summary of conservatism— "A disposition to preserve and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman."

Mr. McCloskey concisely and clearly shows in his volume how Field, Sumner, and Carnegie, each in his own way, "captured democracy and made it hostage to conservatism." This was in direct contrast to the anti-democratic tendencies of earlier conservatives like Hamilton and Marshall. The new conservative philosophy which furnished the bases of "the gospel of wealth" was a mixture of Spencerism, Darwinism, Ricardianism, and Malthusianism, although "Carnegie's conservatism differs from the extremist Fieldian or Sumnerian brand." It was gradually embedded in the American constitutional tradition until by 1905 "the doctrine of the Lochner case was the social theory of Sumner's *The Challenge of Facts.*"

In all these well documented conclusions the author convincingly demonstrates that when democracy is once identified with the rights of property alone, then proposals to regulate business are regarded as no less than an attack on democracy itself. This is "the inversion in liberal principles" or, in the words of Moeller van den Bruck, liberalism becomes nothing more than "self-interest protectively colored." It should be remembered, however, that while Jefferson's theory of democracy was based on human rather than property values, landed property was widely held at that time and, in the words of Locke, "every man has a property in his own person."

Mr. Anderson in skillfully outlining Adams' "ideas on government and administration—the practical application of his historical theories"—recalls that this unpredictable and pessimistic Bostonian gadfly was not only called a radical by his contemporaries but also often disagreed with others who regarded themselves as conservative. Adams' hostility to both the capitalist and the socialist is best revealed in this blast: "I ask you what can be more degraded than the Plutocratic Democracy, when you have a Wallstreet, which demands that everything shall have its money price and a proletariat which will not serve but whose dream is to sell." As Mr. Anderson in his well-grounded study suggests, "Adams was already face to face with the modern choice between fascism and socialism."

Imbued with hostility toward the destructive and obsolete specialization of the capitalist and the mercenary nature of the legal system, Adams proclaimed the administrative, generalizing mind as "the highest vehicle of energy" and a characteristic of the soldier whose virtues were appreciated by his friends, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and even Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. In his desire for efficiency, Adams advocated many of the features of socialism, including planning, although socialists remained anathema to him all his life. Mr. Anderson rightly concludes that Adams was "dealing, actually, with the same problems that fascism purports to solve" without realizing the dangers involved in his own proposed solutions. To the last he believed that "the rising generation has already learned that true conservatism lies not in the adherence to the notions of their fathers, but in an intelligent study of their surroundings, and in a disposition to accommodate their institutions to their environment."

Both authors have performed a valuable service in their lucid exposition of conservative political ideas in our recent past. These studies would have been enhanced, however, by a more thorough analysis of the dilemma of liberalism, which has disintegrated so often in the direction either of conservatism or of socialism—long ago attacked by Herbert Spencer as the "new Toryism." Such an investigation is especially pertinent at present when conservatives are claiming that they, rather than the liberals, are fighting the battle of freedom against socialism, just as Spencer predicted. In fact, another Englishman in our time, Quintin Hogg, asserts that "the whole basis of modern Conservatism is the rejection of the Absolutist claims of the modern Socialist State." But even as they stand, these volumes supply the background for a better understanding of contemporary political philosophy in America. And the issues raised here remain controversial throughout the free world.

GUY HOWARD DODGE.

Brown University.

Les Partis Politiques. BY MAURICE DUVERGER. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1951. Pp. ix, 476. 1,100 fr.)

Professor Duverger of the *Institut d'Etudes politiques* of Paris, author of several works on public law and of a recent study on the influence of electoral systems on politics, aims in the present work to establish a general theory of political parties upon an empirical base. His facts come principally from France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and Great Britain, to a lesser extent from the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, and the United States, and briefly from some other countries. Although much of the Continental material will be new to American political scientists, perhaps the outstanding contribution of the book is the logical clarity with which some of the most fundamental propositions about political parties are related to facts.

The total structure of the work is admirable. It has two major divisions: Party Structure and Party Systems. Within the first part, we find chapters on the internal party machinery and hierarchy, on the nature and intensity of participation of the party membership, and on the selection, power, and parliamentary influence of party leaders. Within the second division, are chapters on the dual-, multi-, and single-party systems, on party size and party alliances, and on the influence of parties upon candidates, public opinion, and the actual constitution of government.

Among the detailed conclusions set forth by M. Duverger, one may select for illustration several that seem to this writer of significance in the context of the documentation which the book offers. The party system, writes Duverger, is less a photograph of public opinion than public opinion is a projection of the party system. Political institutions—including election systems and party structures—determine political behavior in important respects. Although all governments are oligarchic (the author contributes new material to the Michels thesis), the Marxist distinction between formal and real liberty is not accurate; under conditions of party competition, some real liberties may be achieved. Indeed the elimination of communist parties from democratic regimes, believes

Duverger, would threaten the equilibrium established by the pluralist party system. The profound meaning of party government is not government of the people by the people, but "government of the people by an elite springing from the people." Thus Duverger develops the democratic side of Michels' theory of oligarchy. The parties arose historically as the masses began to enter politics, and the parties formed the cadres for the political blocs into which the masses became divided. Democracy today is threatened not by party government but by the present tendencies of parties to acquire centralized and disciplined internal government resembling military, religious, and totalitarian organizations. This and other conclusions, reminiscent of the warnings of Bagehot, Lowell and Michels, and supported by contemporary evidence, make of Duverger's book a valuable contribution to the growing science of political parties.

The techniques employed by the author in reaching his conclusions are fairly simple, and, as he says, not newly devised. For the most part he uses tables, graphs, and bar charts, with a few diagrams and pie charts; they are designed expertly, and effectively assist his historical and comparative generalizations. He does not employ sample surveys, correlational techniques, original socio-political maps, or intensive case studies of the type that has become indispensable in American writings during the past twenty years. The brief bibliography misses important literature on American political parties, and Professor Duverger's statement that scarcely any periodical literature of significance to his bibliography exists is questionable. In respect to techniques and coverage of materials, then, the book lacks fullness; and one may wish that the author, whose skills are so apparent within his scope, might be invited to the United States for a prolonged academic visit.

ALFRED DE GRAZIA.

Brown University.

Communism in Western Europe. BY MARIO EINAUDI, JEAN-MARIE DOMENACH, AND ALDO GAROSCI. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1951. Pp. ix, 239. $3.00.)

This slender volume is described by the editor and co-author, Professor Mario Einaudi, as the first of a series devoted to a "French-Italian Inquiry." If subsequent volumes maintain the high standards of this first publication, we are entitled to anticipate them with excitement and keen pleasure. Whether the combined treatment of France and Italy is an altogether happy idea may be debated, and this reviewer feels that it was probably dictated more by Professor Einaudi's interest in both countries than by the logic of the subject itself. However, since his interest has been responsible for giving us this very valuable contribution, there is no cause for quarrel.

The book is divided into three parts: a general consideration of Communism in Western Europe by Professor Einaudi; an analysis of the French Communist party by Jean-Marie Domenach, editor-in-chief of the independent progressive-Catholic review *Esprit*; and a chapter on the Italian Communist party by Aldo Garosci, historian and a former leader of the "*Giustizia e Libertà*" movement.

In the first part Einaudi traces the general historical and psychological reasons for the growth of Communism, gives some assessment of its strength, and quite correctly deprecates the possibility of a strong "national" or "Titoist" Communist movement rising in Western Europe. The indifferent result of Cucchi's and Magnani's defection in Italy certainly bears out this contention. His account of Communism's reaction to the Marshall and Schuman Plans is a useful résumé which does not add anything that is new and probably does not intend to do so. On the other hand, Professor Einaudi's prescription as to what must be done to combat Communism in Western Europe is a more controversial piece. What he suggests as imperative, such as the diminution of party egoism, would indeed be most desirable and would make a tremendous difference; but unfortunately it does not have the logic of events, for neither in Italy nor in France—and especially in the latter—do the political conditions exist which would make the implementation of this advice even a faint possibility.

Domenach's part is the *pièce de résistance* of the book. It analyzes with profound understanding and a high degree of objectivity the attraction of Communism for large parts of the French population. It is particularly meritorious that the author modifies the myth of the monolithic and inhuman efficiency of the French Communist party and demonstrates convincingly the existence of important human, i.e., irrational, factors which prove that even the Communists do not quite escape from being French. Very impressive also is the author's description of the quasi-religious devotion of the Communist militants and his analysis of Communism's penetration into different classes and regions. Only one-half of the workers' vote is Communist, but the Communist party is nevertheless more representative of the French working class than any other party. Communism has made deep inroads into the rural population; and through its wide distribution over all sections, it is not only the numerically strongest (in voters) party, but also the most "national" of all parties. Since France is a country with a revolutionary history, the Communists have sold themselves to many people as the legitimate heirs to the "left" tradition of the country. Domenach cites Professor François Goguel's revelation of the amazing constancy of France's political division since 1849 and shows how the Communist strength lies primarily in the traditionally left regions. Today, Communism is effectively isolated, largely as a result of its own, Moscow-dictated policy; but it derives an element of strength from the nature of anti-Communism which, moving steadily to the right, strengthens the Communists' efforts towards the monopolization of the leadership of the left.

Aldo Garosci's contribution is mainly historical. It portrays the Italian Communist party as the result of direct intervention of the Comintern, which later maintained particularly close relations with the party. Later, Communism was decisively influenced by the experience of Fascism, whose moves for totality of power facilitated later drives in the same direction by the Communists. These efforts succeeded especially in the trade union movement, but they were largely frustrated in other fields. Garosci's treatment of the collaboration between the Communists and the Nenni-Socialists is disappointing and not convincing;

but, on the other hand, the interesting personality of Palmiro Togliatti emerges clearly, and the unusual flexibility and adaptability of the party is depicted in extremely interesting and revealing fashion.

ROBERT G. NEUMANN.

University of California (Los Angeles).

Power Politics; A Study of International Society. BY GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. Revised Edition. 1951. Pp. xxii, 898. $12.75.)

This is a basic study of international relations by the Director of Studies of the London Institute of World Affairs, a renowned scholar in the field of international law. The book is so lucidly and admirably written and is so sensibly argued that one is reluctantly compelled to find it fundamentally unsatisfactory. The central theme, the subordination of international organization and law to international politics, is depicted most accurately. However, this study displays serious inadequacies in analyzing the concept of power and its relation to foreign policy.

Attention is centered first on the sovereign states, their various forms of composition, instruments of policy and hierarchy of power. Other groups and forces are considered, but these are assigned a role secondary to the states—the "aristocrats of international society." The discussion of the elements of power politics includes an impressive exploration of the often-missed point that this pattern of power relationships is most dynamic and unstable. Unfortunately this does not lead to a systematic exposition of the strengths and weaknesses of the significant but essentially static concept of the balance of power.

Major attention is devoted to post-1918 international organizations. The main thesis is cogently argued: international organization has necessitated a continuation of the practice of power politics in disguised form, under the cover of League or U. N. activity, since the states have remained the sovereign repositories of power. A merciless examination is made of such concepts as the pacific settlement of disputes, collective security, armament controls, functional co-operation, trusteeship, and the protection of human rights. All are revealed as inadequate attempts to reduce tension and avoid wars, since the states, as independent centers of authority, refuse to bind themselves in any meaningful fashion for many reasons, including security, morality and power.

The weakness of international law is also underscored in the author's contention that these approaches are incapable of producing an effective supra-national government. Yet the menace of Soviet Russia is recognized, in a cool and realistic appraisal, as an immediate danger. After rejecting current proposals of a regional nature, Dr. Schwarzenberger concludes that only a limited federal union of the United States, Western Europe and the Commonwealth would be a sufficient response. The proposal has much to recommend it, but the difficulties of realization, especially as concerns India, are far greater than its sponsor admits.

However valuable this book may be in exposing the misconceptions which surround the concepts of international organization, it fails to grapple adequately with the theoretical issue of power and the problem of policy formation in international affairs. The need for "international planning" in constructing an international order is boldly accepted (Ch. 33), but little light is shed on the subject.

The basic discussions of how foreign policy is formulated and executed, and of the factors which are most important in these processes, have been oversimplified. For example, the roles of morality and public opinion are treated almost exclusively as instruments of rationalization by statesmen. However, another conclusion can be drawn from the negative moral effect on Europe of the Ethiopian affair and the importance of British public opinion after Hitler's Czech coup of 1939. Moreover, the related problem of *motivation* in foreign policy is inadequately developed, although it is absolutely essential to an understanding of the quest for power in international affairs. Since it is in the goals of national foreign policy that the basic questions of peace and war originate, it is in this context that the issues of violence and power politics must be studied.

The author's description of power politics as the central factor in international relations was a much more difficult observation to make in 1941, when the first edition of this study was published. Today the importance of power politics is so widely recognized that the author fears it is causing the growth of a corroding cynicism and general loss of faith. But it cannot be said that this work will contribute toward arresting this alarming trend. By associating power and power politics with anarchy, and by implying that the problem of power politics is insignificant in more closely knit communities, the author commits a grave disservice to his cause. Power plays a vital role—for good or bad—even in a well-organized, legally ordered social system, and to seek to eliminate power politics altogether is to seek the impossible. The insufficiency of such an approach is revealed in the author's praise (p. 291) of Smuts and Wilson for having denied that power politics had anything to do with the chances of the League of Nations to succeed. It is doubtful whether even "idealistic" adherents of a collective system of security can support that viewpoint today.

The failure to stress that power can be, and often is, related to meritorious objectives and the insistence upon positing a sharp divergence between law and power are factors which contribute to a general air of helplessness. The author's road of power politics leads to a yawning, unbridgeable chasm beyond which lies international world order, based on a community structure and law. However, the very start of wisdom requires an acceptance of the importance of power in the formation of an orderly society. The study of international relations would be far better served if we accepted its central theme of power politics for what it is—an old acquaintance found in all political processes of whatever degree of governmental order.

It is true that the high expectation of violence in world politics places a high premium on the physical aspects of power. We should not, however, underestimate power's other components, nor fail to consider it primarily as a means in interstate relations. It is only then that the different types of foreign policy and their various implements and strategems, such as propaganda and alliances, can be studied in a constructive quest for peace and stability.

The barrenness of a heavy dependence on international law and organization to solve the problem of world peace has been most capably exposed in this book. It is to be hoped that Dr. Schwarzenberger's further studies on this subject along more positive lines will soon be forthcoming.

FRED GREENE.

Williams College.

Human Rights as Legal Rights; The Realization of Individual Human Rights in Positive International Law. BY PIETER N. DROST. (Leiden: A. W. Sitjthoff's Uitgevermij N. V. 1951. Pp. 272. Fl. 18.50.)

This book by a Dutch jurist is an interesting contribution to the ever-increasing literature on human rights. The book gives, first, a brief outline of the development of human rights in municipal and international law. The author admits the present-day precarious situation. He correctly states that the U. N. Charter speaks of human rights only *de lege ferenda* and that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights creates no legally binding norms; in fact, its legally nonbinding character explains the maximum program it contains and the fact that it was accepted by a majority of states. He concludes that human rights as legal rights in positive international law have to be created and that international treaties are the only available means.

The book, further, sketches, in its principal part, the main features of a future system of human rights in positive international law. In his proposals *de lege ferenda* the author tries to evade both "false utopianism" and "wicked cynicism." He postulates treaties *of* (and not merely *on*) human rights, recognizing the individual as a full person in international law with claims against his own state. The individual must derive substantive rights against his own state directly from international law and individual, quasi-judicial remedies. The individual must have full procedural capacity before international implementation organs, on a par with his state. Such human rights should not encroach the right of self-determination of nations, nor the rights of states. International law must, therefore, develop in three branches: as law of states, as law of nations and as law of individuals. This is certainly a heavy order.

On the realistic side, the author recognizes that binding obligations concerning human rights will necessarily have to be limited to a restricted number of human rights and to a reduced number of states. The realization of the maximum program of the Universal Declaration will need a great many conventions and must be looked at "in a perspective of centuries." The author recognizes that under actual conditions universal agreement on human rights is impossible and, further, that as far as implementation is concerned, judicial enforcement is "unacceptable to many States."

He sees, therefore, the only practical solution in a non-judicial system with quasi-judicial procedure. He builds on the epoch-making precedent of the 1922 Geneva Convention on Upper Silesia. He proposes special international enforcement organs, independent of municipal law and machinery, on three levels: national, regional, universal. The organs on the national level, composed of national and a majority of international officers, would implement the conventions on a "private" level; international standards would have to be measured with different yardsticks, according to the total character of the country in question. These organs would, first of all, seek conciliation and amicable settlement between the parties (the individual and his state). Failing that, they would deliver a final decision with adequate remedies (specific performance and/or damages). An appeal would lie to the regional implementation agencies, as to the law and the facts. The universal implementation agencies would have a supervisory function and act as a highest instance of appeal in matters of law.

The author fully discusses the obstacles presented by antagonistic ideological differences between East and West, and, within even the democratic states, between personal liberty and the longing for economic security. The author, finally, warns that not too much can be expected from law alone. The evils of the world cannot be cured simply by the enactment of legal norms. The realization of human rights depends in any country on the degree of democratic maturity and on the degree of economic welfare.

JOSEF L. KUNZ.

University of Toledo.

The Jeffersonians; A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829. BY LEONARD D. WHITE. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1951. Pp. xiv, 572. $6.00.)

The pioneering study of the roots of the nation's present-day administrative theory and practice, begun with *The Federalists,* is continued in this excellent volume. With the publication of *The Jeffersonians,* Professor White has carried his study through the administration of John Quincy Adams. In doing so, he has succeeded in making this reviewer anxious to follow his account into the time of Jackson and beyond.

The years of Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Quincy Adams did not constitute the period of reaction against procedures originated by Federalists that one might have anticipated from an examination of views expressed by Republicans in opposition. True, these newer leaders were genuine in their desires to maintain principles they had defended so stoutly. And while to a degree they were successful—sometimes unfortunately, we now know—the Republican chieftains often found that the responsibilities of office prevented them from applying doctrines that earlier had seemed so sound. Even those tough defenders of liberty, Jefferson and Gallatin, prevailed on reluctant Congresses to vest in the national executive ever-increasing authority to restrict liberty in the compelling interest of the Embargo.

Thus, although the turn of the century saw the Federalists defeated and dispersed, they were able, administratively speaking, to retreat to strong prearranged positions. They presented the Republicans with "a system in full order" with which "the people were familiar"—one that "was well adapted to the work to be done." And "it was taken over with hardly a ripple and maintained substantially intact for over a quarter of a century." Professor White's analysis of the effects of political change on administrative practices stresses the words "untouched," "unaltered," and "continued." Nevertheless, this was a vital period of administrative growth, for the years of the Republicans were years wherein the experiments of the Federalist were tested and many of them found to be sound.

This scholarly study of Professor White's is not merely history. While these pages will be of interest to antiquarians, political scientists will find the book a thoughtful study of administration in action, of American politics, of constitutional law. The "Report of the Four Secretaries," for example, is of but little less importance in gaining an insight into present-day administrative problems than are portions of the reports of the Hoover Commission. The mere passage of 125 to 150 years does not deny to this work the character of a study of administration in being. This would hardly be the case save for the fact that the author of *The Jeffersonians* is one of the really great students of modern administration, one fully equipped to select edible grain from useless chaff.

The nearness of the first quarter of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth is evidenced by the character of the administrative problems dealt with by executives in the earlier period. These men were concerned with problems of federal-state relationships, government planning, federal works programs, federal field operations, and federal employees' unions. Some of these Republican executives were bothered by a failure to maintain cabinet secrecy, suffered from a lack of staff aids for top officials, and neglected to organize effectively for war. It was during the quarter-century in question that the Corps of Engineers came into being and was given responsibilities with regard to civil public works, that a statutory cabinet agency—we would call it a cabinet committee today—was created, and that Congress extended its supervision of the executive through the mechanism of the investigating committee. Here, for the first time, we find an application of the "yardstick," the organization of a public service hospital association, a beginning with in-service training, and a limited use of the examination to test qualifications for governmental service. And through a part of the period the Treasury remained of crucial administrative importance.

For all of these similarities, marked contrasts are not overlooked. The problems faced by early nineteenth century statesmen were difficult ones; but in many ways the society out of which they grew was much more simple than is that of today, and that simplicity is reflected in the character of the problems. We find men as wise as Jefferson and John Quincy Adams reviewing the work of all their immediate subordinates in minute detail. Too, we learn that these early presidents were subjected personally to gross indignities from office-seekers.

Professor White divided the book into thirty-five chapters and each chapter into numerous sections. This arrangement, along with the fact that the volume is carefully indexed, makes the information contained in the study easily and quickly available for reference purposes. But the book should be of especial value for another reason: it can serve as a guide to more than a score of volumes yet to be written on specialized aspects of administration that are of current interest to political scientists. As this was but a single book, it was necessary for the author—while presenting a panorama of the era's administrative experience—to be content with pointing out fields where additional work may well be done. We know now, to take but one example from among the many, that the nation was fumbling with organization and administration of field work early in the nineteenth century. In the light of our failures along this line during the second quarter of the twentieth century, we can well afford to know more of the experiments of the Jeffersonians. In the long run, one of the great services of Professor White's historical study may be in convincing modern scholars of the importance of working at the foundations of our national administrative experience.

CHARLES AIKIN.

University of California (Berkeley).

Muddy Waters; The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers. By ARTHUR MAASS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1951. Pp. xiv, 306. $4.75.)

As the author's subtitle says, this book, one of the Harvard Political Studies Series, is about "the Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers." It is deserving of high points for its objectivity and for the careful documentation of the raw material and original sources on which it is based. Yet it may well be remembered primarily as a first-rate pamphlet which is of significance in a political controversy of no mean proportions.

For this is a book about the most powerful American bureaucracy. As this review is being written, there are persistent rumors that President Truman at long last has decided to send to the Congress in this election year a reorganization plan transferring the civil functions of the Engineer Corps to the Department of the Interior. If he does not do so, the result will be merely a postponement of the inevitable political defeat of the Corps.

This defeat is certain because the Corps has broken all the rules of our democracy, as the author has so thoroughly and irrevocably documented in every chapter. Professor Maass says nothing that has not been said before by every impartial student who has ever studied the problem. This reviewer has in past years listened to the private comments both of President Roosevelt and President Hoover on the Engineers, and he has heard that President Truman's language on the same subject makes that of his two predecessors sound like two spinsters at the vicar's garden tea. This, if true, is indeed high praise! The contribution of Professor Maass is that he has taken what these presidents and the rest of the executive branch of the Federal Government have discovered about this bureau and has now made it available to a much wider audience than the experts.

There are two views on the Corps of Engineers. The first is their own, which is shared by the Congress with a few worthwhile exceptions. As the author has phrased it: "among the officers in the United States Army today the Engineer

Corps is considered the elite. Traditionally, only the highest eight per cent of the graduating class of the Military Academy is allowed to choose the Engineer Corps, and the Corps is given high preference by most of the graduates in indicating desired assignments."

The other view can be summed up in the irascible words of the late Harold Ickes who wrote the foreword for *Muddy Waters:* "No more lawless or irresponsible Federal group than the Corps of Army Engineers has ever attempted to operate in the United States, either outside of or within the law."

A hardened and cynical Washington observer, who for the past twenty years has been daily subjected to inflamed speeches on the floors of both Senate and House about an arrogant and irresponsible bureaucracy squandering billions of the people's money, can only appreciate the incongruous when he notes the tender congressional solicitude and protection afforded the military when they are engaged in flood control and navigation projects. This is not because they are army officers, for in 1952 it is "open season" on the military. Secretary Ickes explained it in a succinct sentence: "The Congress has not acted because of the torporific effect of the pork barrel."

This is the real theme for the political scientist—a mésalliance exists between the army officers, engaged in the civil functions of flood control and navigation for the nation's rivers, and certain congressional committees which authorize such projects and appropriate the money for them. Here is the higher importance of the Maass conclusions for the larger audience which may not be particularly interested in natural resource problems. His book is an excellent briefing on the practical irrelevance of American constitutional government, if by that we mean three independent and coordinate branches of government, one of which is governed by a Chief Executive. A single bureau makes an alliance with its clientele, the pressure group it serves—in this case, the local Chambers of Commerce, local water users, and the contractors who benefit financially from such projects—and with two or three congressional committee chairmen. Together they drive through the Congress whatever proposals they wish, irrespective of the public interest. Maass shows that, in fact, the Corps of Engineers is utterly irresponsible and utterly unaccountable in the sense that it is neither responsible nor accountable to the President of the United States, to its titular political superior, the Secretary of the Army, or even to the Congress as a whole. This is, of course, a phenomenon in American politics which is becoming more readily understood by a widening audience. It is important that the American people begin to understand that in many of their interests they are being ruled by a triumvirate, by a clique, by a bureau-clientele-committee chairman form of government.

Besides its usefulness as an object lesson, the reason the Corps is worth a book to itself is not only because it squanders billions of dollars but because it does untold harm to the natural resources of the country by the projects it selects to build. For the history of the Corps of Engineers is a story of utter planlessness.

In these pages also is an account of the sometimes vigorous, sometimes pathetic attempts of good men who have cared enough about our natural resources

—and the taxpayers' money—to control the Corps of Engineers. They have tried to do some intelligent programming and planning so that the river basins of the United States could be developed for the best uses of the people. In every case the story so far is one of defeat, as illustrated by the lingering torture and death of the Natural Resources Planning Board in 1943, or by the later mostly futile attempts of the Bureau of the Budget to enforce the Chief Executive's prerogatives.

This is *Muddy Waters*, although the reviewer has stated it somewhat more directly in terms of his own prejudices and without sufficient emphasis on the detailed proof which the author has displayed for each of these generalities. It is impossible for an author to pose as a dispassionate scholar on such a controversial subject, but Professor Maass has done as well as an honest man can by marshalling an imposing array of facts and letting them do their own pleading. He appears to have done this within the shibboleths of his own trade by first setting forth in his introduction the "criteria" for "gauging administrative responsibility," by which he means "the extent to which any administrative agency conducts itself as a responsible instrument of government." This reviewer is not sure what all the jargon in the author's long introduction means. Presumably such language gives the book a respectable coinage among the erudite audience for which it is written, so it is perhaps banal to express an old-fashioned fondness for plain English. The book then describes how the Engineers and their interlocking Congressmen have yielded many of their powers, given to them by the American people, to private lobbying groups such as the Rivers and Harbors Congress and how they then depend on this lobbying to beat the rest of the Congress into line. Maass subsequently outlines the calculated, persistent and successful efforts throughout the years by this group of army officers to ignore the express commands of their Commanders-in-Chief, the presidents of the United States. Perhaps even more damning, at least to them, is the chapter in which he compares their performance to the accepted standards of the engineering profession and of the unbiased natural resources experts. And for his *pièce de résistance*, the author throws in his separate study on the King's River project, which received so much critical acclaim several years ago when it first appeared as a study for the Hoover Commission.

If a layman may say so, this work bears all the marks of first-rate objective scholarship. What is more important, it will be a most useful political handbook in the coming struggle to make the Corps of Engineers responsive to and responsible under democratic government. It may well be the balance that ends the battle sooner rather than later.

James H. Rowe, Jr.

Washington, D. C.

Regional Organization of the Social Security Administration; A Case Study. By John A. Davis. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1950. Pp. 315. $4.00.)

This book deals with one of the most difficult and complex problem areas in the organization of the federal government, namely, field organization and headquarters-field relations in a large multi-program agency. Traditionally, federal agencies have assigned the administration of their major programs to separate operating bureaus, each with its own distinctive pattern of regions and field areas and a straight line of authority from the headquarters of the bureau to its regional offices. In recent years, however, increasing concern has been given to the need for inter-program coordination in the field and the possibilities of economy through consolidating the housekeeping services common to most bureau units in major field centers. Several agencies, including the Federal Security Agency, the General Services Administration, and, on a more limited basis, the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, have developed or are developing plans for coordination in the field.

As its title indicates, Dr. Davis' book is a case study of the regional organization of the Social Security Board and its successor, the Social Security Administration, from the origin of the Board in 1935 to 1947. Such a study has particular interest for students of federal administration since the Social Security Board played the pioneer role among the civil agencies of the government in developing uniform regions with a regional director who had partial control over the regional units of the various bureaus of the agency. The experience of the Board and the Administration and the more recent experience of the Federal Security Agency with respect to regional organization provide a mine of valuable information for other multi-program federal departments and agencies.

After a chapter giving a general description of the organization of the Social Security Administration as it existed in 1947 when the study was completed, Dr. Davis traces the evolution of the organization from the creation of the Social Security Board, indicating many of the major problems encountered, the various solutions proposed, and something of the considerations involved in the arrangements finally adopted. He then presents a detailed description of the organization and functions of the regional office.

A chapter on the determination of regional areas and the location of regional headquarters throws considerable light on the difficulties, political and otherwise, involved in drawing regional boundaries and locating regional offices. It also points up the problem which arises when uniform regions are used for all programs of a multi-program agency; and it tells how the Social Security Board finally met the problem for its federal-state programs, which needed regions consisting of several states, and for its old age and survivor's insurance program, which needed regions based on the number of insured workers regardless of state lines.

Considerable attention is given to the use of what the author calls "functional bureaus" in the social security program, which provide certain specialized services to the basic program bureaus and administer segments of the various programs, such as the Bureau of Accounts and Audits, the Office of the General Counsel, and the State Technical Advisory Service dealing with personnel and merit system matters in the states. The author brings out some of the inter-bureau conflicts which resulted from this arrangement and the advantages which it afforded by way of greater and more economical use of specialized personnel once a suitable division of authority was worked out between the program and the functional bureaus.

The heart of the problem of regional organization in the Social Security Administration was the determination of the proper role of the regional director and the lines of supervision from headquarters to the region. These were matters of long and heated controversy within the agency. In general, the program bureaus desired full line authority over their units in the regional offices, while some of the regional directors wanted a single line of command through themselves for all programs. The formal rules of the agency and the facts have never entirely agreed, and in practice the influence and authority of the regional director have varied considerably, depending on the personalities involved. In the view of the author, the solution ultimately evolved by the Social Security Board, which he considers the only proper solution in a multi-program agency, was a single line of general administrative command from the Commissioner of Social Security to the regional director and separate lines of program or functional command from the various bureaus.

Dr. Davis has done a first-rate job in presenting and analyzing the experience of the Social Security Administration, which holds much of value for the guidance of other multi-program agencies. One, however, may be pardoned some skepticism concerning the degree to which the principles laid down by the author on multiple-command over regional activities simplify the solution of the problems of regional organization. The fact is that a satisfactory plan of regional organization for a multi-program agency cannot be formulated on the basis of theories as to lines of command. It has to be based on an intensive analysis of the interrelationships among activities of the various bureaus of the agency at the regional level calling for coordination and a careful study of the matters needing regional leadership or specialized personnel and services of a type that cannot, or cannot economically, be provided by the individual bureau units for themselves. Furthermore, no matter how carefully designed, the organization will require considerable adjustment in the light of actual experience, and it cannot be expected to work satisfactorily until the personnel have been thoroughly trained and have become accustomed to operating within the new framework.

RAYMOND C. ATKINSON.

Washington, D. C.

Personality and Government; Findings and Recommendations of the Indian Administration Research. BY LAURA THOMPSON. (Mexico, D.F.: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano. 1951. Pp. xviii, 229. $2.00.)

Life in a Mexican Village; Tepoztlán Restudied. BY OSCAR LEWIS. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1951. Pp. xxvii, 512. $7.50.)

Why review two cultural-anthropological studies in a professional journal of political scientists? The justification rests on two assumptions: first, that similar, if not identical, processes of change, structural patterns and functional relationships are the proper subjects in the scientific investigation of social relations, including government and politics; and, second, that the wider the focus of attention of a particular discipline in the social-scientific division of labor, the more relevant are its observations (i.e., the closer does it come to reality). The interdisciplinary approach, then, would seem to provide a more comprehensive picture of the phenomena of interest to the social scientist and, hopefully, give more satisfactory explanations than "specialized" treatment. Political science, especially, with its conceptual apparatus still largely derived from history and law, and with a perceptual field still widely determined by a mechanistic rationalism, may benefit from intellectual intercourse with the dynamic formulations of modern cultural anthropology.

Miss Thompson's book is of interest to political scientists for a variety of reasons, not least important among them the fact that she treads, with less caution than an angel's, on political stamping grounds. Her book is, in capsule form, a report on a series of investigations into the difficult "personality-culture-public policy" complex of tribal Indianism in the United States. Set up in 1941 by contract under the joint auspices of the U. S. Office of Indian Affairs and the University of Chicago's Committee on Human Development, the latter subsequently succeeded by the Society for Applied Anthropology, the "Indian Personality and Administration Research" was considered from the beginning an "action-research" project. With policy-orientation taken for granted, it was the purpose of studies among various Indian tribes to determine just how federal policy affected the Indian psychologically in his social and natural environment. It was hoped that such determination might help "to define his real needs and resources more precisely and help him more effectively to make a creative adjustment in the modern world."

A project of such scope required careful research design. The six tribes selected for research—Hopi, Navaho, Papago, Sioux, Zia and Zuni—were presumably representative of Indian Service problems as well as of different types of Indian cultures and authority systems. Moreover, the project required interdisciplinary cooperation because no one discipline could be assumed to have all the knowledge and skills necessary to solve the problem under scrutiny. Hence, at one time or another, over fifty specialists from anthropology, psychiatry, psychology, public administration, linguistics, pedagogy and primitive economics were involved in various phases of the project. Also, it was a prerequisite of success that a theoretical frame of reference and a research methodology should be developed which would be acceptable to the specialists participating in the inquiry. Hence, theory and methodology had to be evolved experimentally as the research progressed. Above all, it was recognized that in order to make the scientific findings relevant to the policy needs of the project, the scientific frame of reference had to be as broad as that of the administrator (i.e., it could not leave out any part of the latter's "problematic situation").

However, the project was not simply "applied research." Rather, it sought to construct a bridge between theory and practice, between those immediate conclusions of interest to the policy-maker, and those theoretical generalizations of interest to the scientist. For instance, though beginning with a "culture-personality" formulation, the theoretical implications of the project had to be expanded when it became clear that in the selection of variables it was important to discover not only new and relevant factors, but also relationships among *interdependent sets* of such variables. The theoretical approach, then, became "multi-dimensional" or "integrated"; and while some readers may remain unconvinced by Miss Thompson's "metaphysic"—in the best sense of that term, which does not imply anything supernatural, but indicates purely methodological matters not springing from immediate experience—they cannot but be impressed by the heuristic value of her theoretical formulations.

What were the findings? First, the current Indian policy of rapid assimilation can only be detrimental to Indian personality development and community welfare. In fact, costly institutionalized school and health services and other technological aid will not bring about rapid assimilation. On the contrary, they will probably contribute to further disorientation. And, second, the earlier Ickes-Collier policy, embodied in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and related legislation, though not fully implemented even in its heyday, has had beneficial effects on the Indians, both as personalities and as societies. This policy has been expressed by John Collier in a single, simple sentence: "The Indian societies, whether ancient, regenerated, or created anew, must be given status, responsibility and power."

Oscar Lewis' magnificent report on Tepoztlán, a Mexican village first studied by Robert Redfield in 1926, was originally conceived as a continuation of the earlier investigator's work, but it turned out to be a "restudy" with significantly different findings and conclusions. There is much virtue in this unforeseen "accident." For too many social science investigations are additive rather than cumulative, with the result that there is little progress in theoretical insight. Indeed, out of this "accident" developed the main part of Lewis' argument in seeking to answer the question: how could he account for the differences between his own findings and those of Redfield?

Redfield had described Tepoztlán as a relatively homogeneous, isolated, smoothly functioning and well-integrated society of contented and well-adjusted people. His emphasis had been upon cooperative and unifying factors. Lewis, on the other hand, emphasizes the individualism of Tepoztlán institutions and character, lack of cooperation, tensions within the village and among neighboring villages, and a pervading quality of fear, envy, and even distrust in interpersonal relations.

In seeking to account for these differences, Lewis might have been satisfied with easy answers. Surely, the differences could have been due to actual historical changes, variations in the general scope of research, new approaches and methods, or contradictory testimony of new informants. But the differences were too marked to allow such simplistic explanations. Lewis concluded that the differences in findings must be due to differences in the theoretical assumptions underlying Redfield's and his own work. He found that Redfield's conceptual framework of the "folk-urban continuum" did not "fit," because it focuses attention primarily on the urbanization process as the source of social change to the exclusion of possible interaction among folk societies themselves. Consequently, culture change may not be a matter of folk-urban progression, but rather an increasing or decreasing heterogeneity of culture elements. Moreover, the "folk-urban continuum" theory ignores the possibility of formalism and impersonality, presumably characteristics of the city, in a small and homogeneous society. It also tends to obscure the wide range in the behavior and value systems of primitive peoples which modern anthropology has discovered. Neglect of psychological data, and the implicit value judgment that folk societies are "good" and urban societies are "bad," round out Lewis' critique of Redfield's theory.

Lewis' own methodological orientation resembles that of Laura Thompson. Its historical, functional and configurational emphasis permits Lewis to study Tepoztlán culture as a changing phenomenon, responding to different influences at different times. By linking institutions as they function today, he succeeds in viewing Tepoztlán culture as a whole, as an integrated way of life. The approach is multi-dimensional in that Lewis seeks to understand the interdependent relationships among geographic, historic, economic, social, political and psychological variables. All of these factors are carefully examined in separate chapters and pulled together to make a meaningful profile of the village and its people.

However, unlike the investigations of the "Indian Personality and Administration Research," Lewis' study is not "action-research," though its author hopes that his book may "be useful to administrators concerned with the task of carrying out welfare programs in the so-called backward areas of the world." Short of some revolutionary change in the behavior patterns of bureaucrats, the promise of such hope may well be doubted.

But what political scientists can learn from anthropologists (and some other social scientists), is the painstaking effort that is made in describing the researcher's theoretical frame of reference, conceptual tools, hypotheses and criteria of evidence, research design, use of technical gadgets and field techniques, and relationship with his subjects. Lewis' book, just as Thompson's, may serve as a model. If one compares a study such as Lewis' report on Tepoztlán with an investigation such as V. O. Key's *Southern Politics*, both "monumental" in their respective domains, one is struck by the difference between the carefully designed approach of the anthropologist and the hit-and-miss procedures of political scientists. Certainly, there is much that political scientists can learn from their colleagues in neighboring specializations in this respect.

HEINZ EULAU.

Antioch College.

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

American Democracy and Military Power; A Study of Civil Control of the Military Power in the United States. By Louis Smith. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1951. Pp. xv, 370. $5.00.)

Since 1940, under the impact of World War II and the following period of strain and partial mobilization, political scientists have begun to turn to the neglected area of military affairs. Dean Smith, for whom this is apparently a long-standing interest, has now provided the first comprehensive statement of the major elements and issues in civilian control of American military power. His book fills a major gap. Using both historical and analytical methods of inquiry, he considers in turn the function of the President, the departments, and the Congress; if occasionally the analysis has already been dated by events, this is not his fault. He then adds a brief but perceptive discussion of the role of the courts, and concludes with an earnest restatement of his conviction that civil control is of the first importance to the welfare of our society. The survey as a whole is careful and sensible. In most places it rests on the research of others, but Dean Smith is the first to acknowledge his debts, and more than once he shows that he can dig for himself when necessary; no one has gone further with the fascinating problem of the proper role of congressional committees in wartime. A book for which so much can be said is the more disappointing in its failings, of which I must note three. First, this volume, which is heavily dependent upon quotation and reference, displays a most slovenly inaccuracy in citation. In a single quotation from Arnold Toynbee (p. 326) there are four small errors; in one from the *Federalist* (p. 292) there are eight; and a similar if less extreme carelessness is to be found in many other instances. No one should quote at second-hand from this book. Second, I think Dean Smith relies too much on the judgments of others; too often he seems to give us other men's opinions not so much because they fit his argument as because he thinks the big names should all be included. To have the classic statements of opposing positions is helpful, but a discussion assembled largely from other men's writings may leave the reader with no assurance that he understands the argument and conclusions of the author himself. In the present case conclusions sometimes leap out almost from nowhere; the book ends, for example, with three large and sweeping propositions about the value of civil control, and not one of these propositions has been systematically argued or defended anywhere before. Yet when Dean Smith does take over the argument for himself, the results are usually excellent; I wish he had done so more often. Finally, with all its intelligence and comprehensiveness, this study seems to lack flesh-and-blood reality. War and politics are subjects with a passion and power that are missing from Dean Smith's somewhat distant analysis. Occasionally, when he lets us hear an angry soldier or congressman, some of the reality of the subject comes through, but in the main this book applies the techniques of a black-and-white snapshot to a topic that calls for both movement and color.—McGeorge Bundy, *Harvard University.*

The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment. By Jacobus ten Broek. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1951. Pp. vi, 232. $3.00.)

On one aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment many will agree—it demonstrates by contrast the magnificent drafting skill of those who framed the original Constitution. From Roscoe Conkling to Mr. Justice Black competent researchers have been able to prove that the Fourteenth Amendment means just about anything they would like to have it mean. Professor ten Broek holds that the real difficulty with the published studies to date is that they are concerned almost exclusively with events after December, 1865, when the first draft proposals for the amendment were introduced into Congress. His thesis is that the real meat is to be found in the doctrines of the organized abolitionist movement beginning at least a generation earlier. Drawing primarily upon the prolific output of the abolitionists between 1833 and 1866 Professor ten Broek finds another "true" meaning. It is natural law—the Fourteenth Amendment simply constitutionalized man's inalienable, natural rights. This Delphic answer is given somewhat more precise content by reference to the disabilities suffered by negroes *and abolitionists* prior to the Civil War. Since many of these disabilities were the product of private action, the author has no difficulty in "reversing" the Civil Rights cases. Natural law puts him on Cardozo's, rather than Black's, side of the conflict over the relation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Bill of Rights. And, of course, he must necessarily accept Black's and reject Conkling's position as to corporations. He reads "equal protection" as meaning "full protection," and "the privileges and immunities of citizens" as "the natural rights of all men" which, if judicially adopted, might be expected to bring thoroughly revolutionary results. Doubtless *some* of the "fathers" supported these and each of the other researched meanings of the great amendment. But the abolitionists never constituted more than a small, despised minority. Even if they were in agreement among themselves on Lockian natural law (cf. Adam Smith's version which Mr. Justice Field *et al.* introduced into the Fourteenth Amendment long ago), it is a big step to the proposition that their generally unpopular views explain *the* meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether Professor ten Broek has proved his case more adequately than his competitors have proved theirs is at least debatable. For my part, the combined research efforts to date suggest mainly that those who gave us the Fourteenth Amendment were as divided on its meaning as we are.—WALLACE MENDELSON, *University of Tennessee.*

GOVERNMENT PROJECT. BY EDWARD C. BANFIELD. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1951. Pp. 271. $3.50.)

Devotees of Aeschylus, Sophocles or Dreiser will understand this book. With the relentlessness of a Greek tragedy, the story of this Resettlement Administration project—a cooperative farm at Casa Grande in the Arizona desert—moves forward from relief and destitution for (at most) fifty-seven families, through hope, then security, to the very brink of permanent success, only to disintegrate "not with a bang but a whimper." The story is well told. The administration was adequate though not always excellent. The project farmers, mostly dust-bowl migrants of the middle-thirties, were of old American stock. But they were there because they had previously failed, and it seems they could not overcome their sense of guilt at having proved unfit when measured by the standards of their American environment. With sympathy and understanding, Mr. Banfield describes the origin of the idea, the development of the plan, the organization of the cooperative, the selection of the settlers, and the reasonably successful first year—1938. Then as drought, which was a severe handicap at first, gave way to normal and even excellent farming conditions, the settlers developed a persistent factionalism which was to grow apace with the increasing prosperity accompanying the preparation for war. In fact, these people became dissatisfied, unhappy and cantankerous in direct proportion to their increasing economic well-being. This phenomenon seemed strange to the project manager and the higher administrative officials, and even Mr. Banfield has difficulty in understanding it. In a painstaking analysis, the forces and factors leading to failure are set forth in an intelligent and thoughtful final chapter. Why was Casa Grande a failure? The aim was to resettle uprooted people. The organization vehicle was a cooperative, and these people had undergone no previous indoctrination in a new and strange ideology. The settlers had been failures according to their own standards. The management was sometimes inept. Yet new dispensations were tried and a good deal of thought and imagination were perhaps belatedly applied. It seems to this reviewer that the author is on sound ground when he discusses the inability of the settlers and the administrators to develop "leadership." The time was short, however, and the group was not typical by any standards of a community of persons which would likely be thrown together so intimately elsewhere in American society. Moreover, the outside world was hostile—mildly so in the Casa Grande valley and viciously so in the halls of Congress in faraway Washington, D. C. According to Rexford G. Tugwell, author of the Foreword, these settlers "came to grief not because the conception was bad or because the technique was mistaken, but because the people there could not rise to the challenge. It was character which failed. And that was not because the human stock was feeble; it was because the environment was hostile to the development of character." This reviewer agrees that the failure was one of character—not only at Casa Grande but in the very highest circles in Washington. As a member of the 78th Congress, he knows not only who "killed the goose that laid the golden egg" but also who threw the egg away.—HOWARD J. MCMURRAY, *University of New Mexico.*

Governmental Organization in Metropolitan Areas. BY BETTY TABLEMAN. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 179. $2.50.)

This study by Mrs. Tableman, of the Bureau of Government in the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Michigan, is valuable for its summary of the available data on governmental problems in Michigan metropolitan areas and the efforts thus far made to solve them. She also evaluates the techniques employed or proposed for their solution. Particular attention is given to the Detroit metropolitan area. The discussion of the problems in Michigan is preceded by a similar study of experience with metropolitan problems in the rest of the country. After a quick review of the principal means of "metropolitan integration," she pays particular attention to "cooperation" and metropolitan special districts. These are characterized as expedient approaches. The cooperative approach includes the assumption of municipal functions by the county, the furnishing of services by the central city, joint undertakings, and metropolitan planning. The most useful part of the book is the listing of places where these devices are used. To supplement the discussion in Chapter III, the book contains a sixteen-page appendix in which instances of central city services, county assumption of functions, and joint city-county activities are listed for each of 140 metropolitan districts. The names of metropolitan or county planning agencies and of metropolitan special districts are also given for each metropolitan district. Another appendix provides us with data on the area, activities, establishment, financing, directors, and employees of 38 metropolitan special districts in the United States and Canada. These data are summarized and evaluated to some extent in Chapter IV. The author's overall conclusion is hesitant but, I believe, too optimistic: "The underlying economic dependency and the common service needs tend inevitably to push an area toward unification. As problem pressures build up, integrative measures will have to be taken. In the beginning the cooperative techniques hold forth greatest promise. Gradually, as the web of governmental interdependence grows, it should be possible to gain support for more fundamental structural changes."—VICTOR JONES, *Wesleyan University.*

A Guide to the Microfilm Collection of Early State Records; Supplement. PREPARED BY THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA. COLLECTED, COMPILED AND EDITED BY WILLIAM SUMNER JENKINS. (Washington: Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress. 1951. Pp. xxiii, 130, xviii. $3.00.)

In the supplement to the original *Guide* published in 1950, W. S. Jenkins inventories five additional classes of early official state materials, as follows, recorded on 170 reels of film: local records, records of American-Indian nations, newspapers, rudimentary states and courts, and miscellany. In the class of local records only seven units are represented, but these point the way to a need for fuller representation of representative bodies in the earlier period. Among the records of the American Indians, those of the Cherokees are most fully covered; in addition, there is a very extensive record of Indian laws and constitutions. In the class of newspapers are grouped the early gazettes and newspapers, so far as files could be located, since these contained often the only printing of official records. Under the heading "Rudimentary States and Courts" are grouped the records of various transitory governments, including those of western mining districts, 1859–66. The final class "Miscellany" includes large collections of broadsides, which in the earlier period seem to have been the principal form for official publication. In addition, there are some pages of addenda and errata to the main *Guide.* Altogether, Jenkins has collected with the greatest assiduity and search on 1,870 reels of film (which can, subject to very little restriction, be reproduced in part or in whole) the great body of basic early state records, printed as well as manuscript, necessary for the study and understanding of the development of government.—JAMES B. CHILDS, *Library of Congress.*

Introduction to American Constitutional Law; A Selection of Cases and Materials. BY FRANCIS H. HELLER. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. x, 691. $5.00.)

Containing approximately 100 cases and a substantial number of readings, this text is designed for advanced undergraduates in political science. Professor Heller has supplied interpretative comments and summaries of constitutional developments.

Cases on Church and State in the United States. Compiled by Mark De Wolfe Howe. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1952. Pp. 393. $6.00.)

Preliminary edition of historically important cases, from colonial times to the present, collected by professor of law at Harvard.

Upon Its Own Resources; Conservation and State Administration. By Lawrence L. Durisch and Hershal L. Macon. (University, Ala.: Cooperatively published by University of Alabama Press, University of Georgia Press, University of Mississippi Bureau of Public Administration, University of South Carolina Press, and University of Tennessee Press. 1951. Pp. ix, 136. $3.00.)

Seventh and concluding volume in study undertaken by six state universities and TVA of the administration of state resource programs in the Southeast. Prepared by TVA, the present volume summarizes the findings and recommendations of the six state studies, reviewed in this REVIEW, Vol. 43, p. 378 (April 1949).

Public Administration; Readings and Documents. By Felix A. Nigro. (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc. 1951. Pp. xi, 493. $4.00.)

Selections on various aspects of "The Role of Public Administration," "The Function of the Executive," "Organization," "Personnel Administration," "Financial Administration," "Administrative Regulation" and "Administrative Responsibility," supplemented by introductory notes, study questions and annotated references.

Essentials of Missouri Government. By Robert F. Karsch. (Columbia, Mo.: Lucas Brothers. 1952. Pp. iii, 156.)

Second edition of current manual of state and local government by University of Missouri political scientist.

Fifteen Years of County Manager Government in Virginia; An Experiment in Local Government. By George W. Spicer. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Extension Division. 1951. Pp. 145. Paper $0.50, Cloth $2.50.)

Revision of previous study entitled *Ten Years of County Manager Government in Virginia.* The chapter on Arlington County is rewritten, those on Albemarle and Henrico Counties are brought up to date, and a new chapter on Warwick County is added.

Domestic Control of Atomic Energy. By Robert A. Dahl and Ralph S. Brown, Jr. (New York: Social Science Research Council. 1951. Pp. v, 117. $1.00.)

A study, exploratory in nature, briefly surveying the numerous, and for the most part ignored, areas of profitable research available in the field of atomic energy and their implications for the social scientist.

Price Policies in the Cigarette Industry; A Study of "Concerted Action" and Its Social Control, 1911–50. By William H. Nicholls. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 1951. Pp. xix, 444. $6.00.)

Part IV, "The Social Control of Oligopoly," examines the legal and economic significance of the *Tobacco* case of 1940–46 and analyzes the strength and deficiencies of antitrust action as a control device.

How to Get Rich in Washington; Rich Man's Division of the Welfare State. By Blair Bolles. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1952. Pp. x, 309. $3.75.)

Examples of corruption, favoritism and irresponsibility in the federal government since World War II, drawn chiefly from the letting of war contracts and the awarding of tax amortization certificates, the granting of shipping and airmail subsidies, RFC loan-making and the collection of taxes.

The Teaching of Contemporary Affairs; 1950, Twenty-First Yearbook. Edited by John C. Payne. (Washington: National Council for the Social Studies. 1951. Pp. xvii, 233. Paper $2.50, Cloth $3.00.)

Essays by seventeen educators on practices and problems from the grades to junior colleges. Chapters on public opinion are of particular interest to political scientists.

So It Seemed. By William L. Chenery. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1952. Pp. xi, 300. $4.00.)

Fifty years' recollections, by the former editor and publisher of *Collier's.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

J. ALTON BURDINE AND EMMETTE S. REDFORD
University of Texas

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Les Constitutions Européennes. By Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1951. 2 vols. Pp. xiii, 883. 1,500 fr. ea.)

Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II; An Examination of Significant Aspects of Postwar Public Law with Particular Reference to the New Constitutions of Western Europe. Edited by Arnold J. Zurcher. (New York: New York University Press. 1951. Pp. viii, 351. $5.00.)

These two books deal with a crucial issue of our times—the prospects of constitutionalism in Europe. Yet neither Professor Mirkine-Guetzévitch's two-volume work, which consists of a long introductory essay and a careful and valuable compilation of all the European constitutions now in force, nor Professor Zurcher's volume, which consists of ten essays supplied by various writers, goes to the heart of the nature and problems of European constitutionalism. Professor Mirkine-Guetzévitch is primarily concerned in his introductory essay with institutional arrangements as such. A constitution is for him a "technique de la liberté" and he is, as in his previous studies, passionately concerned with techniques. Yet after a detailed study of the provisions of the new constitutions with particular reference to legislative-executive relations (the best part of the essay), the new Bill of Rights—which he traces to the French Jacobin tradition—and the self-imposed limitations in favor of international law and international agreements, Professor Mirkine-Guetzévitch concludes that both the technique of liberty and the faith in liberty are lacking. Europe still awaits a constitutional rejuvenation, though the author hardly makes the effort to point out the fundamental weakness of the constitutional systems and the new factors that might revitalize them in the future.

Professor Zurcher's volume, on the other hand, lacks a general point of view and a systematic approach. It opens with an essay written by Professor Carl Friedrich on "The Political Theory of the New Democratic Constitutions" in which the author develops the thesis that the new constitutions embody a "negative revolution," a revolution directed against all forms of totalitarianism through a reaffirmation of human rights and an emphasis upon social goals. He calls for a reorientation of our study of European constitutionalism by pointing out that its success or failure depends upon the development of European unity. This essay might have provided the editor with an excellent frame of reference for the subsequent essays of the volume. Instead the concluding study on "The Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age," written by Professor Loewenstein, takes issue with Professor Friedrich's thesis. The constitutional documents are transitory, they embody revolutionary principles only evasively, and they are unrelated to the broader frame of European unity. In between the opening and the concluding studies are essays on "Electoral Changes" and on "The Position of the Representative Legislature in Post-War Constitutions" (Edward G. Lewis); "Stabilization of the Cabinet System in Western Europe" (Joseph Dunner); "Local Autonomy in France and Italy" and "Functional Autonomy after World War II" (F. A. Hermens); "Federalism—The Bonn Model" (J. B. Mason); "The British Commonwealth as an Example of a Multi-national State System" (Adam Ulam); and "Constitutional Documents of East-Central Europe" (Robert G. Neumann). Most of these essays are of a descriptive nature. The authors enumerate the constitutional provisions without making any effort to study their operation and assess their viability. Some of the essays are repetitious. For instance Professor Lewis' essay on the position of representative legislatures is partially repeated by Professor Dunner in his essay on the stabilization of the cabinet system. Others deal with unimportant topics. Professor Hermens, for instance, after an excellent essay on local autonomy in France and Italy proceeds to revive the ghost of functional representation only to lay it at rest once more and Mr. Neumann is constrained to enumerate many of the provisions of the constitutions of the Peoples' Democracies, though conceding their purely formal and propaganda character. The best essay happens to be the one least related to the rest, and this is the study of constitutional developments in the British Commonwealth, in which Mr. Ulam does a remarkable job of compression and interpretation of a very complex subject.

Aside from the descriptive character of the essays and the probably unavoidable duplications and contradictions, the main weakness of Professor Zurcher's volume lies in its omissions. Why not, for instance, study the applications of the social and economic provisions of the new constitutions? How have executive-legislative relations fared in Western Europe in the context of the new constitutions? What is the test—if any—of the viability of the provisions related to the Bill of Rights or the supremacy of international law? None of these topics is treated separately. Again, isn't the focal point of Western constitutionalism "European" rather than "national?" Finally, are the issues of functional representation or the federal provisions of the Bonn constitution more pertinent to our understanding of constitutionalism than the study of the admittedly more complex social, economic, ideological and political forces on which in the last analysis the future of European constitutionalism depends? Both Professor Mirkine-Guetzévitch and the contributors in Professor Zurcher's volume admit that they are not. Time and time again they state almost apologetically that constitutions are "skeletons" or mere "forms" that hide the "substance" and that their provisions are only incidental to a full understanding of the issue of constitutionalism. Why then not study the "substance" instead of returning to the texts and describing them lovingly and meticulously? And even more important—why not make an effort to assess the relationship between "substance" and "form," between constitutionalism and constitutional texts?—ROY C. MACRIDIS, *Northwestern University.*

The Perón Era. BY ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. Pp. x, 239. $3.50.)

As Professor Alexander points out, amazingly little has been published about Argentina since the hectic days of World War II. For their basic information on and impressions of Argentine affairs, "North Americans" in the main have had to rely, until the appearance of *The Perón Era,* on works of the vintage of Ray Joseph's hysterically anti-Nazi *Argentine Diary* (1944), Ysabel Rennie's more sober and scholarly *The Argentine Republic* (1945), and Felix J. Weil's *Argentine Riddle* (1945), itself somewhat enigmatic. Since these books were written, World War II has crashed to an uncertain close, Hitler and the Axis have been declared to be dead, and President Juan Domingo Perón has endeavored with some success to clamber off the pro-Axis limb from which the Argentine revolution of 1943 had left him hanging. Alexander has set himself the task of bringing us up to date on postwar developments. Essentially, *The Perón Era* is a carefully traced chronology of the recent public acts of Perón and his remarkable and comely first lady, "Evita" Perón. Alexander is an economist, and he is, as might be expected, especially effective in his handling of conventionally economic matters. This is at once the major strength and the glaring weakness of the book. I know of no better treatment of the current status of the Argentine labor movement than is to be found in *The Perón Era,* and the section on land economics is likewise good. However, if these be Alexander's forte, they consume only three of the volume's eighteen chapters. The author's work is thin and frequently superficial when spread over the other aspects of Peronism, with which most of the book deals. The chapters on the Army and the Church hint at, rather than analyze, the militaristic and clerical phases of the regime; "Evita" Perón's highly significant place in the "new Argentina" rates only a scant and sketchy twelve pages; and the governmental process for the consolidation of Peronism is largely neglected. Moreover, *Justicialismo,* Perón's attempt at a contribution to political and economic theory, is not even mentioned, although it might eventually occupy a niche, however small, in the history of social philosophy. In essence, *The Perón Era* is a fact-by-fact chronology of recent events, presented without a theoretical structure. Despite the circumstance that the book is written primarily from Socialist sources, Alexander does not venture an evaluation of the role of the Socialist movement in Argentina. The reader is left without a grasp of the sweep of history or the broader contexts endowing Peronism with life and meaning. Academicians may feel constrained by their respective disciplines to forego expecting the book to capture the tense human drama and the charged atmosphere of the "new Argentina." However, if Alexander's principal purpose is to present us with a carefully and handily organized digest of more recent Argentine events, *The Perón Era* serves that purpose well.—GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN, *Northwestern University.*

Reflections on the Constitution; The House of Commons, the Cabinet, the Civil Service. BY HAROLD J. LASKI. (New York: Viking Press. 1951. Pp. 220. $3.00.)

In his final "reflections on the Constitution," Laski returns to the subject which he so ably analyzed in 1938 in *Parliamentary Government in England.* As in his earlier work, Laski demolishes the observations of Amery, Muir and Hewart that parliamentary control of the Executive, especially in the realm of finance, has become a nullity; that the M.P. today is less independent and far less competent than his predecessor; that Parliament has lost the power of legislation to the Departments; and that the growth of administrative jurisdiction can be regarded as, in any serious way, an invasion of the rule of law. To Laski, the growth of cabinet power has not meant the reduction of Parliament to "colonial status." If it is true that the general direction of the House is determined by the Cabinet, it is equally true that the authority of the Cabinet is always tempered by the knowledge that any grave error on its part in estimating what Parliament is prepared to accept, may lead to its defeat. Laski remains "a strong believer in a stable Executive with sufficient authority to drive an important and substantial programme through the House of Commons in the lifetime of a Parliament of five years." With all the changes that have taken place in Parliament during the last half century Laski sees no decline in its greatness, nor any ultimate danger that it should be by-passed in its fundamental purposes, above all in the most fundamental of all its purposes, the duty to see that the conditions are maintained which protect the freedom of the ordinary citizen.—ELAINE WINDRICH, *Stanford University*.

Governments of Continental Europe. EDITED BY JAMES T. SHOTWELL. (New York: Macmillan Company. Revised Edition. 1952. Pp. xv, 881. $6.00.)

Extensive revision by five of the seven associates who wrote the first edition in 1940. The editor, now president emeritus of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contributes a brief introduction. With separate responsibility, R. K. Gooch, University of Virginia, writes on France; Arnold J. Zurcher, New York University, on Italy and Switzerland; Karl Loewenstein, Amherst, on Germany; Michael T. Florinsky, Columbia, on the USSR. Coverage of Scandinavian and other smaller powers, included in the first edition, has been omitted.

Political Handbook of the World; Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1952. EDITED BY WALTER H. MALLORY. (New York: Published by Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 1952. Pp. 229. $3.50.)

Twenty-fifth annual edition, edited by the executive director of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Reader in Bureaucracy. EDITED BY ROBERT K. MERTON, AILSA P. GRAY, BARBARA HOCKEY AND HANAN C. SELVIN. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1952. Pp. 464. $5.00.)

The fifty or more selections, dealing with American and West European political organizations, are intended to emphasize the sociological study of bureaucracy. The editors have provided brief introductions to the major topic headings, and a fourteen-page bibliography.

The Rise of Modern Communism; A Brief History of the Communist Movement in the Twentieth Century. BY MASSIMO SALVADORI. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1952. Pp. x, 118. $2.00.)

An interpretative sketch of the rise of Communism and its expansion within and without Communist-controlled areas. The author, now teaching at Smith and Bennington Colleges, was educated in Italy and Switzerland, and was formerly Director of Unesco's Division of Political Sciences.

The Soviet Financial System; Its Development and Relations with the Western World. BY MIKHAIL V. CONDOIDE. (Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, College of Commerce and Administration, Ohio State University. 1951. Pp. xiii, 230. $4.00.)

An analysis of the operations of the Soviet financial system and its place in the Soviet economy as a whole. There are chapters on foreign trade and foreign economic policies. The author, born and educated in Russia, is an economist at Ohio State University.

The Scandinavian States and Finland; A Political and Economic Survey. (London & New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1951. Pp. viii, 312. $4.00.)

Organized on a country basis. Includes brief discussion of the political structure and political parties and the foreign relations of each country.

Mediaeval Orvieto; The Political History of an Italian City-State, 1157–1334. BY DANIEL WALEY. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1952. Pp. xxv, 170. $4.00.)

History of a small independent commune of the Papal States from the time it was granted self-governing status to the *coup d'état* of its first tyrant. The author, a British medieval historian, has based his work almost entirely on original sources.

Winston Churchill, 1874–1951. BY LEWIS BROAD. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. xx, 611. $6.00.)

American issue of third English edition of conventional biography. Quotations from speeches are numerous and often extensive.

Lazaro Cardenas; Mexican Democrat. BY WILLIAM CAMERON TOWNSEND. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: George Wahr Publishing Co. 1952. Pp. xiv, 379. $4.00.)

A biography of the man who was president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940, and who proved "that a man can be in office and remain honest, and retire poor."

Foundations of World Organization; A Political and Cultural Appraisal. EDITED BY LYMAN BRYSON, LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, HAROLD D. LASSWELL AND R. M. MACIVER. (New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. 1952. Pp. xiv, 498. $4.00. Distributed by Harper & Brothers.)

This volume, which contains the proceedings of the Eleventh Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, consists of some forty-three papers, prepared and delivered by distinguished scholars, dealing with various phases of international organization.

Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789. EDITED BY GEORGES BERLIA. (Paris: Libraire générale de droit et de jurisprudence. 1952. Pp. 705.)

The seventh edition of this standard collection of French constitutional documents devotes considerable space (almost one-half its content) to the various French regimes (Vichy, Free France, etc.) of World War II and the Fourth Republic, thus making readily available basic source texts relating to contemporary French government. Previous editions were compiled by L. Duguit, H. Monnier and R. Bonnard.

Het Parlement. ('s-Gravenhage. 1950–51. 5 parts.)

The debates of the two chambers of the Netherlands Parliament, and of their joint sittings, beginning with the sessions of 1950–51, have been currently published in loose parts, octavo format, grouped in five large classes by the subject matter of the Ministries for handy reference. No title-pages or indexes seem to have been printed as yet. The customary regular chronological publication of the debates of the two chambers of the Staten General in foolscap folio as *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal* seems rather forbidding to the user, even though there is a sessional index. The current parts of *Het Parlement* even without an index or table seem much more convenient for use, and call attention elsewhere to the need for continual reconsideration of the conventional recording and publication of parliamentary debates.—J.B.C.

The Council of State in Egypt. BY JASPER Y. BRINTON. (Cairo: American Embassy. 1951. 54, 25 leaves. [Mimeo.])

The legal attaché of the American Embassy at Cairo has prepared a brief review of the Council of State of Egypt in connection with the establishment of a system of administrative justice created in 1946 after the pattern of France, and has attached to it translations of the law of February 2, 1949, reorganizing that body, and of the law of 1946. Only brief mention is made of the legislative section of the Council, which drafts all legislation prepared by the Government except budgets. The review by Mr. Brinton, who served on the Mixed Courts of Egypt, 1921–48, is to be especially commended, since the annual reports and decisions of the Council are printed only in Arabic.—J.B.C.

Handbook for Congressmen. (New Delhi: Central Publicity Board, Indian National Congress. 1951. Pp. 155.)

A guide for Congress workers and Congress candidates in the first national elections in India, presenting the viewpoint of the principal Indian political party to all problems.—J.B.C.

Berlin, 1950, Jahresbericht des Magistrats. (Berlin W: Kulturbuch-Verlag. 1951. Pp. 167.)

The detailed report of the West Berlin government for 1950 shows the difficult task of reconstruction and of attempting to maintain normal activities under the trying daily contact with East Berlin and the continual war of nerves.—J.B.C.

Rapport fait au nom de la Commission chargée d'enquêter sur les événements survenus en France de 1933 à 1945. PAR M. CHARLES SERRE, RAPPORTEUR GÉNÉRAL, DEPUTÉ. (Paris: Imprimerie de l'Assemblée Nationale. 1951, i.e. 1951–1952. 11 vols. Pp. 547, 2891. Assemblée Nationale, première législature, session de 1947, No. 2344, annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 8 août 1947.)

The National Assembly of France, by law of August 31, 1946, created a Commission including some non-parliamentary representatives of organizations of the Resistance, veterans, and victims of war and fascism, to carry out "une enquête sur l'ensemble des événements politiques, économiques, diplomatiques et militaires qui de 1933 à 1945, ont précédé, accompagné et suivi l'armistice, afin de déterminer les responsabilités encourues, et de proposer, s'il y a lieu, les sanctions politiques et judiciaires." In the nine volumes of "annexes" are the stenographic reports of the hearings of the Commission from May 21, 1947, through May 18, 1951. The report was supposed to be presented within a year, hence the numbering as of August 8, 1947. Actually, it was not finished until February 1952.—J.B.C.

Le elezioni politiche del 1948. Elezione del Senato della Repubblica. Note illustrative e documentazione statistica. Notizie sulle elezioni politiche in alcuni paesi esteri. BY ISTITUTO CENTRALE DI STATISTICA. (Roma: Tipografia Fausto Failli. 1951. Pp. vi, 215. L. 800.)

The report upon the elections to the Italian Senate in 1948 includes a careful statement as to the history of the legislation setting up that body, an analysis of the statistics of the election, and a statement as to elections to the upper house in various other countries. The previous report on the election to the Chamber of Deputies comprised two volumes.—J.B.C.

Manual of Election Law; a Compilation of the Statutory Provisions Governing Elections to Parliament and the State Legislatures. BY MINISTRY OF LAW, INDIA. (Delhi: Manager of Publications. 1951, i.e. 1952. Pp. 271.)

Contains the relevant portions of the Constitution and the constitutional orders, the Representation of the People Acts, extracts from the Part C States Act, the Parliament Prevention of Disqualification Acts passed by Parliament in 1950 and 1951, and the more important rules and orders made under these Acts, all of which have been corrected and brought up to date. The Manual is published only in English. A more elaborate *Election manual* (Pp. 719) prepared by the Parliament Secretariat was published at New Delhi as of October, 1951.—J.B.C.

Deutschland im Wiederaufbau; Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundesregierung für das Jahr 1951. HERAUSGEGEBEN VON DEM PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG. (Bonn: Deutscher Bundesverlag. 1952. Pp. 243.)

A consolidated report of the activities of the various ministries of the German Federal Republic for the year 1951. The previous volume of 120 pages under the same title covered the period of the establishment of the Bonn Republic, September, 1949, through the year 1950. Apparently there is no provision requiring the various ministries to present separate annual reports.—J.B.C.

Les publications officielles et la documentation internationale; travaux de la Conférence de documentation réunie à Paris le 29 janvier 1951. PUBLIÉ SOUS LA DIRECTION DE MARCEL ROUSSIER. (Paris: Centre Européen, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1952. Pp. 81.)

The proceedings of the conference on official publications and international documentation held at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, on January 29, 1951, under the auspices of the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contains useful summary statements on the official publications of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Great Britain and the United States.—J.B.C.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

MARIO EINAUDI

Cornell University

General

Molok, A. I. Staline et la Commune de Paris. *Cahiers du Communisme.* March, 1952.

Speier, Hans. International Political Communication: Elite vs. Mass. *World Politics.* April, 1952.

United Nations Library. Constitutions of the World. [A selected bibliography of titles in the official languages of the United Nations and in the languages of the various countries. Second draft.] New York, 1951.

Specific Areas

United Kingdom

Arthur Street. *Public Administration.* Winter, 1951.

Bell, R. W. The Relation of Promotion and Training to Higher Management in British Nationalised Industries. *Public Administration.* Autumn, 1951.

Bertrand, A. Les Techniques du Travail Gouvernemental en Grande-Bretagne. *Revue*

Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle. January–June, 1951.

Conservative and Unionist Central Office. Six Years of Socialist Government. London, Conservative Research Department, 1951.

Fitzsimons, M. A. The British Elections. *Review of Politics.* January, 1952.

L'Expérience Travailliste. [A symposium on the British Labour Party with articles by F. Sellier, H. Bartoli, R. Lemnis, G. E. Lavau, J. Hundec, N. McLaren, and I. Mikardo.] *Esprit.* March, 1952.

Lord Citrine. Problems of Nationalised Industries. *Public Administration.* Winter, 1951.

Minister of Local Government and Planning. Town and Country Planning, 1943–1951. London, H.M.S.O., 1951. (Cmd. 8204.)

Parties. [A special issue in three parts on the British Party System, with articles by S. B. Chrimes, J. A. Hawgood, D. C. Somervell, G. D. H. Cole, R. P. Dutt, R. T. McKenzie, H. G. Nicholas, *Sir* E. Barker, S. King-Hall, *et al.* A select bibliography by S. D. Bailey.] *Parliamentary Affairs.* Winter, 1951.

Rolfe, S. E. Manpower Allocation in Great Britain during World War II. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review.* January, 1952.

Taylor, H. A. Communism in Great Britain: A short history of the British Communist Party. London, Conservative Party Centre, 1951.

Commonwealth of Nations

Forsey, Eugene. Mr. King and Parliamentary Government. *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.* November, 1951.

Western Europe

Andreani, Pierre. La Formation du Parti Radical-Socialiste. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* January, 1952.

Bibliographie Sélective des Publications Officielles Françaises. [A fortnightly publication of French documents, now published by the Commission Interministérielle de Documentation et Diffusion, 57, rue de Varenne, Paris VII.]

Brochard, P. La Crise de l'Idée de Nationalisation. *Revue de l'Action Popularie.* January, 1952.

Carleton, W. G. Germany Seven Years After Defeat. *Yale Review.* March, 1952.

Cassin, R. Le Conseil d'État, Gardien des Principes de la Révolution Française. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle.* January–June, 1951.

Charlier, R.-E. Les Contradictions Internes des Groupements: I. L'Equivoque de l'Association; II. Du Syndicat au Parti. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* July–September, 1951, and October–December, 1951.

Courtade, Pierre. Le Parti des Ouvriers, des Paysans et des Intellectuels. *Nouvelle Critique.* February, 1952.

Duclos, Jacques. Maurice Thorez et les Intellectuels. *Nouvelle Critique.* February, 1952.

Durand, Paul. Les Rapports de l'Entreprise du Comité d'Entreprise. *Droit Social.* December, 1951.

Ettori, Charles. Le Contrôle Juridictionnel de l'Administration en Italie. *Revue du Droit Public.* October–December, 1951.

Fontanet, Joseph. Mérites et Limites de la Réforme Constitutionnelle. *Terre Humaine.* January, 1952.

Garaudy, Roger. Le R.P.F., Parti Fasciste. *Cahiers du Communisme.* February, 1952.

Jarrier, Bernard. La "Croisade" pour la Productivité. *Esprit.* February, 1952.

Le Proletariat Nord-Africain en France. [A symposium on the conditions of members of the French working class who are North African emigrés, with articles by M'hamed Ferid Ghazi and Frantz Fanon.] *Esprit.* February, 1952.

Les Tendances Politiques du Protestantisme Allemand. *Documents.* September, 1951.

Mejan, F. L'Evolution de la Législation Scolaire et ses Répercussions sur les Rapports de l'Eglise et de l'Etat: I. *Revue Administrative.* December, 1951.

M. G. The West German Coal and Steel Industries since the War. *World Today.* March, 1952.

Micaud, C. A. Organization and Leadership of the French Communist Party. *World Politics,* April, 1952.

Mirkine-Guetzévitch, B. La Révision Constitutionnelle. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* December, 1951.

M.K.G. Progress in Italian Land Reform. *World Today.* March, 1952.

Moreux, René. L'Union Française devant une Option Capitale: l'Assimilation ou le Fédéralism. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* February, 1952.

Office of the High Commissioner for Germany, Historical Division. History of the Allied High Commission for Germany: Its Establishment, Structure and Procedures. By Elmer Plischke. 1951. (Research Project No. 107.)

Orlando, V. E. La Forme de Gouvernement

en Vigueur en Italie aux Termes de la Constitution de 1948. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle.* July–December, 1951.

Palewski, Gaston. Pour Confédérer l'Europe. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* January, 1952.

Rimbert, Pierre. L'Avenir du Parti Socialiste. I. Son Evolution de 1920 à 1950; II. Age et Composition Sociale. *Revue Socialiste.* February and March, 1952.

Servin, Marcel. L'Internationalisme Prolétarien dans l'Action Solidaire des Partis Communistes de France et d'Allemagne. *Cahiers du Communisme.* March, 1952.

Sorre, Maurice. Les Pères du Radicalisme. *Revue Francaise de Science Politique.* October–December, 1951.

Sternberger, Dolf. Das Schicksal der Parteien. *Wähler.* 1951, no. 7.

United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report on Germany: Report of the Special Study Mission to Germany and Certain Other Countries. Washington, G.P.O., 1952.

Weill-Raynal, Etienne. La Crise Ministérielle de Janvier et Sa Signification. *Revue Socialiste.* February, 1952.

XXX. Genèse de l'Armée Européenne. *Terre Humaine.* March, 1952.

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Dumont, C.-J. Composantes Idéologiques de la Situation Religieuse en U.R.S.S. *Revue Française de Science Politique.* October–December, 1951.

Dziewanowski, M. K. The Foundation of the Communist Party of Poland. *The American Slavic and East European Review.* April, 1952.

Grossmann, K. R. The Political, Social and Economic Development of Eastern Germany during 1950. *Political Science Quarterly.* March, 1952.

Honti, François. Le Problème de l'Etat en U.R.S.S. *Revue Politique et Parlementaire.* December, 1951.

J.C. The Peasant in Poland Today: Reactions to Land Reform and Collectivization. *World Today.* February, 1952.

Kertesz, S. Soviet and Western Politics in Hungary, 1944–1947. *Review of Politics,* January, 1952.

Leites, Nathan. The Politburo through Western Eyes. *World Politics.* January, 1952.

Macridis, Roy. Stalinism and the Meaning of Titoism. *World Politics,* January, 1952.

Nikoaev, V. V. K Voprosu o Glavnykh Fazakh Razvitija Sovetskovo Gosudarstva [On the Subject of the Principal Phases of the Evolution of the Soviet Government]. *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo I Pravo.* August, 1951.

Polish Embassy. Draft Constitution of the Polish People's Republic. Washington, D. C., 1952.

Soviet Union. [A special number, with articles by Hazard, Simmons, Werth, Baykov, and Barker.] *Political Quarterly.* January–March, 1952.

Towster, Julian. Soviet Policy on Nationalities. *Antioch Review.* Winter, 1951–52.

Africa and the Middle East

The Oil Industry in Persia. (Cmd. 8425.)

Asia

People's Republic of China. Agrarian Reform Law, together with Other Relevant Documents. [2nd ed.] Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1951.

———. Trade Union Law, together with Other Relevant Documents. [Revised ed.] Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1951.

Peterson, B. C. The Japan Communist Party, 1922–1945. Occasional Papers, Center for Japanese Studies. Ann Arbor, Michigan. Number 1, 1951. [Includes a 45-item bibliography.]

Reeve, W. Public Administration in Siam. London, New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951.

Latin America

Friedrich, C. J. Considérations Générales sur la Constitution de Porto-Rico. *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Politique et Constitutionnelle.* July–December, 1951.

Z. Argentina in the Tunnel. *Foreign Affairs.* April, 1952.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

The Foreign Policy of the United States. By Felix Morley. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1951. Pp. ix, 175, iii. $2.50.)

It is proper that students of United States foreign policy should continually reassess national security in terms of balancing foreign commitments with available power. Felix Morley agrees with former President Hoover that we have overextended these commitments and have therefore jeopardized our security. This distinguished journalist and former president of Haverford College also reviews the techniques of maximizing national security and concludes that several of these techniques are no longer effective. Balance of power procedures, for example, will no longer prevent the polarization of power between two implacable enemies. And even if Western Europe could be united today, it would not be powerful enough alone to reestablish an equilibrium, Morley argues. Nor is world organization any more successful in promoting national security. The chief failure of the United Nations, the author finds, rests with the ineffective mechanism for implementing collective security, i.e., no charter definition of aggression, big power veto, and the difficulty in expelling recalcitrant members. Finally, mistakes in the formulation of American policy have resulted from the arrogation of power by the president and from the silencing of congressional criticism with the adoption of a bipartisan policy. The State Department has declined in effectiveness, the author writes, not only as the result of President Roosevelt's personalized diplomacy but also due to the unfortunate wartime appointment of enthusiastic though largely untrained employees, prominent among whom were political science professors. Morley concludes that either voluntary limitation or economic collapse will enforce inevitable retrenchment of United States foreign commitments. The United States will then seek to defend the western hemisphere by its own power and by the military alliances it has concluded with Pacific and Atlantic states. It will also stop supporting imperialist policies and recognize the national independence of the Arab and Asiatic countries.

Within the confines of this short essay, the reader learns little of the facts and reasons which brought the author to his conclusions. The objectivity of some of Mr. Morley's authorities—including Charles A. Beard, Freda Utley, Douglas MacArthur, and Herbert Hoover—might be questioned. It could be wished that some of the discussion were more timely. For example, Mr. Morley might have tempered his criticism of the United Nations by a consideration of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution with its provision to circumvent the big power veto by General Assembly action. Similarly the criticism of the State Department during the last war has less contemporary significance today after its reorganization along general lines proposed by the Hoover Commision. If President Hoover's Great Debate is to be revived, participants will need more effective ammunition than this book presents.—Martin B. Travis, Jr., *Duke University.*

The United States and Spain; An Interpretation. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. (New York: Sheed & Ward, Inc. 1951. Pp. 198. $2.75.)

This volume is an expansion of the Fenwick Lectures delivered at the College of the Holy Cross in 1951, with a bibliography appended. After a brief introduction on Hispanic-American relations through the nineteenth century, the author attempts to dispel "some inveterate Anglo-American notions" about Spain, to describe the iniquities of the Spanish Republic, and to reiterate his attack on American policy towards Spain since the end of World War II. His evaluation of 1936 election statistics, his sketch of the Franco rebellion, his estimates of Axis and Soviet military intervention in the Civil War, as well as his description of current economic and social conditions, spring from a "partial and limited view," his own description of Herbert Feis's balanced account, *The Spanish Story* (1948). Hayes labels the State Department 1946 white paper on *The Spanish Government and the Axis* "tendentious"; many of his own paragraphs uncritically espouse the cause of Franco Spain. Hayes writes as though Franco deserves special commendation for refraining from intervention on the side of the Axis in World War II. In 1942, during the North African landing, it was not Franco's choice, but Hitler's that kept Spain neutral; it was a *Führer* decision based on a German appraisal of the military realities to avoid embroilment in a peninsular war. Professor Hayes' analysis of Spanish character is disappointing. One might have expected more from the author of the *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* than platitudes such as: "All nations are human. The Spanish is particularly so" (p. 32). Professor Hayes' demand that Spain be treated as "part and parcel of the Atlantic Community" might well become American policy. If it does, Spain will contribute to the defense of the West the Pyrenees and the hungriest people in Europe.—Frank E. Manuel, *Brandeis University.*

Negotiating with the Russians. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson. (Boston: World Peace Foundation. 1951. Pp. xi, 310. $3.50.)

A symposium by ten Americans who negotiated with the Russians between 1940 and 1950. The negotiations discussed are Military Assistance, 1943–1945 (Major General John R. Deane); Lend-Lease (John N. Hazard); Nuremberg Trial Agreements (Sidney S. Alderman); Bretton Woods (Raymond F. Mikesell); Establishment of Far Eastern Commission (George H. Blakeslee); Refugees and Displaced Persons (E. F. Penrose); Balkans, 1945–47 (Mark Ethridge and C. E. Black); Atomic Energy (Frederick Osborn); and Cultural Exchange (Ernest J. Simmons). There is a concluding chapter on "Some Soviet Techniques of Negotiation" by Philip E. Mosely.

American Crisis Diplomacy; The Quest for Collective Security, 1918–1952. By RICHARD W. VAN ALSTYNE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1952. Pp. xiii, 165. $3.50.)

A concise account of American diplomacy in the context of the fundamental shifts of world power which have occurred since 1918. Includes an analysis of current problems in foreign policy. Part of this book is a revision of portions of the author's *American Diplomacy in Action.*

The United States and the Far East, 1945–1951. By HAROLD M. VINACKE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1952. Pp. vi, 144. $3.00.)

An analysis of the main events and issues in United States policy in the several areas of the Far East. Describes the relationship of Far Eastern to European policy and the dilemma of the Far Eastern policy makers.

Master Plan U. S. A.; An Informal Report on America's Foreign Policy and the Men Who Make It. By JOHN FISCHER. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1951. Pp. 253. $3.00.)

A popular discussion of the aims of American foreign policy, how it is made, the personalities who make it, and the chances for its success.

Documents on American Foreign Relations; Vol. XII, January 1–December 31, 1950. EDITED BY RAYMOND DENNETT AND ROBERT K. TURNER. (Princeton: Published by Princeton University Press for World Peace Foundation. 1951. Pp. xxvi, 702. $6.00.)

General policy statements and many valuable documents on the foreign policy of the United States. Changes in organization from previous volumes include expansion of the chapter on "International Peace and Security" to accommodate the development of regional security machinery, special sections for regional political problems in the last four chapters, and a new chapter on relations with the Middle East and Africa.

An Outline of International Relations. By GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR AND ALFRED DE GRAZIA, JR. (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1951. Pp. xi, 339. $1.50.)

Manual in College Outline Series dealing with history of international politics, status of great powers, and major aspects of international law and organization.

International Economics. By JACOB VINER. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1951. Pp. 381. $5.00.)

A reprinting of twenty-five papers published over a period of thirty years, representing the effort of a distinguished political economist to apply theoretical analysis to specific issues of public policy.

United States Economic Policy and International Relations. By RAYMOND F. MIKESELL. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1952. Pp. xii, 341. $4.75.)

This volume in the Economics Handbook Series provides a brief survey and analysis of the foreign economic policy of the United States since 1919. Approximately three-fourths of the book deals with the period after 1939.

Rearmament and Anglo-American Economic Relations; A Problem Paper. PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES GROUP OF THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. (Washington: Brookings Institution. 1952 Pp. viii, 64. $0.60.)

A revision of the problem paper *Anglo-American Economic Relations* published in November, 1950, taking account of the effect of rearmament on the British economic position.

Partners in the Free World. EDITED BY ROBERT K. TURNER. (Boston: World Peace Foundation. 1951. Pp. x, 103. $1.00.)

A summary report on the Canadian-American Conference on Foreign Relations, Niagara Falls, Ontario, May 31 to June 5, 1951, sponsored by the World Peace Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

European War Crimes Trials; A Bibliography. COMPILED AND ANNOTATED BY INGE S. NEUMANN. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1951. Pp. 113. [Mimeo.] $1.00.)

Covers materials published between 1941 and 1950, and is confined largely to American and Western European publications. Compiled for the Carnegie Endowment's Committee on War Crimes Research, with some additional material supplied by the Wiener Library, London. Edited by Robert A. Rosenbaum.

America and the Mind of Europe. EDITED BY LEWIS GALANTIÈRE. (New York: Library Publishers. 1952. Pp. 125. $2.75.)

Ten writers with international reputations, including Arthur Koestler and Stephen Spender, draw up a broad, analytical report on the postwar mind, with particular reference to what Europeans today are thinking of the United States on a variety of subjects.

The Old Dominion and Napoleon Bonaparte; A Study in American Opinion. BY JOSEPH I. SHULIM. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1952. Pp. 332. $4.50.)

Survey of opinions of Virginians, particularly from 1798 to 1809, about French diplomacy and domestic politics. Sources include manuscripts, newspapers, and collected works.

Underground; The Story of a People. BY JOSEPH TENENBAUM. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1952. Pp. ix, 532. $4.50.)

An account of East European Jewry, chiefly in Poland, during Nazi occupation.

Danmarks traktater og aftaler med fremmede magter efter 1814; Syvende bind, 1908–1920. Udgivet paa Udenrigsministeriets foranstaltning (København: Gyldendal. 1951. Pp. 1036.)

The latest volume of the great collection of Danish treaties and agreements since 1814, covers the period 1908–1920, and follows the pattern of volumes 4–6, published from 1918 through 1942 and covering the treaties of 1880–1907. Arrangement is by date of signature or adherence by Denmark; the official text, or texts, are given—in the Danish language only when it is one of the official languages. Citations relative to ratification and publication by the Danish government are furnished. Agreements and understandings which at times seem not to have been published officially elsewhere are included. To facilitate use by those not too familiar with Danish, the chronological table as well as the indexes by government and by subject are reproduced also in French. Compilation has been done by the Archivist of the Foreign Office (vol. 4 by Fr. Le Sage de Fontenay, and vols. 5–7 by Axel Heils, who died in 1949). Volume 7 reproduces 177 treaties, making with those in volumes 4–6, a total of 491 from 1880 through 1920. Volumes 1–3, planned to cover 1814 through 1879, have not yet been published. For the years 1921 through 1935, an annual collection was published under the title *Danmarks traktater*. Beginning with 1936, treaties have been published currently in section C of the *Lovtidende* (law gazette).—J.B.C.

Kingdom of the Netherlands Foreign Service Consular Manual. BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (The Hague: General State Printing Office. 1951. 2 vols. [Looseleaf].)

The last previous edition of the *Consular Manual* was in 1926. Netherlands, English and French languages were used then. The present work, intended especially to serve the needs of the many honorary consular officers, is up to the date of January 1, 1951, and apparently appears only in English. A number of the chapters, such as those on nationality, will have an interest far beyond the Netherlands consular service as being concise up-to-date official statements on topics of increasing importance.—J.B.C.

Instrumentos internacionales de carácter bilateral suscriptos por la República Argentina (hasta el 30 de junio de 1948). BY MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA. (Buenos Aires: Alea, S. A. C. e I. 1950, i.e. 1951. 3 vols. Pp. xxxii, 2998; cxxxiii.)

The new treaty collection of the Argentine includes only the bilateral agreements in force as of June 30, 1948, together with the text of those concluded since 1925 (date of the last previous edition) but not yet put into effect. The first two volumes are devoted to the Americas, arranged alphabetically, and the third to the remainder of the world. There is a chronological as well as a topical index. Wherever possible the effective date of the agreement is given. The work will save much trouble in searching for the texts in the annual *Memorias* of the Ministry and in establishing effective dates.—J.B.C.

Recueil des traités de la République d'Haiti; Tome second, 1905–1921. Publication de la Secretairerie d'état des relations extérieures. (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l'état. 1951. Pp. xi, 1422.)

The first volume of the Haitian treaty collection printed in 1945 covered the period 1804–1904 in chronological order, including seventy agreements concluded. The second volume for 1905–1921 includes 79 agreements (50 multilateral and 29 bilateral), an indication being given as to those still in force. At the end of the volume is a chronological table of treaties concluded November 1922–March 1951, with reference so far as possible to the place of publication in the *Moniteur*, the official gazette of Haiti, to facilitate use of the documents pending the printing of subsequent volumes.—J.B.C.

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS

H. ARTHUR STEINER*
University of California (Los Angeles)

ARTICLES

International Politics and National Policies

General

Abelin, Pierre. A la Recherche d'un Équilibre Mondial. *Politique Étrangère.* August–December, 1951.

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POLITICAL THEORY, RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

Justice According to Law. By ROSCOE POUND. (New Haven: Published by Yale University Press for Westminster College. 1951. Pp. 98. $2.50.)

The publication of another set of lectures by Dean Pound does not, and was probably not intended to, advance the argument on any of the juristic fronts where the Dean has performed notably during the past sixty years. His discussions of "Justice" and "Law" in the first two parts follow, in abridged form, the analyses which have long been familiar to those of us who acknowledge him Master. And his treatment of "Judicial Justice" in the third part is pretty frankly proselytizing as well. Pound feels that the dangers of "administrative justice" today are still not adequately appreciated, and not even the passage of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act will divert him from his crusade. Well, more power to him, although this reviewer would have thought the Act vulnerable on rather different grounds than those Pound assigns.

The author's basic traditionalism on this point, however, still contrasts strangely with the social engineering view of the end of law which used to be the touchstone of Poundian jurisprudence. Nor is there much in this little volume to suggest the answer. On page 29, to be sure, it seems to be assumed that social engineering to secure the maximum satisfaction of interests is a pragmatic next-best sort of effort which lawyers are warranted in attempting pending agreement of the philosophers on a theory of values and a definition of justice. And, even more revealing of a doubt as to the ultimate adequacy of an engineering technique, is his reference on the same page to expectations "urged in good faith and confident belief in their intrinsic rightfulness" as the data with which the jurist must work, even in this interim period. Yet, despite this, he returns on page 31 to a perspective in which the maximum satisfaction of wants represents the most inclusive order yet conceived as to the end of law. Apparently, then, the Dean still sees in method and measurement of sociological fact some sort of alternative answer to the problem of law entitled to compete on more than a basis of equality with the bad old metaphysics of the idealists.—KENNETH C. COLE, *University of Washington.*

Conflict of Loyalties; A Series of Addresses and Discussions. EDITED BY R. M. MACIVER. (New York: The Institute for Religious and Social Studies. 1952. Pp. vii, 150. $2.00. Distributed by Harper & Brothers.)

Roger N. Baldwin, Lyman Bryson, Harold D. Lasswell, R. M. MacIver, Franz L. Neumann, Ordway Tead, and others explore the area of conflicts in group loyalties and personal standards of conduct.

Papal Pronouncements on the Political Order. COMPILED AND EDITED BY FRANCIS J. POWERS. (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press. 1952. Pp. xii, 245. $3.50.)

As stated in the Preface, "The purpose of this compilation is to present, through the use of topically arranged selected excerpts from the documents, messages and allocutions of the Supreme Pontiffs from Leo XIII in 1878 to Pius XII in 1951, the principal teachings of the Church on the political order." The editor has contributed brief introductions to each chapter, a table of documents, a selected bibliography of reference works in English, and a list of supplementary readings.

Th Anatomy of Communism. BY ANDREW MACKAY SCOTT. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1951. Pp. xiii, 197. $3.00.)

An analytical treatment of Communism. Part I is a brief critique of selected aspects of Marxian theory, and Part II an examination of contemporary Communism, with particular reference to the relation of Marxist and Marxist-Leninist thought to Communist practice.

The Ethics of Redistribution. BY BERTRAND DE JOUVENAL. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1952. Pp. ix, 91. $1.75.)

A critical examination of the socialist ideal of income redistribution, and of the actual effects of income redistribution on social values. Lectures delivered at Cambridge University in 1949.

Great Political Thinkers; Plato to the Present. BY WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc. 1951. Pp. xix, 903. $6.50.)

Selections from the works of some thirty-five writers, designed "to present the major turning points of western political thought . . . ." Readings are supplemented by introductory essays and eighty-five pages of bibliographical notes.

Journey Through Utopia. BY MARIE LOUISE BERNERI. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1951. Pp. xi, 339. $3.75.)

A description of, and critical comment on, the more significant Utopias from Plato's *Republic* on down, with generous extracts from the originals.

The Quest for Utopia; An Anthology of Imaginary Societies. BY GLENN NEGLEY AND J. MAX PATRICK. (New York: Henry Schuman. 1952. Pp. 599. $6.75.)

Selections from twenty-five Utopias, with introductory comments by the authors.

Social Romanticism in France, 1830–1848. BY DAVID OWEN EVANS. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1952. Pp. 149. $3.00.)

This volume consists of an essay on the social doctrines of the leading French Romantic writers of the period 1830–48 and a forty-page selective critical bibliography of French socialism from Saint Simon to Proudhon. The author, an Oxford scholar, believes that the Romanticists, though lacking the analytic tools to serve their idealism, demonstrated on the whole an "extraordinary blend of social realism and prophetic genius."

Torchbearer of Freedom; The Influence of Richard Price on Eighteenth Century Thought.

By Carl B. Cone. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1952. Pp. 209. $3.75.)

A biography of "the good" Dr. Price, with full discussion of his political and other writings. Price's role in the American and French revolutions and his influence on the Constitution of the United States are described. The author is a University of Kentucky historian.

The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions. Translated by Clyde Pharr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1952. Pp. xxvi, 643. $20.00.)

First translation in any language of the Code, the Sirmondian Constitutions, and the Novels of the Theodosian Corpus. This is the first volume in an extensive project for the collection and translation of all the source material of Roman law.

The Social System. By Talcott Parsons. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 1951. Pp. 575. $6.00.)

In the words of the author, "an attempt to bring together, in systematic and generalized form, the main outlines of a conceptual scheme for the analysis of the structure and processes of social systems."

Cultural Sciences; Their Origin and Development. By Florian Znaniecki. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1952. Pp. viii, 438. $6.00.)

A study of the evolution of the scientific approach to the cultural order. The cultural sciences are viewed as becoming increasingly independent of the natural sciences, and sociology is held to be "the basic cultural science, just as physics is the basic natural science."

The Law of Freedom as the Remedy for War and Poverty. By Emil Korner. Translated by H. Leige Farnell. (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd. 1951. 2 vols. Pp. xxiii, 562; vi, 663. $9.50 a set. Distributed by British Book Centre, Inc., New York.)

The general thesis is that the doctrine of laissez faire, rightly understood and correctly applied, furnishes the key to economic stability and world peace. The author, former Czechoslovakian political economist and for twenty years finance director of the Witkowitzer Iron Works, attacks Communist, Keynesian and other interventionist theories and gives his prescription for a free enterprise society. A World State is regarded as essential and inevitable.

Anatomy of Public Opinion. By Norman John Powell. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1951. Pp. xi, 619. $5.50.)

An introductory textbook designed as well for trade readers, "since not all first approximations of knowledge and insight in this undeveloped terrain have come from the academician."

Understanding Public Opinion; A Guide for Newspapermen and Newspaper Readers. By Curtis D. MacDougall. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1952. Pp. xii, 698. $5.00.)

Comprehensive text by Northwestern University professor of journalism.

The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation. By Raymond B. Fosdick. (New York: Harper & Brothers. 1952. Pp. xiii, 336. $4.50.)

History of the Foundation, 1913–1950, with considerable attention to related Rockefeller philanthropic trusts. Three chapters deal specifically with the Foundation's activities in the social sciences.

NOTE ON GAETANO MOSCA

A letter of Gaetano Mosca to this writer dated July 5, 1938, may be of interest to the student of politics who tries to unravel the origins of the theory of the ruling class. Much material has been published on the matter, but this letter refers to the divergent points of view of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, who are as close in many a student's mind as they were apart in reality.

This letter does not deal directly with the most important aspect of the Mosca-Pareto debate, but it contributes some final details on the priority of Mosca's writings. The importance of the controversy between the two Italian writers lies in the fact that the same concept, as expounded by Mosca and accepted by other scholars such as Luigi Einaudi and Antonio de Viti de Marco, became the core of a real and desperate attempt at stemming and fighting Fascism and at opposing tyranny with moral and intellectual forces. As expounded by Pareto, it became the gospel of

Fascist intellectuals who found in this principle the material with which to give scientific garb to the many improvisations and expediencies of the Fascist regime.

The mere question of chronological precedence is *in se* extremely important because it implies originality. The intellectual consequences of the disagreement between the two authors are far reaching. Any detailed study of the theory of the ruling class and of the differences between the Mosca and the Pareto versions, or rather of Mosca's contribution and of Pareto's adaptations, may enable the student to understand how the same conceptual approach has served opposite ends. An awareness of this possibility is highly important for the modern political scientist.[1]

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"I answer your letter of June 6 after some delay because I wanted to reread carefully your long article about my work.[2] No objections are to be raised to its first part. But since in the second part you discuss the problem of the originality of my writings and those of Professor Pareto, I add some data which, I hope, will close once and for all this unpleasant disagreement.

"The great similarity between the conceptions of Mosca and Pareto has been noticed by almost all those who read the works of both writers. Even in a book by Professor G. H. Bosquet, written and published in honor of Professor Pareto, one may find on page 206 the following statement: 'We know that before Pareto, Gaetano Mosca had formulated some theories which have a definite similarity to those relating to the circulation of the elites. It is to be regretted that the name of this author is not to be found in Pareto's writings.' (G. H. Bosquet, *Vilfredo Pareto, sa vie et son oeuvre* [Payot, Paris, 1928]).

"In the works of Pareto some words have been changed. Thus instead of *political class* and *political formula*, employed by Mosca, other terms have been employed: *élite*, *residues*, and *derivations*. The difference in terminology, however, ill conceals the striking similarity of the concepts.

"Since there is no doubt that a similarity exists between Mosca's ideas and Pareto's, the problem is to ascertain which writer preceded the other. The answer is easy if we look at the problem chronologically, for chronology, like mathematics, is not a matter of opinion.[3]

"Mosca expounded his theories for the first time in 1884 (*Teorica dei governi e governo parlamentare*) and then developed and amplified them in 1896 (first edition of the *Elementi di scienza politica*),[4] continuing this development in the second edition of the *Elementi* in 1922 and completing it in his work on the history of political theories (1932).[5]

"Pareto's first publications were limited to the field of economics. In the October 15, 1891, issue of the *Revue des deux mondes* appeared a long article of his on political and economic conditions in Italy, entitled 'L'Italie économique.' In this essay the author reveals a purely liberal and democratic orientation. His later orientation appears for the first time in August, 1900, in an article entitled 'Una applicazione di teorie sociologiche,' published in the *Rivista italiana di sociologia* (Vol. 4, pp. 401–456 [July–Aug., 1900]).

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[1] Mosca was almost a forgotten man under the Fascist regime. He was remembered only as a useful target of totalitarian rhetoric. While intellectually a rigid positivist, wholly devoid of philosophical or moralizing themes, he was above all a moralist. His opposition to socialism was based not merely on scientific but on moral grounds. (Cf. "Risposta ad un' inchiesta sul socialismo," *Bios*, Vol. 1 [1902–3].) His opposition to the Fascist regime was also both intellectual and moral. He had the opportunity to state his views in the Senate of the Kingdom in a speech explaining his vote opposing the grant of full powers to the Prime Minister, Benito Mussolini. The speech was at the same time the declaration of faith of a liberal and of the way of life of a true gentleman. It is reprinted in a collection of Mosca's essays and speeches, *Partiti e sindacati nella crisi del regime parlamentare* (Bari, 1949).

[2] Renzo Sereno, "The Anti-Aristotelianism of Gaetano Mosca and Its Fate," *Ethics*, Vol. 48, pp. 509–518 (July, 1938).

[3] A detailed bibliography of Gaetano Mosca has been published by Mario delle Piane, *Bibliografia di Gaetano Mosca* (Siena, 1949).

[4] The *Storia delle dottrine politiche* was published again by Laterza, Bari, in 1937, and republished in 1939, 1942, and 1945.

[5] The *Elementi* has been published in English as *The Ruling Class* (edited by Arthur Livingstone, New York, 1938). Senator Mosca in a letter to this writer dated December 28, 1937, dealing *inter alia* with the American edition of his work, sent thanks to Professors Borgese, Mario Einaudi, Merriam and Lasswell for their interest in the diffusion of his thought. The *Elementi* was published once more in 1939 by Laterza, Bari, and republished in 1947 with an introductory essay by Benedetto Croce. On the revival of Mosca's theories after the demise of Fascism, cf. Gabriele Pepe, "Gaetano Mosca," *Belfagor*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 42–66 (Jan., 1950).

"In 1896 Mosca, at the behest of the economists Maffeo Pantaleoni and Enrico Baroni had sent a copy of the *Elementi*, recently published, to Pareto. Pareto, however, wrote to Baroni berating Mosca for his reactionary ideas. After a more careful examination Pareto found much to be praised in these reactionary ideas. He was enough impressed by them to change his point of view radically, as he showed in the above-mentioned article in the *Rivista italiana di sociologia* and his other successive publications in the field of sociology.

"Together with this letter I am sending you a copy of a brief answer of mine to an attack by Pareto (reprint from *Riforma sociale*, Vol. 17, fasc. 4 [1907]).[6] It was the first time I deemed it proper to answer Pareto, who failed to reply. The question was reopened recently by an article of Professor Luigi Einaudi,[7] who found a great similarity between some ideas of Pareto and those of Professor Antonio de Viti de Marco, whom Pareto neither quoted nor mentioned.

"I trust that this is the last time that I shall have to speak of this unpleasant matter, rendered more unpleasant by the demise of one of the debaters.

"P. S. The term *élite*[8] as employed by Pareto has without doubt enjoyed, particularly outside Italy, a much wider diffusion than the term *political class* employed by Mosca. This is due to several causes.

"1. The term *political class* originated in an era that was not ready for the concept, and thus it found great difficulty in being accepted. The term *élite* came to the fore when minds were ripe for the concept of the inevitability of a ruling minority.

"2. When the term *élite* appeared, Pareto had already achieved an international reputation as an economist, while Mosca was little known outside Italy.

"3. Pareto wrote his greatest works in French (particularly the *Cours d'économie politique*), a language far better known throughout Europe and America[9] than Italian, the language Mosca employed exclusively."

Renzo Sereno.

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[6] The article "Piccola polemica" here mentioned has been republished in *Partiti e sindacati, etc.*, quoted above in n. 1.

[7] Luigi Einaudi, "Dove si discorre di Pareto, di Mosca e anche di de Viti," *Riforma sociale*, Vol. 45 (Nov.–Dec. 1935).

[8] On the development and meaning of the term *élite*, cf. Sereno, p. 515, n. 15.

[9] Mosca was keenly interested in American political thought, much more so than most continental scholars of his time. He was familiar not only with the writers of the Revolutionary period but with the juridical ways and problems of the United States. He was greatly pleased with C. E. Merriam's *American Political Theories* and *American Political Ideas* and was extremely interested in the approach of Harold Lasswell, which appealed to him because it involved social disciplines and points which he deemed most important to the development of a study of politics—psychology and positive scientific systems. He was also aware of the gap separating political thought and political practices in the United States, which he had learned through the works of Bryce, Ostrogorski and Benoist (the writings of the latter, particularly *Les maladies de la démocracie*, he deemed pointless). Herman Finer, in *Mussolini's Italy* [1935] presents a highly inaccurate picture of Mosca.

Among the Americans who understood Mosca only partially is James Burnham, who wrote a long chapter about him in his *The Machiavellians*. Mosca cannot be considered a Machiavellian either in the vulgar, or indeed in any other, meaning of the term. Mosca greatly admired the Florentine's clear mind and direct style, but considered him unpractical and unscientific. He was more interested in Guicciardini, who, though a far less gifted writer and thinker than Machiavelli, had in common with Mosca *spregiudicatezza*, the gift of looking at old and current problems as if judgments thereupon had never been formulated. Burnham makes no mention of the Machiavellian writings of Mosca. ("Encore quelques mots sur le *Prince* de Machiavelli," *Revue de sciences politiques*, Vol. 48, pp. 481–509 (1925), and Vol. 49 pp. 5–27 [1926]; published in Italian in the collection πολιτέια [Roma, 1927], under the title "*Il Principe* di Machiavelli quattro secoli dopo la morte del suo autore." Cf. also the chapters on Machiavelli, Guicciardini and the Practical Machiavellians in the *Storia delle dottrine politiche* [fifth Italian ed., Bari, 1945], pp. 107–139.)

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NEWS AND NOTES

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Considerable impetus to the development of political science internationally should result from the work now being done by the International Political Science Association with the assistance of UNESCO. So far advanced is the study of political science teaching in a selected group of countries that the working group, under the chairmanship of Professor William A. Robson of the London School of Economics and Political Science, met for a five day session, April 6–10, at Peterhouse College, Cambridge University, to consider the national reports on eight selected countries and to confer on the basic problems which will enter into the final report to be written by Mr. Robson. Three representatives of the United States were present at this meeting: Professor Peter Odegard of the University of California, who is a Fulbright Professor at Oxford University this year; Professor C. B. Robson of the University of North Carolina, who is working in Germany with HICOG this year; and the undersigned, who prepared the IPSA report on the teaching of political science in the United States. UNESCO expects to publish the report on political science with a symposium of three other reports dealing with various phases of social science (sociology, economics, and comparative law). So far no arrangement has been made to publish the national reports on political science of the eight different countries making submissions. UNESCO has arranged with Professor Horace Taylor of Columbia University to prepare a condensation of all the reports dealing with the social sciences in the United States.

The main purpose of this inquiry is to provide information to countries where political science is still relatively underdeveloped and to pool information for the use of any interested country. The experience of the Cambridge conference indicates clearly that when a group of fifteen to twenty political scientists from countries in many parts of the world come together, a basis is soon established for a remarkable degree of agreement and for mutual understanding. This conclusion is confirmed by the experience of other UNESCO working groups, such as the economists.

National reports, detailed and highly informative, were received from Egypt, France, Great Britain, India, Mexico, Poland, Sweden and the United States. Supplementary reports were also obtained from certain other countries, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece and Jugoslavia. As has been said, the presentation of these reports was followed by a discussion of main problems arising in the course of the inquiry. The subjects dealt with at the Cambridge Conference were: the scope, content and nature of political science (Soltau, Lebanon); the aims of political science (Dimock, USA); subjects associated with political science for teaching purposes (Kogekar, India); international relations and political science (Vedel, France); the status of political science and its relations with neighboring disciplines (Barents, Netherlands); undergraduate teaching of political science (Chapsal, France, and Harrison, Great Britain); postgraduate methods of teaching political science (C. B. Robson, USA); training and recruitment of teachers of political science (Brogan, Great Britain); research in relation to political science teaching (Hecksher, Sweden); the problems and needs of political science teaching (Hanson, Great Britain); and general conclusions concerning the enquiry (W. A. Robson, Great Britain). Others taking an active part in the deliberations of the conference were Professor M. Bridel of the University of Lausanne; Dr. J. Goormaghtigh, director of the Institute of International Relations of Brussels and European representative of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Peace; Dr. J. N. Khosla, Ministry of External Affiars, India; and Mr. W. Pickles of the London School of Economics and Political Science. The proceedings were in French and English, but surprisingly little translation was required as the conference proceeded. Dr. K. Szczerba-Likiernik of the Social Science Department of UNESCO was present as an observer, and several other social scientists were drawn in for special purposes.

Meetings of the Steering Committee of the International Political Science Association were held simultaneously. At these meetings Professor Odegard represented IPSA's president, Professor Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago. The Second World Congress of the IPSA is planned for September 8–12, 1952, and will be held at The Hague. The subjects to be discussed are:

1. The role of ideologies in political change, the methods of their dissemination and the conditions of their acceptance.
2. Local self-government as a basis for democracy.
3. The political role of women.
4. The teaching of political science.

It is hoped that many American political scientists will be in attendance at this Congress. Members of the American Political Science Association are reminded that membership in the International Political Science Association costs only two dollars a year, a sum which includes a subscription to the *International Social Science Bulletin* of UNESCO. IPSA dues should be sent directly to M. J. Meynaud, secretary-treasurer of IPSA, 27 rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris VII, or to the executive director of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., Dr. E. H. Litchfield, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. In view of the active role being played by IPSA, it is to be hoped that large numbers of American political scientists will wish to join this organization.—MARSHALL E. DIMOCK.

The Indian Political Science Association held its fourteenth conference at Osmania University, Hyderabad (Deccan), December 27–29, 1951. One of the principal features of the program was a discussion of public administration in India, with a report on public administration by A. D. Gorwala, formerly of the Indian Civil Service, serving as the main focus for analysis. Other scheduled discussions were held on the topics, "Personal Freedom in a Planned Society" and "The United Nations at Work." In addition, the president of the Association, Dr. Bimanbehari Majumdar, principal of H. D. Jain College, Arrah, arranged a special meeting to permit a discussion of the general elections which were recently held in India. The Association gave its formal approval to a research project on the general elections which is being conducted under the chairmanship of Professor M. Venkatarangaiya of Bombay University.

The fifteenth conference of the Association is to be held in December, 1952, at Aligarh University, Uttar Pradesh. The Association's new president is H. K. Sherwani, professor of political science, *emeritus*, Osmania University.

The Political Studies Association of the United Kingdon held its second annual conference at the Queen's College, Oxford, March 28–30, 1952, with an attendance of over seventy members of the Association. Visitors from overseas included Professors Barents (Amsterdam), Bridel (Lausanne), Dimock (U.S.A.), Harvey (U.S.A.), Kogekar (Poona), Odegard (U.S.A.), and Dr. Goormaghtigh (Paris).

The program of the meeting included the presentation of a series of papers, each of which was followed by general discussion. The titles of the papers and their authors were: "The Relation of Political Theory to Political Practice," by Charles Wilson, fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford; "The Schuman Plan as Viewed from Belgium," by John Goormaghtigh, director of the European Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; "The Limitations of Electoral Research," by David Butler of Nuffield College, Oxford; "Bases for the Comparative Study of Local Government," by Maurice Hockham of the University College, Leicester; and "Law and Political Studies," by R. M. Jackson of St. John's College, Cambridge.

The Association gave its endorsement to proposals of its Executive Committee for the financial management and editorial control of a journal to be published by the Association under arrangements with the Oxford University Press. The journal, to be entitled "Political Studies," will be published in three numbers a year, and will be edited by Wilfred Harrison of the Queen's College, Oxford.

The following persons were elected to constitute the Executive Committee of the Association for 1952–53: D. N. Chester (Oxford), W. Harrison (Oxford), R. S. Milne (Bristol), P. A. Reynolds (Aberystwyth), W. A. Robson (London), K. B. Smellie (London), W. S. Steer (Exeter), H. Street (Nottingham), and David Thomson (Cambridge). A. H. Hanson (Leeds) was reëlected secretary and treasurer of the Association.

The next annual conference of the Association is to be held March 27–29, 1953, in Birmingham, England.

The Western Political Science Association held its sixth annual meeting at the University of Arizona, April 14–15, 1952, in conjunction with the annual spring meeting of the Arizona Municipal League. The program of the meeting included a series of ten round tables, which were under the general theme, "Practical

Realism in Government and Politics." Attention was given to foreign and domestic policies and problems of the federal government, as well as to recent and current developments in the western states. Separate round tables were given over to an analysis of current American foreign policies, the subject of the rehabilitation of the states within the United States, and opportunities and responsibilities of political scientists in getting students into active participation in politics and government. The meeting was addressed by the Honorable Ernest W. McFarland, majority leader in the United States Senate. Other guest speakers included Sam T. Adams, personnel director, United States Bureau of the Budget, who discussed difficulties in reducing governmental expenditures, and Denna F. Fleming of Vanderbilt University, who spoke on the topic, "Can We Avoid a Third World War?"

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists held its tenth annual meeting April 24–26, 1952, at the University of Notre Dame, with a registered attendance of 181 persons. Round table discussions were held on these topics: "Methodology in Political Science: Foundations for Systematic Study," "The Present Scene in Central Eastern Europe," "Southeast Asia Today," "Current Trends in State and Local Government," "Methodology in Political Science: How Adequate Are Our Foundations?" "Administrative Responsibility," and "Responsibility of Political Scientists in Civic Education." There was also a general round table on "Parties and Politics in 1952." The program featured addresses by Walter Trohan, Washington correspondent, and James K. Pollock, past president, American Political Science Association. The former spoke on "Newspapers, Professors, and Politics," while the latter, who represented the American Political Science Association at the meeting, discussed the topic, "Are We Properly Organized for Greater Power Politics?" A conference on the Inter-University Case Program in Public Administration was held in conjunction with the Notre Dame meeting.

Resolutions in memory of John E. Briggs, Frederic A. Ogg, and Ford P. Hall were adopted.

Officers elected at the meeting include Kirk H. Porter, of the State University of Iowa, president; Charles Shull, of Wayne University, vice president; and Herbert McClosky, of the University of Minnesota, and Amry Vandenbosch, of the University of Kentucky, members of the Executive Council.

The 1953 meeting of the Conference will be held at Michigan State College, May 7 through May 9.

The annual spring meeting of The Southern California Political Science Association was held on the campus of the University of Redlands, on Friday, April 25, 1952. The program dealt with the problem of nominating presidential candidates, the general topic being, "Can a Practicable National Presidential Primary be Devised?" The business agenda included a planning meeting of the Association's committee which has been arranging, at Pepperdine College, mock political conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties to be attended by delegations from the various colleges and universities in the area. Officers of the Association who have been elected for 1952–53 are: president, Carleton Rodee of the University of Southern California; secretary-treasurer, Richard Reath of Occidental College; members of the Executive Committee, Luther Lee of Pomona College, Lester H. Phillips of the University of Redlands, J. William Robinson of Whittier College, and William Strauss of Long Beach State College.

"The Study of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago: Objectives and Methodology" was the topic selected for a conference sponsored by the department of political science of Northwestern University, February 22–23, 1952. The conference included two panel discussions, one on the principal problems of the Chicago metropolitan area, and the other on the subject, "What Other Social Sciences Can Bring to the Study of Metropolitan Areas." In addition, addresses were delivered by Herbert Emmerich of the Public Administration Clearing House, who spoke on "Experiences in the Study of Metropolitan Areas," and Victor Jones of Wesleyan University (Connecticut), who discussed "Methodology in the Study of Metropolitan Areas."

The Center for Research on World Political Institutions of Princeton University is sponsoring a one-month gathering of seven men from various social science disciplines. Basing their inquiry on a statement prepared beforehand, the members of this group are making preliminary explorations of some of the ways in which their disciplines, and areas within disciplines, can assist in developing the approach to the international organization problem which the Center has decided to undertake. The group, which began its sessions in mid-June, includes the following political scientists: Werner Levi of the University of Minnesota; George Belknap of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan; Harold Engle, graduate student and former instructor at Columbia University; and R. W. Van Wagenen, director of the Center. The other members of the group are a social psychologist, an anthropologist, and a philosopher.

The second annual conference of the American Association for the United Nations was held in Chicago, Feburary 17–19, 1952. Attended by delegates from approximately one hundred national organizations, including educational, agricultural, business, labor, youth, fraternal and women's groups, the conference had as its general theme "United States Responsibility for World Leadership in 1952: A Profession of Faith and a Call to Action." Sessions were held on collective security, disarmament, peaceful settlement of international disputes, technical assistance to underdeveloped areas, and the position of the United States in world affairs. Among the political scientists who participated in the program were: Ralph J. Bunche, director of the United Nations Trusteeship Division; Quincy Wright, professor of international law, University of Chicago; Clyde Eagleton, professor of international law, New York University; and Clarence Berdahl, professor of political science, University of Illinois. The conference was addressed by Senator Blair Moody of Michigan and Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The *Institut fuer Sozialforschung* was formally reopened at the University of Frankfurt on November 14, 1951. It had been forced to suspend its activities in Germany during the *Nazi* regime, and its headquarters were moved to the United States. Reëstablished as an autonomous body affiliated with the University of Frankfurt, it will occupy a new building, the funds for which were made available by the American High Commission, the City of Frankfurt, The Government of Hesse, and private sources. The international aspects of its activities were stressed in the dedication ceremony. The major research projects on which it will be engaged in the immediate future will relate to the intellectual and emotional effects of the *Nazi* period on Germany, German attitudes toward America, and the impact of foreign propaganda on postwar Germany. The director of the *Institut* is Max Horkheimer, professor of philosophy and sociology, and currently rector, of the University of Frankfurt.

A seminar on "Methodology in the Social Sciences" was conducted at the University of Utah during January, February and March, 1952. Opened to faculty members and graduate students in the various social science disciplines, the seminar included faculty members of the departments of anthropology, economics, geography, history, law, philosophy, political science and sociology. The status of methodology was reported on for each of the several disciplines. In addition, papers, followed by discussions, were presented on such topics as "Methodological Positivism" and "Statistical Method in Social Science." The seminar was under the direction of G. Homer Durham of the University of Utah.

Acting in response to a suggestion from a Committee on the Mathematical Training of Social Scientists, the Social Science Research Council is sponsoring a small group to work during the summer of 1952 on the preparation of problem and source material for the mathematical training of social scientists. This group will attempt to compile from the literature of the various social sciences lists of problems, extracts from sources, and references to sources that illustrate varieties of uses of mathematics in the social sciences. Among the ends which are expected to be served by the lists are those of providing mathematicians with material for use in texts and courses designed for social scientists, affording an indication of the general dimensions of the mathematical training appropriate for students of the social sciences now and in the future, and facilitating the study of mathematics by social scientists for whom organized courses are not available.

Composed largely of representatives of professional associations in the social sciences, the Committee on the Mathematical Training of Social Scientists has already been at work for some time. This Committee has made an appeal for suggestions from persons in the various social science disciplines to aid the summer work group. Although the Committee has indicated that it does not wish to limit the suggestions to specific types of material, it has expressed a preference for the placing of greater emphasis on materials relating to the use of mathematics in the social sciences than on materials relating to statistics. The Committee has also indicated that it desires to be informed of places where programs of mathematical training intended for social scientists are now in existence or in process of development, and of places where mathematics at the level of calculus or higher is required for undergraduate or graduate courses in the social sciences or may be substituted for another requirement for a degree in a social science.

If mailed before August 15, information or suggestions intended for the Committee or the summer work group should be sent to Professor William G. Madow, the Committee chairman, Baker Library, Hanover, New Hampshire. After August 15, the address should be the University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

The University of Michigan is sponsoring a special six-weeks summer program on the general subject of political science in the high school curriculum. The program, under the direction of Phillips Bradley of Syracuse University, is designed to aid social studies teachers in high schools. Separate workshops in connection with the program are being conducted by Henry Bretten, Arthur W. Bromage, Samuel J. Eldersveld and Joseph E. Kallenbach, all of the University of Michigan.

The Social Science Research Council is sponsoring a summer faculty seminar at Northwestern University on research and analysis in comparative government. Participants in the seminar include Karl W. Deutsch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harry Eckstein of Harvard University, Kenneth W. Thompson of the University of Chicago, Robert E. Ward of the University of Michigan, and George I. Blanksten of Northwestern University. The seminar is under the immediate direction of Roy Macridis of Northwestern University.

A study of school governmental relations is being conducted at Stanford University under the direction of Robert A. Walker of the department of political science. The study is being conducted under a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, and is a part of the Pacific Southwest Project in School Administrator Education, which is centered in the School of Education at Stanford. Carl F. Stover, who has been serving as a teaching assistant at Stanford, has been appointed as research assistant for the study.

A study of administrative factors influencing technical assistance to underdeveloped areas is being conducted at Stanford University as part of a Stanford program of research in social change, which is being carried forward under a grant from the Ford Foundation. The study is under the direction of Robert A. Walker of Stanford, while Richard F. Crabbs has been appointed as research assistant for the study.

H. Arthur Steiner, professor of political science at the University of California (Los Angeles), delivered a series of three lectures on Chinese communism and American foreign policy at the University of Utah in January, 1952. The lectures were delivered under the auspices of the Institute of Government at the University of Utah.

The Honorable J. Ruben Clark, Jr., former United States undersecretary of state and a member, since 1933, of the First Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, delivered the fourth annual Pi Sigma Alpha lecture at the University of Utah on February 13, 1952. The lecture, entitled "Our Dwindling Sovereignty," was sponsored by the local chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha and the Institute of Government of the University of Utah.

Edward S. Corwin, professor emeritus of Princeton University, lectured during the spring term of 1951–52 at the New School for Social Research and the New York University School of Law on the history of American constitutional interpretation. His audience at New York University comprised the newly arrived group of Root-Tilden scholars.

"Africa and the Modern World" was the topic of a series of five weekly lectures given in Chicago during March and April, 1952, under the joint sponsorship of Northwestern University and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Lecturers for the series were Melville Herskovits, professor of anthropology and director of the African Study Center at Northwestern University; William R. Bascom, associate professor of anthropology; Roland Young, associate professor of political science at Northwestern University and consultant to the United States Atomic Energy Commission; and Charles Fuller, Methodist missionary to Africa.

James Watson, executive director of the National Civil Service League, delivered a series of lectures at Florida State University during the week beginning March 17, 1952. The topics for the lectures were: "The Citizen's View of Civil Service," "Major Public Relations Problems Regarding Civil Service," and "A General Review of the Federal Personnel Administration Picture Today."

George B. Galloway, senior specialist in the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, gave the James Lecture at the University of Illinois, April 3, 1952, on the subject, "Next Steps in Congressional Reform." The James Lecture, in memory of Edmund James, former president of the University of Illinois, is given annually on some aspect of American government.

Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago delivered a series of six lectures under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions at the University of Chicago between March 26 and April 4, 1952. The lectures were on the general topic, "From Political Philosophy to Political Religion."

John H. Hallowell of Duke University delivered a series of six public lectures under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study of American Institutions at the University of Chicago, April 7–18, 1952. The general title of the lectures was "The Moral Foundations of Democracy."

Federal Judge Luther W. Youngdahl, former governor of Minnesota, was the principal speaker for the annual political emphasis week at Macalester College, April 27 to May 3, 1952. A mock national party nominating convention was an additional feature of the program.

Francis W. Coker, professor emeritus of Yale University, was awarded the LL.D. degree at the winter quarter convocation of Ohio State University.

PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL POLITICAL CONVENTIONS IN 1954

At its meeting in San Francisco, August 27, 1951, the Association's Committee on Political Parties adopted a statement recommending that the Democratic and Republican National Conventions decide in 1952 to meet again in 1954. This statement had been prepared by a subcommittee consisting of Clarence A. Berdahl, University of Illinois, chairman; Hugh A. Bone, University of Washington; and Paul T. David, The Brookings Institution.

The statement was issued to the press on October 15, 1951, and was also brought directly to the attention of various political leaders, including President Truman and the chairmen of the two major party National Committees.

At a press conference soon after, President Truman stated that he had the proposal under consideration. On February 26, 1952, in a letter to Congressman Jacob K. Javits, President Truman commented on the problem of maintaining democracy within each party, and then endorsed the proposal for off-year conventions in the following statement: "It also seems to me that it would be an excellent idea to provide for holding National Party Conventions in the off years as well as in the Presidential years. Such a Convention would provide a platform for Congressmen and Senators running in the off years."

Chairman Gabrielson of the Republican National Committee commented on the proposal as follows in a letter to the Association dated October 16, 1951: "I shall be happy to present your proposal on the 1954 Convention to the Committee on Rules of the National Committee when it is appointed and recommend that the committee members give it careful study. I am sure you realize, however, that there are many important factors to be considered in connection with holding a National Convention in other than a presidential election year. Your committee's interest in seeking to promote greater party effectiveness is commendable, and I appreciate receiving your proposals directed toward that objective."

Chairman McKinney of the Democratic National Committee discussed the proposal in a letter dated April 24, 1952, to Senator Hubert Humphrey. He commented in part as follows: "Obviously, there are administrative and technical problems involved in the holding of more frequent national conventions. One of these is the expense of such an undertaking. Yet the plan undoubtedly has much merit."

Senator Estes Kefauver favored the proposal and discussed it at some length in an article in the *New York Times Magazine* of

Sunday, March 16, 1952. He speculated on what would have happened if national conventions had been held in the summer of 1950, and observed:

"Whatever the specific decisions, several major results would have occurred. The conventions would have dramatized the *national* importance of the Congressional elections of 1950. In the Democratic party, there would have been a salutary opportunity to remind all concerned—President, Senators, Representatives, party workers, voters—that unless the Democratic party retained a majority in both Senate and House, it would be unable to organize those bodies and would be right back where it found itself during the famous—or infamous—Eightieth Congress. . . .

"In the case of the Republican party, there would have been an equally salutary demonstration of the fact that an off-year election is a *national* opportunity for the minority party—and not merely an opportunity for local sniping and head-hunting in individual states and districts. Furthermore, the minority party would have been put on notice that to conduct an effective opposition, it needs a national program of its own—needs it just as much in an off-year campaign as in a Presidential election year. . . . While I have no desire to advise the Republican party on how to solve its problems, I think that it might have been able to make itself a more effective and a more useful opposition party if it had been able to elect a new national committee in 1950 to handle firmly the problems of interim leadership. Moreover, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential aspirants in the minority party would have had an opportunity to display their talents in a forum at which Governors, Senators and university presidents would have equal opportunities to speak their minds on public questions."*

The full text of the statement adopted by the Committee on Political Parties at San Francisco is as follows:

"The Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association believes that the Democratic and Republican National Conventions should each decide in 1952 to meet again in 1954. The purpose of the meetings in 1954 would be two-fold: (1) *to bring the party platforms up-to-date for the Congressional election campaigns*, and (2) *to consider in each case how the party can be made a more effective national institution.*

"The proposed meetings in 1954 would be a first step in the direction of the Committee's previous proposal in the Report entitled "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," in which the Committee stated that, in the interest of greater party effectiveness, the conventions should meet at least biennially instead of quadrennially as at present, in order to adopt party platforms and perform other functions as the party governing bodies. The holding of conventions in 1954 would test the idea of off-year conventions and party platforms and would also provide a thoroughgoing opportunity for each of the major parties to consider fundamental problems of its own organization and future.

"*PLATFORMS NEEDED EVERY TWO YEARS.* In recommending national conventions to write party platforms in 1954, it will be apparent that the Committee believes that party platforms are of practical importance. No political process is unimportant that seeks to define and express the principles and program of the major political party. A close reading of political history will demonstrate that many vital decisions have first taken practical form in the evolution of a party platform, even though the execution of the decision was a matter for the future and was necessarily subject to many influences along the way.

"The responsibility of the national conventions for the adoption of party platforms is thus a major responsibility of continuing importance. Platform committees begin their work weeks in advance of the national conventions, public hearings are held on the policies to be incorporated into the platforms, the committees labor for hours over many provisions, and vigorous debate may occur on the floor of the convention itself. The debate and the roll calls at the Democratic National Convention of 1948 on the civil rights question will be long remembered, but many historic battles have been fought on such issues as prohibition, the gold standard, and the League of Nations.

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* By way of a bibliographical note, it may be said that President Truman's letter to Congressman Javits was made public by the latter and can be found in the *New York Times*, March 2, 1952; Chairman Gabrielson's letter, only a part of which is quoted above, is available in the files of the Association; Chairman McKinney's letter was made public by Senator Humphrey, and much of it appeared in the *New York Times* of Sunday, May 4, 1952; Senator Kefauver's article was reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, Appendix, March 28, 1952, in addition to appearing in the *New York Times Magazine.*

"Major limitations of the platforms as expressions of party policy and program arise from the fact that they are prepared only in Presidential election years. *The four-year interval between platforms is too long if a platform is to be considered a realistic statement of party position on current issues for the entire period until another platform is adopted.* The fact that the platform is associated primarily with the Presidential campaign tends to leave an impression that it is morally more binding on the Presidential than the Congressional candidates of the party. Conversely, whatever moral effect a platform may have for the Congressional candidates in a Presidential election year is almost wholly dissipated by the time the next Congressional election year rolls around.

"For all of these reasons, the Committee concluded in its previous report that there is a need for a method of platform-making that is closely related to the Congressional as well as the Presidential campaigns. Such a method should provide sufficient participation on the part of the party members in Congress to give them the feeling that any platform adopted is as much their platform as the Presidential nominee's. The first essential, however, is *to provide for the authoritative adoption of national party platforms in each Congressional election year, thereby making clear the continuing importance of such expressions of party policy and their close relationship to the legislative processes of government.*

"*SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF '54 CONVENTIONS.* Certain difficulties will arise in convening off-year conventions. The Presidential nominating conventions are such large, cumbersome, and expensive affairs that there will be question as to whether so elaborate a mechanism should be assembled for off-year purposes. The size of the national conventions is an obstacle to effective deliberative activity and it also has many other bad consequences. The delegations from many states are so large that individual delegates have little or no feeling of personal responsibility. Often the delegations are unrepresentative, in part because in many cases the delegates must meet their own expenses of participation.

"The Committee has previously suggested that these deficiencies be cured by convening a convention of not more than 500–600 members, composed mostly of delegates elected directly by the party voters on a more representative basis (300–350 members), a substantial number of ex officio members (the National Committee, state party chairmen, congressional leaders—probably about 150 altogether), and a selected group of prominent party leaders outside the party organizations (probably 25).

"The Committee is aware of the reluctance with which any assembly receives suggestions for the reduction of its own size. Various persons have assured the Committee that under no circumstances will a national convention vote to establish rules for future conventions that would markedly curtail the number of delegates.

"*If special rules are impossible, the Committee woule still favor holding the proposed conventions in 1954.* The result of assembling such massive delegate bodies will be to increase the relative importance of the committee work, but not necessarily to prevent the work from being done. Nevertheless, the Committee hopes that it may be possible to adopt special rules for the special national conventions for 1954, without prejudice to any later decisions as to further off-year conventions or to the conventions in 1956, and that in such special rules provision would be made for a delegate body of workable size and representative character to deal with the questions of 1954.

"*POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO BIENNIAL CONVENTIONS.* The proposed 1954 conventions, in dealing with the general question of how each party can be made a more effective national institution, should consider the various means by which the party platforms can be kept up to date in authoritative form. If the biennial convening of national conventions appears to present too many difficulties as a permanent policy, various alternatives could be considered.

"In the case of the party in power, *one alternative is to look to the President for such statements of party policy as may be necessary.* This would have obvious disadvantages, and would not be practical unless the President can be given a much more specific mandate to rewrite the party platform from time to time than has ever been accorded him in the past.

"The national committees represent a further alternative. Until very recently the national committees seldom met between Presidential election years, and they have never been considered effective policy-making bodies. *With some changes in size, composition, and procedure, the committees could perhaps be reconstructed as appropriate bodies to act with full power on all party matters, including the revision* *of the party platform,* in the interim between conventions held only quadrennially. Without drastic changes, however, many observers would be reluctant to entrust the task of writing the off-year platforms to the national committees.

"The suggestion has been made previously by this Committee and by others that, rather than seeking to reorganize the national committees, *a national party council should be created by each major party, of such high quality and representative character that it could carry on platform drafting and interpretation and perform other major policy functions between conventions.* If this proposal were to be accepted, the functions of such a council might be expanded to the point where frequent meetings of the conventions would be unnecessary. On the other hand, it might prove no more difficult to secure change in the composition and functioning of either the existing national committees or the conventions themselves than to establish new organizations that might tend to compete with both the conventions and the committees for the privileges and responsibilities of acting as the supreme governing bodies of the parties.

"It has also been proposed as an alternative to the holding of more frequent national conventions that *the same purposes can be served by regional meetings of the kind that have become popular in both parties in recent years.* This Committee regards the regional conferences as a useful and commendable development. They have apparently had great educational value for all who participated and have increased the ability of the parties to deal effectively with the development of public policy. But the regional conferences hold the potential danger of enhancing the forces of sectionalism, thereby making national policy even more difficult to formulate than would otherwise be the case. And in any case, it is clear that no regional conference or series of them could be put into the position of acting as a supreme governing body with powers comparable to a national convention. It would seem impossible, for example, to adopt new national platforms through any regional conference procedure.

"The speculative character of the discussion just traversed will make it clear why this Committee does not think that any of these alternatives can be adopted for the drafting and enunciation of national party platforms in 1954, if, indeed, they offer any real possibility for later years. *A national convention, duly assembled, is the only unquestioned, authentic, and legitimate voice of a major political party under the present order of things.* If other machinery is to be devised through which the parties can speak with equal authority, careful consideration at a duly constituted convention will be required to produce the necessary plans and take appropriate action. Such consideration would seem difficult if not wholly impossible at the 1952 conventions, and that is why we propose the special conventions in 1954.

"*COMMITTEE'S DETAILED STUDY OF CONVENTIONS.* If the major political parties are to operate effectively as national institutions, they must each have a supreme governing body that is workable as such and that is responsible to the party as a whole. The existing national conventions undoubtedly leave much to be desired from almost any point of view. In our previous report, we referred to them as "unwieldy, unrepresentative and less than responsible in mandate and action." Yet it would seem that the way forward in American political life must be found to a large extent by attacking the heart of the problem: the constitution of the governing bodies of the major parties that compete for the honor and privilege of governing the nation.

"With this in mind, *this Committee expects during the next year to devote intensive attention to the study of all aspects of the conventions and to the completion of a report on convention functioning and procedure.* The Committee solicits the assistance of its fellow political scientists, and will welcome suggestions and information from any quarter.

"*CONVENTIONS IN '54 ESSENTIAL.* Meanwhile, we reiterate the view with which this statement began. We believe that both party conventions should decide in 1952 to meet again in 1954. *With the present pace of world events and the many complexities of the domestic as well as the foreign scene, any platform written in 1952 will require revision in 1954 if it is not to become altogether a dead letter.*

"The parties should meet the need for more effective leadership by undertaking to make clear their own positions as parties with reasonable frequency. In order to do so, the more frequent convening of meetings and conventions will doubtless be necessary; but if such meetings and conventions are to be wholly effective, party organization must be improved, and improved most of all in terms of its ability to cope with national policy problems. Party organization can be improved only by party action; the parties should therefore give the highest possible priority to putting their own houses in order. *A decision to hold conventions again in 1954 is, we believe, the essential first step.*"

COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT ON CONVENTION DELEGATIONS

On March 10, 1952, the American Political Science Association initiated a new cooperative research project that had been under consideration for some months. The project is concerned with the preconvention political campaigns of 1952, with special emphasis upon the processes by which the delegates are selected in the various states, the organization of the state delegations, and their work at the national conventions in Chicago in July.

This project was made possible by a grant from one of the smaller foundations, and the Brookings Institution is also cooperating by making available the services of Dr. Paul T. David as its director. He will be associated with the headquarters staff of the Association on a full-time basis until November, 1952.

An outgrowth of the work of the Association's Committee on Political Parties, the project also reflects the interest of the Association's Committee for the Advancement of Teaching in the production of improved teaching materials. Much of the work of the project will be associated with the teaching activities of the political scientists who are cooperating in the various states. Eventually, it is hoped, the data provided by the project should be useful in the revision of textbooks in American government and political parties.

A major portion of the project will consist of case studies of eight Republican and seven Democratic delegations to the respective national conventions. The Republican delegations selected for case studies are those of the following states: Connecticut, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. The Democratic delegations are those of the following states: California, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Texas. In general, the intention was to select an equal number of delegations from states using the primary system and states using the convention system for selecting delegates, with regional diversification and some recognition of known factors of special interest.

The case studies will be supplemented by shorter reports on most of the other delegations. Over 50 political scientists in 40 states have each agreed to prepare a brief report this spring on how one delegation or the other from his state is being selected, covering local party customs and practices as well as the formal requirements of state law. In addition, several other political scientists have agreed to act as project correspondents in their own states, without undertaking formal reporting obligations.

Finally, plans are being laid for work at Chicago during the actual period of the conventions. Dr. David and his assistant, Mr. Robert V. L. Wright, Jr., will be at Chicago throughout the convention period, and the project staff will maintain a roster of all political scientists who will also be there. Any political scientist who expects to attend either convention as a delegate, alternate, or observer is urged to communicate his plans to the national office of the Association at 1785 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

As of June 10, 1952, the following political scientists were cooperating in the work of the project in the manner indicated:

Alabama: Donald S. Strong, Univ. of Ala., short report on each delegation; Charles E. Cayley, State Teachers Col., Jacksonville, correspondent.

Arizona: Paul Kelso, Univ. of Ariz., short report on Democratic delegation.

Arkansas:

California: David G. Farrelly, Univ. of Calif., L.A., case study of Democratic delegation, with assistance of Charles Clapp, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley; Thomas S. Barclay, Stanford Univ., short report on Republican delegation.

Colorado: Curtis W. Martin, Univ. of Colo., short report on Republican delegation.

Connecticut: Mrs. Mary Trackett Reynolds, Hamden, Conn., case study of Republican delegation; Bernard O. J. Linnevold, Univ. of Conn., short report on Democratic delegation.

Delaware: Paul Dolan, Univ. of Del., short report on each delegation.

Florida: Manning J. Dauer, Univ. of Fla., short report on each delegation; Elston R. Roady, Fla. State Univ., correspondent.

Georgia: Lynwood M. Holland, Emory Univ., case study of Democratic delegation; Merritt B. Pound, Univ. of Ga., short report on Republican delegation.

Idaho: Clifford I. Dobler, Univ. of Idaho, short report on Democratic delegation; Hobart P. Sturm, Idaho State Col., short report on Republican delegation.

Illinois: Clarence A. Berdahl, Univ. of Ill., case study of Democratic delegation; Anthony Birch, Commonwealth Fund Fellow (Univ. of Manchester), Univ. of Chicago, short report on Republican delegation.

Indiana: Paul Willis, Ind. Univ., short report on Democratic delegation; Ferdinand A. Hermens, Univ. of Notre Dame, correspondent.

Iowa: Donald B. Johnson, State Univ. of Iowa, short report on Democratic delegation; John R. Mashek, Iowa State Col., short report on Republican delegation.

Kansas: Walter Butcher, Kans. State Teachers Col., Emporia, short report on Republican delegation; A. D. Miller, Kans. State Col., correspondent; Rhoten A. Smith, Univ. of Kans., correspondent.

Kentucky: J. B. Shannon, Univ. of Ky., short report on each delegation; Louis C. Kesselman, Univ. of Louisville, correspondent.

Louisiana: L. V. Howard, Tulane Univ., case study of Republican delegation.

Maryland: Malcolm Moos, Johns Hopkins Univ., short report on delegation; Franklin L. Burdette, Univ. of Md., correspondent.

Massachusetts: Roy Gootenburg, Harvard Univ., short report on Democratic delegation.

Maine: Herbert H. Wood, Univ. of Maine, short report on each delegation.

Michigan: James W. Miller, Mich. State Col., case study of Democratic delegation, short report on Republican delegation; Samuel J. Eldersveld, Univ. of Mich., correspondent.

Minnesota: Arthur E. Naftalin, Univ. of Minn., short report on each delegation.

Mississippi: James H. McLendon, Miss. State Col., short report on each delegation; Leon A. Wilber, Miss. Southern Col., correspondent.

Missouri: Carl A. McCandless, Washington Univ., short report on Democratic delegation; John W. Schwada, Univ. of Mo., short report on Republican delegation.

Montana: Thomas Payne, Montana State Univ., short report on Republican delegation.

Nebraska: Robert J. Morgan, Univ. of Nebr., case study of Republican delegation.

Nevada: C. C. Smith, Univ. of Nev., short report on Democratic delegation.

New Hampshire: Robert Dishman, Univ. of N. H., short report on each delegation.

New Jersey: Harwood L. Childs, Princeton Univ., correspondent.

New Mexico: Ira G. Clark, N. Mex. Col. of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, short report on Republican delegation; Howard J. McMurray, Univ. of N. Mex., short report on Democratic delegation.

New York: Phillips Bradley, Syracuse Univ., case study of Republican delegation; Mrs. Louise B. Gerrard, Barnard College, case study of Democratic delegation.

North Carolina: William Hays Simpson, Duke Univ., short report on Republican delegation; Preston W. Edsall, N. C. State Col., short report on Democratic delegation.

North Dakota: Melvin P. Straus, N. Dak. Agricultural Col., short report on Democratic delegation; Henry Tomasek, Univ. of N. Dak., short report on Republican delegation.

Ohio: E. Allen Helms, Ohio State Univ., case study of Democratic delegation; J. C. Heinlein, Univ. of Cincinnati, short report on Republican delegation.

Oklahoma: E. Foster Dowell, Okla. A. and M. Col., short report on Republican delegation.

Oregon: Freeman Holmer, Willamette Univ., case study of Republican delegation; Waldo Schumacker, Univ. of Ore., short report on Democratic delegation.

Pennsylvania: G. Edward Janosik, Univ. of Pa., case study of Republican delegation.

Rhode Island: John O. Stitely, Univ. of R. I., short report on Democratic delegation.

South Carolina: Douglas H. Carlisle, Univ. of S. C., short report on Democratic delegation; Charles E. Cauthen, Wofford Col., correspondent; James K. Coleman, The Citadel, correspondent.

South Dakota: T. C. Geary, Univ. of S. Dak., short report on each delegation.

Tennessee: T. W. Goodman, Univ. of Tenn., short report on Republican delegation.

Texas: O. Douglas Weeks, Univ. of Tex., case study of Democratic delegation, short report on Republican delegation.

Utah: M. R. Merrill, Utah State Agricultural Col., short report on Republican delegation; E. E. Weaver, Univ. of Utah, short report on Democratic delegation.

Vermont: Robert S. Babcock, Univ. of Vt., short report on Republican delegation; Oliver Garceau, Bennington Col., correspondent.

Virginia: Spencer D. Albright, Univ. of Richmond, correspondent.

Washington: Hugh A. Bone, Jr., Univ. of Wash., case study of Republican delegation;

Daniel M. Ogden, State Col. of Wash., short report on Democratic delegation.

West Virginia: William R. Ross, W. Va. Univ., short report on Democratic delegation; Paul D. Stewart, Marshall Col., correspondent.

Wisconsin: William H. Young, Univ. of Wis., case study of Republican delegation; William S. Shepherd, Beloit Col., short report on Democratic delegation.

Wyoming: Charles A. Bloomfield, Univ. of Wyo., correspondent.

Alaska:

District of Columbia: W. Rowland Ludden, George Washington Univ., short report on each delegation.

Hawaii: Daniel W. Tuttle, Univ. of Hawaii, short report on each delegation.

Puerto Rico:

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

Pedro E. Abelarde, formerly a member of the staff of the Philippines Delegation to the United Nations, has joined the staff of the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency as economic affairs officer in charge of foreign trade and commerce for Korea.

Spencer D. Albright of the University of Richmond is a visiting professor of political science at Emory University for the summer session of 1952.

Luther A. Allen of the University of Chicago has recently been serving as instructor in the department of political science at the University of Delaware.

Guthrie S. Birkhead of Syracuse University is serving as visiting assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri during the summer session of 1952.

Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., formerly assistant secretary of the United States Department of Commerce, has been appointed director of the Bureau of International Relations, University of California (Berkeley).

Hugh A. Bone of the University of Washington is a visiting professor at Columbia University for the summer quarter of 1952. He was recently appointed as a member of the executive committee of the Washington Committee on State Government Organization.

William E. Briggs has been appointed to an assistant professorship in political science and public administration at American University. He is serving as academic director of the Washington Semester Program, which is administered by the department of political science and public administration of American University.

D. W. Brogan, professor of political science at the University of Cambridge, has been appointed to a Walker-Ames professorship at the University of Washington for the autumn quarter, 1952. While at the University of Washington, he will offer courses in political theory and comparative government.

Richard G. Brown is teaching on a part-time basis in the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Manuel García Calderón of the University of San Marcos, Peru, served during the spring quarter of 1952 as visiting professor at the University of North Carolina, where he offered a course in inter-American international law. He came to the University of North Carolina under the auspices of the United States Department of State and the University's Institute of Latin American Studies.

Gwendolen M. Carter, chairman of the department of government at Smith College, has been advanced to a full professorship at that institution.

Harold Chase is expected to return to his position at the University of Delaware in September, after two years of service with the United States Marines.

Asher N. Christensen of the University of Minnesota is a member of the summer session staff of the Salzburg Seminar on American Studies.

O. B. Conaway, Jr., has resigned as acting director of the Bureau of Public Administration of Boston University to become assistant director of the Graduate School of the United States Department of Agriculture.

Hedley V. Cooke, a foreign service officer of the United States from 1928 to 1946, and, more recently, a member of the Middle East Planning Staff of the Economic Cooperation

Administration, was a visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Alabama during the spring semester of 1952.

Lee C. Corter has been advanced to an assistant professorship at Pennsylvania State College.

Vera Micheles Dean, research director of the Foreign Policy Association, will be a visiting professor of government at Smith College during the academic year 1952–53. Her course offerings will include an interdepartmental course on contemporary India and its role in Asia.

Larry Dennis, formerly instructor in political science and journalism at the State University of Iowa, and more recently special assistant to the United States Commissioner of Education, has joined the editorial writing staff of *The Register and Tribune*, Des Moines, Iowa.

William DeSiero has been serving as lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Bridgeport.

Conley H. Dillon, on leave from his position as head of the department of political science at Marshall College to serve in the Office of Price Stabilization in Washington, D. C., has been promoted to the position of chief, Service Trades Branch, Services, Export-Import Division of the Office of Price Stabilization.

Paul Dolan, associate professor of political science at the University of Delaware, served during the past year as acting chairman of the department of political science at that institution.

Oliver P. Field has been named acting chairman of the department of government at Indiana University to serve until a successor to the late Ford P. Hall, former chairman of the department, is selected.

Julian R. Friedman, recently lecturer in colonial administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science, was lecturer in political science at the University of California (Berkeley) during the spring semester of 1952.

Wilfred C. Gilbert has been serving as acting director of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, during the absence of Ernest S. Griffith.

Leon Godshall, head of the department of international relations at Lehigh University, is a visiting lecturer at West Virginia University for the summer session of 1952.

Alex Gottfried has recently been on leave from his position as assistant professor of political science at the University of Washington for research under a Ford Foundation fellowship.

Ernest S. Griffith has been on leave from his position as director of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, while serving as visiting professor at Oxford University, under a Fulbright grant. His appointment abroad also includes lecture courses at the Universities of Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester, Oslo and Swansea.

Dell G. Hitchner of the University of Washington is a visiting professor at the University of Utah for the first term of the summer quarter of 1952.

Charles S. Hyneman has been appointed as a member of the Civil Service Commission of the Sanitary District of Chicago.

Frank H. Jonas has been granted a second year's leave of absence from the University of Utah to permit him to continue for another year in his assignment in the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany.

Louis G. Kahle, assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri, was appointed as a research fellow for the summer of 1952.

Herbert Kaufman has joined the staff of the department of government of the City College of New York.

Lionel H. Laing of the University of Michigan is a visiting member of the faculty of the University of British Columbia for the summer of 1952.

Harold D. Lasswell, who has been professor of law at Yale University since 1946, has been designated professor of law and political science at that institution. Professor Lasswell and Nathan Leites, lecturer in political science, will offer a one-year graduate course in political behavior.

W. Richard Lomax was on leave from Indiana University during February and March, 1952, for work with the staff of the United States Senate's subcommittee on manpower utilization in the federal government.

Allen McConnell, recently a graduate student at Columbia University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Brown University.

Ellis McCune has been appointed instructor in political science and director of the curriculum in applied politics and economics at Occidental College.

Howard J. McMurray of the University of New Mexico is a visiting professor at the University of Washington for the summer quarter of 1952.

Charles E. Martin of the University of Washington is a visiting professor at the University of Hawaii for the summer of 1952.

Wiley W. Mather, attorney at Upland, California, has been appointed lecturer in American government at Pomona College.

Edward W. Mill, formerly American consul, Surabaya, Indonesia, served as lecturer in political science at the University of California (Berkeley) during the spring semester of 1952.

Eugène H. Miller of Ursinus College served as visiting professor of international relations at Lehigh University during the spring semester of 1952.

G. T. Mitau has been promoted to a professorship in political science at Macalester College and named co-chairman of the department of political science at that institution.

William Mitchell has resigned from his position as associate professor of government at the University of Massachusetts to accept a position in Washington, D. C.

Lewis Nixon is teaching on a part-time basis in the department of political science and public administration at American University.

Edward S. Overman of the University of Virginia served as visiting professor at the University of Alabama and as educational director of the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration during the spring of 1952, in the absence of Albert Lepawsky.

Howard Page is giving a portion of his time to teaching in the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Norman D. Palmer, chairman of the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, will serve as visiting lecturer in political science at the University of Delhi, India, from July, 1952, to April, 1953, under a Fulbright grant.

Roy V. Peel has joined the part-time teaching staff of the department of political science and public administration of American University.

Norman J. Powell has been advanced to an associate professorship at the City College of New York.

Richard Frost Reath is serving as director of the summer session at Occidental College.

Channing B. Richardson, instructor at Columbia University during the past two years, has been appointed assistant professor of government at Hamilton College.

J. W. Robinson is on leave from Whittier College for the summer of 1952, and is engaged in research at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

Charles C. Rohlfing will serve as chairman of the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania during the absence of Norman D. Palmer. Professor Rohlfing has been serving as acting executive director and secretary of the Greater Philadelphia Movement.

Joseph S. Roucek of the University of Bridgeport is a visiting professor of political science at the University of Puerto Rico for the summer session of 1952.

Dorothy Schaffter served as head of the Government Section, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, during the spring of 1952, in the absence of W. Brooke Graves, who was visiting professor in public administration at Florida State University.

Chandler Shaw, head of the department of history and political science at Bethany College, is a visiting lecturer at West Virginia University for the summer session of 1952.

George A. Shipman of the University of Washington has been appointed as a member of the executive committee of the Washington Committee on State Government Organization.

William R. Smyser, foreign service officer (retired), has been appointed lecturer in political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Marvin Tableman, formerly an instructor in political science and a staff member of the Institute of Public Administration at the University of Michigan, has been appointed as administrative assistant to the governor of Michigan.

Richard W. Taylor, instructor in political science at the University of Minnesota, was recently appointed faculty adviser for the program in England of the Minnesota Student Project for Amity Among Nations. He is directing the field work for twenty-one students who are studying in England during the summer of 1952. In addition, he is studying the British government's organization for economic planning, under a research grant from the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota.

John Wahlke of Amherst College taught at the University of Massachusetts on a part-time basis during the spring semester of 1952.

Lawrence C. Wanlass, assistant professor of political science at Mount Holyoke College, taught at the University of Massachusetts on a part-time basis during the spring semester of 1952.

Frederick M. Watkins has resigned as Angus Professor of Political Science at McGill University in order to accept an appointment as professor of political science at Yale University.

James T. Watkins, IV, has been named acting executive head of the department of political science of Stanford University.

E. E. Weaver of the Institute of Government, University of Utah, recently served as educational director for the annual regional training schools conducted by the Utah Association of County Officials. He also conducted the regional training schools sponsored by the Utah Municipal League during the spring quarter of 1952.

Donald H. Webster of the University of Washington has been appointed as a member of the executive committee of the Washington Committee on State Government Organization.

Wah Wong of Columbia University was a visiting member of the political science faculty of the University of Washington during the spring quarter of 1952.

IN MEMORIAM

Jacob Tanger. Jacob Tanger, emeritus professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State College, died suddenly of a heart attack on December 20, 1951, at the age of 71. As a young man he taught for a year at the Carnegie Institute of Technology and for five years at the University of Pennsylvania. Upon receiving his Ph.D. degree from the latter institution, he accepted an instructorship at Penn State, where he remained for thirty years, retiring from active duty in 1946. He served as head of the division of political science at Penn State for a number of years and was named as first head of the department of political science which was established in 1940. Dr. Tanger was an active member of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association and served as its president from 1946 to 1948. He was co-author of a textbook, *Pennsylvania Government, State and Local*, and was editor of *The Constitution of Pennsylvania*. He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth.—R. WALLACE BREWSTER.

John Ely Briggs. John Ely Briggs, professor of political science at the State University of Iowa, died unexpectedly of a heart attack at his home in Iowa City, on February 9, 1952, at the age of sixty-one. Receiving his bachelor's degree at Morningside College in 1913, he attended the State University of Iowa, where he received the A.M. degree in 1914 and the Ph.D. degree in 1916. In 1946, Morningside College conferred the LL.D. degree upon him. For thirty-eight years, with a brief time out for teaching assignments at the University of Colorado and the Ohio State University, he was a member of the department of political science of the State University of Iowa. During this period he came to have a unique influence as the guide, preceptor and well-loved friend of generations of students. At the same time he carried on an extremely heavy and productive program for the State Historical Society of Iowa, including twenty-three years of service as editor of *The Palimpsest* and three years as general editor. While thus engaged he published four books dealing with the history of his native commonwealth and made frequent contributions to professional journals in the field of political science. He was a thorough student of political science and history, and his wide learning in these fields was marked by an enthusiasm for the scholarly quest that was infectious in its quality. All of his students caught something of his engagingly youthful zest for the task at hand. They also caught something of his zeal for good workmanship, for he was a precisionist, bringing to his work as editor, scholar and teacher, the exacting standards of the finished craftsman. This, too, left its mark on those around him, particularly the young graduate students entering the field. Perhaps the chief quality, which drew students to him year after year as though by a magnet, was a certain warm-hearted interest in them as individuals. Quickly sensing that they had found a friend, they brought to him, with the greatest trust, their most closely-held hopes, aspirations, troubles and joys, and were never disappointed. It was this capacity for friendship which made him a great teacher. In the field of political science he worked generously and with good effect on numerous committees and programs of his profession. Active in the affairs of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists from its beginning, he served as president of this organization in 1942. He also served as chairman of the Committee on Regional Societies of the American Political Science Association, and, at the time of his death, was a member of the committee of this Association which administers the Fulbright fellowships.—Francis R. Aumann.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS

THE ANNUAL MEETING

Report of Nominating Committee, 1952

At the coming meeting of the American Political Science Association to be held in Buffalo, the Committee on Nominations (James L. McCamy, Chairman, University of Wisconsin) will propose the following officers for 1952–1953: President-Elect, Ralph J. Bunche (United Nations); Vice-Presidents, Charles Aikin (University of California, Berkeley), Charles McKinley (Reed College), and E. E. Schattschneider (Wesleyan University); members of the Executive Council for two years, Walter H. Bennett (University of Alabama), Hugh A. Bone (University of Washington), Robert A. Dahl (Yale University), David Fellman (University of Wisconsin), Victor Jones (Wesleyan University), Jack W. Peltason (University of Illinois), Emmette S. Redford (University of Texas), and Clinton L. Rossiter (Cornell University).

Notice Concerning Resolutions

The attention of all members of the Association is called to the provision of Article 9 of the Constitution which reads as follows: "All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendation before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting. Notice of this provision shall be given to the members of the Association in advance of the annual meeting." The meeting of the Executive Council of the Association will be held on Monday, August 25. Resolutions for consideration at that time should be in the hands of the Secretary-Treasurer, Edward H. Litchfield, before the day of the meeting. They may be addressed to him at the Executive Office of the Association, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

Program for the Annual Meeting, 1952

Probably no phase of our associational behavior as political scientists receives more continued criticism than the program arranged each year for the annual meeting. The complaints are numerous; the dissatisfaction is apparently widespread; and yet no two persons are ever in agreement about what should be done.

As Program Chairman, I have ventured this year to try a new approach to the task of constructing an annual program. Whether the plan can be made to work, and whether the program will be greeted with any greater degree of favor than past ones, remains to be seen.

The objectives in this year's program are these: (1) to provide some degree of unity and comprehensive coverage in the range of subjects considered; (2) to secure a larger number of participants; and (3) to focus attention upon the general intellectual content of our subject matter specialization. Within limits, too, it has seemed desirable to build the program around the work of the committees which function under the aegis of the Association.

In order to realize these objectives, a plan has been worked out which has these principal features. First, the subject matter interests of political scientists have been divided into a sevenfold classification: (1) political theory, (2) political parties and processes, (3) national government (including constitutional law), (4) state and local government, (5) public administration, (6) comparative government, and (7) international law and relations. Second, one person has been asked to organize the appropriate parts of the program in each of these fields. These seven persons, who collectively make up the Program Committee, are as follows: (1) Walter H. Bennett, University of Alabama, (2) Paul T. David, Brookings Institution, (3) Charles McKinley, Reed College, (4) Charles M. Kneier, University of Illinois, (5) Wallace Sayre, College of the City of New York, (6) Harold Zink, Ohio State University, and (7) John Gange, University of Virginia.

Third, each person organizing a broad segment of the program has been asked to proceed along a common pattern. As a general arrangement, there are expected to be four program sections for each of the seven major fields. In some instances there will be one or two more and in other instances one or two fewer sections. Each section will have a chairman and consider at least one paper. It is hoped that sections will have as many as twenty participants to carry on discussion. Moreover, each section will meet twice in order that every participant will have an opportunity during the two periods to comment on the paper presented or to express his own point of view.

Fourth, the Program Committee is encouraging each chairman to plan his particular section around *one topic selected from a suggested list*: a recent noteworthy contribution to the literature of the field; some recent trends in events which call for scholarly investigation and analysis; some present research activities of interest to the field; or recent developments in research and instructional techniques.

In some fields, notably comparative government, the division of interest among the sections will be geographical. Thus section meetings are being planned on the Far East, Latin America, Western Europe, etc. In other fields, it is expected that the sections will be divided on the basis of anticipated attendance. Thus, in public administration, it is altogether likely that two sections will consider the same topic. The differentiation will consist solely in the different set of participants.

The list of participants will be assembled in two ways. A section chairman is expected to invite some participants for his particular discussion group. In addition, the central office of the Association is circularizing the department chairmen at various colleges and universities to find out who plans to attend the meeting in Buffalo and who wishes to participate in the various sections.

This program arrangement will not prevent persons from wandering about and sampling various discussions. Nor will it eliminate the usual congregating in hotel corridors. But at least it will guarantee a "hard core" of some participants in each section.

The construction of this year's program has run into a number of difficulties. How well these can be surmounted remains to be seen. For one thing, many political scientists have been uncertain whether they were going to Buffalo for the meeting from August 26 to 28. The time and place of the meeting, in combination, present certain obstacles, at least as viewed from the vantage point of those planning the program. In addition, some political scientists are not enthusiastic about helping to work out a program. If the same names and faces appear year after year on the program of our annual meeting, it is consequently easy to understand why. Moreover, the proposed program arrangement does not give too much scope for special hobbies, and for this reason certain enthusiasts for very highly specialized topics of discussion are not happy.

At least this year's annual meeting is launched upon a "noble experiment" in program construction. How satisfactory it may turn out can only be judged after the event.—JOHN D. MILLETT.

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

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